Humanitarian Action Plan for the Conflict-Affected Provinces of Mindanao Responding to needs Consolidating gains Transitioning to recovery 2011
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE... 1 TABLE I: SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS (GROUPED BY CLUSTER)... 3 TABLE II: SUMMARY OF REQUIREMENTS (GROUPED BY APPEALING ORGANIZATION)... 3 2. CONTEXT... 4 3. NEEDS ANALYSIS... 10 3.1 HUMANITARIAN CASELOAD... 10 3.2 HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS... 17 3.3 HUMANITARIAN NEEDS OF IDPS AND RETURNEES... 21 4. SCENARIOS... 23 5. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES... 25 6. HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND COORDINATION... 28 6.1 COORDINATION... 28 6.2 HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES... 31 7. CLUSTER RESPONSE PLANS... 33 7.1 CCCM... 33 7.2 EARLY RECOVERY... 42 7.3 EDUCATION... 47 7.4 FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE... 54 7.5 HEALTH... 59 7.6 NUTRITION... 64 7.7 PROTECTION... 70 7.8 WATER, SANITATION AND HYGIENE... 85 ANNEXES... 89 ANNEX A. LIST OF ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED... 89 ANNEX B. LIST OF RESPONSE PLAN PROJECTS (GROUPED BY LOCATION AND CLUSTER)... 90 ANNEX C. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS...106 Full project details can be viewed, downloaded and printed from http://fts.unocha.org. i
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Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 1. Background and Scope The Humanitarian Action Plan for Conflict-Affected Provinces of Mindanao (HAP) covers humanitarian activities in six provinces of the southern Philippine island of Mindanao: Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato and South Cotabato. 1 The provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur fall within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The provinces of North Cotabato, South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat fall within Region XII. The province of Lanao del Norte is within Region X. The island provinces of Basilan and Sulu, although affected by conflict and with outstanding humanitarian needs, are not covered by the HAP at this time owing to a lack of information and access. It is intended, however, that these provinces be covered by the HAP in due course. The HAP covers a twelve-month period, from January 2011 until the end of December 2011. The total value of the projects in the HAP is US$ 34,527,526. 2 The HAP was developed shortly after passage of the Republic Act No. 10121 (the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act / DRRMA), which strengthens the Philippine disaster risk reduction and management system. The process of developing the HAP and the cluster plans therein fully recognises the provisions of this law. The HAP was developed through an intensive consultation process at the Mindanao level, which commenced with a one-day workshop in Cotabato City on 2 August 2010. The HAP workshop, which established the basic scope, framework and approach for the HAP, benefitted from the active participation of ARMM and Region XII Government representatives, all members of the international humanitarian community active in Mindanao and key local non-government organizations (NGOs). The main component of the HAP was developed through the clusters, with each cluster chaired by the respective government line ministry, and subsequently endorsed by both the Mindanao Humanitarian Team (MHT) in Cotabato City and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Manila before being shared with the regional governments for their final comments. 3 A list of government departments, international organisations, UN agencies and international and national NGOs which participated in the HAP process is included in Annex A. From humanitarian response to early recovery With the initial conflict-related displacement having taken place more than two years ago, and the ceasefire of July 2009 continuing to hold 4, the vast majority of the caseload of internally displaced people (IDPs) targeted in this HAP have returned to their places of origin. Accordingly, the emphasis of programming by humanitarian actors (as well as governments) is increasingly on early recovery interventions, both as projects in their own right and as a fundamentally important cross-cutting theme in ongoing humanitarian programmes. In terms of the generally recognised model of transition from humanitarian relief through early recovery to development (as illustrated in the diagram below), the target caseload is considered to be in the early recovery phase, requiring decreasing humanitarian intervention specifically related to needs generated by conflict/displacement and increasing humanitarian support through early recovery initiatives. This critical shift in focus has been reflected throughout the HAP, with early recovery mainstreamed into each of the cluster response plans (rather than overburdening the Early Recovery Cluster Response Plan ). The HAP recognises the fundamental importance of ensuring that returns are sustainable and that failure to adequately support early recovery would risk prolonging the crisis. It is important to note in this context that in the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for 2012-2018, which is being developed in close consultation with the Government and key stakeholders, Mindanao in particular the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao has been identified as the region least likely to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and, accordingly, as a priority geographic focus of the UNDAF (meaning that the HAP is in line with longer-term UN and government development objectives). Moreover, it is important to note the pattern of the past few decades, which has been that of peace negotiations punctuated by widespread fighting that results in relatively few deaths but displaces hundreds of thousands i.e. cycles of displacement/return/displacement. 1 About 33% of the total budget is earmarked for projects in Maguindanao (see also the pie charts in Annex B). 2 All dollar signs in this document denote United States dollars. 3 These consultations took place from 30 November to 3 December 2010 in General Santos City (OCD Region XII), Koronadal (DSWD Region XII), Cagayan de Oro (OCD and DSWD Region X) and Cotabato City (ARMM Government). 4 The International Monitoring Team has recorded only three armed skirmishes between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) from January to October 2010, a significant drop from 110 for the same period in 2009 (a total of 116 armed skirmishes were recorded from January to December 2009, and 222 from March to December 2008). 1
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Source: Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery (2008), Guidance note on Early Recovery The diagram illustrates the transition from the relief to early recovery and development phases and the main mechanisms the international community offers in support throughout this process, noting the continuity of the role of the national coordination mechanisms throughout. An Early Recovery Plan was developed in mid-2010 by the ARMM Government, through a consultative process and with the support of international actors. The Plan aims to bridge the gap between immediate relief and reconstruction and augment ongoing emergency assistance operations by building on humanitarian programmes, to ensure that their inputs become assets for long-term development and thereby foster the self-reliance of affected populations and help rebuild livelihoods. 5 In keeping with the Guiding Principles on Early Recovery, the plan focuses on building local capacity, effective analysis and monitoring, and includes cross-cutting themes such as gender, conflictsensitivity and human rights. The Early Recovery Plan covers 196 conflict-affected barangays (communities) in ARMM and prioritises 46 of these (in Maguindanao). The HAP has been developed carefully in order to ensure consistency with, and support for, the ARMM Early Recovery Plan, as is reflected in the early recovery projects and the early recovery aspects of projects in the other Cluster Response Plans. On 7 October 2010 the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) presented the Government s new PAMANA: Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (Resilient Communities for Peace and Development) Programme for Communities in Conflict-Affected Areas to the international community. While the PAMANA Programme is intended to cover all conflict-affected areas in the Philippines, its main geographic focus is the conflict-affected areas of Mindanao. 6 Accordingly, compatibility between the objectives of the HAP and those of PAMANA is essential. It should be noted in this context that the PAMANA Programme provides a general framework for action, rather than a detailed action plan, 7 and is focussed on peace-building, reconstruction and development. The geographic scope of the HAP is generally in line with the conflict-affected provinces in Central Mindanao identified by PAMANA 8 and, like PAMANA, the HAP aims to ensure that communities are at the centre of the response, through application of the participatory approach (e.g. community identification of priorities and involvement in project implementation). 5 ARMM Early Recovery Plan (2010), page 3. 6 According to PAMANA, 82.64% of conflict-affected barangays are in ARMM/Mindanao. 7 The only information on PAMANA available at the time of writing was the powerpoint presentation from the 7 October meeting. No further documentation has been provided. 8 PAMANA identifies Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte as the most conflict-affected provinces in Central Mindanao. 2
