After the Fukushima dust settled: Shifts in nuclear energy policy in Germany. Sara van Hoeve

After the Fukushima dust settled: Shifts in nuclear energy policy in Germany Sara van Hoeve Radboud University Nijmegen saravanhoeve@gmail.com Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference, 26-29 August 2015, Montréal Work in progress! Please do not quote without the author s permission Abstract: After the nuclear disaster of Fukushima in March 2011, the German policy on nuclear power shifted radically. While Angela Merkel's government had originally reversed the planned nuclear phase out only half a year before the accident, following the event, the original phase out term was reintroduced. The dramatic character of the Fukushima accident seems a likely reason for this sudden policy shift in Germany. However, in many other countries (e.g. Belgium and France) we have only witnessed minor reactions and no such policy change following the incident. To understand the radical policy shift and the role of ideas and discourse in the German case and to determine whether or not the Fukushima incident was indeed the major cause this paper will qualitatively investigate the dominant frames used by important actors in the debate. 1

Introduction A week after the earthquake in Japan and the following nuclear accident in Fukushima in March 2011, Germany radically changed its nuclear energy policy. The initial phase-out of nuclear power plants the Atomausstieg announced by the red-green alliance of Gerhard Schröder, entered into force in 2002. Angela Merkel reversed this decision and extended the term in September 2010, just some months before the nuclear accident in Japan. After the accident in Fukushima the term extension was cancelled and the German nuclear energy policy took a second radical turn within a year. Such radical changes in policy, twice within a short time period, are not to be expected in Germany. Germany has many veto-players in the policy process. Policy is expected to change slowly in countries characterized as a compound polity like Germany. Also the institutional context did not change in between the two shifts. The essential government actors are the same. When Fukushima caused a change in policy, we would expect to see this in other countries too. Remarkably this reaction is only seen in Germany, Japan and Switzerland. 1 The two shifts in nuclear policy in a short time in Germany call for an explanation and the existing literature does not give a satisfying full explanation yet on why the policy changed. This is because of the perspective (Jahn & Koralczuk, 2012; Wittneben, 2012), the exclusion of important actors or the public level (Shim, Park & Wildung, 2015) and the time frame investigated: or only after Fukushima (Haunss, Dietz & Nullmeier, 2013), or only two points in time (Shim, Park & Wildung, 2015), which does not cover for the discursive interaction of a policy process. This paper will seek for a deeper explanation of the policy shifts, investigating from the time the first turn is debated (autumn 2010) until the final decision of the Atomausstieg (June 2011). To take into account the institutional context, and also take ideas and discourse serious, the discursive institutionalist approach is chosen. This paper attempts to show that the policy shift was caused by ideas and discourse, using a discursive institutionalist approach introduced by Vivien Schmidt (2008). This approach gives the opportunity to explain the policy change. New institutionalist approaches take the institutional context into account when explaining policy. Institutions are defined not just by formal organizations, but also recognized as informal patterns of structured interaction (add ref). However, the new institutionalist approaches are limited to explaining static policy situations. They treat institutions as 1 This study will analyze in depth the German case and will not be a comparative study. 2

