FHSMUN 32 SECURITY COUNCIL THE SITUATION IN HAITI Abstract: The political and security situation in Haiti has been chaotic for many years but conditions have deteriorated significantly in the aftermath of the catastrophic January 12, 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of Port-au-Prince and other urban centers throughout the country. The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has made critical progress along several security dimensions, including improving the Haitian National Police force and the judiciary. The UN Security Council and the wider international community need to devote considerable energy towards working with Haitians to devise and implement comprehensive long-term solutions that will stabilize Haiti s political and security situation and provide the requisite policy space and opportunities for sustainable development. Introduction The most important security situation, at least for the UN Security Council, in the Caribbean remains the instability and profound lack of development in Haiti. Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and has suffered from political violence and instability for many decades; according to recent statistics, 76% of all Haitians live on less than $2 USD per day and Haiti ranked 149 out of 182 states in the UN Development Programme s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) for 2009. 1 Elements of gradual progress that were previously visible have been reversed in recent months, particularly as a result of the January 12, 2010 earthquake that devastated Portau-Prince and its aftermath. In the most recent ranking of Failed States by Foreign Policy, Haiti ranked 11 th, matching its ranking in 2007 and falling 3 spots from its 14 th place ranking in 2008. 2 Haiti has, however, been severely affected by escalating food and fuel prices and President Rene Préval s government must work closely with the international community, donor nations, and international financial institutions (IFI s) to address these key issues. 3 With the devastating January 12, 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of the capital Port-au-Prince and killed over 230,000 people, Haiti s myriad problems were both multiplied and exacerbated. It is critical that the Security Council along with the international community, Haitian civil society, and Haitians living 1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Statistics of the Human Development Report 2009. Found at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 2 Foreign Policy, The Failed States Index 2010 July/August 2010. 3 Colum Lynch, Growing Food Crisis Strains UN The Washington Post May 25, 2008.
abroad capitalize on the aforementioned recent progress to devise and implement comprehensive and lasting solutions to Haiti s security and development problems. Background Haiti s recent history is replete with episodes of extreme violence and considerable foreign intervention. As France s cornerstone colony in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Haiti provided France with tremendous revenues from its sugar plantations, worked overwhelmingly by slaves imported from Africa. After a successful slave rebellion, Haiti declared its independence in 1804 and established itself as the second independent country in the Western Hemisphere. Relations between the newly emergent Haiti and its hemispheric neighbors have been consistently volatile, and far too often, violent. Haiti invaded its immediate neighbor, the Dominican Republic, with whom it shares the island of Hispaniola several times and the Dominican Republic s security forces have massacred large numbers of Haitians seeking to cross into the Dominican Republic for work, particularly during the reign of the Dominican dictator, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. Haiti s relationship with the United States has been problematic as well. The US refused to recognize Haiti as an independent country until 1862 and has invaded and occupied Haiti several times, including from 1915-1934. The US invasion and subsequent occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 was motivated by US security concerns about German naval influence in the Caribbean during World War I, demands by US banks and firms for repayment of debts and protection of commercial interests, and concerns about political instability in Haiti that could affect the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the recently acquired US territory of Puerto Rico. Haiti s domestic politics have been quite volatile, too. For the past 50 years, the dominant political figures in Haiti have been François Duvalier, the notorious Papa Doc, his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, Baby Doc, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the current president, Rene Préval. The oppression of the Papa Doc era was exemplified by Papa Doc s terrifying security forces known as the Tonton Macoutes. The use of these oppressive security forces internally created large numbers of refugees and also delayed the creation of effective civil society institutions and the implementation of the rule of law. These institutions remain weak and only partially developed. As a result, corruption is deeply entrenched within Haitian society, including within the Haitian National Police (HNP). In 2007, Haiti ranked 177 th out of 179 countries in Transparency International s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), meaning it was ranked as the 3 rd worst country in the world for how deeply corruption is already embedded. 4 4 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index December 2007. Found at: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007
Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Lavalas Throughout the 29 years of the Duvalier family reign, the Duvalier family counted on the support of the Haitian elite, the military, foreign allies, including the United States and France, and at least the tacit support of the Catholic Church. While many priests and nuns worked with the poor and vulnerable in Haiti throughout this time, the Church itself rarely criticized the regime openly; one crucial exception to this was when the Pope excommunicated Papa Doc for appointing his own chosen priests in Haiti. 5 By the early 1980 s, however, a new generation of priests, steeped in liberation theology, began to openly criticize the Duvalier regime and call for mass demonstrations against the government and the Tonton Macoutes. Predictably, the government responded with further repression but the demonstrations and strikes continued. Foreign sponsors of the regime also tired of the constant repression and in February 1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier left Haiti with his family to live in a luxurious villa in the south of France. While the economic elites and the military sought to control the transition from the Duvalier era, Haiti s first sustained mass participatory political movement since the rebellion against France pushed for more profound change beyond merely the expulsion of the Duvalier family. Despite considerable political violence and attempts at intimidation by paramilitaries, Tonton Macoute agents, and supporters of the exiled Duvalier family, the most popular of the liberation theology priests, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, won a two thirds majority in the 1990 elections. Aristide s election suggested the beginning of a new and better era in Haitian politics for many of Haiti s poorer citizens, especially from slums such as Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince, but his first administration was overthrown in a violent coup after only 7 months. Led by Raoul Cédras and Michel François, at least 300 people were killed in the first night of the coup, probably many more; the Washington Post reported that 250 people died in Cité Soleil alone. 6 The military junta created by Cédras, François, and Toto Constant would brutalize Haiti for the next 3 years, killing at least 3,000 of Aristide s Lavalas supporters as well as imprisoning and torturing thousands more. The United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed an embargo against the regime but enforcement of that embargo was haphazard. As the violence drove thousands of Haitians to flee, frequently headed for the Bahamas and the United States, the US Coast Guard began intercepting and returning Haitians to Haiti, causing a number of international jurists to argue that the US was guilty of refoulement, the illegal return of refugees to a country where they faced imminent danger. After the UN and the OAS sponsored the 1993 Governor s Island Agreement, the Haitian military junta continued its brutal practices until a US-led peacekeeping mission was sent to Haiti in October 1994. 7 Aristide was restored to power at the end of 1994 but he had had to agree to conclude his term in 1995, notwithstanding his 3 years of exile as a result of the 1991 coup. 5 The excommunication would be lifted in 1966. 6 Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment Verso New York 2007 p. 40. 7 The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established by Security resolution 940 (S/RES/940) of July 31, 1994.
Aristide s short tenure as president of Haiti did not mean that his popularity waned, however. His political ally and initial Prime Minister, Rene Préval, won the 1995 presidential elections with 88% of the vote; Aristide s departure in favor of his then ally and friend marked the first peaceful electoral transition of power in Haitian politics. Aristide would break with Préval over disagreements regarding a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment plan and his political allies would achieve a parliamentary majority in the 2000 elections. Aristide himself would be reelected president the following year, although many of the elections were boycotted by opposition parties. Before the full results were announced, international observers, including a contingent from the Organization of American States (OAS), declared the 2000 elections as the best in Haiti s history. 8 Within a few weeks of the announcement of the results, the US, France, and domestic Haitian and international organizations opposed to Aristide s government denounced the elections as deeply flawed and characterized by massive fraud and irregularities. As Haiti became increasingly polarized, Aristide found himself relying more on political supporters from Cité Soleil, some of whom maintained close ties to street gangs. These Aristide supporters would eventually be known as the chimeres, or ghosts, and Haiti would be wracked by violence between former Duvalierists, ex-tonton Macoutes, and supporters of Cédras, including their allies in the military and the police as well as in commerce and politics, and Aristide s supporters and the chimeres. Aristide s international standing would decline precipitously in the early 2000 s, particularly incurring the wrath of the US and France. Peter Hallward notes that Haiti s profound dependency on foreign assistance gives its donors massive if not irresistible leverage. 