III (2014) CLT 5B (CN) (AP) ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT M.S. Ramachandra Rao, J. YARLAGUNTA BHASKAR RAO & ORS. Petitioners versus BOMMAJI DANAM & ORS. Respondents CRP No. 4099 of 2013 Decided on 26.9.2013 ORDER 1. This Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is filed challenging the order dt. 3.9.2012 in I.A.No.150 of 2011 in I.A. No. 119 of 2010 in OS. No. 31 of 2010 on the file of the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Sathupally, Khammam District. 2. Heard the counsel for the petitioner at the stage of admission. 3. The petitioners are defendants in the said suit. The suit was filed by the respondents restraining the petitioners-defendants from interfering with their alleged possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property and costs. The court below in I.A. No. 119 of 2010 granted ad-interim injunction order in favour of the respondents on 9.4.2010. 4. The respondents filed I.A. No.150/2011 against petitioners seeking police aid alleging that petitioner Nos.1 and 3 were set ex-parte in the suit; that they had not filed written statement; and petitioners 2 and 4 are contesting the suit; that inspite of the ad-interim injunction order dt. 9.4.2010, the petitioners and their family members were interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the respondents-plaintiffs in respect of the plaint schedule property; that on 20.5.2011 and 9.6.2011, they trespassed into the land along with coolies, cut barbed wire fencing, broke certain pillars and threatened the respondents with dire consequences; and that they also tried to plough the plaint schedule property, while abusing the respondents. The respondents sought directions to the Station House Officer, Police Station Dammapeta to give police-aid for implementation of the court orders. 5. No counter-affidavit was filed to this I.A. by the petitioners. 6. After waiting for a reasonable amount of time on 3.9.2012, the Court below granted police-aid to the respondents on the ground that the petitioners were interfering with the possession of the respondents over the plaint schedule property inspite of passing of an injunction order by the Court and also on the ground that no counter was filed by the petitioners. 7. Aggrieved thereby, this Revision is filed. 8. It is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that unless sufficient material is filed by the respondents, grant of police protection during the pendency of the suit on the basis of adinterim injunction is not sustainable and merely because the petitioners had not filed any counter, instead of adjudicating the issue basing on the evidence on record, the court below erred in granting police-aid. He also placed reliance on a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Polavarapu Nagamani and Ors. v. Parchuri koteshwara Rao and Ors., 2010 (2) ALD 41 (DB). 9. In the said decision, it was held: "24. Of late, this Court has noticed that the number of suits for injunctions (classified as
title suits) in all the Courts is on increase. It is not without truth to say that more often than not frivolous suits of injunction are filed only to bring the defendants around the plaintiff's view and accept some via-media arrangement to avoid long drawn, expensive and time consuming proceedings in the Courts, during which the defendants would not be able to enjoy the property with peace. In all such cases, ordinarily, urgent motion is moved before the civil court, an order of ex-parte injunction is obtained and waiting for a period of fortnight or so, immediately application is moved under section 151 of CPC seeking police protection. Instances are not rare where defendants are subjected to harassment after obtaining order of injunction. The Courts in India have repeatedly held that the police have no role in civil adjudication, and therefore, the courts should be very cautious and vigilance not to introduce police intervention in civil adjudication in indirect manner at the instance of a clever and resourceful plaintiffs. In view of this, we direct all the Civil Courts in the State of Andhra Pradesh to exercise abundant caution in dealing with interlocutory applications filed by the party obtaining an order of injunction seeking police protection. For the guidance of all the civil courts, we hold and lay down as under: (i) When the allegations are made by the party obtaining an order of injunction, that the said order has been violated, an application seeking police protection would not lie. The aggrieved party has to necessarily file execution petition under Order-XXI Rule 32 or an application under Order-XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC seeking attachment and/or arrest of the violator for contempt of the Court. (ii) When a petition is filed seeking police protection, whether or not to exercise of power under section 94 [e] or Section 151 of CPC, the facts alleged or pleaded, an order for police protection cannot be passed in a routine manner. (iii) If an application is filed by the person obtaining ad-interim injunction alleging that there is a threat of breach, disobedience or violation of the order of injunction, subject to proof, the court has power to order police protection imposing necessary conditions not to interfere with the life and liberty, and rights of the opposite party. (iv) The standard of proof required in the case of threat of disobedience of injunction or alleged breach,. Disobedience or violation of an order of injunction should be very high and it should be in between the standard of beyond reasonable doubt and a standard of balance on probabilities. Be it noted, as held by Supreme Court in Chottu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC 530 and Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21, in all cases of contempt the plea should be proved applying the very high standard of proof and not mere affidavits or selfserving statements of the party seeking the intervention of the Court. 10. Relying on point No.1 above, the counsel for the petitioners would contend that the only remedy available to a party for violation of the order of injunction is to file an application under Order-21, Rule 32 or application under Order-39, Rule-2 [A] of CPC and respondents cannot file application for police protection. 11. Thus, in the above decision, the Division Bench of this Court held that when an application is filed by the person obtaining ad interim injunction alleging that there is a threat of