given and external to the actors. Acting is constrained and follows a rule-logic (Schmidt, 2008, p. 314). As a result, new institutionalisms are less capable to explain actual institutional change. Discursive institutionalism takes a more dynamic view of change by putting ideas into their meaning context and seeing discourse as following a logic of communication. DI scholars have in common that they take ideas and discourse seriously. In the case of nuclear policy change in Germany this approach will give the opportunity to look at the interactive process between actors around the time of the policy shifts. Various actors can be included, to get a sufficient overview of the discursive debate. This paper examines the influence of ideas and discourse in the case of the radical German policy shift on nuclear energy Therefore the dominant frames in nuclear energy around the policy shifts in Germany will be analyzed. This is done to reveal the interactive discursive process around the time of the policy shifts. Therefore various documents such as press releases and press conferences from between autumn 2010 and summer 2011 are analyzed. The discourse is categorized in various arguments for and against term extension within four frames of nuclear safety, energy security, clean energy and the meta-issue of economic growth. This paper will contribute to our understanding of the radical policy shift in the specific case of Germany nuclear policy, and the influence of the disaster of Fukushima on German policy. It will add to our knowledge of the influence of ideas and discourse in the German institutional setting and how external shocks like the disaster of Fukushima can influence the domestic policy discourse. Shifts in Germany nuclear energy policy Timetable Appendix A Research overview Research on the remarkable German nuclear policy turns has found several explanations for the shifts. The Fukushima accident seems to be the turning point, however in other countries we do not see such a policy shift. This leaves the interesting question what caused the turn in Germany. Party political approaches (Jahn & Korolczuk, 2012; Wittneben, 2012) for example explain the policy shift as the result of the pressure of regional elections, two weeks after the Fukushima accident in two (of 16) German Länder (Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz). In this approach the turn would be an attempt to win votes. The national political response should therefore have positive impact on the regional election outcome for the CDU and the elections should matter for 3

the national level. This explanation is not satisfying, because the CDU was already performing bad in the polls before the accident in Fukushima 2. The party based approach is thus not satisfying and can only partly explain the policy shifts. Also the history of nuclear protest in Germany is seen as an explanation for the response to Fukushima, compared to other countries with a weaker nuclear identity. However, the ruling party of chancellor Angela Merkel, CDU/CSU, had a different history and identity, being supporters of nuclear energy. This was strengthened by the term extension of nuclear power plants under Merkel in autumn 2010, against the phase-out planned in 2002 by former chancellor Schröder in the redgreen alliance. After this turn, political actors as the chancellor and Bundesregierung stayed in their positions. Because the anti-nuclear sentiments were not present at government level, this should mean that the dominant view within the government parties has changed before the policy turned. To investigate the influence of the several actors with different ideas on nuclear policy in Germany, Haunss, Dietz & Nullmeier (2013) conducted a network analysis from the moment of the accident in March 2011, until the final decision to phase-out nuclear power in July 2011. They took a discursive analytical perspective to explain the radical policy shift. This approach takes several important actors into account in showing the changing discourse over time. Unfortunately, it does not take into account the discourse before the earthquake in Japan or around the time of the first turn in nuclear policy. To understand why the policy changed, it is important to trace the changes in the policy process of nuclear energy and take into account the process around the first turn until Fukushima and afterwards. Therefore this research cannot give a full explanation for the radical policy shifts. Also Shim, Park, and Wilding (2015) conduct a networks analysis to investigate nuclear policy frames, comparing six countries including Germany. They look at two points in time, before and after Fukushima and can therefore see whether the frame has changed. They derive the frames from discourse of top-level decision makers. They encourage further studies to make a more detailed analysis that take into account other actors that could influence the nuclear energy policy and discourse such an media and nongovernmental organizations. A closer in detail analysis within one country will contribute to our understanding of ideas and discourse. The focus on German nuclear energy discourse, between top-level policy makers and within other nongovernmental organizations help get a more complete explanation of the policy shifts in Germany. 2 The CDU was already unpopular in Baden-Württemberg by a multibillion euro affair around the railway station project in Stuttgart (Pidd, 2011). 4

