NYU- School of Law International Investigation Commission 1-2/11/2013 Bahrain: Assessment of BICI Commission Abdulnabi Alekry, researcher, Nat. Cent. of Studies On 14 Feb. 2011, Bahrain became the third country to experience their own Arab Spring, after Tunisia and Egypt. On 14 February 2011, thousands of youths marched towards the capital, Manama, demanding political reforms. The cry for freedom and change was spread through social media tools such as Facebook, YouTube and Twitter, acting as a centralizing force for protestors. Many Bahraini youths sought refuge online, far away from government censorship laws which violate their basic human rights to free speech. Social networks created a space for the voiceless people who had no opportunity to speak out before, and discovered social media to be a way to speak in a way that could be heard on a wider scale and go beyond Bahrain boundaries.(1) The demand for constitutional reform goes back to 14th Feb 2003, when the first constitutional conference was held, comprising opposition political organizations, Lawyers Group, CSOs and prominent personalities. The conference drafted constitutional amendments and launched popular and parliamentary campaign to promote these amendments. Al-Wefaq opposition 18 MPs presented draft constitutional amendments, upon election in Oct 2006, while popular campaign secured more than 100,000 signatures. But the regime control of the parliament and non-adherence to popular will, undermined constitutional reforms until today.(2) The constitutional reform was in the heart of the demands of the 14th Feb.2012 uprising. This was manifested by different means. Despite the demand of minority for a referendum on the republic, and the refusal of the loyalists for substantial constitutional reform, the majority of the population were for radical constitutional reform towards democratic constitutional monarchy. This was crystallized in the letter of the opposition (7parties) to the HE the Crown Prince Sh. Salman Al-Khalifa, who was entitled by his father HM king Hamad Al-Khalifa to engage into negotiation for settlement. The Crown Prince declared on the 13th March 2012 his 7 points as bases for negotiation including constitutional reform.(3) The invasion of the Saudi forces on the 14th March aborted negotiated settlement. The country entered a deep crisis, ongoing till today. Despite the atrocities, the opposition is still adhered to negotiated settlement which includes constitutional reform. With the exception of few days of tranquility, where thousands assembled at the well known Lulu Roundabout (formally GCC Roundabout), and massive marches, the post 14 Feb.2011, was characterized by bloody attacks by the security forces and in some instances by
pro-regime thugs. The is took a turning point upon the invasion of the Saudi forces on 15 March 2011, comprehensive total attack, to bolster the deployment of Bahraini Defense Force (BDF),The National Guard, The MoI Security forces and The National Security Agents (NSA) to carry massive operation to squash the 14 Feb Uprising. It started with sweeping attack against The Lulu Roundabout at 15 March 2011 dawn, then swept other protests areas including Salmanya Medical Complex.The combined Bahraini forces, established tens of checkpoints, imposed siege on residential & work areas, and launched an combing operation. The operation included using fire shooting, quelling of protests using excessive force, mass breakdown of houses at dawn, mass arrests, mass detention, torture, mass dismissal and demolition of Shea mosques.(4) To legitimize the operation, The King decreed state of emergency ( formally State Safety) on 16 March2011 for 3 months, authorizing The High Commander of BDF to command the operation,and entitled Military Prosecutor and Courts to investigate, interrogate and Try the defendants. The State of Emergency was the harshest in the modern history of Bahrain. It lasted from 15 March-31 May 2011, when it was terminated formally, but the reign of terror continued till today. The State of Emergency was lifted upon pressure of Bahrain allies especially US and due to its very negative impact on business especially financial services, where some foreign banks started to pullout or limit their activities. It was motivated also to absorb internal and external pressure,the authority organized so called "National Dialogue" during June 2011, comprising around 335 representatives, where the opposition was represented only 35, the recommendations were short of substantial constitutional reform. In view of the committed atrocities, Bahraini regime was under pressure to allow independent investigation of events since 14 Feb.2011, including UN option. Bahrain was persuaded by US to accept an independent investigation commission by prominent western jurists. Through consultations, it was agreed to commission US-Egyptian Prof. Cherif Basuni to lead the commission who in turn and through intensive US-Bahraini consultations selected other members (Sir Nigel Rodley UK),Dr.Badrea Alawdi-Kuwait,Judge Phillippe Kirsch(Canadian),Dr Mahnoush Arsanjani (US-Iranian origin) of what became known as Bahraini Independent Committee of Investigation (BICI). BICI Commission The commission is the second international commission in the history of Baharain.The first was commissioned by UN Secretary General U Thant in March 1970, upon request of Un Security Council, and headed by his representative in UN-Geneva, Vitori Guispardi, to investigate Bahrains choice of being in an independent Arab state or to join Iran. The findings of the mission was independence choice, approved by The UN_ Security Council, unanimously, and paved the way for independence of Bahrain. It is worth remembering that this was brokered by the British envoy to the region Sir William Luce, and the British representative at UN NY Lord Caradon. The Bahrainis made their choice conditional of democratic independent state under Al-Khalifa rule, but alas. Since independence on 14 Aug. 1971, Bahrainis have been living in series of ordeals the latest of which commenced on 14 Feb 2011.(5)