breach, disobedience or violation of the order of injunction, subject to proof, the Court has power to order police protection. But if he alleges that the said order has been violated, an application for police protection would not lie. 12. In Meera Chauhan v. Harsh Bishnoi, (2007) 12 SCC 201, the Supreme Court declared: "14. Before we deal with this question of possession as to who was in actual possession at the relevant point of time it would be appropriate to note that the order for restoration was passed by the trial court on an application under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A question may arise whether such an application can be entertained by the court when specific provision under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been made for grant of injunction in the form of mandatory order in the exercise of power under the said order. Therefore to decide this aspect of the matter, let us consider the scope of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 151 reads as under: "151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." 15. On a bare perusal of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it cannot be said to be in dispute that Section 151 confers wide powers on the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court. 16. The power of Section 151 to pass order of injunction in the form of restoration of possession of the code is not res integra now. 17. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527 while dealing with the power of the court to pass orders for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court, this Court held that the courts have inherent jurisdiction to issue temporary order of injunction in the circumstances which are not covered under the provisions of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, it was held by this Court in the aforesaid decision that the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be exercised only in exceptional circumstances for which the Code lays down no procedure. 18. At the same time, it is also well settled that when parties violate order of injunction or stay order or act in violation of the said order the court can, by exercising its inherent power, put back the parties in the same position as they stood prior to issuance of the injunction order or give appropriate direction to the police authority to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the orders passed in the suit and also order police protection for implementation of such order. 19. It is also well settled that when in the event of utter violation of the injunction order, the party forcibly dispossesses the other, the court can order restoration of possession to the party wronged." (emphasis supplied) 13. In P.R. Muralidharan and Others v. Swamy Dharmananda Theertha Padar and Others, AIR 1962 SC 527 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider whether a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India could grant the relief of police protection. It held that in
a given case, a person may be entitled to police protection having regard to the threat perception to his life and liberty or for protection of rights declared by a decree or order passed by a civil court, and if court is satisfied that the authorities have failed to perform their duties. It held that there would be no such entitlement for protection of the writ petitioner's rights in question (to property or to an office and discharging of certain functions) when the writ petitioner's rights to do so are open to question as manifested by the pleadings themselves. It held that disputed questions of fact cannot be gone into in a writ proceeding and that the jurisdiction of a civil court being wide and plenary, the High Court cannot grant such a relief in a writ proceeding. It held : "17. A writ petition under the guise of seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to give protection to a writ petitioner, cannot be made a forum for adjudicating on civil rights. It is one thing to approach the High Court, for issuance of such a writ on a plea that a particular party has not obeyed a decree or an order of injunction passed in favour of the writ petitioner, was deliberately flouting that decree or order and in spite of the petitioner applying for it, or that the police authorities are not giving him the needed protection in terms of the decree or order passed by a court with jurisdiction. But, it is quite another thing to seek a writ of mandamus directing protection in respect of property, status or right which remains to be adjudicated upon and when such an adjudication can only be got done in a properly instituted civil suit. It would be an abuse of process for a writ petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the police authorities to protect his claimed possession of a property without first establishing his possession in an appropriate civil court. The temptation to grant relief in cases of this nature should be resisted by the High Court. The wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would remain effective and meaningful only when it is exercised prudently and in appropriate situations.......... 19. A writ for "police protection" so-called, has only a limited scope, as, when the court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil court. It cannot be extended to cases where rights have not been determined either finally by the civil court or, at least at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner, and then too in furtherance of the decree or order." So in this decision also, the Apex Court held that police protection may be granted in writ jurisdiction when a Court is approached for protection of rights declared by a decree or by an order passed by a civil court granting an injunction in favor of the applicant and was deliberately flouting it. 14. It appears that the Division Bench in Polavarapu Nagamani (supra) did not notice the above two decisions of the Supreme Court which have held that even in cases where there is a violation of an injunction order in a suit (as opposed to a situation where only a threat of violation exists), orders of police protection may be granted. No doubt it is necessary that the rights of the parties should be determined either finally in the suit or, at least at an interlocutory stage in an unambiguous manner. Therefore, the view of the Division Bench in Polavarapu Nagamani (supra) in so far as it held that an application for police protection is not maintainable