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Table I: Summary of requirements (grouped by cluster) Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 as of 27 January 2011 http://fts.unocha.org Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by appealing organizations. Cluster Requirements ($) CCCM 4,435,700 COORDINATION 246,888 EARLY RECOVERY 1,075,950 EDUCATION 2,828,150 FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 11,941,675 HEALTH 2,554,415 NUTRITION 2,014,000 PROTECTION, INCL. CHILD PROTECTION AND SGBV 5,537,704 WASH 3,893,044 Grand Total 34,527,526 Table II: Summary of requirements (grouped by appealing organization) Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 as of 27 January 2011 http://fts.unocha.org Compiled by OCHA on the basis of information provided by appealing organizations. Appealing Organization Requirements ($) FAO 2,141,675 IOM 4,285,890 MinHRAC 291,557 MTB 307,912 MYROi 261,055 OCHA 246,888 SC 1,452,700 UNDP 1,075,950 UNFPA 808,410 UNHCR 3,994,147 UNICEF 9,042,150 WFP 9,800,000 WHO 819,192 Grand Total 34,527,526 3
2. Context Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 The provinces of Mindanao covered by this Humanitarian Action Plan have been in a state of lowintensity conflict since 1968. 9 The conflict, combined with the impact of clan feuds and natural disasters, has resulted in cycles of displacement in which large numbers of civilians depend primarily on humanitarian assistance. The most recent major displacement occurred in August 2008, with approximately 750,000 people displaced by armed conflict. The IDPs remaining from this displacement and those who have returned recently to their places of origin, or resettled elsewhere, form the main basis of the humanitarian caseload with which the current HAP is concerned. In order to more fully appreciate the context, it is important to understand the impact of chronic poverty on the remote communities in the provinces targeted by the HAP, which serves to exacerbate the effects of conflict (for example, very poor access to potable water, troubling nutritional statistics and a range of other concerns, all of which have been highlighted in the UNDAF process as well). A snapshot of the conflict-affected provinces While the geographic scope of the HAP covers six provinces in Central Mindanao, the situation pertaining to each province is quite distinct and, accordingly, the humanitarian needs specific to each province vary to a significant degree. The ARMM Region (which, for the purposes of the HAP, includes Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur) is where the humanitarian needs are greatest and, consequently, is the priority focus of the HAP. According to the National Statistics Office, at the time of the last census in 2007 the populations of the six provinces covered by the HAP were: Maguindanao 1,273,715 Lanao del Norte 538,283 Lanao del Sur 1,138,544 North Cotabato 1,121,974 South Cotabato 767,255 Sultan Kudarat 677,062 The following provides a snapshot of the current situation in respect of each province: ARMM Maguindanao Maguindanao is the province where most people were displaced as a result of the 2008 conflict and where the impact of the conflict on civilians was the most severe in other respects as well (e.g. damage to houses and community structures). Accordingly, Maguindanao is the primary focus of the HAP. According to official government data, 10 Maguindanao is also the most impoverished of the six provinces, which means that the underlying vulnerabilities of the affected population were more pronounced even before they were displaced (see section 1.3 Humanitarian Needs of IDPs and Returnees ). While most IDPs in Maguindanao have spontaneously returned to their places of origin over the course of 2010, there remains a residual caseload of IDPs, both those living in Evacuation Centers (ECs) and those living with host communities, who require humanitarian assistance. Moreover, the people who have returned face significant challenges in re-establishing their lives and livelihoods, and their humanitarian needs are numerous. These needs include (but are not limited to) access to food and nutritional support, access to potable water, proper sanitation facilities and health care, rehabilitation of community structures (such as health facilities, schools, farm-to-market roads and solar driers), shelter support and support for education and sustainable livelihoods (especially agricultural support). There is also a significant need for support in the area of human rights and protection, including an improved mechanism for reporting human rights violations and child protection interventions. 9 It is estimated that the conflict was responsible for the deaths of 120,000 civilians between 1972 and 2004. 10 e.g. National Statistics Office; National Statistical Coordination Board; Regional Planning and Development Office- ARMM. 4
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Lanao del Sur Twenty of the 38 municipalities in Lanao del Sur (including Marawi City) were affected by the 2008 conflict, with the majority of the affected areas found around the lake where the main settlements are located. At only 14,643 people, however, the caseload that the HAP is targeting in Lanao del Sur is relatively modest compared with other provinces. It should be noted that this figure is perhaps an underestimate, reflecting the fact that many of the displaced people in Lanao del Sur live with host families and, consequently, are more difficult to track than those in Evacuation Centers. What is of note is that in September 2010 the percentage of those who were still considered displaced (47%) was relatively high compared with other provinces. This is likely to be in part due to ongoing local security issues and natural disasters. In addition to being badly affected by the conflict, Lanao del Sur has also been subjected to flooding and clan feuds known as rido. (In December 2010 a period of heavy rainfall reversed the previous trend of return to places of origin and resulted in further displacement.) Unfortunately the rule of law is weaker in parts of this province than most others in the HAP, especially in the conflict-affected municipalities, which makes assessments and the subsequent implementation of projects in the area more challenging. In general, there is a lack of up-to-date data for the area (some ongoing initiatives and projects under the HAP aim to address this issue). The data that are available suggest that there are significant needs relating to food, nutrition, health and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). Region XII North Cotabato, South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat The 2008 conflict affected each of these provinces, although less severely than in ARMM. The Region XII authorities had relatively functional mechanisms to support the displaced population. The capacity of the region and the fact that IDP numbers were generally lower meant that phases of IDP return to places of origin and recovery progressed further in Region XII than in ARMM. According to IOM s data from September 2010, more than 90% of the IDPs in North Cotabato were reported to have returned, whilst in Sultan Kudarat a relatively high proportion remained displaced (25%). The latter was in part due to natural disasters, and the figures would also capture those displaced by rido. Recent data from Region XII DSWD indicates that the families displaced due to the 2008 GRP/MILF conflict have returned home, but does not include on rido or flood-displaced communties. Closer examination indicates that the humanitarian situation in the provinces of Region XII varies considerably. Some municipalities continue to suffer more acutely the consequences of displacement due to conflict, including rido. Issues relating to health, protection, WASH and nutrition are of particular note. Other municipalities particularly in Sultan Kudarat have suffered relatively high displacement due to flooding. In some areas the activities of armed groups have hindered the access of IDPs and host communities to services (both of the government and of the humanitarian community) and have further obstructed the return and recovery process. Region X Lanao del Norte Lanao del Norte was the only province in Region X directly affected by the conflict. Thirteen municipalities within Lanao del Norte were affected, with the majority of the displacement taking place in the coastal municipalities on Iligan Bay. According to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), figures on displacement indicate that displacement peaked in September 2008, at 12,595 families, but the total cases recorded by humanitarian agencies is significantly higher. At the time of preparation of the HAP, more than 88% of the caseload of 38,510 people was considered no longer displaced (WFP data from September 2010), with additional returns anticipated in the intervening period. Consequently, the emphasis on programming in Lanao del Norte under the HAP is on early recovery activities. 5
