The youth electoral behaviour in the post-communist Lithuanian society

The youth electoral behaviour in the post-communist Lithuanian society Dr. Rūta Žiliukaitė Department of Sociology Faculty of Philosophy Vilnius University E-mail: ruta.ziliukaite@fsf.vu.lt ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux, 4-7 September 2013 Panel: Generational Differences in Electoral Behaviour 1

The data of the electoral behaviour of Lithuania s population reveals that the cohorts of young people whose values were formed after the collapse of communism and during the country s transition to democracy are characterized by the lowest turnout levels in the society. Longitudinal analysis shows that as young adults become older, their level of turnout in the elections remains considerably lower than that of the older generations when they were at the same age. Moreover, the Lithuanian youth is characterized by exceptionally low level of interest in politics. The gaps of turnout and interest in politics between the youngest cohorts of voters (up to 29 year old) and the older voters are among the largest in Europe. This paper is aimed at explaining the electoral behaviour of youth in the post-communist society of Lithuania by using the data of several representative surveys of the country s population conducted from 1992 to 2012. Voter turnout by age and cohort It is worth to start discussing the age impact on voting in the Lithuanian society by taking a look at the curves of turnout by age as well as age cohorts drawn based on the data of the post-election surveys covering the five parliamentary elections which took place in Lithuania since 1996. The curvilinear impact of age on voter turnout is one of the consistent findings in the study of political behaviour (Glenn & Grimes, 1968; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). In general, Lithuanian data on the voting participation by age correspond to this common pattern: low turnout level turnout of young voters, high level of participation among middle-aged voters and slight decline of voting participation with old age (see 1 fig.). The possible exception is that the highest level of voting participation in the five elections in Lithuania was observed not among the middle-aged people, but among those who are in their sixties. The figure of voter turnout by age cohorts is more complicated. The inconsistencies of the shape of curves referring to the six elections could be explained to the large extent by sampling error, since the surveys contain a relatively small number of respondents in each age group. On the other hand, despite the sampling error some recurring regularities of turnout by age cohorts could be observed: 2

Figure 1. Turnout by age in five parliamentary elections (%). 90,0% 80,0% 70,0% 60,0% 50,0% 40,0% 30,0% 20,0% 10,0% 0,0% 18-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71 and older Data sources: the pooled data of representative post-election surveys of Lithuania s population in 1996, 2000, 2008, 2012, New Baltic Barometer 2004 (N=5787). Figure 2. Turnout by age cohorts in six parliamentary elections (%). 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 30 20 10 0 1924 and early 1925-1934 1935-1944 1945-1954 1955-1964 1965-1974 1975-1984 1985-1994 Data sources: Values and Elections in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia 1992-1993, representative post-election surveys of Lithuania s population in 1996, 2000, 2008, 2012, New Baltic Barometer 2004, and pooled data of 1996 to 2012 post-election surveys. 3

First of all, it could be pointed out that during the first decade of Lithuania s independence people born in the Interwar and Second World War period were characterized by relatively higher turnout level. The second decade witnessed a gradual decrease of voting participation in this age cohort. Secondly, people who were born and reached their young adulthood within the Soviet period were marked by the highest level of participation in the last parliamentary elections. However, during the first decade of the new political system after the enthusiasm of the first free elections in post-communist countries cooled down (Kostadinova, 2002) this particular generation seemed to be most affected by the spread of political disappointment and growing political alienation that were followed by deteriorating life conditions brought by social and economic reforms implemented at that time (Ramonaite, 2006). Finally, the lowest level of turnout is found in the post-soviet generation (born in 1975 and later). However, the data presented in figure 2 suggests a slight increase in the level of participation with this generation growing older. This trend seems to correspond to a wellestablished trend that the propensity to vote increases with age (Glenn & Grimes, 1968; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980; Blais, 2000). The main focus of this paper is to establish to what extent the low level of the participation of the young voters could be explained by the life-cycle and cohort effects. However, before drawing your attention to this question, let me provide a summary of youth s political and civic participation in Lithuania. Civic and political participation of the Lithuanian youth In Lithuania, as one of the young democracies, civic education of the young people in educational institutions, the promotion of activities of youth organizations attracted and continues to attract a lot of attention. It was expected that new, post-soviet generations would be characterized by higher levels of civic and political participation, stronger pro-democratic values than those generations that reached their adulthood during the Soviet period. However, the recent country-based research data reveals that the youngest generation of adults is different from the older generations not only by low voting participation, but also by weak support for political community; they are also characterized by weaker solidarity and philanthropic attitudes than older generations (Žiliukaitė, 2007). 4

