SMALL WARS JOURNAL smallwarsjournal.com On Pakistan: Interviews with Shaukat Qadir and Aqil Shah by Octavian Manea Even when failing, the Pakistani military manages to do better than the current corrupt, elected leaders : Interview with Shaukat Qadir How would you assess the management performance of the formal custodian/manager of the state the Army- in actually governing the country? The army s involvement in governance dates back to 1956 when Ayub Khan, the serving Commander in Chief of the army was concurrently appointed Defense Minister. He then took over in a bloodless coup in 1958. It would not be irrelevant to point out that ALL military takeovers have been welcomed by the people and ALL ousters of the military have occurred when the people got fed up with military rule. Ironically, in its own unusual way, military dictatorships have also been democratic, in as much as they represented the wishes of the people- --at that time. In the current situation, the current top brass of the military were witness to the mess created by Musharaf and, consequently, were determined to remain apolitical. The fact that they have been forced to assume political roles is a direct consequence of the current political (elected) government s determination not to assume responsibility for anything remotely connected to issues of security. Since security is now an all-encompassing role, the military is seen as increasingly active in spheres which it should have had no role in. Quite obviously, politics and governance are not the military s forte. Consequently, while it is efficient in delivering where the issues relate merely to administration and can be solved through disciplined, organized administration, the military excels but when dealing with more complicated issues of politico-economic governance, the military has failed to perform. Regretfully, at the present juncture, even when failing, the military manages to do better than the current corrupt, elected leaders. In early 2009 the Riedel Review called for the need of the Pakistani government to shut down the AQ and Taliban safe havens on its territory. Since then we have seen an impressive COIN campaign to clear some of the territories controlled by the militant insurgency. But COIN campaigns remain first of all governing competitions. And COIN is not just a military affair, but it is intensely political and it requires a wide range of responses - political, diplomatic, and developmental as well. It is said that the counterinsurgents are not generally outfought by an insurgency, but they are outadministered or out-governed. How would you assess the ability of the formal Pakistani state in securing the support or at least the acquiescence of the local population inside FATA and the North-West Frontier Province? In holding and building the territory that has been cleared of insurgents? 2011, Small Wars Foundation August 28, 2011
This question addresses the crux of our problem. The military is ineffective in COIN. It cannot even win battles, let alone the war. The best it can do is to buy time for politicoadministrative functionaries to resolve issues and out-govern the insurgents. Therein lies the greatest failure of our present government. Let me quote a few examples to illustrate. A) Over 2000 Taliban captured during the Swat and South Waziristan operations ending July/October 2009 are still languishing in military custody----by all standards of Human Rights; in illegal custody. They are there because neither the provincial nor the central government agree to accept custody of them, let alone initiate judicial proceedings; and the army cannot turn them loose! B) The only effort to reclaim the minds of young boys who were trained to become suicide bombers and rehabilitate them is being made in a school in Mingora, Swat, called Sabaoon (a Pushto word meaning the crack of dawn---signifying hope). It is being run by a lady psychiatrist and has met remarkable success. Almost 50% children have returned home and are leading normal lives-- ---but it is funded by and run under the aegis of the army! No one has even chosen to emulate this model! C) Although your focus is not Balochistan but the complaint of the youth there is that they are not given equal opportunity; being deprived of quality education. The only attempt to provide affordable, cheap, quality education is being run by the army! D) Months after Swat was retaken, political administrative officers remained prominent by their absence. They finally arrived in 2010 but, to-date, when faced with a problem they refer to the senior-most army officer available and seek instructions. In effect, COIN in all it is about non-military functions; the ones that can actually achieve success or failure, remain in military hands! For its entire existence the Pakistani Army s mindset was focused on waging conventional war against India. To what extent did the intensive COIN campaign in FATA change the focus on India of its organizational culture? The Pakistan army had indeed focused entirely on retaining the ability to cope with the threat from India. However, in the Musharaf era, when the