Securitizing, Economizing, and Humanizing Immigration: The Case of the Employment Permit System in South Korea Sookyung Kim*; Jeong-Woo Koo** June 2015 * Sookyung Kim (kimsk@alumni.stanford.edu) is research professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at Korea University. She received her Ph.D. in sociology from Stanford University. Her publications have appeared in Mobilization, Discourse and Society, and Asian and Pacific Migration Journal. Her research interests lie in international migration, globalization, national identity, and political sociology. ** Jeong-Woo Koo (jkoo@skku.edu) is associate professor of Sociology at Sungkyunkwan University. He received his Ph.D. in sociology from Stanford University. His publications have appeared in Social Forces, Sociology of Education, International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Comparative Education Review, Human Rights Quarterly, and Social Science History. His interests include comparative-historical sociology, global and transnational sociology, human rights, and development. 1
Background Immigration poses a dilemma for host states. Embracing international migrants contributes to economic prosperity and the national reputation as a guardian of human rights, but simultaneously triggers security concerns. How can a migrant-receiving state address this dilemma? Using the case of the Employment Permit System (EPS) in South Korea, this paper examines how a nation-state optimizes its policies on migrants to satisfy competing demands for security, economic prosperity, and human rights simultaneously. We maintain that while the EPS is considered the fruit of civic engagement and a victory for human rights (Kim 2003, 2005; Chung 2010; Lee and Park 2005; Lim 2003), analyzing the detailed provision of the system reveals that political calculations in economic terms and security concerns were still dominant rationales that guided the law-making process. Furthermore, we argue that the Korean government s efforts to simultaneously respond to contradictory requirements resulted in a decoupled policy structure: i.e., the maintenance of gaps between incorporating global norms and pursuing national interests. To understand how the contents of the EPS were decided, we scrutinize and uncover the process of negotiating among various actors in drafting and introducing the EPS. Particular attention will be paid to how different actors mobilized political rationales of security, economy, and human rights and how the government balances these competing concerns. Undoubtedly, the influx of migrants sparks concerns over national security. Migrants are often perceived as a political threat to the regime of the host society. On the other hand, to respond to pressures from domestic businesses, states often put forward an argument on the economization of migration that recognizes the urgent need to rejuvenate national economies in stagnation (Buonfino 2004). The economization argument frames migrants as an economic resource that can be mobilized for national interests. While constrained by domestic economic and political interests, immigration policy of a given society is also highly influenced by global actors. The worldwide human rights regime, represented by the United Nations system replete with a variety of programs addressing numerous human rights issues, puts pressure on nation-states to make their policy decisions more attuned to global norms and values, which leads to greater openness to migrants. However, local practices are often decoupled from these global norms, as they are highly idealized and in many cases impossible to actualize (Strang and Meyer 1993). Decoupling is a stable solution for organizations to deal with competing pressures, with the creation and maintenance of gaps between symbolic endorsements and actual practices (Meyer and Rowan 1977). For example, the Korean government simultaneously addresses concerns about security, economy, and human rights by rhetorically incorporate global norms and practically pursue national interests. Few studies use the concept of decoupling for the analysis of the immigration phenomenon (Boswell 2008), but this concept has critical implications in understanding how a nation-state responds to the complicated challenges posed by immigration. Policy Analysis No Policy Period: Security Emphasized In the 1980s, the Korean economy was suffering from labor shortages specifically in the production-related and construction sectors. Against this backdrop, employers associations filed a series of petitions that prompted the government to import a foreign labor force (Donga-ilbo 1989, 1990a; Seoul-sinmun 1990). However, the government, specifically the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Justice, was firmly opposed to this idea for two reasons: in economic terms, an influx of cheap labor causes serious unemployment for domestic workers, and in social terms, it disrupts social order and security (Donga-ilbo 1990b, 1990c, 1990d; 2
Park 1990; Segye-ilbo 1990). The point to reiterate is that cultural and ethnic issues were at the core of these concerns. In July 1990, the Korea Electronic Industries Cooperative suggested bringing lai Daihan, Vietnamese who were fathered and usually abandoned by Korean soldiers during the Vietnam War, and employing them in the unskilled job sectors. The argument went that they [Viet-Korean lai Daihan] are certainly Koreans, sharing the same bloodline with us [Koreans], and thus their influx would not cause any problems as long as their length of stay is well regulated (Seoul-sinmun 1990). The industries preference for co-ethnic migrants reflects the government s concern that importing a labor force disrupts ethnic homogeneity and eventually leads to socio-cultural conflicts. The Ministry of Labor was concerned that introducing foreign workers from less developed countries might cause social problems, such as migrant marriage to Korean natives (Donga-ilbo 1990d). While the industries had no specific ethnic preference at first, they found that ethnic Koreans could be a less risky option for the Korean government that was concerned about social