Filing # 63794638 E-Filed 11/06/2017 11:26:27 AM IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA KAILEY EVANS, CASE NO: Plaintiff, v. ARAMIS D. AYALA in her official capacity as STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, Defendant. / COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL COMES NOW Plaintiff KAILEY EVANS ( Plaintiff ), by and through her undersigned counsel, and for her Complaint against Defendant ARAMIS D. AYALA in her official capacity as STATE ATTORNEY FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT ( Defendant ), hereby respectfully alleges as follows: THE PARTIES 1. Plaintiff is a natural person who resides in Orange County, Florida. 2. Defendant is the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit with a principal address of 415 N. Orange Avenue, Orlando, Orange County, Florida 32801. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 3. This is an action arising under the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. 760 et seq. as amended ( FCRA ). 4. This Court has original jurisdiction over this state statutory claim. 1
5. Defendant engages in a regular course of conduct in the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and has allegedly committed acts in the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida in violation of Plaintiff s rights under state law, thereby giving this Court personal jurisdiction over Defendant. 6. Venue is proper in the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida. 7. The amount in controversy exceeds $15,000.00. FCRA STATUTORY PREREQUISITES 8. Plaintiff is an individual person and an aggrieved person as those terms are defined under Fla.Stat. 760.02(6) and (10). 9. Defendant is an employer as that term is defined under Fla.Stat. 760.02(7). 10. Plaintiff timely dual-filed charges of employment discrimination against Defendant with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ( EEOC ) and the Florida Commission on Human Relations ( FCHR ). See Exhibit A. 11. Plaintiff has complied with all other FCRA requirements and all other prerequisites to bringing this lawsuit. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 12. On or around January 6, 2014, Plaintiff began working for Defendant. 13. At all times pertinent to these allegations, Plaintiff was a qualified disabled individual. 14. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from January 6, 2014 to January 2, 2017. 15. Plaintiff was an Assistant State Attorney that worked for Defendant. 16. Plaintiff was subjected to actual or regarded as disability discrimination in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act. 2
17. In late 2015 and 2016, while employed with Defendant, Plaintiff was in an intimate relationship with a co-employee (but higher than her in the office s hierarchy) named Deborah Barra who is now the Chief Assistant State Attorney for Defendant. 18. During the relationship with Barra, Plaintiff revealed private information to Barra about Plaintiff s background which included challenges she faced with anxiety, depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, and an eating disorder. 19. Plaintiff has treated with appropriate health care providers and her symptoms are well managed. 20. The relationship between Plaintiff and Barra ended in or around early July 2016. 21. After the relationship ended, Plaintiff confided in some other co-employees that she had had a relationship with Barra, that it had ended, and that Plaintiff was displeased that Barra s other girlfriend Ashley Oramas had been hired into the office as a victim services advocate. 22. Plaintiff also told her mentor Kelly Hicks, homicide prosecutor, about her relationship with Barra. 23. Hicks is very close personal friends with Barra. 24. Hicks suggested that Plaintiff was crazy and unstable and that she disbelieved that the relationship had occurred. 25. Two days later, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with Tamra Crane, Defendant s Human Resources Director, and Mark Wixtrom, Plaintiff s direct supervisor, during which Crane suggested that Plaintiff was mentally and emotionally unfit for duty and suggested that she go on FMLA leave. 26. Plaintiff responded that she was perfectly fine and that she did not need or want to take any leave period. 3
27. Crane then told Plaintiff that she was required to obtain a fitness for duty certification from her health care provider in order to assure the Defendant that she was medically cleared to work. 28. Although Plaintiff was upset about the request, she complied and her health care provider provided a note that there were no concerns about Plaintiff s ability to function on the job or to function normally. 29. Subsequently, Plaintiff was disciplined ostensibly for talking about the relationship with Barra in the office (even though many other employees talked about their personal relationships in the office and were not disciplined), transferred into another division, and then terminated. 30. Defendant perceived Plaintiff as having a substantial mental impairment and took adverse employment actions against her, including termination, based thereupon. 31. The facts described above constitutes actionable actual or regarded as disability discrimination under state law which conduct is attributable to Defendant. 32. Plaintiff has complied with all prerequisites, statutory or otherwise, to the bringing of this lawsuit. SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS COUNT I FCRA HANDICAP/DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION 33. Plaintiff hereby adopts and incorporates by reference each and every allegation asserted in paragraphs 1-32 hereinabove as if set forth fully and completely herein. 4
34. Defendant has, with malice or reckless indifference, violated the dictates of the FCRA by intentionally discriminating against Plaintiff because of her disability or because it perceived Plaintiff to have a disability. 35. The specific acts of discrimination attributable to Defendant include terminating Plaintiff because of her disability or Defendant s perception that Plaintiff had a disability. 36. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant s acts, Plaintiff has suffered damages, including, but not limited to, lost employment, income, benefits, distress, humiliation, and embarrassment. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court award Plaintiff such damages as Plaintiff has sustained and as shall appear proper within the provisions of the FCRA, including, but not limited to, back pay, front pay, economic and non-economic compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney s fees, court costs, interest, and all other relief that this Court may deem just and proper. herein. JURY DEMAND 37. Plaintiff demands and is entitled to a trial by jury as to all issues and claims set forth DATED this 6 th day of November 2017. HOLLIFIELD LEGAL CENTRE By: /s/ Travis R. Hollifield Travis R. Hollifield Florida Bar No.: 0094420 147 E. Lyman Avenue Suite C Winter Park, Florida 32789 Telephone: (407) 599-9590 Facsimile: (407) 599-9591 Primary E-mail: trh@trhlaw.com Secondary E-mail: rf@trhlaw.com ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 5
Exhibit A