Prof Basuni, had conviction that he and his mates were carrying noble endeavor, where they are bound by their conscience, and free to act, ass assured by The King of Bahrain,prior to initiating their mission. In many instances Prof, Basuni applauded the King decision as unprecedented at the Arab and Islamic world, appraising his courage. He appraised the full cooperation of the Bahraini authorities in the investigation including unwanted visits to prisons and detention premises, inspecting dossiers and records and interviewing top official, short of The Ruling Trio, The King, The Prime Minister and The Crown Prince)( 6) He was affirmative of the findings of his commission and certain that its recommendations will be implemented as affirmed by The King prior to the commissioning at the inaugural launching of BICI report on 23 Nov. 2011.(7) I, as a head of Bahrain Transparency Society (BTS),and my colleagues,cooperated h with BICI investigators,furnished them with dossiers and arranged interviews with tens of the victims. I met Prof Basuni and BICI members on two occasion. First was on dinner where I discussed extensvly with Sir Nigel Rodley, whom I know since Geneva days ad sp. Rp on Torture,.The second prior to launching the report at Ritz Hotel where I expressed to him, to Sir Nigel Rodley and Dr Badrea Alawadi, the concerns of the Bahraini public of complacency of he eport, but the three assured me of its objectivity. Dr Alawadi revealed that the Arabic translation, done by official recruits, of the report was distorted, but it proved that it was misleading on purpose, which created a lot of confusion. Ultimately BICI removed it off it website. But till today The Kingdom of Bahrain insists on the Arabic version as reference and acts accordingly. I also attended the BICI launching of its report on 23 Nov. 2011, listened to the speech of Prof. Basuni speech and The King s response speech, gauged the response of the attendance, and followed the implementation carefully. The king features were grim, and he resorted to the secrecy need not to reveal Iran involvement in the events in response to Basuni acqittence of Iran responsibility toward Bahraini events. Let us read some of Prof Basuni account for BICI mission as expressed in his launching speech as taken from the BICI website, distributed during the event, and reprinted by local media on 24 Th Nov. 2011.: The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) was mandated to prepare a report about the events that occurred in Bahrain during the months of February and March 2011 in addition to the subsequent related events. The Commission was also charged to make whatever recommendations it deemed appropriate for holding accountable those who had violated the rights and freedoms of individuals, and for preventing the recurrence of such incidents in the future. As a result, the BICI has compiled a report composed of twelve chapters. The report commences with an introduction to the Commission and its methods of work, followed by a background on the modern history and system of government of Bahrain. Then the report describes the applicable legal framework during the events under investigation, and identifies the relevant law enforcement agencies in Bahrain. A detailed narrative of the events is then presented that covers the period from the beginning of February to 31 March 2011, with a special focus on the events that occurred at the Salmaniya Medical Complex. In about 500 pages of documented details, The report then examines the human rights violations alleged to have been perpetrated by governmental agencies against individuals. These include the
deaths that occurred during the events under investigation, the use of force by governmental agencies, the manner in which arrest warrants were executed, the treatment of detainees, and cases of forced disappearances. The report also tackles the demolition of religious structures, dismissals of public and private sector employees, and the expulsion of students and the suspensions of scholarships. The report then examines human rights violations perpetrated by individuals, in particular attacks against expatriates, and Sunni citizens. The report also examines the allegations of foreign involvement in the events that occurred in Bahrain, and discusses the matter of harassment by the media. Subsequently, the report reviews the measures and remedies undertaken by the Government of Bahrain to address some of the human rights violations that took place, as well as to address deficiencies in some domestic legislation. The Commission s work was not easy. We began our work in an atmosphere fraught with tension and were under immense pressure from the public, which was eager to have the testimonies of the many victims and witnesses heard. The Commission had to collect all the evidence, examine the documents and reports submitted to it, and conduct field visits, all of which were arduous tasks. The Commission also ensured the protection of witnesses that it heard and the confidentiality of information it received, which further complicated its work. In addition, the Commissioners and investigators worked to meet the expectations of Bahraini citizens to decisively intervene to prevent human rights violations regardless of the type of that violation or the perpetrator. Overall, the Commission received nearly 9,000 complaints, statements and testimonies and conducted dozens of on-site investigations throughout the country. The Commission also sought to resolve other problems including the dismissal and suspension of university students, employees, healthcare workers, and attempted to mitigate the negative effects of criminal prosecution Allow me to summarize the general observations and recommendations of the report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry: 1. The forceful confrontation of demonstrators involving the use of lethal force led to the death of civilians. This caused an increase in public anger, increased the number of persons participating in protests, and led to a palpable escalation in their demands. As protests continued into mid-march 2011, the general state of security in Bahrain deteriorated considerably. Sectarian clashes were reported in a number of areas, attacks on expatriates took place, violent clashes occurred between students at the University of Bahrain and other educational institutions, and major thoroughfares were blocked by protesters. This situation led the government to declare a State of National Safety on 15 March 2011. 2. HM King Hamad approved that HRH the Crown Prince engage in negotiations with various political parties with a view to reaching a peaceful resolution to the unfolding situation in Bahrain. Notwithstanding the best efforts of HRH the Crown Prince, negotiations to reach a political solution were not successful. The Commission is of the view that if the initiative and proposals of HRH the Crown Prince had been accepted at the time it could have paved the way for significant constitutional, political and socio-economic reforms and precluded the ensuing negative consequences. 3. The Commission s investigations revealed that during a substantial number of the arrests carried out by law enforcement agencies arrest warrants were not presented to arrested individuals