insurgency in the tribal area began, the military s performance steadily deteriorated. This was due to the fact that, while professing support to the US, Musharaf depicted to his domestic (military and non-military) audience, that this was not Pakistan s war. The rank and file and junior, even mid-level officers, lost confidence and could not justify to themselves the fighting of a war against their own citizens, merely to please the US. Thus the instance in August 2007, when 208 soldiers under a Lt Col, surrendered to a handful of Taliban, without a shot being fired. Starting November 2007, when Kyani took over as the army chief, he managed to work wonders in a few months. The military doctrines, standard procedures, and tactics have been effectively modified to cater to this new form of threat. How appealing is the cause of Radical Islam/Militant Islam inside the Army ranks? Is the army on the verge of a mindset shifting? Traditionally the Army was a secular, profoundly nationalistic education system (a huge melting pot of ethno linguistic identities) able to create and shape good citizens loyal first of all to the Pakistani state. The military is still essentially secular, patriotic, nationalistic, and across the ethnolinguistic divide. However, the military also comprises of citizens of Pakistan and, as Pakistani society acquires a radical hue, so also will it affect the military. But, being a disciplined organization, the growth of radical Islam is considerably less. As an example; if radicalism in Pakistani society grows at the rate of 1 %, in the military it will grow at about 0.25%! For obvious reasons, however small the number of radicals in the military, whenever they are found involved in an anti-sate (anti-military) activity, they become increasingly visible. To my 2 smallwarsjournal.com
knowledge, the number of soldiers, serving/retired (irrespective of rank) accused (not proven guilty) of being radical and involved in anti-state activity over the last decade is less than a hundred. If you consider that serving security forces (including para-military and police) number in excess of one million and retired personnel, number over ten million, the percentage is infinitesimal and yet, they will make headlines while the millions of people like me will not. Having said that, I must acknowledge that in the last five to seven years, the growth of radical Islam in Pakistani society (and proportionately in the military) has increased. The increase is directly proportional to bad governance and the growing view that our politico-military leadership is becoming increasingly America-dependent. As a consequence, there is also increasing anti-americanism in Pakistan. Having in mind the demographic boom, the education gap, the economic deterioration over the last decade, how would you assess the ability of the state institutions to cope with all these trends and deliver goods and basic services to an increasingly larger society? Is Pakistan on the path of state failure? The current government has failed in all respects. It might surprise you to learn that, starting from the earthquake in 2005 to the floods in 2010, while the military responded with its usual efficiency, it was the civil society and the fantastic, courageous, dedicated, and enthusiastic educated youth that filled the vacuum left by government. With regard to the last part of this question as to whether Pakistan on the path to a failed state, my response is: it is fast approaching that path but has not yet reached it. The scenario following the elections next year will decide whether we are actually treading that path or not. If bad governance continues over the next five to seven years, anything is possible. At the present juncture, I have no fears of this kind. Perhaps I am being optimistic. I am aware that many a Pakistani analyst would respond to your question with an unequivocal, yes! Why do sections of the Pakistani state cultivate & provide support to the militant groups (the Afghan Taliban and the LeT)? Has the ISI become a rogue structure? This question should have been worded in the past tense. The reasons why they did so was the outcome of a flawed policy of employing radical Islamic Jihadists against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Once such a move is started through official patronizing and funding, it will invariably develop a life of its own, as it has. No; the ISI is not a rogue organization; which is not to say that there could not be rogue elements in it, just as there are in the CIA. The problem is that, in the absence of clear explicit instructions from government, the ISI seeks guidance from the army or decides on its own. In either eventuality, when it does so, the government has deniability----since it has given NO instructions. In all fairness, I must admit that in the 1980s and 90s, the ISI had been given immense authority, just as its counterpart, the CIA. Both misused this authority; for obvious reasons, the ISI was the more visible of the two. It should also be mentioned that, since the US occupation of Afghanistan, neither intelligence service; Pakistani or American; have been totally truthful with each other. Both have attempted to cultivate their own assets to the exclusion of the other----once again, for obvious reasons, the ISI will be demonized, while the CIA is exonerated for looking after the legitimate US interests-- -the same yardstick does not apply to the ISI. 3 smallwarsjournal.com
