Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution

ISSN: 2376-1199 (Print) 2376-1202 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcau20 Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution Sabine Freizer To cite this article: Sabine Freizer (2014) Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution, Caucasus Survey, 1:2, 109-122, DOI: 10.1080/23761199.2014.11417295 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23761199.2014.11417295 Published online: 13 Apr 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 587 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 4 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalinformation?journalcode=rcau20 Download by: [46.3.198.253] Date: 05 January 2018, At: 03:39

Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefire: an opportunity to move towards more inclusive conflict resolution SABINE FREIZER Atlantic Council; Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center; email: sfreizer@gmail.com Twenty years ago this May the ceasefire that put an end to active fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces for control over Nagorny Karabakh was signed. It was supposed to be the first step in a process to end the conflict. But the expected pull back of forces, deployment of peacekeepers and return of displaced persons never occurred. Instead in recent years the line of contact between the sides has become increasingly tense as some thirty persons are killed every year. Negotiations facilitated by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) over a set of basic principles to guide a comprehensive settlement have become bogged down in details. Nevertheless a whole range of Armenian and Azerbaijani civil groups have over the years had opportunities to develop a third narrative, and think through concrete technical solutions to bridge fundamental differences. This article, bringing lessons from practice to bear for policy on this conflict, argues that the best push that could be made this year to strengthen the ceasefire would be to broaden the Minsk Group process, taking advantage of the civil society expertise, inter-communal trust and know-how of technical and local political elites who are currently outside the process, in order to move beyond the discussion on basic principles towards a comprehensive peace agreement. Introduction Keywords: Nagorny Karabakh, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Minsk Group, peacebuilding, conflict resolution. War between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh (NK) ended with a ceasefire commemorating its twentieth anniversary in May 2014. Yet peace is as elusive as ever. Some 30 persons continue to die yearly between the two countries and the prospects of all-out war are increasing. In January 2014 during a week of fighting across a large terrain at least four but perhaps up to 20 soldiers were killed and several civilians injured by snipers. Renewed fighting in the South Caucasus could quickly pull in Russia and Turkey, security guarantors for Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. Tensions have been rising, together with frustrations with the negotiations mechanism run by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It has been unable in over 20 years to produce any agreement or formula to resolve the conflict between Azerbaijan s sovereignty and right to maintain its territorial integrity, and the Armenian demand that the majority ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh be able to determine how they are governed a demand shifting over time from unification with Armenia to establishment of their own state. Calls to change negotiations formats are becoming more persistent. Despite the failure of 20 years of closed peace talks to reach a comprehensive agreement, there is general acquiescence by both Azerbaijan and Armenia on the basic principles that could frame an agreement. Hence rather than dismantle the OSCE s work completely, this article argues that a new set of parallel discussions should be set up to widen the negotiation s current narrow set of participants and increase the number of people with a stake in transforming and ultimately resolving this conflict. The twentieth anniversary of the ceasefire can be positively read as a useful juncture and opportunity to begin a more inclusive peace process. Twenty years of failed negotiations Since spring 1992 Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations have been mediated by the OSCE (at the time called the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe) Minsk Group. The peace conference that was to be held in the 1

Belarusian capital was never organized, but the name Minsk Group stuck. France, Russia and the United States serve as the Minsk Group co-chairs and their diplomats mediate talks, most often at the Foreign Minister level but also occasionally between the heads of state, especially when there is a sense of momentum in the process. 1 Information on the content of the talks is tightly controlled and only a handful of persons have access. Even Minsk Group country ambassadors in Yerevan and Baku, the rotating OSCE Chair-in-Office, and diplomatic officials from other OSCE member states are not made privy to many details. Exclusion of the local populations means that there are many missing conversations, which will have to be one day opened for peace to be viable (Conciliation Resources 2012). The lack of real information exchange also helps explain why in spring 2009 highlevel Turkish foreign ministry officials predicted that there would be sufficient progress in the NK talks for them to be able to open the Turkish-Armenian border as part of a normalization package without vexing Azerbaijan. 2 In fact there was no NK agreement and Turkey had to backtrack on the border deal. 3 The two-decade ceasefire has largely held without any subsequent steps to resolve the Azerbaijani- Armenian conflict on the ground. Brokered by Russia, the 5 May 1994 Bishkek Protocol signed by the heads of the Azerbaijani, Armenian and NK assemblies, called on the sides to: come to common senses: cease to fire [ ] and work intensively to confirm this as soon as possible by signing a reliable, legally binding agreement envisaging a mechanism, ensuring the non-resumption of military and hostile activities, withdrawal of troops from occupied territories and restoration of communication, return of refugees. 