One could argue that emphasizing only the negative aspects to describe the civic and political engagement of the post-soviet generation is quite a one-sided view. Thus, on the positive side: various research data shows that young people seem to be characterized by a higher level of participation in voluntary organizations than older people, they are also more active in new forms of civic activities that are based on IT. Moreover, they have stronger belief in the power of ordinary people to influence decision-making processes. In 2007 the Civil Society Institute started the longitudinal study named The Civic Empowerment Index aimed at measuring the dynamics of civic and political engagement of Lithuania s population. The data of this study provides a good summary of the youth civic attitudes and participation. The Civil Empowerment Index (CEI) is calculated on the basis of data obtained from the representative survey of the country s population that is conducted annually. CEI consists of five components each measuring different aspects of civic and political engagement on the scale from 0 to 100: 1) the index of interest in public affairs reveals how involved people are in following the news about the political, economic and cultural life of the country; 2) the index of actual civic participation is based on the data about the participation of respondents in fifteen civic and political activities during the last twelve months; 3) the potential of civic engagement is measured as an attitude towards organizing or joining activities aimed at solving local or national level problems in three hypothetical situations; 4) the external civic efficacy index shows how much people believe that ordinary citizens can have an influence on the decision-making processes and 5) the index of risks of civic engagement measures to what extent people see active civic and political participation as related to various threats for their personal well-being (see webpage of Civil Society Institute for a more detailed description of methodology of the CSI: www.civitas.lt). As can be seen from the data, presented in figure 3, the youngest generation appears to be less interested in public affairs than older people. On the other hand, one could conclude that it has larger civic engagement than other generations: overall, young people are marked by a higher level of participation in various civic and political activities, by more potential of civic engagement and greater civic efficacy. 5

Figure 3. Civic empowerment index and its constituting dimensions by two age groups Data source: pooled data of CSI surveys, conducted in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 (N=4043) However, there is one important circumstance, which becomes obvious if we split the youngest generation in two groups: 1) those aged 15-19, the absolute majority of whom are still attending educational institutions, and 2) those aged 20-29, the majority of whom started their work careers (see table 1). Statistically, the civic engagement level among the latter ones is significantly lower than among the young people still attending schools. The data we possess makes it difficult to determine how much this trend is emphasized by the lifecycle. Yet, there are possible grounds for a hypothesis that the civic engagement of young people is school-based, has limited expiry date and upon graduation from educational institutions it is discontinued. This is conditioned by the fact that there are no bridges between youth organizations, youth-oriented civic activities that are initiated and implemented at schools and community-based as well as other non-governmental organizations. This is to say that in case of the young people of Lithuania we can hardly assume (or at least, for now) the existence of the development of the engaged citizenship model, reflecting altering and expanding the patterns of political participation (Dalton, 2008: 76) as compared to civic and political engagement of older generations: Lithuania s young generations do not vote and do not show a considerably greater proclivity to other forms of civic and political participation. 6