and arrested individuals were not informed of the reasons for their arrest. In many cases, government security forces resorted to the use of unnecessary and excessive force, and in a manner that sought to terrorise individuals, and to cause unnecessary damage to property. 4. The Commission s investigations revealed that many detainees were subjected to torture and other forms of physical and psychological abuse while in custody, which indicated patterns of behaviour by certain government agencies, especially with regard to certain categories of detainees. The extent of this physical and psychological mistreatment is evidence of a deliberate practice, which in some cases was aimed at extracting confessions and statements under duress, while in other cases was intended for the purpose of retribution and punishment. The most common techniques for mistreatment used on detainees included the following: blindfolding; handcuffing; enforced standing for prolonged periods; beating; punching; hitting the detainee with rubber hoses (including on the soles of feet), cables, whips, metal, wooden planks or other objects; electrocution; sleep-deprivation; exposure to extreme temperatures; verbal abuse; threats of rape; and insulting the detainee s religious sect (Shia). Generally, these measures fall within the meaning of torture as defined in the Convention Against Torture (CAT), to which Bahrain is a State Party. They also constitute violations of the Bahrain Criminal Code. These forced confessions have been used in criminal proceedings, either in the special courts established pursuant to the National Safety Decree or, in some cases, in the ordinary criminal courts. 5. The Commission is of the view that the lack of accountability of officials within the security system in Bahrain has led to a culture of impunity, whereby security officials have few incentives to avoid mistreatment of prisoners or to take action to prevent mistreatment by other officials. 6. It was evident to the Commission that government security forces, especially the Public Security Forces (PSF), violated the principles of necessity and proportionality while engaging with demonstrators, which are the generally applicable legal principles. 7. A large number of individuals were prosecuted before the National Safety Courts and imprisoned for violating articles 165, 168, 169, 179 and 180 of the Bahrain Penal Code. The text and application of these provisions raises questions about their conformity with international human rights law and the Constitution of Bahrain. 7. Numerous violations of due process rights were recorded by the Commission during proceedings before the National Safety Courts, which were composed of a presiding military judge and two civilian judges. 8. The manner in which the security and judicial agencies of the government of Bahrain interpreted the National Safety Decree opened the door for the perpetration of grave violations of human rights, including the arbitrary deprivation of life, torture and arbitrary detention. Detainees were kept for questioning for periods that, in some cases, extended to over two months during
which they were neither brought before a judicial body or presented with any charges. The lack of judicial supervision, oversight or inspection of detention facilities operated by these security agencies allowed for the perpetration of human rights violations. 9. Thirty-five deaths occurred between 14 February and 15 April 2011, which are linked to the events of February/March 2011. Thirty of the thirty-five deaths were civilians, while five were security personnel. Investigations were opened by the different security and military agencies concerned, but the Commission has reservations with regard to the effectiveness of some investigations which only included statements by security personnel. 10. Between 21 March and 15 April 2011, security forces systematically raided homes in order to arrest individuals, and in so doing, terrorized the occupants of these homes. These arrests were carried out by masked individuals during night and pre-dawn raids. These individuals intentionally broke down doors and forcibly entered homes. These practices were often accompanied by sectarian insults and verbal abuse, and in some cases women were also exposed to such insults by security personnel. Overall, the total number of persons arrested pursuant to Royal Decree No.18 of 2011 following the declaration of the State of National Safety was 2,929. Of those, 2,178 were released without any charges brought against them. The most prevalent charges made against persons brought before the National Safety Courts included: incitement of hate against the regime, illegal assembly, rioting, possession of anti-government leaflets, possession of material calling for the overthrow of the regime, inciting others to violence, threatening a civil servant, use of violence against a government official, premeditated murder, kidnapping, attempted murder, aggravated assault, membership in an illegally established society, and spreading rumors that undermine public interest. The majority of these charges involved the exercise of freedoms of opinion and expression that are guaranteed by the Bahrain Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 11. Many places of worship were demolished in the aftermath of the events of February/March 2011. Out of 30 places of worship inspected by the Commission, only five had complied with the requisite legal and administrative conditions. Nevertheless, the Commission notes with some concern the timing and method of these demolitions. The government should have realized that under the circumstances, and particularly the timing and manner of the demolitions, that these would be perceived as collective punishment and would therefore inflame existing tensions between the government and the Shiite population. 12. In the aftermath of the February/March 2011 events, over two thousand public sector employees and over 2400 private sector employees were dismissed for their participation in, or support of, the protest movement, and on the grounds that these protests were unrelated to labor The Commission, however, sees that the workers protests that occurred were within the issues. permissible bounds of the law.