The two remarkable shifts in nuclear policy in a short time in Germany call for an explanation which the existing literature does not fully offer yet. Existing views only investigates the time after Fukushima, does not include important public actors or view the puzzle from a narrow perspective, which result in only partly explanations. This study will seek for a deeper explanation of the policy shifts looking at the ideas and discourse around the policy process. Following the discursive institutionalist approach introduced by Vivien Schmidt (2008) it will take into account the institutional context and take ideas and discursive interaction among policy stakeholders and influential societal actors into account. To trace the process of change the discourse will be examined before the first turn in autumn 2010 until the decision to reintroduce the original phase-out term in July 2011. Discursive institutionalism This paper uses a discursive institutionalist (DI) approach introduced by Vivien Schmidt (2008) in an attempt to explain why and how the nuclear phase out policy in Germany developed. It will trace the interactive discursive process of deliberation and discussion of ideas and discourse on nuclear policy. This approach takes into account the content of the ideas in the debate as well as the agency in the dynamics of institutional change (to whom is the debate directed, about what, when, how and why?). The DI approach has a broad understanding of institutions and not only acknowledges it in the formal way (for example parliaments and executives), but as in an informal way looking at structured patterns of interaction between actors (add ref). New institutionalist approaches acknowledge the importance of institutional factors in politics and policy and exist in various forms with different underlying assumptions. The institutional context channels the behavior of policy actors shaped by path dependency (historical institutionalism), cost benefit calculation (rational choice institutionalism) or norms based reasoning (sociological institutionalism). Discursive institutionalism is the fourth new institutionalist approach and differs in the sense that it takes ideas and discourse serious. Actors follow a logic of coordination and communication (Schmidt. 2008, p 314). This fits well within the ideational turn in Political Science where the role of ideas such as paradigms, frames, norms and identities is investigated explaining policies, preferences and interests (add ref). New institutionalist approaches have a bias towards continuity (Schmidt, 2008). They tend to take a sharp distinction between long periods of institutional stasis, interrupted by moments of exogenous shocks that open things up (Streeck & Theelen, 2005, p. 1). This makes the older new institutionalist approaches 5

less capable of explaining change and more focused towards explaining continuities. Forms of gradual change are already described by Streeck & Theelen (2005, p 4). It is exactly these times of changes that DI attempts to explain, by looking at the discourse and ideas in the policy process. DI takes a more dynamic view of change, looking at the discursive interaction between stakeholders in the political and policy sphere. The structure of actors ideas (what, where, when, how and why) is important, as well as the agents of ideas (by whom and to whom). Schmidt (2008) distinguishes two different, but interwoven spheres in the process of policy construction with different logics. In the policy sphere individuals and groups at the center of policy construction seek agreement among themselves, by a logic of coordinative discourse. The policy ideas and programs developed in the coordinative discourse are communicated to the public in the political sphere. Government, political leaders, activists et cetera are involved in the communicative discourse of deliberation and presentation to the general public. When tracing the discourse of the policy domain, we will expect a change of policy occurring with a change in discourse and ideas at positions necessary for changing policy. To see how this happened, and why ideas and policy change, the interaction between several actors is studied. Ideas and discourse can change in different ways. Schmidt (2008: p 306) distinguishes between cognitive and normative ideas. Cognitive ideas guide in problem definition and provide and justify policy solutions. Normative ideas are about the appropriateness of policy and legitimation of actions. Ideas and discourse can be used strategically, in order to legitimate ones preferences, to persuade the opponents, or because the ideas and discourse are internalized by policy actors and conviction of their ideas. When policy is changing, we will see a move in the discourse. This can be in the justification or legitimation, the (strategic) use and direction of ideas or the content of ideas and discourse. The given institutional setting influences political actions and thought in a certain direction. The setting influence the connection and power of both discourses. Both top-down policy ideas from the coordinative discourse are communicated to the people and bottom-up public actors trying to influence to coordinative discourse interaction is possible in the process of policy construction. Tracing the discourse in the interaction during times of change, like the shifts in German nuclear policy, may help understand why some ideas have succeeded and others failed. We need to look at the ideas and discourse around this shift within their meaning context. Therefore the institutional context of nuclear policy making in Germany will be described below. 6