9 Aristide s government would face chronic budget crises as a result of the freezing of international aid, particularly by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the IMF. Aristide and his Lavalas allies would also confront internal opposition from former military and Tonton Macoute leaders, including the notorious Guy Philippe. In February 2004, Aristide would again flee Haiti in advance of US and UN peacekeepers, this time going into exile in the Central African Republic and ultimately onto South Africa. Aristide has maintained that the United States government forced him to leave Haiti. 10 The UN would then create its latest Haitian peacekeeping mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), with Security Council resolution 1542 (S/RES/1542). Préval would be reelected president in 2006 but political instability and violence would continue. In January and February 2007, MINUSTAH peacekeepers would begin patrolling Cité Soleil in an attempt to stem the flow of both drugs and illegal weapons. 11 MINUSTAH s more vigorous patrols of Cité Soleil have produced positive results as gang violence has declined in recent years. This progress is certainly in danger of being undone by the damage done to the Haitian economy and political arena by the recent increases in food and fuel prices. The decline in gang 8 Henry Carey, Not Perfect, But Improving Miami Herald June 12, 2000. 9 Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood 2007 p. 82. 10 BBC News, Aristide: US forced me to leave March 2, 2004. 11 BBC News, UN soldiers move into Haiti slum January 25, 2007.
violence may also be reversed by the escapes of many gang members as Haiti s prisons were severely damaged in the January 2010 earthquake. 12 MINUSTAH When the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) deployed in Port-au- Prince in 2004, it was certainly unclear as to how long the mission would last. Peacekeeping missions were originally intended to be temporary measures but many of them have extended for decades. The previous UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) lasted only 3 years and the initial hopes were that MINUSTAH would not need to be deployed for an extended time. MINUSTAH has already lasted longer than UNMIH and the current thinking is that it may well be needed through the next presidential election in 2011; in October 2009, the Security Council extended MINUSTAH s mandate through October 15, 2010 and all indications point to a further extension. 13 The peacekeepers and police officers in MINUSTAH are increasingly being called upon to play multiple roles, including creating and training an effective Haitian National Police (HNP), reducing violence within local communities such as Cité Soleil, working with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to create a weapons registry system, improving the human rights situation for prisoners, improving the status and treatment of women and children, and providing Haiti s volatile political actors enough breathing space to negotiate without resorting to the use of violence and intimidation. As was mentioned before, even the best efforts of MINUSTAH s dedicated men and women may not be enough if poverty, unemployment, and food security issues remain unresolved. The consolidation of stability in Haiti will require in parallel to the peacekeeping efforts under way some measurable advances with regard to socioeconomic concerns. The close link between security and development was particularly evident in the context of the rising public discontent at the high cost of living. 14 Violence between the various militias, gangs, and the UN peacekeepers in Haiti has created a tense environment at times, particularly given that civilians and peacekeepers have been killed during these exchanges. 15 While MINUSTAH s efforts in conjunction with the Haitian governing authorities, including the Haitian National Police (HNP), have been focused on urban gangs, armed groups and self-defense groups in the capital and other big city slums, a serious concern is that less attention has been given to ex-military outside Port-au-Prince who have not retained large, organized structures. Armed groups have recently emerged as destabilizing factors, however, especially following Préval s speech on corruption. 16 Violence will not be definitively reduced until urban youths have jobs that are more attractive than gang money. 17 Comprehensively addressing the sources of violence, criminal and political, in Haiti is an essential first step in the process of political reconciliation and sustainable development. 12 Mark Doyle, Haiti jail reveals chaos behind quake breakout BBC News March 17, 2010. 13 S/RES/1892 October 13, 2009. 14 Ban Ki-moon, S/2008/202 March 26, 2008 p. 11. 15 BBC News, UN peacekeepers killed in Haiti March 21, 2005. 16 ICG, Consolidating Stability in Haiti July 18, 2007 p. 10. 17 ICG, Consolidating Stability in Haiti July 18, 2007 p. 12.