4 The ceasefire took effect on the night of 11-12 May 1994, after being signed by the defence ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as the commander of Karabakh Armenian forces (de Waal 2003, 238-9). Large scale fighting ceased but the withdrawal of troops, return of refugees, and deployment of peacekeepers, which Moscow hoped would largely be a Russian dominated Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) force, never occurred. Fighting over NK which during Soviet times had been an autonomous region within Azerbaijan, but declared a union with Armenia in 1988 and independence in a referendum organized by Karabakh Armenians in December 1991 was intense. 5 Combat caused the massive displacement of Azerbaijani civilian populations especially from towns in seven fully or partially occupied districts adjacent to Nagorny Karabakh and numerous atrocities. The biggest massacre occurred in Khojaly, outside NK s self-proclaimed capital Stepanakert, where numbers remain in bitter dispute but according to an Azerbaijani parliamentary investigation soon after the event 485 mainly civilians were killed (de Waal 2011a). 6 Stepanakert also withstood months of indiscriminate shelling, leaving a deep sense of trauma amongst Armenian inhabitants. An estimated 20,000 people in total lost their lives. 7 The Armenian side has said that 6,500 of their combatants were killed and the Azerbaijani government in its first official death toll announcement in early 2014 said at least 11,557 of its soldiers died in 1991-1994 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2014a). Today Armenian forces continue to control some 14 percent of Azerbaijani territory and 600,000 Azerbaijanis, the vast majority from land around NK and not from the entity itself, remain displaced. 8 Armenian occupation is in violation of four United Nations Security Council resolutions passed in 1993 and calling for the withdrawal of local Armenian troops. 9 In NK the local population of between 90,000-150,000 feels increasingly secure of its independence as its authorities have built up local government structures, held elections, provided services and overseen some economic development, although no Azerbaijanis have been allowed to return. Since 2008 the ceasefire has been under ever greater strain. Clashes have grown in frequency and intensity, with reports of the use of mortars and other heavy weapons at times. Yet in general this is a trench war, replete with underground tunnels and minefields, where troops have gradually inched closer to each other over the years. Much of the fighting has been focused along the 110-mile line of contact (LOC) between occupied territory around NK and Azerbaijan, but skirmishes and commando-style raids also increasingly occur in places along the Armenian- Azerbaijani border far from the disputed territory. Snipers are a major threat to the civilian population (International Crisis Group 2009a, 2-3; 2011, 3). Since 2008 the OSCE has been calling on the sides to pull back the shooters but Baku has refused, claiming that this would help solidify the status quo, and that it has the right to maintain all selfdefence measures while under occupation. Sometimes civilians or soldiers inadvertently cross the front line and are captured. 10 Yet the lack of more widespread fighting and the ceasefire s tenacity is also remarkable as the only peacekeeping force is a six-person monitoring team led since 1996 by Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk (Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office). According to his mandate, the Representative should assist in creating the conditions for a full OSCE peacekeeping operation, working together with an OSCE High Level Planning Group (HLPG) tasked with the technical planning. 11 Yet the necessary conditions to move forward with 2

the implementation of the 1994 ceasefire agreement have not been met. On several occasions in recent years even the non-threatening OSCE monitoring team, who informs the sides of the place and time of their observation missions in advance, has been forced to cancel ongoing monitoring due to shooting. To effectively monitor violations, the OSCE would need a larger, more flexible, team. Accurate information on security breaches is impossible to obtain as the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides produce contradictory and politicized data. Days after agreeing to an Olympic truce in February 2014 for example, Azerbaijan reported the killing of one of its soldiers, which the US OSCE Minsk Group co-chair noted as a violation of the truce, but the Armenian side immediately refuted as strange. 12 Baku refuses a more extensive international monitoring presence, together with the setting up of a formal monitoring and investigation mechanism of ceasefire violations which Yerevan supports (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia 2014). Since 1994 Azerbaijan and Armenia have been unable to transform the ceasefire into a more comprehensive agreement due to their inability to agree on what the final status of NK should be. From an Armenian perspective NK is legally separate from Azerbaijan since a December 1991 referendum and de facto independent since the war in 1992-1994 forced an Azerbaijani withdrawal. Azerbaijan rejects the referendum as firstly unconstitutional, according to the Soviet constitution still nominally in force at the time, and secondly, incomplete since it was boycotted by NK s Azerbaijani population. Baku sees NK as an inviolable part of its territory that can have the highest possible level of autonomy, but where status can only be determined within the framework of Azerbaijan s territorial integrity, and after occupation has ceased. Over the past 20 years a few windows of opportunity presaging a possible peace deal have appeared. The two sides were possibly closest in 1997 and in 2001 during talks held in Key West (US). 