Institutional context of German nuclear policy The institutional context in Germany is characterized by the federal structure of the country. Political powers are dispersed among multi-levels. The Bundesrepublik and Länder each have their own policy domains and decision power, many domains need the consent of both the layers. Representatives of the Länder are united in the Bundesrat, and have a vote in some of the legislation process on the national level. Where in many cases a majority of the Bundesrat is a necessity, nuclear policy is an exception. Approval of the Bundestag is sufficient for new or changing legislation concerning nuclear energy and power plants (M. G. Schmidt, 2011, p. 190). The decision to extend the phase out term of nuclear power plants was approved only by the Bundestag. However the turn, in the summer of 2011, when the term extension was cancelled was made with the consent of the Bundesrat as well. This means that the first decision was made by the government parties alone, without veto players (as described Tsebelis, 2002) and the second decision had the agreement of the Bundesrat. Because of the various players at different levels in German policy making, veto players are present at several positions. Cooperation is important among policy makers at different positions in Bundesrepublik and Länder, and between Bundesrat and Bundestag. This marks Germany as compound polity. Therefore Schmidt (2008, p. 313 ) expects a more coordinative discourse in Germany. This means the discourse between policy makers is more important than the communicative discourse to the public. In the case of the nuclear phase out, there are less policy levels involved. Whether this would also mean that the coordinative discourse is less important compared to other policy fields would be an interesting side question, that can possibly be answered by the analysis in this study. The government of Germany at the time of both decision was led by Angela Merkel, Bundeskanzler and representative of the Christian democratic unionparty CDU/CSU. Her party formed a coalition government together with the FDP after the Bundestagwahl in 2009. This second Merkel cabinet succeeded a grand coalition of the SPD and the Unionsparties also led by Merkel. After 2009 the SPD took place in the opposition together with Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Die Linke. The leading ministry in the nuclear energy policy is the Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit, led by the CDU-minister Norbert Röttgen. The ministry developed in context of highly discussed environmental and nuclear safety issues during the 1970s and 1980s. In 2010 Germany had seventeen active nuclear power plants, accountable for about a fifth of the energy supply. Also involved is the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, led by the 7

FDP minister Rainer Brüderle and succeeded by his party colleague Philipp Rösler in May 2011. This ministry is responsible for the energy supply, and therefore involved in the Atomausstieg and Energiewende. The energy and environmental policy of Germany is, when compared to other countries, progressive. Apart from policy actors, several non-governmental organizations and energy companies are part of the nuclear energy debate. The anti-nuclear organizations are well developed, as Germany knows a broad history for nuclear protest. The connections between the energy and environmental lobby and the German politics are widespread (Sühlsen & Hisschemöller: 2014). Involved are power plant manufacturer Siemens and the big four nuclear companies E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall. Their influence is also visible in the Förderfondsvertrag, where government and companies agree on the term extension. Organizations like ausgestrahlt, Robin Wood and Greenpeace are part of the anti-nuclear lobby. The policy and lobby actors interacted around the decisions concerning term extension and nuclear phase out. With the changing policy it is expected to see a shift in discourse. The disastrous consequences of the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe could have had its impact on the nuclear policy discourse in Germany. This could have changed the content of the discourse, the justification (cognitive ideas) or legitimation (normative ideas) of the policy and the coordination or communication of policy around nuclear energy in Germany. To identify the discursive process a frame analysis will be conducted. Methodology To investigate the role of ideas and discourse in explaining the German change in nuclear policy, this paper will conduct a frame analysis. Thereby the content of ideas, as well as the dynamics of institutional change will be taken into account within the described institutional context of German nuclear energy policy. This requires tracing the interactive discursive processes of deliberation and decision-making between policy and non-governmental actors, their positions and changes over time. This will reveal the discursive struggles and interaction between actors and the influence on the policy outcome. Frames refer to a process where actors develop particular conceptualizations of certain policy topics (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Actors frames can be conscious and unconscious, used strategically or by persuasion of appropriateness. Frames define problems in a certain way, highlighting bits of information and leaving other bits out (Entman, 1993). 8