13. A large number of university students were expelled or suspended in connection with their role in the events of February and March. The Commission finds that the universities applied arbitrary and unclear standards for issuing determinations and taking disciplinary action. The Commission welcomes, however, the move by the Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the University of Bahrain and Bahrain Polytechnic, to reverse the vast majority of disciplinary action taken against students. 14. The Commission received sufficient evidence to support the finding that Sunnis were targeted by some demonstrators, either because they professed loyalty to the regime or on the basis of their sectarian identity. Sunnis were subjected to verbal abuse, physical attacks and attacks on their private property as well as harassment. 15. The Commission finds sufficient evidence to establish that some expatriates, particularly South Asian workers, were exposed to attacks during the February/March events. Pakistanis, in particular, were targeted. Because of the atmosphere of fear which prevailed, some foreign nationals were afraid to return to their work and commercial activities. The Commission found that four expatriates were killed and many were injured by mobs as a result of these attacks. 16. The evidence presented to the Commission in relation to the involvement of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the internal affairs of Bahrain did not reveal a discernible link between specific incidents that occurred in Bahrain during February/March 2011 and Iran. In addition, the Commission has not found any evidence of human rights violations committed by the GCC-JSF units deployed in Bahrain, from 14 March 2011. 17. The Commission concluded that much of the material shown on national television contained derogatory language and inflammatory coverage of events, and some may have been defamatory. Then it sets recommendations to address the environment, the legislations, the culture, and the structure of law- enforcement that led to these mass and systematic atrocities However, the Commission did not find evidence of media coverage that constituted hate speech. The Commission also identified numerous examples of defamation, harassment and, in some cases, incitement through social media websites. Both prolimited to outlining, compiling, and and anti-government journalists were targeted through so The Commission s report is not analyzing the human rights violations that occurred in Bahrain during the period under investigation. Rather, the Commission also submitted the following recommendations to the Government of Bahrain: 1. To establish an independent and impartial national committee that consists of personalities of high standing representing the government, opposition political societies, and civil society to follow up monitor and implement the recommendations of the Commission. This committee should re-examine the laws and procedures that were applied in the aftermath of the events of February and March 2011 in order to make recommendations to the legislature for the appropriate
amendments to existing laws and to develop new legislation, in line with the recommendations of this Commission. 2. To establish a national independent and impartial mechanism to hold accountable those in government who have committed unlawful or negligent acts resulting in the deaths, torture and mistreatment of civilians with a view to bringing legal and disciplinary action against such individuals, including those in positions of command, whether civilian or military, in accordance with the principle of superior responsibility. 3. To consider the Office of the Inspector General in the Ministry of Interior as a separate entity, independent of the Ministry s hierarchical control. The tasks of this office should include receiving complaints, and should protect the safety and privacy of complainants. 4. To amend the decree establishing the National Security Agency (NSA) in order to keep the organization as an intelligence gathering agency without law enforcement or arrest authorities. Legislation should also be adopted to provide that the detention of individuals shall be governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure even during the application of a State of National Safety. 5. To adopt legislative measures requiring the Attorney General to investigate claims of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 6. To allow for the review of all convictions rendered by the National Security Courts where fundamental principles of a fair trial were not respected. 7. To conduct effective investigations in all cases of deaths attributed to security forces and identify those responsible for these deaths. Likewise, all allegations of torture and similar treatment should be investigated by an independent and impartial body. In addition, a standing independent body to investigate all complaints of tortureor ill-treatment, excessive use of force or other abuses at the hands of the authorities should be established. The burden of proof to demonstrate that treatment complies with the prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment should be on the state. 8. To implement an extensive program of public order training for the public security forces, the National Security Agency and the Bahrain Defense Force, including their private security companies, in accordance with UN best practices in order to ensure future compliance with the Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials. 9. To avoid detention without prompt access to lawyers and without access to the outside world, and, all cases of detention should be subject to effective monitoring by an independent body.