disruptions (Yonhap-news 1990). Despite the continuing demand for labor, the government officially announced on March 19, 1991, that it would not allow labor migration due to its negative effects (Hankyoreh-sinmun 1991). This decision hints that security was considered a far more important source of legitimacy for the government than economic interests at that time: they believed that failing to serve the function of security provider would jeopardize their legitimacy and that economic gain could not compensate for such a security loss. Industrial Trainee System: Economy and Security Nevertheless, industries kept demanding a foreign labor force and eventually, on October 17, 1991, then- President Roh Tae Woo announced in a luncheon with small firm owners, As far as it does not cause social problems, the government will expand a foreigner industrial trainee system to ease serious labor shortages [emphasis added] (Kyunghyang-sinmun 1991), which marks the beginning of the Industrial Trainee System (ITS). While the government decision ignited opposition from labor unions, scholars note that while labor unions nominally opposed the labor migration, their opposition was rather haphazard and disorganized (Choi 1997), and theoretical and passive (Chung 2012). While it seems that the government was finally prevailed upon by business owners to embrace the economization rationale, the previously noted President s statement that labor migration should be allowed as far as it does not cause social problems proclaims an important principle that security was still of utmost concern in adopting migrant workers. The emphasis on security is traced in the fact that the implementation of the ITS was processed only through government decisions, without parliamentary discussions. The government issued (and cancelled) countless new measures and revisions in an impromptu manner whenever needed. These and other facts indicate the construction of migrant workers as an existential threat to Korean society (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998), which, in turn, brings a state of emergency, justifying exceptional political measures, such as the government s absolute control over policy decisions (Huysmans 2006). Under the ITS, the trainees did not hold the legal status of worker and thus had to endure dehumanizing working conditions without any legal protection. Nevertheless, this exploitative system was maintained for more than 10 years. Oftentimes security and economy are considered hard to satisfy simultaneously because the former justifies restrictive policies while the latter justifies the expansionary policies. However, the ITS was designed in a way that silence both security and economic concerns while sacrificing the rights and welfare of labor migrants. The unacceptable act of discrimination against migrant workers was justified as a necessary evil because national security and economy were much more urgent concerns for Korean nationals and the government. 3
Employment Permit System: Human Rights, Economy and Security From the mid-1990s, the global development of human rights began to affect the mobilization for migrants in Korea. Its influence came in both direct and indirect ways. First, international audiences pressured the Korean government directly through statements, petitions, and media briefings to criticize human rights violations against migrant workers. Second, aside from the direct influence, domestic NGOs appropriated global discourse on human rights to push for their goal. Scholars note that the ability of civic groups to humanize the issues of migrant workers was critical in facilitating structural reform (Kim 2003, 2005). While the Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers, which introduced the Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2004, is often considered the fruit of these efforts to humanize the issues of migrant workers (Lim 2003; Kim 2003; Chung 2010; Park 2011; Kim 2005; Lee and Park 2005), looking deeper into the parliamentary debates on the EPS reveals that the EPS was not a mere reflection of humanitarian concerns: cost-benefit calculations in economic terms and security concerns were still dominant rationales that guided the law-making process. Initial humanization In 2000, the Joint Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Foreign Workers and Promoting their Basic Rights (CEDFW) submitted a legislative petition for The Act on Employment of Foreign Workers and their Human Rights Protection. The proclaimed goal of this law was to properly utilize a foreign labor force and guarantee foreign workers basic human rights by specifying the employment process of foreign workers and stipulating the prohibition of discrimination against foreign workers and the protection measures toward them (Article 1). The critical moment for structural reform came with the presidential election in 2002. With the election of Roh Moo Hyun in December 2002, the effort to enact laws introducing the EPS was accelerated. In March 29, 2003, the Roh administration officially announced in a government meeting that it would introduce the EPS and make every effort to pass the Act on Employment Permit for Foreign Workers and their Human Rights, which was proposed by MDP members to the Korean National Assembly on November 13, 2002. The EPS ignited a huge debate among politicians and after a series of parliamentary meetings, the contents of the law were carved into a different shape from that suggested in the original bill. The core of the change was in the weakening of humanization. To demonstrate this, it is worthwhile considering the three bills and relevant debates: 1) the CEDFW s Act on the Employment of Foreign Workers and their Human Rights Protection, 2) the MDP s Act on Employment Permits for Foreign Workers and their Human Rights, and 3) the KNA s Act on the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers, which was the final bill passed on July 15, 2003. First, comparing 1) and 2) shows how viewpoints differed in and out of the institutional setting. Second, comparing 2) and 3) reveals how parliamentary discussion guided the direction of the bill. Economy re-emphasized The major difference between the MDP s initiative and that of the CEDFW is that the human rights rhetoric was much more diluted in the MDP version. First, the term human rights (ingwon) appears only twice in the MDP s versus seven times in the CEDFW s. The proclaimed purpose of this law was to guarantee basic rights of foreign workers, not their human rights as stated in the CEDFW version. In fact, the term human rights itself ignited a huge controversy in the parliamentary debates. The following passage from a parliamentary committee discussion by Yu Yong-Tae, an assemblyman from the progressive MDP, highlights how parliamentarians felt about human rights rhetoric: 4