A documentary analysis will provide the basis for the frame analysis, in order to map actors ideas and interactive discourse on nuclear energy policy in Germany. These documents will include press releases of the government, ministries and non-governmental actors, debates, election programs and press conferences. In these documents use of frames by different actors, throughout time will be searched. The content, as well as the form and type of argument will be examined. Also the distinction between coordinative and communicative discourse will be taken into account. Nuclear energy policy frames Framing of nuclear energy policy has already been investigated by for example Yun (2012) and Shim, Park & Wilding (2015). Yun distinguishes a twofold frame: cost versus benefits of nuclear power. Several indicators of both frames are mentioned, for example climate mitigation and economic feasibility versus radioactive waste disposal and nuclear power plant meltdowns. Shim, Park & Wildung (2015) discern three major frames of energy security, clean energy, and nuclear safety, together with the meta-issue of economic growth. In total they identify 14 policy arguments, accompanying the policy frames, in the six countries they investigate. The approach of Shim, Park & Wildung seems to fit the DI approach, taking content into account in deliberating policy arguments. Interestingly both cost and benefit indicators fit within each individual frame. Therefore a combination the frames recognized by Yun (2012) and Shim, Park & Wildung (2015) is used as a guideline in this frame analysis. Additionally several policy arguments applicable on the German case will be inductively recognized during the analysis (see Table 1). In the German case the term extension (Laufzeitverlängerung) is the discussed policy before and after the disaster in Fukushima. Within each of the frames there are arguments for and against the term extension. The arguments used are influenced by the world views of actors, especially the appropriateness of the policy concerning the safety of nuclear power plants. Actors agree on the fact that nuclear power plants have certain risks. However, German safety standards are very high. The risks concerned with nuclear power plants are negligible. Opponents think the risk is minor but since the consequences are enormous, accepting the risks is not appropriate. Also there is debate on the security of energy supply and whether Germany is, or should not be dependent on nuclear energy. The clean energy frame has two sides. Nuclear energy is almost CO2 neutral. It is seen, by the German government, as a bridging technology towards renewable energy (Energiewende). However 9

others state that the use of nuclear energy hinders the expansion of the network for renewable energy distribution and the development of technologies. Frame Energy security Clean energy Nuclear safety Economic growth (metaissue) Explanation Meeting growing energy Mitigation of climate Risks and safety of Sustaining needs change nuclear power economic development Pro term Stable energy supply Bridging technology Risks are negligible: Export of nuclear extension High safety standards in technology Germany Relatively cheap energy Nuclear energy is almost CO2-neutral Risk at natural disaster in Germany is minor Economic feasibility High energy security Taxes on nuclear energy Jobs will finance the Energiewende Against term extension Moratorium Germany s energy CO2 neutrality is not in Technical risks: nuclear supply should not be complete consideration power meltdown, dependent on nuclear energy radiation leaks Germany s energy Nuclear energy hinders Problems related to supply should be development of radioactive waste disposal renewable renewable energy supply and management External risks: natural disaster and terrorism Buying nuclear energy As fast as possible to Reconsider the risks of from other countries is renewable energy nuclear power not a solution Japan also has high safety standards, so it can happen in Germany too Table 1. Frames of nuclear energy policy in Germany (based on Yun (2012) and Shim, Park & Wildung (2015) Actors investigated will be policy and non-governmental actors participating in the debate around nuclear policy in Germany. The analysis will start in 2010, when the new policy on Laufzeitverlängerung (term extension) was implemented by CDU/CSU and FDP, although the red-green alliance of 10