13 But the sides never got past the discussion stage and have been unable to even agree to interim confidence building measures. In an attempt to break the deadlock and avoid the difficult issue of NK s future status, in 2005 the co-chairs shifted from talks about a comprehensive agreement to discussion of a package of Basic Principles. These were officially presented at the OSCE 2007 Madrid summit (hence their common moniker as the Madrid Principles ). The Basic Principles are based on three fundamental elements: the non-use of force, territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. Only a few pages long they would lay the foundation for a comprehensive agreement based on the following: the return of the occupied Azerbaijani territories surrounding NK; an interim status for NK guaranteeing security and self-governance; a corridor linking NK to Armenia; eventual determination of NK s status by a legally binding expression of will; the right of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees to return; and international security guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation. 14 A real push to get the Basic Principles agreed began in autumn 2008. This was a period in which Russia was looking for ways to improve its image in the region, after its August War with Georgia; President Dimitri Medvedev took the lead in the negotiations. He sat with Presidents Aliyev and Sarkisian in 10 tête-à-tête meetings over 18 months. It looked like the effort was paying off as Azerbaijan and Armenia signed the first official document since the 1994 ceasefire on 2 November 2008 in Moscow s Meiendorf Castle. What has become known as the Moscow Declaration mainly reaffirmed the sides intention to find a peaceful settlement to their conflict. 15 At G8 Summits in 2009-2013, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs issued statements encouraging the sides to resolve their few final differences. 16 Talks were especially intensive in 2009. Co-Chairs expressed confidence that a deal on the Basic Principles would be agreed by the Presidents in Kazan in June 2011 to allow the start of the treatydrafting phase of the peace process. 17 But this too failed. Azerbaijani authorities claim that at the very last moment on their way to the Kazan summit they received a list of new additions to the Basic Principles, including one potentially allowing for the deployment of Russian peacekeepers which they could not accept. 18 The Armenians put the blame on the Azerbaijanis saying that President Aliyev came to the meeting with a list of nine or ten amendments to the latest draft document, the Armenian side raised objections to them, and the meeting, although it lasted almost four hours, was pretty much over as soon as it began (de Waal 2011b). But the problems were mainly in the details. For example though the parties could agree that a corridor would be set up in Lachin to link NK and Armenia, they could not agree on whether the town of Lachin would be included, how wide the corridor would be, who would be able to travel on it, etc. 19 The parties also had different concepts about the sequencing of implementation of the six principles. The Armenians considered that once NK s status as an independent state is assured then all other issues can be dealt with, while the Azerbaijani side seeks the opposite, i.e. resolution of all problems, especially return of displaced persons, before status determination. 20 Since then almost all the hope and expectation associated with the Basic Principles has evaporated, and been replaced with deep cynicism and distrust. Especially in 2012 and 2013, elections years in Armenia and Azerbaijan, the OSCE Minsk Group talks largely froze. 21 3

Growing insecurities, ever more closed societies As lack of progress at the negotiations table exacerbated frustrations, the situation on the ground became increasingly tense. Clashes expanded from the heavily militarized and entrenched line of contact (LOC) inside internationally recognized Azerbaijani territory, to new areas along the Armenian-Azerbaijan border, especially in the Tavush region and in a few instances in southern areas near Nakhichevan, an exclave and autonomous republic of Azerbaijan (commonspace.eu 2014). Civilians live in both areas, especially Azerbaijanis along the LOC and Armenians along the Armenia-Azerbaijan state border. Even though the ceasefire has held, non-binding arms embargoes on Azerbaijan and Armenian have not. 22 Azerbaijan has been steadily increasing its military budget since President Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003, from $175 million at his inauguration to $3.7 billion in 2013. Purchases from Russia, Ukraine, Israel, South Korea and Turkey include attack helicopters, fighter planes, multiple launch rockets, armoured personnel carriers and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). 23 In June 2013 Russia delivered a $1 billion arms package to Azerbaijan. 24 Some of the new artillery has a strike range of 90 kilometres, and can disperse anti-personnel and anti-tank mines over wide areas, threatening Armenian resupply and escape corridors. 25 Azerbaijan is also in the preliminary stages of developing a domestic weapons industry, to supply machine guns, ammunition, automatic rifles and artillery. 26 Just as important as any arms purchases was the autumn 2013 appointment of a new Defence Minister replacing the longest serving minister in the former Soviet Union, Safar Abiyev, and subsequent turnover in several top-level military officials. Armenia in comparison officially spent $451 million on defence in 2013 but remains confident that its control of strategic terrain, training and psychological preparedness will allow it to maintain the advantage in any fight. 27 Russia provides it with weapons at preferential prices. It also maintains a 4-5,000 troop military base in Gyumri, which in 2013 was rumoured to be supplied with Iskander-M systems with a 400-kilometre firing range and soon to be receiving a helicopter squadron. 28 Yerevan, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), also claims development of a domestic arms industry including the production of Armenia s own UAVs. Regular bellicose statements by the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents contribute to the sense of insecurity. Presiding over a grandiose Army Day parade in June 2013, President Aliev declared: Strong Azerbaijan can afford to speak to feeble Armenia in any manner. 29 Meanwhile President Serzh Sargsyan promised during a front-line visit with commanders in Karabakh to deliver a devastating and final blow if Azerbaijan attacked. 