History and root causes of the conflict Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 An estimated 5% of the Philippine population of 88.5 million people 11 are Muslim, referred to as Moro. Historically the Islamic Moro people formed a majority in much of Mindanao, the second largest of the country s more than seven thousand islands. Islam had spread to Mindanao from the Molucca Straits in 1380 and was adopted by a number of the distinct ethnic groups of Mindanao, including the Maguindanaoans, the Maranaoans and the Tausug. From 1565 onwards, the Moro people came into contact with the Spanish, who were in the process of colonising the Philippines. The relationship between the colonisers and the Moro was characterised by a war of attrition interrupted occasionally by temporary truces. During more than 300 years of Spanish control of the Philippines, the Spanish at no time controlled the island of Mindanao, with the exception of its settlement in Zamboanga, from which it commanded the Basilan Straits. The United States governed the Philippines from 1898 through to its independence in 1946 and consolidated the country under one system of government modelled on that of the United States. Throughout the American colonial period, people from other parts of the Philippines, particularly the Visayas, began to settle in parts of Mindanao. It was only after independence in 1946, however, that migration to Mindanao accelerated. By the 1960s, Muslims formed a majority only in the provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, as well as in specific municipalities of several other provinces. The unique history of Mindanao within the Philippines is fundamental to understanding the current situation, with the root causes of the conflict stemming largely from the island s unique circumstances. Currently, the conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao are the poorest in the Philippines and, in addition to the conflict-related humanitarian and early recovery needs, there is widespread unemployment and under-employment. Governance and rule of law face significant challenges and a situation of generalised insecurity and poor human security persists. The PAMANA Programme recognises the following as the root causes of the conflict: (i) poor governance, injustice and abuse; (ii) political marginalisation and inferiorisation ; (iii) threats to Moro and Islamic identity; (iv) perception of government neglect and absence of government; and (v) exploitation and marginalisation of indigenous and cultural communities. 12 A brief history of war and peace Communal fighting between Moro and settlers began shortly after the independence of the Philippines from the United States, with both Moro and Christian settlers forming militias. The Moro formed Blackshirt and Barracuda militias and settler militias were known as Ilaga. Originally seeking secession from the Philippines, the Moro insurgencies later modified their aims to that of greater autonomy within the Philippines for the Moro people in the areas where they form a majority of the population. The MNLF-GRP conflict The first Moro insurgent group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), was founded in 1968 and launched an armed insurgency against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) in 1972. The first peace agreement, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, was unsuccessful in reducing the level of conflict, due in part to the fact that it was implemented unilaterally by the government of President Marcos. The MNLF signed a Final Peace Agreement with the GRP during the administration of then President Fidel V. Ramos on 2 September 1996, with a further agreement signed the following year. To continue with the implementation of the Final Peace Agreement, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), MNLF and the Organization of the Islamic Conference Peace Committee for the Southern Philippines (OIC-PCSP) on 20 April 2010 in Tripoli. The MNLF cadres have been incorporated within the structures of the GRP, particularly those of the ARMM, and some of its fighters have been integrated within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The MNLF has not fought against the Government since this peace agreement was signed, but the MNLF still exists as a political movement. During the ARMM Peace Summit of September 2010, the MNLF leadership made clear its concern that successive governments had not implemented fully the Final Peace Agreement, that ARMM was 11 According to the National Statistics Office, the national population of the Philippines is estimated at 92.2 million as of 2009. 12 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) (October 2010), presentation on PAMANA. 6
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 not succeeding (partly due to being underfunded), and that many of the original grievances that had driven the conflict remained unresolved. Although the MNLF does not maintain fighting forces, in Basilan and on the Sulu Islands there are groups claiming to be affiliated with the MNLF that continue to engage in armed conflict. The MILF-GRP Conflict The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) broke away from the MNLF in 1977 (over questions of strategy and personality differences between its leadership 13 ) and was officially launched in 1984. The MILF maintains that the Moro people have been unfairly treated by successive governments, disenfranchised of their land and subjected to economic and political discrimination. They seek recognition of the Moro peoples status as a first nation supplanted by settlers, as well as redress for perceived injustices in the treatment of the Moro people by the GRP, especially with respect to land titling. The MILF does not accept the present governance and security arrangements and rejects the ARMM or any form thereof as a solution. On breaking away, the MILF absorbed many of the fighters from the MNLF who were based on Mindanao and rapidly built its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF). Lowintensity conflict persisted between the BIAF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines throughout the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s. The first talks between the GRP and MILF began in 1997 and have continued sporadically ever since. Periodically, talks are suspended due to major outbreaks of violence, causing a humanitarian crisis. Most recently, talks restarted in October 2004 and continued up until August 2008, 14 led by the respective peace panels of both parties. In August 2008, the Government and MILF appeared to be close to a breakthrough as they agreed a draft Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, which defined the geographical extent of a plebiscite where the electorate would be asked if they wished to join a putative Bangsamoro Juridical Entity that would form the basis for a revised autonomous Muslim region. The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain had been initialled by both parties in Kuala Lumpur, where negotiations had been taking place, and was due to be signed formally by the Philippine President and MILF leadership. In response to a Temporary Restraining Order lodged against it, however, the Supreme Court, ruled that the agreement was unconstitutional. Negotiations ceased and fighting broke out between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and three base commands of the MILF acting independently of the MILF central leadership, resulting in approximately 200 people being killed and 750,000 displaced. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Mindanao produced the highest number of new IDPs for 2008. 15 Although the August 2008 conflict affected Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, the fighting was most intense in Maguindanao. After a year of intermittent fighting between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and these renegade commands, the GRP announced a Suspension of Military Operations (SOMO) on 23 July 2009, followed two days later by an announcement by the MILF of a Suspension of Military Actions (SOMA). The SOMO and SOMA, although not explicitly recognising the de facto control of administrative areas by the MILF, freezes in place the situation that existed at the time. The two parties have undertaken not to encroach on the territory controlled by the other. In preparation for the resumption of the stalled peace talks between the GRP and the MILF, a fourpoint Joint Statement was forged by the two parties during their two-day meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 28-29 July 2009. The Joint Statement led to the creation and the adoption of the framework agreement on the formation of the International Contact Group on 15 September 2009. Subsequently, the Agreement on the Civilian Protection Component of the International Monitoring Team was signed on 27 October 2009 and peace talks resumed on 8-9 December 2009 in Kuala Lumpur. Security improved markedly during the second half of 2009, until the Maguindanao Massacre of 23 November 16 caused new displacement and led to major political upheavals in the ARMM, especially in the province of Maguindanao. 13 The leader of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, is a Tausug from the Sulu Islands. The initial MILF leader, Salamat Hashim was a Maguindanaon. 14 During this time the conflict continued but over seventy separate agreements and protocols were signed between the two parties. 15 See the section on Humanitarian Caseload in the Needs Analysis. 16 58 people were killed in the Maguindanao massacre. 7