Gerhard Schröder had realized an agreement on Atomausstieg by 2022. In March 2011 the Fukushima disaster took place, and in May 2011 the final decision to phase out nuclear energy has been made. The analysis will therefore be conducted over a period of approximately one year, from 2010 until summer 2011. Within the selected documents, arguments for and against term extension and nuclear energy will be analyzed, and categorized within the acknowledged frames. Thereby the direction of the ideas, to whom, what, where and how, will be considered as well as the context of the time. Also the distinction between normative and cognitive ideas, and communicative and coordinative discourse will be taken into account.. Analysis (provisional) As explained in the method chapter the four frames can be used for and against the nuclear term extension. The different analyzed actors have a clear starting point in their opinion about the term extension. The (provisional) results are shown in Appendix B. Startpoints of view The anti-nuclear movements as ausgestrahlt and Robin Wood are against the term extension. The main argumentation they use is within the frame of nuclear safety. Also they are concerned about the development of renewable energy, which is, they argue, hindered by the use of nuclear energy. The big four energy companies, united in the Deutsche Atomforum, are for the term extension. They emphasis the need of nuclear power for a secure energy supply and economic growth in Germany. Also, the point at the safety standards in the power plants, which are the most safe in the world. The government decided in the autumn of 2010 to extent the term of nuclear power plants. They argue for the term extension. The dominant argument in their discourse is the view of nuclear energy as a bridging technology. This fits within the frames of energy security and clean energy. Nuclear power is still needed for a secure energy supply for two reasons. The network to distribute green energy over the German electricity network is not yet developed. Also the supply of renewable energy is not enough yet to satisfy the energy demand in Germany. To prevent the purchase of (more expensive) energy from abroad, nuclear energy is still needed until the renewable energy network and capacity are sufficiently developed. The nuclear safety frame is used to emphasis the 11

high security standard of German nuclear power plants. The technology is of a high standard and therefore there is no need to worry. Influence of Fukushima The disaster in Fukushima had consequences for the discourse on nuclear energy in Germany. Since the government set out a moratorium to consider the nuclear energy policy, a new discussion developed. Policy options are to exit nuclear power immediately, keep the term extension, or move out of nuclear energy faster than planned. The anti-nuclear organizations stay with their original position, to exit nuclear power sooner rather than later and switch to renewable energy. They stay within the discourse of nuclear safety, and emphasis more than before the Fukushima accident the risks of uncontrollable external factors as natural disasters and terrorism. The four big energy companies react differently. The Deutsche Atomforum declares the high safety standards of the nuclear power plants. E.ON and EnBW report to the press after the accident, interestingly Vattenfall has no reports at all for a while after Fukushima. 3 The German government declares soon after the accident that German nuclear power plants are of the highest safety standards and there is no need to worry. However, on March 14, the government sets out a moratorium to reassess the risks of nuclear power. This reconsideration of the acceptable risk becomes the dominant frame in the discourse of governmental actors. The residual risk was accepted as part of nuclear power and was seen as so small and improbable that it was appropriate to take. The argumentation of the government after the disaster in Fukushima has become normative. Their understanding of risk has changed. The safety of nuclear power plants is reconsidered and checked. The government still argues that nuclear power is a bridging technology and that Germany cannot yet have a secure energy supply without nuclear power. However, the dominant discourse is more within the nuclear safety frame, emphasizing the priority of safety. Also an important new feature of the discourse is the comparison to Japan. The recognition of Japan, as a high developed country, with high safety standards for nuclear power plants, seems to affect the idea of risk. Even though earthquakes like the one in Japan are not to be in expected in Germany, the risks of natural disaster needs to be reconsidered. The fact that it went wrong in Japan, despite the high safety standards, makes that the governmental actors in Germany also have more doubt about the German safety standards and the completeness of the risk assessment. 3 RWE AG has no data available before 2012. 12

Conclusion (provisional) - Institutional context stays the same before and after Fukushima in Germany - Discourse and positions of non-governmental organization (anti-nuclear movements and big four energy companies) does not change much - Discourse of the German government shifts partly o Nuclear energy still a bridging technology, but looking for ways to do it faster o Risks are reconsidered o The appropriate risk is smaller than before o High safety standards are also in Japan, so Germany risk assessment might also not be complete 13