30 Not only words but also actions deepen distrust and animosity. Thus in September 2012 the Azeri government negotiated the transfer of Ramil Safarov, a former military officer who in 2004 killed an Armenian counterpart at a NATO training course in Hungary, and gave him a hero s welcome when he returned to Baku. Armenia tests nerves in Baku by stating repeatedly since 2012 that it is about to reopen a newly renovated airport outside Stepanakert to regular plane traffic. Azerbaijan responds that it would then have all necessary rights to respond by shooting aircraft down or bombing the runway. The prospect of further armed conflict is especially worrying because it could rapidly take on a regional dimension as Azerbaijan has security guarantees from Turkey, and Armenia from Russia. Some worry that a resumption of fighting may even be seen as an opportunity in Moscow to deploy troops in and around NK where it has not been authorized by the parties to have a peacekeeping force, as it has done in Abkhazia and South Ossetia since the early 1990s (Giragosian 2013). Divisions between societies keep growing, as the generations that remember easy co-existence during the Soviet period get older and are replaced by ones that have been schooled in an atmosphere of hate and distrust of the other. The people living in NK today have in many ways become the most intransigent. While for a long time it was generally recognized in Armenia that at least five territories around NK would eventually have to return to Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians have largely succeeded in turning opinions against this prospect, saying that all the lands are liberated territories essential for their survival and part of a non-negotiable Armenian historical heritage. Any change in the status quo would affect Karabakh Armenians first. Yet they are not currently part of the OSCE Minsk Group talks and there is very little international engagement with the people of the entity. The Azerbaijani side refuses any steps that could be construed as recognition of the Karabakh Armenians, even as a party to the conflict as Baku emphasizes that its dispute is with Armenia, strongly discounting any possibility that Karabakh Armenians could play any autonomous role. Baku calls instead for discussions between the two communities of NK Karabakh Armenians and Karabakh Azerbaijanis. Karabakh Armenian representatives in Stepanakert are adamant that they deserve their own place at the negotiations table. A temporary modus vivendi has worked as Armenia s recent Presidents Robert Kocharian and Serzh Sarkisian are from NK and they can more implicitly negotiate on Karabakh Armenians behalf. But as future Armenian leaders are less likely to come from Karabakh the 4

issue of Karabakh Armenian inclusion will soon become more acute. Ultimately if discussions ever turn to the details of comprehensive peace deal, arguments to include representatives of both Karabakh Armenians living in NK today and Azerbaijani displaced communities, including those from NK itself, will grow stronger as they will be responsible for implementing any agreement. Moving beyond the ceasefire to start a broad dialogue Twenty years after the ceasefire tensions are growing and concern is being voiced in major capitals that a resumption of all-out war is possible in the coming years. Questions are being asked about the possibility of changing the negotiations process and identifying new conflict resolution tools. 31 The OSCE Minsk Group talks were largely frozen in 2012 and only restarted in autumn 2013 after Azerbaijan s October presidential elections. 32 The OSCE Minsk Group organized the first meeting since January 2012 between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in Vienna on 19 November 2013 (OSCE 2013a, 2013b). This was followed for the first time in many years by an OSCE statement on NK, which requires the agreement of the two sides, and according to which the sides agreed to continue working together on a just and peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis what has been already achieved, but little else (OSCE 2013c). The foreign ministers met again on 24 January 2014 just as tensions were escalating due to exchanges of fire causing at least four deaths. 33 Another meeting of the Presidents is expected in the coming months but few predict a major breakthrough. One long term NK-watcher, Richard Giragosian, has termed the talks as part of a back to basics approach focused on keeping the parties talking, engaged in a diplomatic process while seeking to prevent a resumption of hostilities (Giragosian 2013). There is nevertheless room to be more ambitious. The appointment in summer 2013 of a new US co-chair, who has made an effort to start lifting the veil of secrecy on the Minsk Group talks, offers one entry point. His use of social media instruments like Twitter has made basic information on the talks more accessible and interesting, especially compared to the dry, uninformative OSCE press releases that previous co-chairs relied on for their public information strategy. In one he tweet he asked, The Presidents of #Armenia and #Azerbaijan will meet for the first time in nearly 2 years. What should be their highest priority? 34 The Ambassador, a seasoned diplomat, will work mainly on the NK conflict, unlike several previous US co-chairs who had broader portfolios. Another positive impulse may come from Switzerland, which for the next two years will take the lead on Caucasus-related issues while sharing the Chairmanship (CiO) of the OSCE with Serbia. 35 Its past mediation experience between Russia and Georgia (2010-2011) and Turkey and Armenia (2007-2009) gives it a degree of legitimacy and trust that previous CiOs have not had for several years. It has made dialogue and confidence building in the South Caucasus a priority. In late 2013 Bern was clearly looking for a way to provide value added to the existing Minsk Group structure. 36 However, by March 2014 it appeared that Bern s limited expert resources may have become over-stretched by the crisis in Ukraine, where the Swiss were pushing for a greater OSCE role. Helpfully, over the past two decades, and in the shadows of the official negotiations process, a host of civil society groups have taken part in far-ranging dialogue on issues of common concern. Since June 2010 much of this has been facilitated by international NGOs within the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK; www.epnk.org), an initiative funded by the European Commission. 