How will the nature of relationship between an elected government and the military evolve over time? I suggest that it will depend on how much responsibility the elected government is prepared to assume. If it is prepared to assume ALL its responsibility, the military will have to revert to being confined to its constitutional role; the greater the vacuum the elected representatives leave, the more of it will be filled by the military. I guess, in time, probably during the tenure of the government formed after next year s elections, a home-made model will emerge for Pakistan. I can only hope that it is the one in which elected representatives take full charge and the military is confined to its real role. Having in mind, the Pakistani ungoverned or rogue regions that incubate schools and training facilities that are able to create potential terrorists, should Europe (especially the countries with large Pakistani diasporas) fear Pakistan more than other countries? I would suggest wait-and-see. If, by 2013/14, Pakistan is found to be firmly treading the path to becoming a failed state ; yes, be careful. If the next government begins to deliver good governance; relax---we will be on the path to salvation and security! How appealing are the The Pakistani Taliban grievances outside FATA in the other discontented ethnic communities? Could the Pakistani Taliban use a religious trans-ethnic platform to rally all these dissatisfied provinces against the centre? Has nobody in Europe wondered why, despite the all-pervasive anti-americanism (among the common man) in the Pashtun dominated region, there is NO support (outside their own tribes) for those Pashtun tribes that have revolted? In the case of those tribes fighting against the state (Pakistan), there is very limited support even from within their tribes. Basically, the Maulvi (Cleric---for lack of a better word, since there are no clerics in Islam) is so far down the social order that he barely makes it above the menials! For this reason alone, tribes that throw up Maulvis as leaders will never be acceptable to other tribes. However, your question has another angle to it (in its first portion). The answer is no; the Taliban have virtually no support/sympathy outside their tribes in the PASHTUN belt. However, there is a very troubling growth of the Taliban in our settled areas, particularly in Punjab and, to a very limited degree in Karachi. For me, the greatest worry is Taliban increase in Punjab. It is the most lethal threat of the future and is multiplied by the fact that the government insists on remaining in a state of denial! According to them, there is no such threat. This is the breeding ground from where increasing numbers of suicide attackers are going to the tribal areas for training. Shaukat Qadir is an Independent Risk and Security Threat Analyst. He is a former Brigadier in the Pakistani Army. His expertise is focused mainly on South Asia with emphasis on terrorism, conflict resolution, security, conduct of warfare, guerrilla warfare and, to a limited extent, nuclear stability. For more info you can access http://shaukatqadir.info/ 4 smallwarsjournal.com
Civilian institutions are weak and often corrupt but not beyond redemption : Interview with Aqil Shah What should be the role of the Army within the Pakistani state? The Army should be restricted to its proper constitutional role. The Pakistani constitution envisages only two main tasks for the Army: to defend the country from external aggression and to assist the civilian government in keeping public peace and security when needed. In reality, the military exercises heavy influence in policymaking areas that it views as its exclusive domain of national security, including foreign policy towards India, Afghanistan, and the U.S.; nuclear weapons and even internal security. How would you assess the management performance of the Army in actually governing the country? Except for illusory, short-term gains in economic growth, the military s actual performance as governor has been dismal. In general, military rule foments internal divisions, depoliticizes civil society and undermines the growth of civilian political institutions. Specifically, army rule is problematic for peacefully and democratically managing Pakistan s ethnic diversity. The military is primarily recruited from the largest and most powerful Punjab province. Hence, other ethnic groups, such as the Baluchis of the resource-rich Baluchistan province, perceive army rule as the instrument of Punjabi domination, which breeds resentment towards the central government, and foments political instability. How would you assess the ability of the state institutions to deliver goods and basic services to an increasingly larger society? Is Pakistan on the verge of state failure? The