Table 1. Participation in voluntary activities according to age groups Interest in public affairs Actual level of civic engagement Potential for civic engagement External civic efficacy Perception of risks of civic engagement CEI 15-19 35,1 39,8 45,0 57,7 23,4 41,5 20-29 39,5 34,4 38,5 49,8 22,9 36,6 Data source: pooled data of Civic Empowerment Index surveys, conducted in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2012 (N=4043) While focusing the attention on the low level of voting participation of the post- Soviet generations it is worth considering several bivariate relationships between voting and other factors that are partly the reason why young people in Lithuania do not vote. For this purpose I will use the data of the post-election survey of the year 2012. It is a well established fact that the decision of the individuals to vote is affected by such political characteristics as interest in politics, political knowledge, party identification, internal political efficacy and engagement in other political activities. Lithuanian data confirms these relationships. When asked why they do not vote during parliamentary elections seven out of ten respondents aged 18-24 pointed out that they were not interested in politics. The percent of people who indicated a lack of interest in politics as the main reason for non-participation in all other age groups was smaller by three to four times (represented by 24 to 13 %). The data presented in Table 2 suggests that among those aged 18-24 and 25-30 the proportions of people who are interested in politics, have medium or high political knowledge, feel close to any of the parties for the longer time or support them are considerably smaller than among those aged 31-70. The young people also score low on the factor of internal political efficacy. Except for political knowledge the influence of age on these characteristics remains high when the level of education is controlled. All these features are significant factors in predicting the voting behaviour of the young citizens: the gaps of turnout rate between the categories of young people defined by these political characteristics (interested or not interested in politics; having low, medium or high political knowledge, etc.) are much higher than the gaps observed in older age groups. The presented profiles of youth civic and political engagement could be seen as reflecting the life-cycle or generational effects. Is there a way to sort this out? 7

Table 2. Political characteristics by age groups Have medium or high political knowledge Feel close to any of the parties Support any of the parties for longer time Internal political efficacy (average factor score) Interested in politics 18-24 6,1% 41,9% 22,9% 29,8% -0,26 25-30 21,4% 51,7% 39,1% 44,2% 0,12 31-40 25,2% 60,1% 43,1% 47,7% 0,16 41-50 32,7% 70,4% 48,6% 52,8% 0,20 51-60 33,9% 70,7% 57,9% 63,2% 0,07 61-70 38,1% 60,1% 56,2% 65,9% -0,04 71 and older 39,7% 56,8% 39,3% 54,4% -0,36 Data source: Post-election survey 2012 Definitions of life-cycle and generational effects Life-cycle effects describe the changing social circumstances of people over their life-time that influence their political participation. According to Putnam (2000, 248), life cycle patterns of political behaviour are usually determined by three factors: marriage and family needs, entering or leaving labour force and health deterioration in old age. The slight decrease in turnout level of senior voters is generally associated with the physical infirmities. Although some other social circumstances frequently encountered at this period of life such as living without a spouse also might have a negative impact on political participation of the elderly (Bhatti et al., 2012: 588). The highest turnout of middle-aged people is related to such life-cycle aspects as their stronger community ties, decreased career-pressures and availability of more leisure time after their children leave the home. As regards the voting participation of young people it is said to be associated with leaving parental home and increasing geographical mobility, as well as time and energy pressures related to getting established in one s occupation or taking other adult roles by getting married and taking care of minor children (Glenn & Grimes, 1968; Jennings &Niemi, 1975; Bhatti et al., 2012). On the other hand, some researchers do not find sufficient empirical evidence to prove that life-cycle transitions that define "adulthood have an important impact on the electoral behaviour of young people; these transitions account only for a small portion of the age differential in turnout (Highton & Wolfinger, 2001). The life-cycle effects could be explained not only by the adult-roles model, but also by the gradual learning model of political activity. As Verba and Nie suggest, the longer one is exposed to politics, the more likely one is to participate" (1972, p. 148). These authors 8

maintain that the participation differences between young voters and older voters reflect variations in resources and experience of political participation of the age groups. Voting is associated with political interest, party identification and political efficacy and all of them increase with age, all of them become stronger with acquiring more experience of political participation (Campbell et al., 1980; Glenn & Grimes, 1968). Voting in the elections is assumed to be a form of political activity that requires relatively small resources or as Brady et al. put it as the easiest political act, voting ought not to require much in the way of resources except, perhaps, some free time to get to the polls (1995: 282). Nevertheless, in order to decide which party or candidate should one vote for, the individual needs information and it takes time to accumulate political knowledge and update information in the area of formal politics. Thus, voting in an election process is definitely not the simplest form of political participation from the point of view of young adults; taking part in the act of protest politics could appear to be much less difficult than going to the polls and making a vote decision. One more factor of aging indicated in the written resources on electoral behaviour is habituation to voting (Goerres, 2007, 92), although in some analyses past voting is treated as being independent from the age factor (Gerber et al., 2003). Since voting in one election increases the likelihood of voting in the future, the stronger proclivity of voting of older people is explained by their larger experience of voting in the past. Finally, differences of turnout between young and old voters are also related to different levels of conformity to social norms. As voting is commonly perceived as socially desirable behaviour and the adherence to social norms is stronger among older people (Schwartz, 2006, 25), this also has an impact on differences of participation between age groups (Goerres, 2007, 92). An alternative explanation of the influence of age on voting focuses on intergenerational value differences or, speaking in more general terms, generational effect (see, e.g. Lyons & Alexander, 2000; Henn et al., 2002; Dalton, 2008; Blais et al. 2004, 2011; Wass, 2007). Cohort effects are stemming from the common socialization experience shared by people born during a certain period. It is assumed that this experience has a lasting influence on the political attitudes of cohorts. Age cohorts might differ not only by a set of values unique to them, but also by a number of people sharing certain social characteristics that have an influence on electoral behaviour. It is important to notice that generational or cohort effects are much more determined by a specific historical or political and economic context of a country than by life-cycle or aging effects. Although general trends of 9