10. The Commission recommends that the government urgently establish, and implement vigorously, a programme for the integration into the security forces of personnel from all the communities in Bahrain. 11. To train the judiciary and prosecutorial personnel on the need to ensure that their activities contribute to the prevention and eradication of torture and ill-treatment. 12. To annul or mitigate convictions of persons charged with offences involving political expression that does not involve the incitement to violence, and to commute the death sentence for cases of murder arising out of the events of February/March 2011. 13. To compensate the families of the deceased victims in a manner that is commensurate with the gravity of their loss, and to compensate all victims of torture, ill-treatment, or prolonged incommunicado detention. In this respect, the Commission welcomes Royal Decree no. 30 of 2011 on the establishment of a compensation fund for victims, which was issued on 22 September 2011. 14. To ensure that the remaining dismissed employees have not been dismissed on the basis of their right to exercise freedom of expression, opinion, association or assembly. 15. To consider relaxing censorship on mass media and to allow the opposition greater access to television broadcasts, radio broadcasts and print media. 16. To undertake appropriate measures including legislative measures to prevent incitement to violence, hatred, sectarianism and other forms of incitement, which lead to the violation of internationally protected human rights. 17. To develop educational programmes at the primary, secondary, and high school levels and at the university level to promote religious, political and other forms of tolerance, as well as the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. In general, the Commission also recommends that the Government of Bahrain develop a national reconciliation program that addresses the grievances of groups which are, or perceive themselves, to be deprived of equal political, social and economic rights and benefits across all segments of Bahrain s population. The King in his response speech, despite his apologetic remarks, arousing pretexts for these atrocities, restrain to secrecy pretext in relation to Iran and applauding the professional performance of Bahraini forces ( BDF, NG, SF, NS) under duress, accepted fully the responsibility of his government for these atrocities, BICI recommendations and sincere implementation. Basuni Optimism VS Rodley Realism
Prof.Basuni was the only outspoken on BICI for months until the passage of 18 months when Sir Rodley spoke differently for the first time. In several interviews with TV channels, especially Saudi Al-Arabia post launching the BICI report Prof. Basuni acted as government defense lawyer, where he complemented the Bahraini government for its full cooperation in BICI Endeavour. He convicted the Sheit protesters, of attacking Sunnis and expatriate Asians, which is contrary to the fact, that Sheit, were victims of Sunni halogens(baltajia) with full support of the police, while the 2 expatriates were killed by police fire. The Bahraini courts and the loyalist National Unity Gathering which, were sources Prof. Basuni information of Sheit attack of Sunnis and Asians, are non-credible. He dismissed the responsibility of BDF in the atrocities, to one victim, while he was aware the magnitude of DF atrocities with support of Saudi forces. He affirmed that the Minister of Interior was not aware of the gross violations by his forces, and believed wrongly that they were behaving according to norms. He also absolved the Ruling Trio ( The King, The PM & CP) and Commander of BDF of any knowledge or responsibility of the onslaught, while the Council of Minister has been meeting repeatedly, with King heading in some cases. He blamed Alwefaq for wasting the opportunity of accepting CP, Sh Salman bin Hamad Alkhalifa, offer for settlement, while he knows well that The Opposition, led by Alwefaq, accepted CP 7 points as bases for negotiated settlement, but it was the Saudi invasion which killed CP initiative This is unbelievable in an era of open space of the flow of information in cyber age, the documented testimonies of the victims, and recurrent reports by the national and international HROs The fact is that The Leadership and the government were aware of these violations and only opted facial acceptance of BICI findings and recommendations to defuse the pressures, with the intent of circumventing them, as proved later. Prof Basuni, in rare confession, in an interview with Du Paul Univ. TV stated that The King has to chose between his family and his people if he wants to impellent BICI recommendation and defuse the crises which was a reverse to previous statements.. Sir Nigel Rodley, stated, in seminar on Transitional Justice at UN-Geneva, April 2012, that The Government of Bahrain had not been implementing BICI recommendations. In TV interview, Sir Rodley described BICI report as balanced, objective, non appeasing to the government, and a road map for Bahrain to get out of its impasse to the future.he asserted that BICI report is relevant to Bahrain and to the world also as it was based on international and benchmarks. The implementation of BICI recommendations methodology, criteria requires months, not years, conditional of the government political well. He revealed his