Pakistani state s capacity to perform its core functions of providing public safety, security and social services for its people is in decline. But the state is not about to collapse. Its civilian institutions are weak and often corrupt but not beyond redemption. The higher judiciary is asserting its independence and civil society is pushing back against repression from both the state and violent non-state groups. Pakistan s core problem is the state s lopsided focus on war and military security at the expense of human and economic development. Pakistan annually spends more almost ten times more on the military than education and health combined. The military s threat inflating, ultranationalist, pessimistic and parochial worldview drives Pakistani state policies. This military-controlled state is unable to comprehend that the world around it is changing rapidly, that economics trumps war, cooperation with other states trumps confrontation. Having in mind the possible appealing of the The Pakistani Taliban grievances outside FATA and in the other discontented ethnic communities is the Pakistani state on the verge of becoming a jihadist state? It is complicated. The Pakistani Taliban have little mass appeal in or outside FATA. The main reason for their growth and power is military patronage of jihad. The generals see some violent extremist groups as legitimate instruments of warfare against India. The military nurtures and uses groups like the LeT for fighting India in Kashmir, and the Afghan Taliban to counter Indian influence in Kabul, especially after the U.S. troops wind down in the region. However, there is blow back from military sponsorship of jihadi groups in the shape of radicalization within both officer and enlisted ranks of the Pakistani Armed Forces. Recent arrests of military officers suggest that some militant groups have infiltrated the military, 5 smallwarsjournal.com
although it is too early to definitively assess the implications of this development for the stability of the military, Pakistan and the rest of the world. Has the ISI become a rogue structure? There is little evidence to suggest that the ISI is a rogue state within a state. While some of its sections might enjoy operational autonomy due to functional necessity, the ISI is essentially a military spy agency which carries out the policies laid down by the high command. Could Turkey (with a highly performant civilian government and an army increasingly subordinated to its civilian masters) be a role model for Pakistan? Yes and No. Geography has made a difference. Turkey is lucky in the sense that it comes under the zone of influence of the European Union. EU Integration comes with strict democratic civilian control conditionality and economic dividends for civil society. The external pressure for democratic reform, combined with the electoral resurgence of the pro-business AKP has created the conditions conducive for limiting the undue political influence of the military. Pakistan, on the other hand, has sought to balance archrival India by allying with the U.S., which has traditionally propped up military rulers for its short-term strategic interests. Externally backed military political power has prevented the emergence of solid civilian institutions. What are the prospects for civilian control of the military and will it matter? Civilian control matters and will matter a lot. But its short-term prospects are bleak. The persistent absence of civilian control is a historical legacy of Pakistan s political development shaped by confrontation with a politically and military stronger India. The military has typically been shielded from international pressure/sanctions by its alliance with the U.S. Capacity is not the real issue. Civilian officials and politicians can and will exercise oversight of the military but only when the military accepts their supremacy. In the medium term, a few legitimate elections and peaceful turnovers in government could help consolidate democratic institutions and create the conditions conducive to civilian control over the military. Aqil Shah is a post-doctoral fellow at the Society of Fellows, Harvard University. He is expert on Military Politics and Democratization in South Asia, especially Pakistan. He is currently working on a book manuscript on the origins and sources of sustained military intervention and weak civilian control in Pakistan in a comparative perspective. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University and an M.Phil. in international development from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy. This is a single article excerpt of material published in Small Wars Journal. Published by and COPYRIGHT 2011, Small Wars Foundation. Permission is granted to print single copies for personal, non-commercial use. Select noncommercial use is licensed via a Creative Commons BY-NC-SA 3.0 license per our Terms of Use. No FACTUAL STATEMENT should be relied upon without further investigation on your part sufficient to satisfy you in your independent judgment that it is true. Please consider supporting Small Wars Journal. 6 smallwarsjournal.com