intergenerational value shifts might be similar across countries (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart & Baker 2000), the identification of the age cohorts will always remain country-specific. This short overview of life-cycle and generational effects provides general guidelines of analysis presented later in this paper. Unfortunately, it should be noted that sophisticated analysis of age effects on electoral behaviour in post-communist Lithuania is highly restricted due to the shortage of data. The available data of representative surveys of population that were conducted in pre-election or post-election periods starting from the first democratic election to the parliament in Lithuania in 1992 usually do not provide a possibility for thorough analysis of age effects because the questionnaires used in the surveys did not contain many standard or comparable indicators related to electoral behaviour. Pooled data of these surveys enables one only to conduct the analysis of a few socio-demographic characteristics with no attitudinal variables in the models. Despite these severe restrictions an attempt is made to shed some light on cohort and life-cycle effects on voter turnout in Lithuania using pooled data of five post-election surveys including the parliamentary elections from 1996 to 2012 and the cross-sectional post-election surveys of 2012. The latter surveys were conducted by the public opinion company Baltic Surveys per request of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University. The main intention of this paper is to explain the political behaviour of the Lithuanian youth; however, cohort effects can hardly be specified with regard to young people without taking the older voters into account as well. Thus, the first task is to define age cohorts in the Lithuanian society which could be relevant for analysis of political behaviour and voting in particular. Political generations of Lithuania s society: the cohort and life-cycle effects on voter turnout This paper maintains that four age cohorts could be distinguished in the postcommunist Lithuania: the first is the Interwar and the Second World War generation, born in 1944 and earlier; the second is the generation born in the period of Stalinism (1945-1953); the third is the later Soviet generation born in 1945-1974, while the fourth is the Post-soviet generation born in 1975 and later. These cohorts grew up and reached their young adulthood in different social, political and economic contexts and, thus, are characterized by different sets of values that could be important for electoral behaviour. The former analysis of the dynamics of value orientations of the Lithuanian society (Žiliukaitė, 2007) showed that the Interwar and the Second World War generation is characterized by much stronger traditional 10

values (Inglehart & Baker 2000) than any of the two Soviet age cohorts or the Post-Soviet generation (see fig. 4). This cohort shares traditional family values, religiosity, and respect for traditional authority. Patriotism is another traditional value quite extensively preserved by this generation. During the first decade after the collapse of communism in Lithuania the Interwar and the Second World War generations were somewhat less affected by growing political alienation in the society. Figure 4. The average of traditional vs. secular-rational values factor scores by age cohorts 1,00 0,80 0,60 0,40 0,20 0,00-0,20-0,40-0,60-0,80-1,00-1,20 1925-1934 1935-1944 1945-1954 1955-1964 1965-1974 1975-1984 1985-1994 Traditional vs. Secular-rational values* Autonomy** Embeddedness** Sense of a civic duty*** Data source: pooled data of European Value Survey 1990, 1999, World Value Survey 1997, Values LT survey 2005 (Žiliukaitė, 2007, 128)*, Post-election Survey 2012**, Information Sources Survey 2008***. The Soviet generations (born under Stalinism and later) compared with the older generation were influenced to a considerably larger extent by secularization processes related to the atheisation politics of the Soviet period and industrialization processes that accelerated in Lithuania in the middle of the 20 th century (Inglehart & Baker 2000, Žiliukaitė 2007). However, the Stalinism period generation still contains a large number of people with traditional values. Meanwhile, the secular-rational values clearly prevail in the later Soviet period cohort. Considering this intergenerational value shift, the Post-soviet generation has even stronger secular-rational value orientations than the Soviet period generation. Ronald Inglehart and Daphna Oyserman (2004: 4) showed that traditional vs. secular rational values (and self-expression vs. survival values) are highly correlated with Schwartz s 11