if there is a violation of an injunction order passed in a suit has to be held to be per incuriam. 15. So a party, who obtained temporary injunction orders, and is complaining of violation of such orders, may file not only an execution petition under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC or an application under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A of CPC seeking attachment and/or arrest of the violator for Contempt of Court, but also an application seeking police protection under Section 151 CPC from the Civil Court. With great respect to the Division Bench, I do not agree with it's view that if a party were to be allowed to seek police protection under Section 151 CPC to implement an interim injunction order granted in his favour, it would render Order XXXIX Rule 2A and Order XXI Rule 32 otiose. 16. Of course, even the Division Bench accepted that the relief of police protection may be granted in a situation where an application is filed by the person obtaining ad interim injunction alleging that there is a threat of breach, disobedience or violation of order of injunction, subject to proof. I also agree with the view of the Division Bench that when a petition is filed seeking police protection, such order cannot be passed in a routine manner and a high degree of proof is necessary. 17. As held by a Division Bench of this Court in Satyanarayana Tiwari v. SHO, PS, Santoshnagar, AIR 1982 AP 394 (DB), no authority in the State, Revenue or Police, can ignore the finding of the Civil Court or refuse to take steps to see that the order of the Civil Court is implemented and the party, in whose favour there is an order of the Civil Court should get all help to maintain the law and order and the other party cannot be allowed to contravene the injunction order and create law and order problem. No doubt, these observations were made in the context of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a writ or direction to police to enforce the orders of the Civil Court to provide protection in furtherance of an order of injunction, but in my opinion, the said observations equally apply to a situation where a party approaches a Civil Court for police protection having obtained an interlocutory order for temporary injunction. 18. In Smt. Nirabai J. Patil v. Narayan D. Patil, AIR 2004 Bom. 225, the Bombay High Court held: "If Civil Court which has passed the order of temporary injunction takes a view that there is no power vested in the Court to direct the police to grant assistance for enforcing or for implementation of the order of temporary injunction, the very purpose of granting order of temporary injunction may be trust rated in a given case. It is the duty of every police Officer to enforce the law of the land. The duties of police officers are reflected in Section 64 and Section 66 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned Trial Judge that "There is no provision for police and for execution of interim order", is totally incorrect. The learned Judge failed to appreciate that he has a power under Section 151 of the said Code to pass the order directing that police help should be made available provided facts of the case warrant passing of such order. 8. As observed by this Court in the aforesaid judgment, the grant of police aid is an extreme step and therefore order for grant of police help or police assistance cannot be made unless the Court is fully convicted about the existence of grave emergency such
as apprehension of violence by the persons against whom the order has been passed. It is very difficult to give exhaustive list of circumstances in which the Court can exercise the said power. However, said power is to be exercised with caution and the said power can be exercised only after the Court is fully convinced of existence of grave situation warranting exercise of said power." 19. In N. Karpagam and Others v. P. Deivanaiammal and Others, AIR 2003 Mad. 219, Justice P. Sathasivam, (as His Lordship then was) also held that the Civil Court can give direction to the Police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved party with regard to implementation of the injunction order passed by the Court. His Lordship held : "It is also relevant to refer the Division Bench decision of this Court reported in 1992 TLNJ 120 (cited supra), wherein after considering the relevant provisions relating to grant of injunction and Section 151 C.P.C. the Bench has concluded that, "In view of the above position of law, it has to be held that in appropriate cases, directions under Section 151 of the Code can be issued by the Civil Courts to the police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties for the due and proper implementation of the order of temporary injunction or a decree for permanent injunction granted by the Civil Court." finally, Their Lordships have concluded that, "In appropriate cases, the Civil Court has the power and is indeed under a duty, to issue suitable directions to police officials, as servants of law, to extend their aid and assistance in the execution of decrees and orders of the Civil Courts or implementing an order of injunction passed by it." 20. Applying the above principles, it has to be seen whether the Court below was correct in granting police aid to the respondents in IA.No.150/2011. 21. Admittedly, ad interim injunction orders were granted in favour of respondents on 9.4.2010 in IA.No.119 of 2010. Although a counter affidavit in that IA had been filed by petitioners herein in July, 2010, the said order had not been vacated. 22. IA.No.150 of 2011 was filed by respondents in August, 2011 alleging violation of the ad interim injunction orders. Admittedly, no counter-affidavit was filed by petitioners herein in IA.No.150 of 2011 in spite of several opportunities being given to them. So, the allegations made by the respondents against petitioners in IA.No. 150 of 2011 stood uncontroverted. The respondents had even given police complaints which evoked no response from the police. Even though the order of injunction was passed in IA.No. 119 of 2010 at an interlocutory stage, it was unambiguous and was in force for almost a year and had not been vacated. Therefore, the Court below, after waiting till 3.9.2012 (almost one year after filing of the IA.No. 150 of 2011), was right in treating that there is no counter on behalf of the petitioners in IA. No. 150 of 2011, that the allegations made therein were not denied. It rightly allowed it, taking notice of the urgency expressed by the respondents and their submission of interference by the petitioners in violation of the injunction order granted by the Court. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the action of the Court below in allowing IA. No. 150 of 2011.
23. Even otherwise, no reason is assigned by the petitioners for the delay of almost one year in questioning the order dated 3.9.2012 in IA.No.150 of 2011 passed by the trial court. I am of the considered opinion that the latches on the part of the petitioners in challenging the said order, is also a factor to be taken into account in denying the relief to them in this revision. Therefore, the CRP is dismissed at the admission stage. No costs. Revision Petition dismissed.