prior knowledge of Bahrain human rights situation,as Sp. Rap, on Torture in the nineties, where he reported on Bahrain, but was denied visit then. Sir Rodley, in contrast to Prof.Basuni, was experienced with the maneuvers and the ploys of the Bahraini governments for years, thus was more objective and cautious. The Course by BICI findings The King pretended to be surprised by BICI report, though it is bereaved that he got it few days before, thus had the chance to gauge his response, which was clear. King Hamad was on a podium flanked on one side by his son and heir, the Crown Prince, the reputed "reformer" in the family. It was his failure to broker a deal with the protestors in March that led to the arrival of Saudi troops, the violent crackdown and his own loss of power within the government. To the king's other side was his uncle, the hardliner, whose brutal response to calls for reform trumped the Crown Prince's approach. He has been the kingdom's unelected Prime Minister since 1971. The royals listened to Basiuni as he was alternately fawningly polite and blisteringly critical of their government. The three sat behind an absurdly gigantic desk which, as Bassiouni listed incidents of torture at their detention centers, appeared to diminish them physically and morally. They sat totem-faced as he described how large numbers of detainees had been blindfolded, beaten, electrocuted and threatened with rape by their security forces. Awkward. The king finally responded (8)with an interestingly defensive line of argument about how the European Court of Human Rights frequently criticizes European states but that the international community doesn't refer to them as "oppressive governments." He said he was "dismayed to find" that the mistreatment of prisoners and detainees had occurred, suggesting he hasn't read many newspapers or watched much TV news this year. He also promised to respond positively to the recommendations in the report by setting various working groups and implementation mechanisms. He spoke for 15 minutes, finishing with a flourishing tirade against Iranian propaganda before the deflating admission that "the Government of Bahrain was not in a position to provide evidence of links between Iran and specific events in our country this year." Then Bassiouni gave him a copy of the report in an enormous red box and it was all over. The king said he hoped "to make this day one that will be remembered in the history of this nation." It is certainly one that will be remembered by the family of
Abdulnabi Kadhem, who, according to eyewitnesses, was killed by a police vehicle a few hours before the king spoke. It was also a day to remember for former opposition MP Matar Matar, who was back in court for his part in peaceful protests. Despite the king's apparent acceptance of the need for urgent reform to the criminal process, these sham trials continue. The notorious case of the 20 medics who were tortured and sentenced to prison for between five and 15 years will resume on Monday, and other cases are scheduled to take place in the coming weeks and months. Most of the government officials, loyalist MPs, politicians, dignitaries media and guests amassed for the the pompous show, were shocked. Sh.Abdulatif Almahmood, the head of government fabricated loyalist part, was heard speaking loudly Damn the day that we knew of Basuni.(9) The PM visited the Ministry of Interior in the afternoon of the same day and assured the top officers that non of MoI personnel will be touched consequent to BICI report, which proved to be so. On the other hand, the victims, the opposition, the independent CSOs, and the majority of the public were satisfied, despite their reservation and lack of trust in the government commitment to implement BICI recommendations, which proved true. The strategy of the state was to absorb the shock that BICI report revealed, to circumvent the implementation if its recommendation, to re-deploy the officials implicated in the reports, and to bit on time such that the impact of the report fade away. The government following policies and actions (10), proved once again, that it was not committed to true implementation of BICE recommendations: st 1-The implementation of the 1 recommendation on the formation of The Bahrain National committee to implement BICI recommendation was farce, as it was formed of officials and loyalist without representatives of the political opposition and real CSOs. Thus the committee was complacent and misleading. It was headed by old time loyalist, The President of Al- Shura ( appointed ) Council Ali Alsaleh and other loyalists. The BNCI, dragged in repeated meetings and joint meetings with the relevant government agencies, ministries and The Parliament. Cosmetic legist elations,appointments and measures were taken measure responsible in the command, to appoint loyalists in so called independent investigation and monitoring agencies, to introduce facial reforms, to pass non significant legist elations,and to confirm sentences against defendants by civil courts.