embeddedness vs. autonomy values. The data on these values enhance the description of value profiles of age cohorts in post-communist Lithuania. According to Shalom Schwartz (2007, 179), In embedded cultures, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. They are expected to find meaning in life largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life and striving towards its shared goals. Such values as social order, respect for tradition, security and wisdom are especially important [...] In autonomy cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities who should find meaning in their own uniqueness and who are encouraged to express their internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings and motives). As you can see in figure 4, the curve of the embeddedness factor, which encompasses tradition and conformity values, corresponds to the curve of traditional vs. secular rational values. However, differences in embeddedness between generations are less expressed than differences in the autonomy values: the post- Soviet generation is best characterized by the values of self-direction, achievement, stimulation, hedonism as compared to older generations that score low on the factor. Schwartz notices that values can change over lifetime, importance of at least some of the autonomy values should decrease and tradition, conformity values should increase with age (2005, 26). Therefore, the discussed differences between age cohorts can not be plainly separated from an effect of aging: the longitudinal data would be needed for this purpose and it is currently not available. Nevertheless, since values of embeddesness are positively correlated with religiosity, while autonomy values are negatively correlated with it, this allows us to assume that they reflect cohort differences: so far no empirical evidence has been available that would allow the supposition that young generations of Lithuanians would be at least half as religious (in terms of institutional religiosity) compared with the older generations. Certainly, the essential question is what traditional vs. secular, embeddedness vs. autonomy values have to do with voting participation. It could be argued that the relatively high level of voter turnout of the Interwar and Second Wold War age cohort as well as of the cohort that was born under Stalinism is based on the common concept for these generations which considered voting to be a citizen s duty related to their traditional values. Moreover, the compulsory participation in the election during the Soviet period also contributed to the development of the habit to go to the polls in these generations. The younger generations and especially the post-soviet generation are characterized by secular-rational values (priority is given to selfish utilitarianism, instrumental orientation, measures of personal benefit and external efficacy). 12

The qualitative and quantitative studies on political and civic participation in postcommunist Lithuania are not numerous, but they consistently reveal the differences of the motivation between age cohorts. While presenting results of qualitative research of political participation in Lithuania Ainė Ramonaitė (2006, p. 110) was one of the first ones to observe that relatively low turnout of the young generation of Lithuania s population is determined by more instrumental, rational attitudes of this generation towards the state and its political community. The majority of people from older generations, according to this author, see voting as a civic duty, while the young people more often perceive it as a matter of individual choice. My previously conducted analysis of the data of representative surveys of population in the field of motivation for philanthropic activity as well as for participation in the activities of non-governmental organizations clearly showed the differences between different generations. On the one hand, there are generations with traditional values that are predominately motivated by a sense of moral obligation, solidarity, compassion for those in need. On the other hand, and one can notice generations with prevailing secular-rational values that are most frequently motivated by instrumental rationality, personal benefits related to these activities (by the possibility to have a good time, to acquire new skills, to receive personal satisfaction, etc.) (Žiliukaitė, 2008:11, 15). In 2012 the Institute of Civil Society initiated the representative survey of pupils, aged 14-19. In the survey the respondents were asked about the importance of a number of motives for their participation in various community activities, volunteering and joining political actions: the data shows that the most important civic engagement motive for pupils is the possibility to acquire knowledge and skills that could be useful in their further life (7 out of ten respondents pointed it out as important or very important). Meanwhile, a sense of civic duty was the least important motive (only 4 in ten indicated the importance of this factor) (CSE 2012: 50). When put together all these insights allow us to have (at least) some confidence in asserting that the post-soviet generation views the act of voting differently than the older age cohorts. Looking back at the figure 4, one can see that the later Soviet generation and the youngest age cohort of voters are less characterized by a norm that voting is a duty of citizens. The curve of the sense of civic duty is drawn using the data of the representative survey of Lithuanian population in 2008. 1 Unfortunately, the main object of this survey was not electoral behaviour, so except of a few indicators shedding some light on the question of interest this survey does not provide any possibility for thorough analysis of age effects on voter turnout. Nevertheless, taking into account the shortage of available data, any empirical evidence acquire certain value. In this 1 Information sources survey was conducted by the public opinion company Vilmorus per request of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University. 13