References (not complete) Chong, D. & Druckman, J.N. (2007) Framing Theory. Annual Review of Political Science, 10 (1), 103-126 Entman, R.M. (1993). Framing Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. Journal of Communication. 43 (4), 51-58 Jahn, D., & Koralczuk, S. (2012). German exceptionalism: the end of nuclear energy in Germany! Environmental Politics, 21(1), 159-164. Pidd, H. (2011). German Greens hail state victory in vote overshadowed by Fukushima. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/27/german-green-victoryfukushima Schmidt, V.A. (2008) Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourse. Annual Review of Political Science. 11 (1), 303-326. Schmidt, M.G. (2011) Das Politische System Deutschlands (2ed). München: Verlag C.H. Beck. Shim, J., Park, C., & Wildung, M. (2015) Identifying policy frames through semantic network analysis: an examination of nuclear energy policy across six countries. Policy Sciences, 48 (1), 51-83 Wittneben, B. B. F. (2012). The impact of the Fukushima nuclear accident on European energy policy. Environmental Science & Policy, 15(1), 1-3. Yun, S. (2012) Nuclear power for climate mitigation? Contesting frames in Korean newspapers. Asia Eur J 10, 57-73. To be continued 14

Appendix A: Timetable policy of nuclear energy (based on Hauns, Dietz & Nullmeier 2013) Date Event 22.04.2002 Bundestag decision to phase-out nuclear energy until 2022 06.09.2010 Signing of the treaty for a term extension between government and energy industry 28.09.2010 Decision of the federal government on a new energy concept (including a term extension) 08.12.2010 Bundestag decision to create an energy and climate fonds by 1.1.2012 11.03.2011 Nuclear accident in Fukushima 14.03.2011 Chancellor Merkel announces the nuclear energy moratorium I: a three month temporary suspension of the term extension for nuclear power plants 15.03.2011 Chancellor Merkel announces the nuclear energy moratorium II: shut-down of the eight oldest nuclear power plants during the moratorium (until 15.06.2011) 22.03.2011 Establishent of the Ethics Commission for a Safe Energy Supply by chancellor Merkel 17.05.2011 Publication of the final report of the Nuclear Safety Commission 30.05.2011 Government decision to phase out nuclear power, and permanent shutdown of the eight oldest nuclear power plants 30.06.2011 Bundestag decision to anchor the nuclear phaseout in the Atomic Energy Act 15

Appendix B: provisional results of frame analysis Actor Date Energy security Clean energy Nuclear safety Economic growth pro contra pro contra pro rethink contra pro contra bundesregierung 02.09.2010 2 2 1 bundesregierung 06.09.2010 4 4 2 1 bundesregierung 06.09.2010 1 1 bundesregierung 10.09.2010 1 2 1 1 bundesregierung 28.09.2010 4 4 1 bundesregierung 12.03.2011 3 5 bundesregierung 13.03.2011 5 bundesregierung 14.03.2011 1 3 2 bundesregierung 14.03.2011 3 4 I 4 7 bundesregierung 15.03.2011 II 2 bundesregierung 15.03.2011 II II 6 1 bundesregierung 17.03.2011 2 1 2 bundesregierung 18.03.2011 1 1 5 bundesregierung 20.03.2011 3 bundesregierung 12.05.2011 3 6 2 1 bundesregierung 17.05.2011 1 4 2 bundesregierung 08.06.2011 1 2 2 bundesregierung 08.06.2011 2 Deutsche 31.03.2010 1 Atomforum e.v. Deutsche 13.08.2010 1 Atomforum e.v. Deutsche Atomforum e.v. 17.01.2011 1 2 Deutsche 12.03.2011 1 Atomforum e.v. Deutsche 17.05.2011 2 1 1 1 Atomforum e.v. EnBW 15.03.2011 Vattenfall 06.09.2010 1 1 1 2 Robin Wood 01.03.2010 4 3 2 Robin Wood 16.09.2010 1 4 Robin Wood 24.01.2011 4 Robin Wood 01.06.2011 3 Ausgestrahlt 20.01.2011 Ausgestrahlt 16.03.2011 2 Ausgestrahlt 05.04.2011 2 1 16