37 Meetings have involved various stakeholders including women, youth, journalists and analytical communities from Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also NK. Through these meetings at least some people living on both sides of the conflict line have been able to see beyond the hate rhetoric regularly voiced by their media and politicians and gotten to know the thoughts and fears of their neighbours. As one Azerbaijani women s leader explained to this author: The first time we [Armenian and Azeri women involved in a peacebuilding project] met, everyone looked at each other as wolves. [ ] There was a lot of tension during the first year of our work but thanks to the project on peace building it gave us a chance to get used to each other and work together. And that is very important. 38 People across the South Caucasus face common problems related to poor local governance, crumbling social services, lack of access to justice and limited rural economic development, and the exclusion of women from political and economic life. These common concerns offer platforms on which to build dialogue. 39 A common finding is that authorities should be more attentive towards local needs and seek to engage the population in frontline districts in regular consultations prior to taking decisions (Saferworld and Conciliation Resources 2012). 5

There have been some threats by the Azerbaijani government to criminalize Azerbaijani contacts with Armenians, but no such legislation has yet been passed and governments continue to reluctantly allow cross-border activities to occur. Women have taken the lead in several dialogue efforts while at the same time being almost entirely excluded from the OSCE Minsk Group process, where no female representative has sat at the negotiations table during the past two decades. 40 At the community level women activists have succeeded in expanding cross-border ties, challenging and mitigating enemy stereotypes, and building trust. 41 Armenian and Azerbaijani women who have been meeting within the framework of the EPNK and preceding initiatives since 2006 now want to become more directly engaged. They aim to see greater attention paid to women s interests in the Minsk Group talks and ideally to have regular meetings with the co-chairs. 42 Until now women s organizations have not had this level of access and information sharing has been extremely poor. But for women to have meaningful, substantial and effective participation in peacebuilding will require them to have access to thorough and timely information on the process and the issues at stake as well as access to the decision makers involved (Kvinna till Kvinna 2011, 5). Information sharing and contacts between official and civil-society driven peace efforts first and second track diplomacy have been extremely limited. While most of the blame can be put on the high level officials who drive the process, civil society organizations also lack comprehensive strategies on how to access the talks and advocate on what issues should be discussed. So far even in the case of EPNK, the most large scale and multifaceted civil society peace effort, there is the sense that EPNK cannot venture into territory covered by the Minsk Group mandate, even if the local partners desire so (IFS 2013, 12). Faced with two decades of complete lack of progress in the Minsk Group talks, some civil society leaders consider the process to be completely discredited and are uninterested in getting involved in the track one process. They prefer to stay focused at the community level gradually helping conflict-affected groups demand their rights and influence policies based on the belief that peacebuilding is wider then a narrow focus on negotiations, [in order to have peace] it should first exist in my community and country. This strategy is based on the assumption that it is essential to develop a sense of citizens engagement and responsibility before trying to facilitate inter-communal peace. 43 At the same time bridging the civil society and governmental levels could promote synergies by providing the opportunity for non-governmental groups to share the trust, understanding, and common solutions they have identified over years of dialogue in order to help overcome obstacles in the Minsk Group talks. As described above, the parties have been stuck for years on issues such as the width of the Lachin corridor or the timing of refugee return. Civil society actors have discussed these issues and sometimes found novel ways to frame the problems to facilitate easier resolution of the challenges. Azerbaijan inadvertently has offered one way to open the talks to new ideas and actors, calling for the start of technical talks on a comprehensive peace agreement arguing that both sides already have agreed to the Basic Principles in one form or another and there is no utility in prolonging discussions on their details. 44 This idea has not been welcomed in Yerevan, but it could be developed further by the OSCE Minsk Group or the Swiss OSCE CiO to give a new depth and impulse to the now largely moribund discussions. A short version of the Basic Principles could for example be agreed by the sides, such as the one that has been part of recent G8 statements, and a comprehensive talk process launched. Multi-track inclusive technical talks If the Minsk Group talks enter the technical phase the inclusion of civil society actors and a whole range of other stakeholders such as parliamentarians, local legal resource persons, technical experts from ministries who have until now been left out will become essential. A large body of literature on inclusive peace supports the idea that peace processes with sustainable outcomes depend on the inclusion of civil society and women to identify underlying causes of conflict and develop shared solutions. 45 Inter-state negotiations are generally accompanied by a technical component. In Cyprus several months before the last round of full-fledged negotiations between the leaders even began in September 2008, 13 committees and working groups discussed common issues of concern, developed joint initiatives and prepared technical agreements for signature. 46 EU-facilitated talks held between the Prime Ministers of Kosovo and Serbia that concluded in a historical agreement to normalize relations on 19 April 2013, were also extensively prepared by working groups who focused on resolution of dispute details in a range of areas including trade, border/boundary management, civil registry information sharing, freedom of movement, and so on. 47 While mainly governmental technical experts were included in the Kosovo-Serbia talks, participation was 6