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 The security situation improved again in early 2010 and has continued to be stable throughout the year. The SOMO and SOMA have held, with intermittent talks taking place between the GRP and MILF in Kuala Lumpur, under the auspices of the Malaysian government. Notably, the Declaration of Continuity for Peace Negotiations between the GRP and the MILF was issued during the 19 th GRP/MILF exploratory talks of 2-3 June 2010. As of December 2010, both the GRP and MILF had identified membership of the reformulated peace panels with the renewal of formal talks anticipated to commence in the coming months. It is anticipated that the current security situation will prevail, providing an environment conducive to the recommencement of negotiations. Although the conflict between the GRP and MILF pits an Islamic insurgency against a primarily Christian government, it would be a mistake to view this as a religious war. There is little or no sectarian violence and relations between Christians and Muslims, who often live in mixed communities, are generally harmonious. That said, optimism of the general public in areas affected by the conflict is tempered by an awareness that the peace process has dragged on for decades, even though several presidents have promised to end it. Moreover, there are spoilers of any potential agreement on both sides. Key peace process mechanisms The Joint Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (J-CCCH) comprising representatives of the Government and the MILF was first established in 1997 as the primary means of monitoring and enforcing the ceasefire. The Joint Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities remains as relevant as ever and is actively engaged in conflict resolution at the local level. The International Monitoring Team, comprising unarmed military and civilian observers led by Malaysia and with the participation of Libya, Japan and Brunei, was first established in 2004 as a small observer mission to oversee the ceasefire and build confidence between the parties. It was withdrawn in the middle of 2008 but recommenced operations on 28 February 2010. Associated with the International Monitoring Team is a Civilian Protection Component, which has a mandate to monitor the situation with respect to the protection of civilians. Furthermore, an International Contact Group (ICG) comprising diplomats from various countries has been established to support the peace process. Other sources of conflict in Mindanao Separate to the Moro insurgencies is that of the New People s Army (NPA) which is fighting for the establishment of a communist state in the Philippines. The New People s Army launched an insurgency in 1968 and is present in many parts of the country. The New People s Army is active in many areas of Mindanao but its actions, although deadly, have not caused displacement and so do not concern directly humanitarian agencies. The Abu Sayyaf Group is fighting against the GRP and has a small presence in Sulu and Basilan but is believed to have little presence in Central Mindanao. With little or no professed political agenda and engaging primarily in kidnapping for ransom, Abu Sayyaf is regarded as a terrorist group with which no negotiations are entertained. Generalised violence and clan feuds ( Rido ) The Maguindanao Massacre of 23 November 2009 was the most egregious and high profile example of a situation of generalised political violence that exists in parts of Mindanao and that is not directly linked to the GRP-MILF conflict. Armed fights between clans, families and other groupings known locally as rido continue to be prevalent. Ridos usually concern land disputes, long-standing vendettas, political power and other such matters. Individuals, between whom there is a dispute, often related to a private matter, often resort to violence. At the time of writing, the Joint Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities was tracking 23 unresolved ridos in Maguindanao province alone, of which nine were active. Although ridos fall outside of the main GRP-MILF conflict, many of the protagonists are affiliated with the MILF or are either elected or appointed government officials. A fight that starts as a rido between two individuals therefore has the potential to escalate, and has certainly done so in the past. Successive governments have supported local politicians in forming Citizen Armed Force Geographical Units or Civilian Volunteer Organisations, most of which are armed militias, and although nominally under the chain of command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, often operate independently of it. 8
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Ownership of weapons is widespread across conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao, further exacerbating conflict and violence. The rule of law is weak especially in Maguindanao province. Extortion, kidnap for ransom and assassinations are commonplace. Natural disasters Like the rest of the Philippines, Mindanao is very susceptible to natural disasters. Seasonal flooding occurs across all the provinces included in this plan, with over 100,000 people displaced annually. This situation has been exacerbated by logging and clearing activities in upstream water catchment areas. In some areas, this has resulted in semi-permanent changes to river flow, prolonging the duration of displacement for those affected during the wet season. In the rural areas of Maguindanao, recent floods hampered the ability of returning IDPs to rebuild and re-establish livelihood activities. Mindanao is also prone to tectonic activity. While small earthquakes are regular, the most recent highmagnitude major earthquake occurred in 1976. The majority of the 5,000 to 8,000 fatalities were in the coastal areas as a result of the tsunami triggered by the earthquake. 9
3. Needs Analysis 3.1 Humanitarian caseload Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 The affected population with which this Humanitarian Action Plan is primarily concerned comprises those IDPs displaced by the conflict that began in August 2008, including those who have now returned or resettled (which is the majority of them). IDPs displaced by generalised violence, including rido, and IDPs displaced by flooding or other natural calamities are also included in the humanitarian caseload. Several of the interventions pursuant to this HAP will also benefit communities hosting IDPs. The total population being considered in this HAP is 447,213 people. History of displacement There have been several major displacements during the past decade and before due to conflicts between the Moro insurgencies and the Government. The most serious displacement was caused by the all out war of 2000, in which it is estimated around one million people were displaced. The fighting of 2003-2004 also displaced an estimated 400,000 people. The graph below was compiled by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre showing the history of displacement in Mindanao, using data from the Department of Social Welfare and Development and other sources: Displacement on a smaller scale due to rido, flooding and other natural calamities is frequent and is usually shorter term. Displacement from August 2008 Estimates very of those displaced due to the conflict that began in August 2008 and lasted until July 2009. The Government recognised that more than 750,000 people had been displaced, but fewer than half of these were ever registered as IDPs. Since the declaration of the SOMA and SOMO, IDPs have been gradually returning to their places of origin. Some IDPs remain displaced, however, with security, shelter and livelihoods being cited as the most common reasons for choosing to remain in the Evacuation Centers. The table below sets out the number of IDP families registered by the Department of Social Welfare and Development as IDPs by region, updated monthly. The number of registered IDPs actually peaked in August 2009, but this was a factor of increased capacity to perform registrations rather than new displacement. What is clear, however, is that displacement is a longer-term problem for Maguindanao than for the other provinces affected by the conflict. 10
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Households displaced by region Region X Region XII ARMM Total Aug-08 11,237 24,225 31,044 66,506 Sep-08 12,595 21,065 26,292 59,952 Oct-08 12,195 20,601 30,312 63,108 Nov-08 12,086 24,284 32,145 68,515 Dec-08 1,344 24,054 38,289 63,687 Jan-09 1,264 17,724 45,631 64,619 Feb-09 1,264 26,244 45,631 73,139 Mar-09 1,013 2,622 43,962 47,597 Apr-09 1,194 2,622 43,962 47,778 May-09 1,194 3,757 47,308 52,259 Jul-09 1,194 10,471 69,458 81,123 Aug-09 261 3,757 76,682 80,700 Sep-09 261 3,757 62,010 66,028 Nov-09 4,181 42,483 46,664 Dec-09 1,894 35,751 37,645 Mar-10 1,862 25,402 27,264 Apr-10 3,741 16,991 20,732 Jun-10 36,984 36,984 Jul-10 22,325 22,325 The accurate number of those displaced at a given moment in time is difficult to establish because agencies tend to track their own beneficiaries, as opposed to the global total of IDPs in a province. Furthermore, as agencies reach the end of their project funding cycle capacity is reduced and tracking mechanisms are discontinued. Meanwhile the DSWD s capacity is not at the level required to monitor the entirety of the conflict-affected areas, and it deploys resources where they are most needed. With these challenges in mind, the recent statistics are as follows: Maguindanao: IOM data as of 17 December 2010 identify 2,549 IDP families (12,332 individuals) in 17 Evacuation Centers; 621 families (3,105 individuals) in Relocation Sites; 108 families (1,540 individuals) as home-based IDPs. DSWD data from 10 November 2010 identifies 2,960 IDP families as still in Evacuation Centres. North Cotabato: DSWD Region XII indicated in January 2011 that they do not consider there to be any families still displaced as a result of the 2008 GRP/MILF conflict. However, displacement exists due to rido, but numbers fluctuate quickly in response to the localised security issues. IOM data from September 2010 identified 9,445 individuals as displaced in the province. Since then IOM monitoring has ceased. South Cotabato: DSWD Region XII indicated in January 2011 that they do not consider there to be any families still displaced as a result of the 2008 GRP/MILF conflict. IOM data from September 2010 identified 1,405 individuals as displaced in the province. Since then IOM monitoring has ceased. Sultan Kudarat: DSWD Region XII indicated in January 2011 that they do not consider there to be any families still displaced as a result of the 2008 GRP/MILF conflict. IOM data from September 2010 identified 7,020 individuals as displaced in the province, due primarily to a rido and flooding. Since then IOM monitoring has ceased. Lanao del Sur: WFP identified 6,958 individuals as displaced in September 2010 due to various factors. Lanao del Norte: WFP identified 4,386 individuals as displaced in September 2010 due to various factors. 11