survey respondents were asked how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statements: I believe that voting in the election is the duty of every citizen ; I vote because I want to express my will in how to run this country ; I go to the polls even if I do not expect that my party or candidate will win. The index of sense of duty was created using factor analysis. Though differences between age cohorts according to this index are not very large, on the whole they correspond to the curves representing the earlier defined value differences between generations. If this is true, than differences of turnout between age cohorts should be found in the analysis of pooled data of the five post-election surveys of Lithuania. The data presented in Table 3 shows that life-cycle and cohort effects both have an impact on turnout. The postsoviet generation is characterized by a lower propensity to vote than the other three generations and it is not only a matter of age and aging. On the other hand, the life-cycle effects cannot be discounted as well: there is no reason to doubt that aging will make young voters more interested in politics and their electoral engagement will increase. However, taking into consideration the values and motives of the youngest generation for the civic and political engagement, and given the current level of political alienation in the country, it is unlikely that we will witness a large increase. Overall, the general turnout level of the youngest generation can remain much lower than the current level of the older generations. Table 3. Results of the logistic regression of the impact of age, generation and education on the voting participation in Lithuania, 1996-2012 Individual level determinants B S.E. Sig. Age,052,014,000 Age 2,000,000,002 Education (ref. Tertiary) Primary -1,217,103,000 Secondary -,600,084,000 Generations (ref. Post-Soviet) Interwar and the Second World War,879,203,000 Stalinism period,438,174,012 Later Soviet period,231,117,049 Constant -,184,280,512 N 5865 Pseudo R 2,084 Model Chi-square 354,0827 (p=0,00) Data source: pooled data of post-election surveys 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012 14

The final issue to consider is the relative importance of the effects of age in predicting the proclivity to vote within the framework of Lithuania s population. The low R squared points out that life-cycle and generational differences as well as education are only small factors that affect turnout. There is no possibility to run the analysis of the pooled dataset while including into the model other political characteristics that are known to have an impact on voting participation. However, without paying attention to these political characteristics it is hardly possible to define what underlies differences between age groups and age cohorts of voters. Therefore, the model with the conventional predictors for voter turnout will be tested using the data of the last post-election survey conducted after the election in 2012. This dataset contains indicators of political interest, party identification, and inner political efficacy. While testing the effects of socio-economic status I rely on the data of the socio-economic class of the respondents and education. Moreover, in the model I included two indicators tapping the life-cycle effects (being employed and living with the spouse/partner). Unfortunately, questions about minor children and health condition were not posed in the survey. Finally, to control the generational effects I use Schwartz s index of autonomy and religiosity. Table 4. Results of logistic regression of the impact of various individual-level factors on voting Individual level predictors of the voting participation B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) Age 0,01 0,03 0,81 1,01 Age 2 0,00 0,00 0,96 1,00 Education (ref. Primary) 0,03 Tertiary 0,67 0,34 0,05 1,95 Secondary 0,58 0,22 0,01 1,78 Interest in politics 0,66 0,22 0,00 1,93 Party identification 2,00 0,18 0,00 7,36 Inner political efficacy 0,28 0,10 0,01 1,33 Socio-economic class (ref. manual workers) 0,50 High level professionals, administrators, and officials 0,35 0,35 0,32 1,42 Routine non-manual employees 0,19 0,20 0,33 1,21 Being employed 0,25 0,23 0,27 1,28 Living with the spouse/partner 0,36 0,19 0,06 1,44 Church attendance 0,57 0,21 0,01 1,77 Autonomy -0,23 0,10 0,02 0,79 Constant -1,75 0,75 0,02 0,17 N 1012 Pseudo R 2 0,379 Model Chi square 311,977 (p=0,00) 15