broader in Cyprus and even more inclusive in other contexts, such as in Northern Ireland, Tajikistan, Guatemala and the Geneva Initiative between Israel and Palestine (Inclusive Security 2013). 48 Rather than have the Minsk Group and high-level officials continue to focus on the details of the Basic Principles, six or seven working groups could be given the task, including governmental and non-governmental participants. Even the most sensitive part of the Basic Principles, dealing with the process of determining the status of NK, could be given to a working group. The group could consider the real differences between autonomy which Baku offers and independence which Armenians claim. In other similar conflicts, particularly in Kosovo, international agencies have made a close link between standards and status, pledging to recognize a more independent status once human rights and democratization standards are met (i.e. the standards before status formula). While there is some sympathy for this approach in Azerbaijan, most Karabakh Armenians seek recognition before standards. But a group of Armenian and Azerbaijani experts brought together by NGO Conciliation Resources found that there is the possibility of convergence around the centrality of standards. Development across a range of governance capabilities, including the rule of law, representative institutions, freedom of expression, property rights and the development of a free market economy, has a direct bearing on Karabakhi society s capacity to one day accept and incorporate a population of returnees (Conciliation Resources 2012). Another group could work on giving substance to the concept of interim status, envisaged for NK in the Basic Principles until its final status is determined. Asked to explain what interim status would signify in practice, a former OSCE Minsk Group co-chair said it would signify that he can open mail coming from NK representatives which currently he has to disregard due to his country s non-recognition policy. 49 Interim status could thus provide NK with more international ties and engagement. While many in Azerbaijan find it difficult to accept any engagement with NK until all territory and displaced are returned, among civil society experts who have been involved in years of different dialogue processes, it was agreed that the approach of engagement without recognition, as outlined in the 48 th point of the European Parliament resolution of 7 April 2011, holds out many positive opportunities to counter the harmful effects of isolation [ ] Engagement without recognition would allow for the EU to have a gentle integrating influence in the spheres of civil society development and political cultures across societies in Armenia, Azerbaijan and NK (Conciliation Resources 2012). Experts in this working group would have the task of assessing what degree of international engagement between NK and the wider world, including international agencies like the EU, is possible without constituting formal recognition of NK independence. In addition committees could begin talks on other issues of mutual concern such as the sharing of natural resources, especially water. Talks could centre on concrete problems such as the upkeep of the 125-metre high Sarsang dam, in an Armenian-controlled area of the conflict zone. Some say that it has deteriorated so badly that it could burst or be sabotaged, threatening the lives of 400,000 people; reportedly Karabakh Armenian representatives have already offered to cooperate on this issue but received no response from Baku (International Crisis Group 2013, 7). Access to pasture land for cattle grazing is another common problem. An economic working group could consider how to optimize the small-scale subsistence farming that inhabitants on both sides of the LOC are engaged in. On its twentieth anniversary the ceasefire is under greater strain than ever before, as made most evident by a week of intensive exchange of fire in late January 2014, but at the same time it is finally becoming more clearly accessible to civil society initiatives and advocacy even without governmental go ahead. Efforts by the OSCE Minsk Group to get both Azerbaijan and Armenia to pull back their snipers along the line of contact since 2008 may have failed, yet local think tanks, such as the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Center (RSC), have become more vocal and outspoken on this issue. Faced with Baku s unwillingness to do anything that could reinforce the status quo, RSC director Richard Giragosian has been calling on Armenia to initiate a unilateral withdrawal of snipers from the front line [some 500 metres] especially as the snipers contribute little military value to the largely defensive advantages of Armenian/Karabakh forces (Giragosian 2013). The internet-based television station Civilnet meanwhile aired a daring report on sniper-affected Armenian villages on the border with Azerbaijan. 50 The UK-based community security organization Saferworld provided a series of confidence building measures in an extensive report entitled Reducing frontline tensions in Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and in 2014 will begin implementing a new frontline communities project (Saferworld 2012). For years the Minsk Group was unable to garner Armenian and Azerbaijani authorization to set up an incident reporting and investigation 7