2-The government redeployed top officials,of the state machinery to new posts and institutions, recommended by BICI, such as Independent Commissioner of Police ( previous inspector Gen Algaith,Ombudsman at MoI (Almauda previous Public Prosecutor),head of investigation unit on torture ( Public Prosecutor), National Human Rights Institute (headed by Alshura Dr Aziz Abol and other loyalist, Committee of Repartition ( official of M o J) etc. The military courts ceded, but all proceedings, findings and documents compiled bu military prosecutors and courts were kept intact and turned over to Civil Courts, to pretend implementing BICI recommendation in this respect. Civil Courts were staffed be exjudges. Sentences by civil courts wee not much different than military military courts 3- After short lull of violations, the state resumed its comprehensive and systematic violations of human rights at larger and more sophisticated scale with a lot of fuss to pretend implementation of BICI recommendations. So the country slipped quickly to a sate of disregard for law, rights and rules. 4- the government secured the blessing of major allies, especially US, UK and EU, who were engaged in so called reform process, including providing experts and expertise in security, judiciary, education, legislations, information, etc. This was accompanied with low rhetoric of need for fulfilling the rest of BICI recommendation, and more engagement with the opposition and civil society By early June 2012, another pompous show was organized to launch its report, but with less fuss, lack of enthusiasm and less guest. It was clear that BNCI lacks credibility and so its report It is worth to mention that the government organized what was called National Consensus dialogue, headed by the long time loyalist Khalifa Aldahrani, The President of house of Representatives, where it amassed about 320 loyalist plus 35 representing the opposition. It was meant to deflect attention of the core conflict and grant the government legitimacy in dealing with the crises The other step of legitimization was holding complementary elections in Oct. 2011 to replace the 18 resigned MPs belonging to Alwefaq opposition who secured %63 of 2010 elections. The election was boycotted where those voted were merely %18 of eligible voters. This was done I absence of independent monitors contrary to precedents. All newly elected MPs opted to loyalty. Having both Parliamentary houses loyal, it was easy for the government to secure cosmetic legislative reforms, recommended by BICI, but more important to refrain of making the government accountable for its deeds and looting the national wealth, and to manipulate it to enact future draconian legislations, to grant the government absolute authority to deal with opposition and to bless its repressive policies
But other factors contributed to the revival of BICI report and recommendations, Once the State of emergency, was terminated, and marginal freedom allowed, the masses led by the opposition aroused with courage and determination. This was manifested in the mass protests, defiance of those adversely affected such as prisoners, dismissed and families, and the unity of the opposition, the licensed and the sanctioned. The opposition and CSOs clinked to BICI report and recommendation scrutinizing the government th The 14 session of UN-HRC UPR final report examination of Bahrain was due in June 2012. Despite all cosmetic measures on human rights including the establishment of Human Rights Ministry, reformation of National HR Institute and the fabrication of loyal HROs at local level, and the sustained efforts to secure supportive stand by friendly states, recruiting PR, and persuading many MPs, media, GNGOs, Geneva witnessed a big contest between the two adversaries in Bahrain,and their allies.actually the HRC ( both states & CSOs) overwhelmingly condemned the abuses of Bahrain Government since Feb 2011, and issued 176 recommendations, the biggest in the history of HRC-UPR. Those included close allies of Bahrain such as US & UK. The Bahraini human rights and civil society organizations and their allies among Int. HROs, played important role in this change Despite the official delegation, 39 delegates led by MoHR Dr Salah Ali,the biggest in the history of HRC, and the support of GCC and Arab delegates failed to convince HRC of its commitment to BICI recommendations and HRC UPR pledges. I was stunned upon listing the 176 recommendations including BICI recommendations, thus it refrained of accepting them willfully as a norm and asked for more time. Loyalists thugs and media in Bahrain lodged open threats to Bahraini HRD in Geneva, which complicated more the official position in Geneva. Once again Bahrain HRC-UPR recommendation were brought before HRC in its session in its 21 st session in Sept.2012. This time the government delegation was led by MoFA,sheikh Khalid Alkhalifa, for higher profile, who took less defiant stand, The government accepted nominally 147 recommendation fully, and 11 recommendations partially and refused 18. Those accepted were BICI recommendations, which it proclaimed that it has already implemented. Conclusion Since then, the controversy is that while human rights has been steadly deteriorating up to HR crises, the government has been proclaiming that it has been implementing both BICI and HRC UPR recommendations. Actually the BICI addressed situation which has deteriorated. Thus there is a need for full implementation of BICI recommendations and linked HRC-UPR recommendations, but there is a need for more recommendations
It is clear that the same government and Parliament responsible for these atrocities, insistent on subjecting its people, and opting to security solution will not implement BICI and HRC- UPR recommendations or introduce real reform. Thus the opposition and independent CSOs, supported by the majority of Bahraini people, with the sympathy at UN-Geneva and many friendly states, MPs, and CSOs, are convinced that introducing radical comprehensive and deep reforms of the system towards Constitutional Monarchy, is conditional of implementing BICI and HRC-UPR recommendations, enacting transitional justice, and ensuring nonrecurrence of atrocities. Footnotes 1-Ms.Reem Khalaf, The Role of Docial Medi IN Bahrain 14 Feb, Uprising, Seminar on Arab spring, Oriental Institute of Studies, Beirut, Lebanon May 2012> 2-abdulnabi Alekry, Bahrain 14 Feb Uprising,, Paper to Seminar of Arab Spring and The Gulf, FRIDE, Madrid,Nov 2011. 3-Ibid 4-Abas Almorshid, Bahrain Uprising, Bahrain Mirror, annual issue 2012,, Beirut, Lebanon, Dec.2012. 5 Dr Abdula Almadani,, T Bahrainhe Story of Bahrain Independence, Al-Ayam, Bahrain 2012,Abdulnabi Alekry, Bahrain:The National & Democratic Struggle 1920-1980, Al-Farades Pub., Bahrain 2008 6-Prof.Basuni interview with AlArab TV, Bahrain, 24 Nov. 2011 7-Ibid 8-HM The King of Bahrain Sh, Haamad bin Essa al-khalifa, Royal Speech before BICI Report Launching Ceremony, Bahrain, 23 Nov.2011 9-Abdulnabi Alekry, BICI and Int. Community, paper to Seminar on BICI 2 Years After, Alorouba Club, Manama, Bahrain 25 Nov.2012. 10-Ibid