The title of this law is the Act on Employment Permits for Foreign Workers and their Human Rights Protection. A law s title summarizes its contents and purpose. Is Korea a country where human rights are ignored? Do we ignore foreigners human rights?... Korea is not an anti-human rights country to the extent that we should create a separate law to protect human rights. The title of this law is so wrong, spitting in our own face. (KNA Commerce, Industry, and Energy Committee, July 15, 2003) As the debates went on, concerns about human rights were gradually put aside. Instead, the parliamentary discussion focused on whether the EPS was a burden or benefit to the national economy. While proponents claimed that the EPS would give a boost to labor-starved small firms, opponents claimed that it would increase labor costs and thus kill less competitive and vulnerable small firms. While their claims were competing, their viewpoints commonly framed the EPS as an economic issue, not a human rights issue. In the end, the MDP s bill was amended and a new version was submitted. In the new bill, the title was changed to The Act on the Employment, etc. of Foreign Workers. The term human rights was deleted from all provisions of the bill. The purpose of the law was amended as follows: This act aims to enhance the match between manpower supply and demand and promote the balanced development of the national economy by systematically introducing and managing foreign workers (Article 1). Simply put, this law is fundamentally more about manpower management than human rights. Security reinforced One of the major principles based on which the EPS was mapped out was no settlement of migrant workers. The MDP initiative limited the number of contract years to 3 years in general and an extra 2 years in exceptional cases (Article 7) while CEDFW s has no such limitation. The fear that migrant workers might eventually settle in Korea was a great concern for those who opposed the EPS. In the final bill, the number of contract years was reduced to 3 years at maximum with no exception to obstruct any possibility of migrant workers permanent stay (Article 9 and Article 18). According to the Nationality Act, one of the requirements for naturalization is that foreigners who want acquire citizenship must have a domicile address in Korea for more than 5 consecutive years. Thus, this 3-year time frame practically serves as a preventative measure to discourage migrant workers from applying for citizenship. Furthermore, to make sure that migrant workers return home when their working visas expire, the MDP s initiative (and the final version as well) newly added a requirement that employers should buy Departure Guarantee Insurance for migrant workers and that migrant workers also should buy Return Cost Insurance. According to O Se Hun, an assemblyman from the conservative GNP, these insurances are to put psychological pressure on foreign workers (KNA Environment and Labor Committee, April 16, 2003). Summary The Korean government was at first reluctant to open their labor market to foreigners out of a concern that an influx of foreigners would disrupt the social order. Until then, the government s political calculation was that security was a major source of legitimacy and failing to provide security for its subject would be expected to decrease its political legitimacy. However, labor-starved small firms pushed the government hard to accept their labor demands emphasizing that labor importation was inevitable for the national economy. The government could not ignore their claim as economic prosperity is just as important as security in supporting state legitimacy. As a result of the lobbying and claim-making activities of the industry, the government eventually allowed labor migration and introduced the ITS in 1991. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the 5
economic concerns surpassed security concerns. The government reconciled the two seemingly competing goals of providing security and economic prosperity by limiting migrant workers rights to almost none. As migrant support groups began their protests against the ITS in the early 1990s, the tacit coalition between government and industry became hard to maintain. Above all, they framed migrant issues as human rights issues and this strategy resonated with the government in that human rights cannot be compromised. The exploitative trainee system emerged as a hot topic in the 2002 presidential election. In the newly elected government, the issue was discussed within the institutional politics and a new system the EPS was enacted and launched. While many scholars regard this structural reform as the fruit of civic engagement and a victory for human rights, analyzing the detailed provisions of the system reveals that the newly enacted law was aimed more at manpower management than human rights protection. Also, the law was designed in a way that satisfied security concerns. When designing the law, assemblymen made efforts to minimize migrant workers rights but at the same time tried hard to hide these intentions by cautiously tailoring the provisions and clauses. We do not argue that the new system reflects no humanitarian concerns, but our findings show that the humanitarian rhetoric exists rather as a declaration of intent, which helps politicians and the government justify their policies, but with limited practical impact. 6
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