mechanism to complement current OSCE field monitoring. But civil society groups working with local communities, especially focusing on incidents that target civilians and their property, are now effectively beginning to carry out this work (Saferworld and Conciliation Resources 2012). Opportunities to breathe new life into the OSCE Minsk Group process exist, if Azerbaijani and Armenian leaderships, as well as the co-chair countries and the Swiss Chairmanship, are willing to make it more inclusive, comprehensive and forward-looking. Until now there has been little interest in capitals, especially in Baku and Yerevan, to open the negotiations to a wider group of experts. Both countries are highly centralized, leader-centric, with little sense of inclusivity, participation or democracy imbued in decision-making. Yet Baku s call to move beyond the Basic Principles and begin comprehensive peace talks, if accepted by Yerevan, and possibly involving acquiescence on the issue of including Karabakh Armenians in future technical talks, is the best opportunity yet to reform the OSCE Minsk Group facilitated process and by extension to strengthen the 20-year ceasefire. Current tensions between Russia on the one hand, and the European Union and the United States on the other, do not bode well for more effective cooperation between the three on NK. Ukraine may have become a defining turning point in Russia US/EU relations. In any case, the South Caucasus is now more divided than ever with Armenia joining the Eurasia Customs Union, Georgia planning to sign an EU Association Agreement and Azerbaijan staying on the sidelines. Russia has signed a series of defence and security agreements with Armenia, and maintains a base in the country, which it is reportedly upgrading, including with powerful Iskander rockets. 51 At the same time, as mentioned above, in 2013 Russia delivered to Azerbaijan $1 billion worth of weapons, allegedly the last tranche of a $3-4 billion weapons sale. Russia therefore remains a determining factor whose support will be essential for any broadened peace process. It may be less reluctant to transform the Minsk Group process into a more inclusive one than one would assume. At the Geneva talks on Syria in late January 2014, civil society, and particularly women, had no place at the table. But Russian experts met with a delegation of Syrian women and the Russian MFA tweeted civil society must play significant role in settlement of crisis. 52 This, coupled with Russia s concern regarding the aggravation of the situation in the areas of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, may help obtain Moscow s acquiescence to opening up the Minsk Group talks to new committees and working groups. 53 Conclusion The OSCE Minsk Group has been unsuccessful in moving beyond the ceasefire to obtain an interim agreement, mainly due to the lack of political will in Yerevan and Baku. The leadership in both countries apparently believes that the current status quo works more in favour of their interests than any of the compromises currently on offer. The problems are not only with the leaders, however, as Azerbaijani and Armenian societies are deeply cynical and suspicious of any concessions to be made to the other side. Most people in both societies do not trust the other or that there could be a mutually beneficial endgame. Nevertheless the fault with the Minsk Group or international engagement to date, as Thomas de Waal argues, is not for the quality of the diplomacy, but for failing to be forceful enough and set out their own distinct agenda for peace outsiders must be more robust in setting out a currently unspoken third narrative that will underline a peace agreement (de Waal 2013). International organizations and donors have been supporting civil society efforts and dialogue processes for almost as long as the ceasefire has been in place. Yet they have not insisted that civil society actors be in any way included in the talks, their recommendations or concerns listened to, or adequate information shared with them. A whole range of civil groups have had an opportunity to develop a third narrative, and think through concrete technical solutions to bridge fundamental differences over NK s future status. The best push that outsiders could make this year to strengthen the ceasefire would be to broaden the Minsk Group process, to take advantage of the civil society expertise, inter-communal trust and the know-how of technical and local political elites outlined above and currently outside the process. Notes 1 On 6 December 1994, the Budapest Summit of Heads of State or Government of the OSCE decided to establish a co-chair system for the Minsk Group process with France, Russia and the US. However, other Minsk Group permanent members include Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE Troika. The mandate of the Minsk Group 8

co-chairs was issued by the Hungarian OSCE chairmanship in March 1995 and can be found here: http://www.osce.org/mg/70125 2 Interview with Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, July 2009. 3 The opening of the border was part of a much broader package agreed upon in two protocols signed in Zurich on 10 October 2009. In a Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Turkey and Armenia promised to establish diplomatic relations on the first day of the first month after ratification; to exchange diplomatic missions; to reopen the border within two months of ratification; and to mutually recognize the existing border. In a Protocol on Development of Relations to go into effect simultaneously with the diplomatic opening the two sides promised to promote cooperation in all areas from energy infrastructure to tourism; to set up a mechanism of regular foreign ministry consultations, including a main intergovernmental commission and seven sub-commissions; to act jointly to preserve the cultural heritage of both sides; and to establish consular cooperation. The protocols are accompanied by a detailed timetable, in which all steps and commissions would be fully implemented and in motion within four months; see Pope (2009). In the Turkey-Armenia case, while there has not yet been implementation of a deal, substantial people-to-people contacts occur, making resolution of differences much easier; see Freizer (2009). 4 Bishkek Protocol, 5 May 1994. Available at: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/ files/armeniaazerbaijan_bishkekprotocol1994.pdf 5 While much has been written about wartime crimes, there has never been a full international investigation such as the Independent International Fact Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia after the 2008 Georgia-Russia war (http://www.ceiig.ch/). Much that has been written by the sides is highly politicized; for more neutral accounts see Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (1994) and de Waal (2003). 6 The Azerbaijani government is lobbying for the Khojaly massacre to be recognized as genocide. 