The results of logistic regression presented in Table 4 suggest that the strongest predictors of the voting participation are party identification, political interest, inner political efficacy and education. An introduction of the indicated political characteristics to the model causes the largest decrease of the age effect coefficients. It could also be noted that church attendance and an individual s scores on the autonomy index also have a significant impact on the propensity to vote. What inferences from all the findings presented in the paper one can make about electoral behaviour of youth in Lithuania? I looked for the possibilities to find out to what extent the low turnout of the post-soviet generation was determined by life-cycle effect and to what extent the values of the cohort distinguished this generation from older age cohorts. However, I finally ended up with mainly accounting for a lack of data that would lead us to definitive statements or focusing the analysis only on the young voters. It would be really difficult to find exceptionally unique factors of youth electoral engagement that are at play only in Lithuania and nowhere else. The well-established facts on the individual-level determinants of turnout in a developed democracy appear to be valid for the description of the voting participation of post-communist Lithuanian population, including behaviour of the young voters. Going through the studies on the youth electoral behaviour in Great Britain (Henn et al., 2002), Canada (Blais et al. 2004, 2011) or United States (Wattenberg, 2003) I was to a certain degree astonished at how much of what was said about the relation of the young people with the election and politics, the reasons of abstaining from voting in countries with old traditions of democracy could be transferred to the description of voting participation of youth in Lithuania. Last year my colleagues and I conducted eight focus groups with pupils, from 16 to 19 years of age, as well as with teachers of secondary schools, gymnasiums and professional training schools. The data of our research showed that young people regard politics as something related only to the political parties, parliament and politicians. They are not interested in politics because it seems distant and disconnected from their life, because they lack political knowledge, which makes it difficult to understand and follow political life of the country, or politics and politicians irritate them, cause feelings of injustice, Politicians get on my nerves. They sit in the parliament and get money for nothing. I would like to have the same: to speak nonsense during the lessons and get the highest grades. (Žiliukaite et al., 2012: 35). For the lack of interest in politics young people also blame politicians who ignore youth problems or explain political disengagement of the youth by the invisibility or lack of 16

young politicians. This is very similar to what was found by Henn, Weinstein and Wring (2002) in a study of youth political engagement in Britain. Concluding their analysis the authors maintain that the youth in Britain are not apolitical, but have a different concept of politics, want a different type and style of politics, therefore, they suggest defining them as engaged sceptics interested in the public affairs, but unsatisfied with the current situation (Ibid.: 187). From all data that we have about the political engagement of the youth it would be hard to be so optimistic about the Lithuanian youth. A very large percentage of Lithuania s young people is apolitical and apathetic and in being such they are just a reflection of the widespread political alienation present in the society, low trust in politicians and political parties. The values held by this generation make them more vulnerable for such moods and disappointments to have an effect on their political engagement. References Bhatti, Y., Hansen, K.M., Wass, H. (2012). The relationship between age and turnout: A roller-coaster ride. Electoral Studies 31: 588 593 Blais, A. (2000). To vote or not to vote? The merits and limits of rational-choice theory. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press. Blais, A., Gidengil, E., Nevitte, N., Nadeau, R. (2004) Where does turnout decline come from? European Journal of Political Research 43 (2): 221 236 Blais, A., Loewen, P. (2011) Youth Electoral Engagement in Canada. Working Paper Series. Elections Canada. Brady, H.E.,Verba, S. & Lehman Schlozman, K. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. American Political Science Review 89: 271 295. Campbell A., Converse, Ph., Miller, W., Stokes, D. (1980). The American voter. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press Dalton, R.J. (2008). Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation. Political Studies 56: 76 98 Gerber, A. S., Green, D. P. & Shachar, R. (2003) Voting May be Habit Forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment. American Journal of Political Science 47(3): 540-550 Glenn, N.D., Grimes, M. (1968). Aging, voting and political interest. American Sociological Review 33 (4): 563 575. Goerres, A. (2007). Why are older people more likely to vote? The impact of aging on electoral turnout in Europe. British Journal of Politics and International Relations 9 (1): 90 121. 17

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