Patterns of displacement Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 A feature of displacement in Mindanao is the typically short distances by which families are displaced. Distances of displacement can be as little as one kilometre and rarely more than a few kilometres. In general, IDPs move from rural areas, often referred to as interior barangays, to the main roads and towns, so as to avoid armed clashes and artillery fire. The relative proximity of the displacement sites and places of origin allows a proportion of the displaced people to work in fields and plantations during the day at the place of origin, but return to the safer locations overnight. Many IDPs moved into camp-like settings known as Evacuation Centers (such as schools, community centres, other government buildings), residing in rooms or temporary shelters in the grounds of the building. Some, however, moved into the homes of family and friends or constructed shelters in host communities. These are commonly referred to as home-based IDPs. In general, the needs of the families at Evacuation Centers are more acute than those who are home-based, as the latter draw to an extent on the resources of their host. However, home-based IDPs have proven more difficult for the authorities and humanitarian actors to track, and therefore run a greater risk of being inadvertently overlooked in the support provided by the agencies. Data collection issues IOM and the Department of Social Welfare and Development are currently tracking IDPs in Maguindanao only. Displacement persists in areas outside of Maguindanao, though the numbers are small and are largely driven by rido and flooding, and periods of displacement are relatively brief in most cases. IOM stopped its tracking outside Maguindanao due to funding constraints, while DSWD discontinued its tracking in other provinces following an improvement in the situation in their respective areas. During the period of displacement due to the 2008 conflict the figures presented from IOM and DSWD tracking varied significantly. In summary, differences in approaching conflict, rido, and flood-related displacement, breadth and depth of coverage, and definition resulted in discrepancies between agencies figures. A technical working group under the Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster was established and is working towards reconciling the data on IDP and returnee figures available. A methodology is being finalised and is anticipated to be rolled out in 2011. The solution proposed will be of value in relation to displacement due to ongoing rido and any future displacement episodes. On behalf of DSWD, IOM developed a Humanitarian Response Monitoring System (HRMS), a database system designed to enable DSWD to track displaced families. This database system was installed in DSWD in early 2010 but has yet to be used, partly due to a lack of capacity. Other organizations also collect data as part of their activities in the field. Returnees As early as January 2009, the Government of President Arroyo made clear its intention to resolve the displacement crisis through the return or resettlement of IDPs. Some success was achieved in North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur and Sultan Kudarat. While the returns process resulted in the physical return of IDPs to their places of origin or resettlement, however, durable solutions proved to be challenging, with some return areas still deficient in the basic support required by returned IDPs, particularly livelihoods and shelter. Many returnees in these provinces live a hand-to-mouth existence and continue to need support of a humanitarian nature. From the various surveys conducted to ascertain the intentions of IDPs, the overwhelming reason given for remaining in their places of displacement is security. Initially, there were concerns about the GRP/MILF ceasefire holding; now the reluctance to return is related more to the lack of a final peace agreement or the continued presence of armed men in their areas of origin. Many IDPs, particularly the men, visit their homes during the day to farm and collect fruit or firewood, but return to their camps at night due to these perceived insecurity concerns. A Conflicted-Affected Communities Forum convened by members of the CCCM Cluster and involving representatives of more than 130 IDP sites and return areas was held in November 2010. The IDPs articulated their need (at both IDP sites and return areas) for humanitarian support and early recovery interventions such as food, health, WASH, shelter, education and livelihood support, as well as security and safety. The tracking/registration of returnees is weaker than that of IDPs and remains a challenging issue in the humanitarian response. 12
Summary Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 For the purposes of this HAP, the humanitarian caseload is as per the table below. The figures below are based on the data available from IOM and WFP, and represent both IDPs and returnees. Observations by agencies at ECs or return locations invariably takes place during the day, and results in relatively greater female than male numbers. This is attributed to males being largely involved in income-generation activities away from the site. Furthermore, some programmes target women exclusively and caseload figures based on this will further increase the relative proportion of women. Affected population Location Female Male Total Maguindanao* 140,898 93,932 234,830 North Cotabato 76,884 51,256 128,140 South Cotabato 2,043 1,362 3,405 Sultan Kudarat 16,611 11,074 27,685 Lanao del Sur** 10,806 3,837 14,643 Lanao del Norte 27,307 11,203 38,510 Total 274,549 172,664 447,213 * Figures for Maguindanao, North Cotabato, South Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat are from IOM as of September 2010. ** Figures for Lanao del Sur and Lanao del Norte are sourced from the World Food Programme (September 2010). The three maps on the following pages show the historical patterns of displacement by municipality. 13
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Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 3.2 Humanitarian and development indicators Indicator Region Province Data Notes Population National 88,566,732 Source: National Statistics Office (NSO), August 2007 ARMM Maguindanao 1,273,715 Consumer price index Source: NSO, April 2010 Consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of change in the average retail prices of goods and services commonly purchased by a particular group of people in a particular area. These figures for April 2010 are compared to the baseline year 2000, whose CPI is defined as 100. Purchasing power of the peso Source: NSO, April 2010 Purchasing Power of the Peso (PPP) shows how much the peso in the base period is worth in another period. It gives an indication of the real value of the peso in a given period relative to the peso value in the base period. Purchasing Power of the Peso (PPP) = 1 / CPI(All Items) * 100 Crude births (per thousand population) Source: NSO Quickstat, 2005-2010 Crude deaths (per thousand population) Source: NSO Quickstat, 2005-2010 Region XII Lanao del Sur 1,138,544 North Cotabato 1,121,974 Excluding 259,153 in Cotabato City South Cotabato 767,255 Excluding Gen. Santos City Sultan Kudarat 677,062 Region X Lanao del Norte 538,283 National 165.90 ARMM Maguindanao 194.50 Lanao del Sur 174.10 Region XII North Cotabato 188.50 South Cotabato 155.5 Sultan Kudarat 169.10 Region X Lanao del Norte 167.80 National 0.60 ARMM Maguindanao 0.51 Lanao del Sur 0.57 Region XII North Cotabato 0.53 South Cotabato 0.64 Sultan Kudarat 0.59 Region X Lanao del Norte 0.60 National 22.80 ARMM Maguindanao 32.50 Lanao del Sur 36.5 Region XII North Cotabato 32.46 South Cotabato 30.51 Sultan Kudarat 24.50 Region X Lanao del Norte 25.91 National 5.48 ARMM Maguindanao 8.40 Lanao del Sur 7.87 Region XII North Cotabato 5.66 South Cotabato 6.35 Sultan Kudarat 5.52 Region X Lanao del Norte 6.56 17
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Indicator Region Province Data Notes Under-5-year-old mortality rate per 1000 live births National 32 Source: UNDP MDG Rate of Progress (Regional ARMM Maguindanao 45 Including the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi result include other provinces in the region), 2006 Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 33 Including the province of Sarangani South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 29 Including the provinces of Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental Infant mortality rate National 24 Source: UNDP MDG Rate of Progress (Regional ARMM Maguindanao 33 result include other provinces in the region), 2006 Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 21 South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Maternal mortality rate Source: UNDP MDG Rate of Progress (Regional result include other provinces in the region), 2006 (National) and 1995 (Regional) Life expectancy at birth (in years, medium assumption) Source: NSO Quickstat, 2005-2010 Literacy Rate (simple literacy) Source: NSO Quickstat, 2003 (National) and 2000 (Provincial) Simple literacy is the ability of a person to read and write with understanding a simple message in any language or dialect. The simple literacy status of an individual can be determined based on the respondents answer to the question Can read and write a simple message in any language or dialect? Region X Lanao del Norte 22 National 162 ARMM Maguindanao 320 Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 188 South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 225 Male Female National 66.11 71.64 ARMM Maguindanao 60.30 61.65 Lanao del Sur 61.87 62.74 Region XII North Cotabato 65.77 71.08 South Cotabato 66.51 71.80 Sultan Kudarat 64.45 69.22 Region X Lanao del Norte 64.03 68.70 National 93.4 ARMM Maguindanao 66.27 Lanao del Sur 80.12 Region XII North Cotabato 86.69 South Cotabato 89.44 Sultan Kudarat 83.96 Region X Lanao del Norte 85.04 18