7 The reportedly complete list of 6,500 Armenians killed was published in the Encyclopaedia of Liberation War in Karabakh in 1991-1994, (Yerevan, 2004), 701-862. Cited in International Crisis Group (2005, 2). 8 The percentage of land occupied is often disputed with the Azerbaijani government regularly claiming that 20 percent of its territory is Armenian-controlled. The 14 percent includes some 92.5 per cent of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), five districts outside NK (Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Jebrail and Zangelan) and a significant part of two others (Agdam and Fizuli) (International Crisis Group 2005, 1; de Waal 2003, 286). The occupied territory around NK is approximately double the size of NK itself. The de facto NK authorities also make claims on territory outside the former NKAO and still controlled by Baku, which they say represents 15 percent of their current land mass. Similarly Azerbaijani authorities regularly claim 1 million displaced, but this includes not only people from NK and the occupied districts surrounding it, but also from Armenia proper and is higher than what it is estimated by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR). 9 United Nations Security Council Resolutions 822 (April 1993), 853 (July 1993), 874 (October 1993) and 884 (November 1993). 10 For example on 28 January 2014, the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry issued a statement that it had detained a 69-year old saboteur (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2014b; see also Kucera 2014). The Armenian side claims that the man simply got lost and crossed into Azerbaijan inadvertently. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) still operates in the area and facilitates prisoner exchanges. 11 For more on the mandates see http://www.osce.org/prcio/66976 and http://www.osce.org/hlpg. Since 1994 the HLPG is mandated to make recommendations to the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on developing a plan for the establishment, force structure requirements and operation of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force for the area of conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference. Located in Vienna, it has a staff of nine. 9

12 After the Azerbaijani statement, the OSCE co-chair @AmbJamesWarlick tweeted on 7 February 2014 Media report the death of an #Azerbaijan soldier along the border with #Armenia. What happened to the Olympic truce? The Armenian MFA Head of Department of Press, Information and Public Relations @TMkrtchyan responded I find it strange that anyone,let alone sb. responsible&knowledgeable could rely on Azeri media reports&make a conclusion on that basis on 8 February 2014. 13 For a brief history of the past talks and models for conflict resolution see International Crisis Group (2005) and Abasov and Khachatrian (2006). 14 The L Aquila statement by the Presidents of the three OSCE co-chair countries issued at the G8 Summit of 10 July 2009 for the first time publicly outlined the principles. The text of the statement is available at: www.osce.org/item/38731.html. 15 This document is known as the Annex to the letter dated 10 November 2008 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. Joint Declaration of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation, Meiendorf Castle, Moscow Province, 2 November 2008. Available at: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/am-az-ry_081102_ DeclarationAzerbaijanArmeniaRussianFederation.pdf 16 In addition to the Aquila statement see the Muskoka Statement, dated 26 June 2010, at www.osce.org/mg/69515; the Deauville Statement, 26 May 2011 at www.osce.org/mg/78195; the 2012 statement at Los Cabos (Mexico) at www.osce.org/mg/91393; and the 2013 Statement at Enniskillen (UK) at www.osce.org/mg/102856 17 Author s interview with one of the Minsk Group co-chairs, Wilton Park (UK) brainstorming meeting on Nagorny Karabakh, May 2011. See also statement by Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, OSCE Secretary General, made in Moscow on 22 June 2011 in RIA Novosti (2011) and OSCE (2011). 18 Author s interview with two high-level Azerbaijani government officials, Baku, November 2011. 19 Ibid. 20 Author s interviews with Azerbaijan and Armenian MFA officials. Baku and Yerevan, November 2013. 21 The last meeting between the two Presidents and President Medvedev was held on 23 January 2012 in Sochi. The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders made a statement pledging to move forward based on the Basic Principles, but nothing else occurred during the year. Since returning to power in March 2012 President Vladimir Putin has shown little interest in the NK conflict and has not called another tripartite presidential summit. Instead he visited Azerbaijan in August 2013 and Armenia in December 2013, mainly to discuss bilateral issues. The Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan met the first time after Sochi in November 2013 in a meeting facilitated by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. 22 In 1992 OSCE (then the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE) and in 1993 the UN Security Council (Resolution 853) imposed non-mandatory arms embargoes on Armenia and Azerbaijan, urging states to refrain from the supply of any weapons and munitions which might lead to an intensification of the conflict or the continued occupation of territory. Although there were no mechanisms for overseeing the embargoes, many Western countries have refrained from arms exports. 23 In January 2013, Azerbaijan received the last of a $360 million order of 24 attack helicopters from Russia (Jennings 2014, Suleymanov 2014a). 24 Russia has almost completed deliveries of a previous, larger package, estimated to be worth $2-3 billion and including S-300 missile systems and attack helicopters. Azerbaijan has also announced a $1.6 billion arms deal with Israel (Reuters 2013). 25 In 2013 Azerbaijan was said to be the 15 th biggest importer of arms and military vehicles worldwide (Suleymanov 2013). In August 2013, Azerbaijan officials announced plans to procure $3 billion worth of arms from South Korea, including submarines and naval vessels (Kucera 2013a). In 2014 Baku also said that it would purchase anti-tank missile complexes from Turkey (Suleymanov 2014b). 10