Annex 1: CVS of BICI members Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni is one of the foremost authorities on international criminal, human rights and humanitarian law. He obtained an LLB from the University of Cairo, a JD from Indiana University, an LLM from John Marshall Law School and an SJD from George Washington University. Until 2009, Professor Bassiouni was a Distinguished Research Professor at DePaul University College of Law, an institution where he spent thirty-five years. Professor Basuni is well-published, having authored a number of works including some of the leading textbooks in international criminal law. During his career, Professor Bassiouni has also held a number of United Nations positions. Notably, this included the position of Chair for the Drafting Committee at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court. He also served as the Chair for the Drafting Committee on the 1985 United Nations Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Powers. Bassiouni has previous experience working on Commissions of Inquiry. Most recently, he chaired the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry for Libya (2011). He was also involved in commissions investigating the human rights situation in Afghanistan between 2004 and 2006, and violations of international humanitarian law in the Former Yugoslavia in 1993.
Judge Philippe Kirsch Q.C. Judge Philippe Kirsch is one of the foremost authorities on international criminal law and public international law. Judge Kirsch has a BCL and a LLM from the Université de Montréal. Judge Kirsch served as a judge at International Criminal Court in The Hague between 2003 and 2009, acting as the Court s first President. Prior to serving as a Judge at the Court, Judge Kirsch served as Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court (the Rome Conference). He was also Chairman of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court (1999 2002). He has also chaired the Canadian National Committee on Humanitarian Law (1998 1999) and served as a member of the Group of International Advisers to the International Committee of the Red Cross (2000 2003). Judge Kirsch has written extensively on international law, and, specifically, on the International Criminal Court. Additionally, Judge Kirsch served as Chairman of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee for the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism (1997-1999) and as Chairman of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee that elaborated the International Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel (1993-1994). Professor Sir Nigel Simon Rodley KBE Professor Sir Nigel Simon Rodley KBE is a leading expert in the field of international human rights law. Professor Rodley obtained an LLB (1963) from University of Leeds (1965), an LLM from Columbia University (1970), an LLM from New York University and a PhD from the University of Essex (1993). Professor Rodley has been a member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee since 2001 and a Professor of Human Rights Law and International Law at the University of Essex since 1990, during which time he held the title of Dean of the School of Law for three years. He also serves as a Commissioner on the International Commission of Jurists. Previously, Professor Rodley held the position of United Nations Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on Torture for eight years. He is well-published in the field of human rights, having written or edited a number of works, including two editions of the book Treatment of Prisoners. Professor Rodley has experience with Commissions of Inquiry having previously served as a member of the International Independent Group of Eminent Persons observing the Sri Lankan Presidential Commission of Inquiry between 2007 and 2008. Dr. Mahnoush H. Arsanjani Mahnoush H. Arsanjani is a leading international lawyer. She obtained an LLB from the National University of Iran (1971), an LLM from Yale Law School (1974) and a Doctorate of Law from Yale Law School (1977). Dr. Mahnoush has served in the legal office of the United Nations for thirty-two years. During that time, she held a number of positions including that of Director of Codification, Secretary of the International Law Commission, and Secretary of the Committee of the Whole, Rome Conference on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court. She also currently serves as a Vice-President of the American Society of International Law. She is well-
published having written a number of books and articles, including the book International Law in Contemporary Perspectives. Dr. Badria A. Al-Awadhi Dr. Badria A. Al-Awadhi is a renowned international and shari a law expert. She holds a Master s degree in public and private international law from Cairo University, Law Faculty (1968), and a PhD in public international law from London University, University College of Law (1975). Dr. Al-Awadhi currently serves as the Director of the Arab Regional Center for Environmental Law. She is also the Regional Legal Consultant at the Freedom House Foundation and is a Professor of international law at Kuwait University, Faculty of Law. She is a founding member of the Kuwait Environment Protection Society and served as Secretary General for over 10 years. She is well-published, having authored several books and articles on, amongst other subjects, international humanitarian law. At the international level, Dr. Al-Awadhi is a member of a number of International Organizations such as the International Federation of Women Lawyers, International Law Association, World Jurist Association and the International Council of Environmental Law..