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Indicator Region Province Data Notes Cohort survival rate in public and private National 69.80 elementary schools ARMM Maguindanao 48.10 Source: ARMM Peace Summit Presentation entitled ARMM Multi-Stakeholders Peace and Development Region XII Lanao del Sur North Cotabato 54.04 Issues, September 2010 (data from 2002-2003) South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 68.00 Proportion of families below subsistence National 10.2% threshold ARMM Maguindanao 18.20% Regional result include other provinces in the region Source: UNDP MDG Rate of Progress 2003-2005 Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 14.00% South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 19.50% Proportion of families below poverty threshold National 24.40% Source: UNDP MDG Rate of Progress, 2003-2005 ARMM Maguindanao 45.40% Regional results include other provinces in the region Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 32.10% Regional results include other provinces in the region South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 37.70% Proportion of underweight children under five National 24.60% years old ARMM Maguindanao 38.00% Source: UNDP MDG Rate of Progress, 2003-2005 Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 27.80% South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 62.10% Rate (%) or Proportion of HH with access to Safe National 80.20% Water Supply ARMM Maguindanao 10.19% Data from DoH Sources: Lanao del Sur 6.13% Field Health Service Information System, DOH/RDO- Region XII North Cotabato 74.30% Data from UNDP ARMM, 2008 South Cotabato UNDP MDG Rate of Progress (Regional result Sultan Kudarat include other provinces in the region), 2004 Region X Lanao del Norte 79.80% Data from UNDP 19
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Indicator Region Province Data Notes Rate (%) or Proportion of HH with sanitary toilet National 86.20% Sources: ARMM Maguindanao 49.07% Data from DOH Field Health Service Information System, DOH/RDO- Lanao del Sur 13.85% ARMM, 2008 Region XII North Cotabato 83.20% Data from UNDP UNDP MDG Rate of Progress, 2004 South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 87.00% Data from UNDP Human Development Index National 0.751 Source: ARMM Maguindanao 0.461 UNDP Humanitarian Report, 2009 (National) Lanao del Sur 0.464 NSO Quickstat, 2000 Region XII North Cotabato 0.512 South Cotabato 0.595 Sultan Kudarat 0.554 Status of energization; % energized Source: ARMM Peace Summit Presentation entitled ARMM Multi-Stakeholders Peace and Development Issues, September 2010 (data from 2007) Region X Lanao del Norte 0.553 National 67.4% ARMM Maguindanao 24.0% Including the provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi Lanao del Sur Region XII North Cotabato 49.1% Including the province of Sarangani South Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Region X Lanao del Norte 71.8% Including the provinces of Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental and Misamis Occidental 20
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 3.3 Humanitarian needs of IDPs and returnees The humanitarian needs of the remaining IDPs and returnees are significant. These needs are summarised in this section but are examined in greater detail in the individual Cluster Response Plans. In general the conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao are among the poorest in the Philippines, as the indicators in the previous section show. Of these, Maguindanao stands out as the most impoverished, with an average life expectancy for males of 61 years, some 11 years less than the national average. Maternal mortality in ARMM is twice the national average. The infant mortality rate in ARMM stands at 32, whereas the national average is 24. Only 10% of people in Maguindanao are stated as having access to clean water, whereas the national average is 80%. On top of these troubling statistics, the impact of repetitive displacements combined with the most recent prolonged displacement has significantly eroded coping mechanisms of the affected population. The difficulty of re-establishing lives and livelihoods is seriously hampering the early recovery of those who have spontaneously returned over the past year. Essential facilities have been damaged by the conflict or fallen into disrepair, homes have been destroyed and farmland has become unproductive. Poor to begin with, laden with debts and having lost most of their assets, returnees are struggling to re-establish their lives and livelihoods and remain vulnerable to shocks, either from natural or manmade disasters. While governance structures remain in place down to barangay level (apart from some barangays of return), a shortage of funding has hampered efforts to support both IDPs and returnees. Following the Suspension of Military Operations and Suspension of Military Action, humanitarian access to almost all parts of Central Mindanao has been good, apart from the period following the Maguindanao Massacre of 23 November 2009 and for short periods in areas affected by rido. The geography of some return areas does hinder access, particularly during the wet season, due to the quality of roads. Food Security and Agriculture The Emergency Food Security Assessment conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) in January 2010 indicated that approximately 70% of IDP and returnee households were food-insecure. Of this 70%, 40% were considered to be highly or moderately food-insecure. Inadequate food consumption is prevalent among IDPs and returnees. IDPs have lost draught animals (carabao), small livestock, farm tools and fishing gear and are heavily indebted to moneylenders, banks and other credit institutions from loans taken out to plant crops that were not harvested due to displacement. Health The increased demand for services brought about by the conflict and displacement of IDPs has caused further strain on the health resources of the host communities. At the same time, the conflict has hampered the implementation of public health programmes in the rural communities. Pregnant women have been particularly vulnerable, due to lack of access to reproductive health services. Nutrition During the first quarter of 2009, UNICEF and WFP led a Joint Nutrition and Food Security Assessment covering the conflict-affected IDPs. The assessment highlighted the disparity between the national average and conflict-affected areas. Global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates of 9.8% (2006 WHO Growth Standards) were close to the threshold that requires urgent intervention (10%). Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) was as high as 2.2% (2006 WHO Growth Standards). The assessment also found that 87% of households faced food insecurity and were eating less-preferred foods while 75% were limiting their meal sizes thereby decreasing dietary diversity. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Two years after being displaced, many IDPs still lack access to safe drinking water and adequate sanitation in Evacuation Centers and other places of displacement. Unsafe drinking water and sanitation are cited as being the causes of the ten highest cases of diseases such as diarrhoea, especially in children. In areas of return, drinking water sources and sanitation facilities have been, in many cases, damaged or have deteriorated over the past two years. 21
Camp Coordination and Camp Management Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Progress is being made in establishing a common understanding of the different categories of the displaced or returned populations, as well as agreement amongst actors as to the most accurate figures for the caseload within each of the categories, but the task of establishing such norms remains challenging. Information exchange between IDPs, the Government and humanitarian agencies that are assisting them needs strengthening, as does the governance and representative structures of conflict-affected communities in both places of displacement and of return. Many IDPs and returnees have inadequate shelter. Most temporary and permanent shelters are constructed of local materials and rapidly become dilapidated in the tropical climate. Education Assessments conducted by Education Cluster members and the Department of Education (DepEd) ARMM, found that around 70,000 children were affected by the 2008 armed conflict. Various assessments conducted subsequently by cluster members indicate that IDP children have poor access to education due to prolonged displacement, destruction and damage to school buildings, the distance of schools from Evacuation Centers, overcrowded classes, poor health and the need to work in order to provide family income. Protection At the policy level, the incomplete national IDP policy framework and legislation hinders the ability of humanitarian actors to work with the Government in relation to displaced populations. Although there has been some improvement, a better understanding of a voluntary returns process is still needed. A number of specifically vulnerable groups have been identified (widows, children associated with armed groups, survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) requiring assistance, and the elderly and disabled), yet disaggregated data or clear information on their needs is not available. Children and their caregivers from these communities are suffering from profound distress because of their prolonged displacement and unstable conditions. The potential for child abuse and exploitation is high, as is the risk of children being recruited by armed groups or falling victim to child traffickers. Early Recovery The priority early recovery needs of the returning IDPs centre on the lack of livelihoods opportunities, resources, essential infrastructure and the capacity of the local authorities to coordinate initiatives. In many cases, almost all of the IDPs meagre resources have been depleted through almost two years in Evacuation Centers. While some of the IDPs have managed to retain their farm animals and basic farm tools, they lack other skills and resources, including seeds and other agricultural inputs. Early recovery has been mainstreamed into all of the cluster response plans and activities will, to the extent possible, support the ARRM Early Recovery Plan. Ensuring sustainable returns through effective early recovery interventions will also support the goals of the PAMANA Programme by helping to build resilient communities and providing a solid foundation for peace-building activities. 22
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 4. Scenarios The following paragraphs outline three potential scenarios for conflict-affected provinces that may arise in 2011: Best-case scenario The Government Suspension of Military Operations and MILF Suspension of Military Action continue to hold and negotiations lead to a peace agreement being concluded in early-mid 2011. The increased deployment of the International Monitoring Team and the associated Civilian Protection Component leads to greater confidence on the part of the parties and the population. Efforts to disarm and demobilise private armed groups are successful, reducing instances of banditry and armed clashes/rido. The trial of those held responsible for the Maguindanao Massacre of 23 November proceeds smoothly. IDPs continue to return to their places of origin or to permanently resettle elsewhere and are successful in recovering their livelihoods. By the end of the first quarter of 2011, there are few IDPs located in either Evacuation Centers or host communities. There are no natural calamities, such as flooding, earthquakes, landslides or tsunamis, during this period. The Government and humanitarian community agree on a policy framework for returns and resettlement that adhere to humanitarian principles and the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Government capacity to respond improves and there is strengthened cooperation with the humanitarian community. Coordination mechanisms, built around the cluster system, are consolidated and improved. Humanitarian assistance focuses increasingly on early recovery and transitions over time to a development phase. Humanitarian access further improves and all of the humanitarian caseload can be accessed, with the exception of those in Sulu and Basilan. Most likely scenario Peace negotiations between the GRP and MILF continue but without a final peace agreement reached during 2011. The issues are complex and negotiations have gone on for many years without a final resolution. Multiple potential spoilers exist on both sides that can easily frustrate the ratification of tentative agreements that may be reached. There exist further difficulties in that any GRP-MILF agreement would need to be in line with the Final Peace Agreement signed in 1996 between the GRP and the MNLF. Despite the lack of agreement, the MILF manages to contain potential spoilers on its side and there is no significant violence associated with the GRP-MILF conflict. There will be a heightened international awareness of the peace process through the work of the International Monitoring Team, International Contact Group and Civilian Protection Component. It is assumed that this will create more humanitarian space for civil society organizations in conflict-affected areas. The ARMM Government elections take place in April 2011, as planned, with some violent clashes before and after the election day but no generalised violence throughout ARMM and North Cotabato (as was the case during the barangay level elections of October 2010). The Government elections do not cause any significant new displacement, nor impact negatively on humanitarian access. Violent clashes concerning rido continue periodically and cause localised, temporary displacement. The displaced population in the Evacuation Centers continues to drop, with most IDPs returning to their places of origin. Some elect not to return, however, due to fear of insecurity and a lack of adequate support to sustain their return. In such cases, IDPs remain where they are, relocate to other Evacuation Centers, choose to live temporarily in resettlement centres or set themselves up temporarily in host communities. It remains challenging for the Government and humanitarian community to determine accurate numbers of IDPs and to identify those requiring assistance. The United Nations (UN) agencies and NGOs continue operations in 2011 with programmes increasingly focussed on early recovery. Financial support from donors decreases, due to the shift to early recovery. 23
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Heavy rains cause flooding in certain areas during the monsoon season, causing temporary displacement and some destruction to property and crops. However, there is no major natural calamity during this period. Worst-case scenario The peace process between the GRP and the MILF either stalls or breaks down completely. Factions within the MILF renew military operations against the GRP, and the Armed Forces of the Philippines responds with large-scale operations. There is significant fighting across Central Mindanao, causing displacement from interior barangays to main highways and towns. This displacement might last for years, with humanitarian needs exceeding available capacities and resources. Many of those displaced may never return to their places of origin, due to fears of continued insecurity. Natural disasters, including flooding and associated landslides, exacerbate the effects of the conflict on the population. Humanitarian consequences include: Large-scale displacement (up to 1,000,000 individuals); Loss of life and injuries, particularly within vulnerable groups (such as pregnant women, young children, the disabled and elderly, people requiring urgent medical attention); Unacceptable humanitarian conditions in places of displacement; Acute lack of health, water, sanitation and hygiene facilities; Increased disease outbreaks in IDP locations; Destruction of homes and infrastructure, loss of property; Severe loss or degradation of livelihoods; Severe food insecurity, both short-term and longer-term; Exponential increase in acute malnutrition; Severe disruption to basic services; Drastic diminution of government capacity in affected areas; Major protection issues, including cases of sexual and gender-based violence; Destruction of road, transport and communications infrastructure; and Severe restrictions on the movement of humanitarian agencies and government departments. 24
5. Strategic Objectives Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 During the Humanitarian Action Plan Workshop on 2 August, government partners from ARMM and Region XII, together with the international humanitarian community (UN agencies, international organizations and international NGOs) and local NGOs, determined the following strategic objectives for the HAP: 1. To support the Government to address the humanitarian needs of affected populations in a timely manner. 2. To establish an enabling environment for the implementation of durable solutions for affected populations. 3. To develop the capacities of local Government and communities to respond to emergencies and manage their early recovery. 4. To establish structures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals and groups. Using these strategic objectives as a basis, the eight clusters worked to develop the cluster objectives, indicators and targets summarised in the table overleaf. These objectives, indicators and targets have also been adapted, as necessary, to ensure their compatibility with the ARMM Early Recovery Plan and the PAMANA Programme, both of which were subsequently launched. The link between cluster plan objectives and the above strategic objectives is summarised in the following pages. Strategic Objective 1. To support the Government to address the humanitarian needs of affected populations in a timely manner. Corresponding Cluster Response Plan Objectives CCCM To collect, track, analyse and disseminate information concerning IDPs and returnees for the use of the humanitarian community and other stakeholders. Education To increase the access of internally displaced children to educational services. To support the provision of services with other clusters that increase access to and quality of education for affected children. Food Security To ensure adequate food consumption for targeted beneficiaries. and Agriculture Health To ensure the provision of essential public health services, including reproductive health, in IDP sites and return areas. To strengthen health sector referral system. Nutrition To assess in a timely manner the nutritional status of IDPs and host communities, including score and severity of the nutritional situation, causes of malnutrition and contextual factors, to inform decision-making and response. Protection To ensure the development of a protection environment in which protection principles are recognised and applied in all humanitarian responses. To establish needs of returning IDP population and to strengthen community self-reliance and livelihood opportunities. In relation to child protection: o To prevent and address the separation of children and the promotion of family-based care. o To provide psycho-social support to children and their caregivers. WASH To ensure those in IDP sites and in return areas have access to essential WASH services at levels that meet commonly agreed standards. 25
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Strategic Objective 2. To establish an enabling environment for the implementation of durable solutions for affected populations. 3. To develop the capacities of local government and communities to respond to emergencies and manage their early recovery. Corresponding Cluster Response Plan Objectives CCCM To ensure that displaced families have adequate emergency shelter. Early Recovery To ensure the integration and mainstreaming of early recovery aspects in interventions of all clusters. To support early recovery and reintegration initiatives by the affected communities themselves. To promote sustainable non-agricultural livelihoods, essential infrastructure and environmental initiatives in IDP sites and return areas. Food Security To increase the access of targeted communities to assets in and Agriculture fragile, transition situations. Nutrition To ensure the availability of appropriate and comprehensive Protection treatment of acute malnutrition for IDPs and host communities. In relation to child protection: o To establish a mechanism to systematically monitor and report and trigger response to grave rights violations and protection concerns of children and women. o To prevent and address the recruitment and use as well as the arbitrary arrest and detention of children. o To raise awareness and responds to incidence of UXOs and other indiscriminate and illicit weapons. CCCM To support the implementation of relevant policies and establishment of protection mechanisms relating to site management of displaced populations. Early Recovery To strengthen capacities of local government, local leaders and other stakeholders for effective emergency response and management of early recovery and provide a solid foundation for peace building Education To enhance the capacity of teachers, day-care workers and volunteers on Education in Emergencies standards. To increase the knowledge and acceptance of education services on the part of affected communities. Food Security To enhance the skills of targeted communities thus improving their and Agriculture resilience to shocks. Nutrition To ensure the promotion, support and protection of appropriate infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices among IDPs and host communities. Protection In relation to child protection: o To establish community based child protection systems in affected areas. o To establish with Government effective leadership on child protection group area of responsibility with links to other clusters/sector mechanism on critical inter-sectoral issues. o To build the capacities of LGUs and communities to provide child protection response during emergencies. o To prevent and address the violence, exploitation and abuse of children and women, including GBV. WASH To build the capacity of local Government and communities to operate and maintain WASH facilities to ensure sustainability. 26
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Strategic Objective 4. To establish structures and mechanisms to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals and groups. Corresponding Cluster Response Plan Objectives CCCM To ensure that site management mechanisms are established. To ensure agreed shelter standards (size, material, cost and methodology) are adopted amongst the shelter actors to ensure equity of response. Education To support Education in Emergencies policies and standards, to include mainstreaming, accreditation and promotion of children attending alternative modes of education. Food Security and Agriculture To increase the attendance of pregnant and lactating women at health centres. To increase the enrolment of children, including IDPs and returnees, in schools assisted by the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster. To strengthen the public and community based institutions responsible for sector development and service provisions (e.g. extension). To increase food production among resettled and returnee households. Nutrition To ensure that children and pregnant and lactating women have access to micronutrients from fortified food, supplements or multiple micronutrient preparations. Protection To ensure the existence of protection mechanisms capable of providing support in a timely manner, through effective coordination, clear referral pathways, early warning and response and identification of vulnerable groups. To ensure the provision of essential protection services in IDP sites and return areas to all children, women and other vulnerable groups. o To establish community based child protection systems in affected areas. o To establish with Government effective leadership on child protection group area of responsibility with links to other clusters/sector mechanism on critical inter-sectoral issues. o To build the capacities of LGUs and communities to provide child protection response during emergencies. o To prevent and address the violence, exploitation and abuse of children and women, including GBV. 27
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 6. Humanitarian agencies and coordination 6.1 Coordination Cluster system Since 2008, the Government of the Philippines has adopted the humanitarian cluster approach through a series of circulars from the National Disaster Coordination Council (NDCC), now the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC). The ARMM Government has established eight clusters for humanitarian response that are the main means by which humanitarian assistance is coordinated for the province of Maguindanao. These eight clusters are: Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM); Health; Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH); Education; Nutrition; Protection Food and agriculture; and Early Recovery. The Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Sub-Group and the Child Protection Network report through the Protection Cluster. There is also a Reproductive Health (RH) Sub-Cluster under the Health Cluster. Agriculture is discussed at the Food Cluster (discussion is ongoing regarding formalising the forum for coordination of agriculture). Each Cluster/sector at the Mindanao level is led by a government department and co-led by a UN agency or other international humanitarian actor, as per the table below. Cluster/Sector Government Lead MHT Lead Support Agencies Humanitarian Coordination TMS-ARMM OCHA RDRRMC Security J-CCCH UNDSS Camp Coordination and Management DSWD IOM UNHCR, CFSI, MTB, KFI, ACF, Oxfam, NRC Food DSWD WFP ACF, CFSI Health DoH WHO UNFPA, Save the Children WASH DoH-ARMM UNICEF WHO, IOM, Oxfam, ACF, MTB, KFI, ASDSW, DILG, DPWH, IPHO, RHU Protection UNHCR IOM, UNICEF, OCHA, WFP, UNFPA, KFI, MTB, CFSI, MSF, Save the Children, MinHRAC, NRC Agriculture DAF-ARMM/DA FAO WFP, UNDP, ILO, UN- HABITAT, Provincial Local Government Units Early Recovery and Livelihoods DSWD (livelihoods and non-food items) UNDP OCD, FAO, WFP, UNHCR, OCHA, IOM Education DepEd UNICEF CFSI, DSWD Save the Children Nutrition DoH UNICEF Save the Children, ACF, MTB, MYROi, CFSI, MTB, WHO, WFP, OCHA Logistics OCD NDRRMC WFP Clusters meet monthly to share updates, identify gaps and plan interventions. The clusters worked together to design cluster response plans within the HAP and review project proposals of cluster members. The cluster reporting arrangements are shown in the diagram overleaf. 28
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils The Clusters operate in accordance with the relevant laws of the Republic of the Philippines, including the Republic Act No. 10121, which defines the GRP s law on disaster risk reduction and disaster management. 17 The Regional Disaster Risk Reduction Management Councils (RDRRMC) in Regions X, XII and ARMM are the principal coordinating bodies for humanitarian action within the respective regions, acting in support of Local Government Units. In ARMM, the RDRRMC is chaired by the Governor of the ARMM, or an official designated by the Governor. ARMM RDRRMC meetings are attended by government officials, and usually the heads, of government departments that have responsibilities related to humanitarian issues, representatives of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, UN agencies and NGOs. Although reporting tends to take place by agency and department rather than by cluster, the RDRRMC performs the function of inter-cluster coordination. The Technical Management Services (TMS) of the Office of the Regional Governor (ORG) provides the secretariat function for the RDRRMC. During the first half of 2010, the RDRRMC met once or twice each month to coordinate support for the return of IDPs to their places of origin, the dominant dynamic during this period. The Office of Civil Defense (OCD) in ARMM, which acts as the secretariat for the RDRRMC in ARMM, has recently been activated. This development should enhance coordination of humanitarian matters in ARMM. Mindanao Humanitarian Team The Mindanao Humanitarian Team is composed of UN agencies, international organizations (including components of the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement, subject to their particular mandate), international NGOs and local NGOs that are participating in humanitarian action in conflict-affected provinces of Mindanao. The forum meets every two weeks in Cotabato City. OCHA provides the secretariat function for the MHT, meetings of which are chaired by the Head of the OCHA sub-office. Reporting at MHT meetings is by organization but the meetings also serve an inter-cluster coordination purpose. 17 The legislation identifies and mandates the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils at local to national level as the main bodies with responsibility for supporting LGUs to respond to humanitarian disasters. 29
Mindanao Humanitarian Action Plan 2011 30