MINUSTAH has also been actively engaged with the Haitian authorities and the international community, including the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), to improve regional security efforts aimed at preventing drug trafficking as well as improving the administration of justice within Haiti itself. The ICG noted that the process of consolidating stability also depends on the perception that the government is reducing impunity and strengthening the rule of law through prison and justice reform. 18 MINUSTAH s ultimate success will depend upon its ability to consolidate security gains, including accelerating disarmament efforts. Secretary-General Ban Kimoon and the Security Council, in consultation with President Préval and the Haitian National Police, are emphasizing community violence reduction efforts in coordination with the National Commission on Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration. 19 MINUSTAH s personnel must also improve its own conduct. Allegations of serious misconduct, including sexual assault and rape, by MINUSTAH peacekeepers and police officers have compromised MINUSTAH s overall effectiveness at times. In 2007, the Office of Internal Oversight Services ordered the repatriation of 124 MINUSTAH peacekeepers for disciplinary issues, with 111 of those repatriated peacekeepers coming from Sri Lanka. With 8 of the current 15 Security Council members contributing to MINUSTAH, the Security Council has a direct interest in improving the performance of MINUSTAH personnel; negative headlines about soldiers and police officers engaging in misconduct on UN peacekeeping missions can prove rather embarrassing in world capitals. Demands for the removal of MINUSTAH staff, such as occurred in Les Cayes and other sites of rioting and unrest in April 2008 20, will only increase if food and fuel price increases as well as misconduct by peacekeepers continue. MINUSTAH s effectiveness is also being compromised by the slow pace of contributions from member states 21 as well as the rapidly escalating costs of fuel. The Earthquake and its Aftermath January 12, 2010 is a day that will forever haunt the historical memories of Haitians. Port-au-Prince and other major urban areas in Haiti were torn asunder by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake and the misery for hundreds of thousands of ordinary Haitians has not been significantly redressed in the more than 6 months since the earthquake struck. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named former US President Bill Clinton as the UN Special Envoy to Haiti in the hopes that Mr. Clinton s visibility and diplomatic connections and experience would bolster ongoing relief efforts. The UN System, Haiti s neighbors, especially the Dominican Republic, the United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) responded swiftly with shipments of emergency humanitarian relief as well as financial commitments to improve Haiti s ability to respond to this emergency. In March 2010, international donors committed 18 ICG, Consolidating Stability in Haiti July 18, 2007 p. 28. 19 Ban Ki-moon, S/2008/202 March 26, 2008 p. 5. 20 Reed Lindsay, Haiti on the Death Plan The Nation May 15, 2008. 21 As of November 30, 2007, outstanding contributions to MINUSTAH for the 2007-08 funding cycle totaled $418.8 million USD out of an overall budget of $535.4 million USD. S/2008/202 March 26, 2008.
nearly $10 billion USD for Haitian relief and reconstruction and in July 2010 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) canceled Haiti s $268 million USD debt as well as to lend Haiti an additional $60 million USD. 22 While these pledges of financial assistance and debt relief are welcome, Haiti s needs are incredibly vast and many Haitian and international observers are concerned about donor fatigue setting in, particularly if the pace of reconstruction remains slow. MINUSTAH s effectiveness has been at least temporarily compromised by the devastating January 12 earthquake that killed 101 UN personnel, the Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General, and destroyed MINUSTAH headquarters. 23 Even though subsequent Security Council resolutions have authorized an increased contingent of police personnel, the demands for humanitarian relief and security have mounted in the 6 months since the earthquake struck. The devastation of wide swathes of Port-au-Prince and the deaths of approximately one quarter of all of Haiti s civil servants has added to the burdens imposed on MINUSTAH and related UN agencies and bodies. Imogen Wall, a UN aid coordinator, noted in July 2010 that The UN has had to provide basic desks and computers to help the government function again. 24 Six months after the earthquake, progress in clearing rubble, rebuilding destroyed areas and buildings, and returning nearly 1.5 million displaced people to their homes remains stalled. 25 On June 18, 2010, MINUSTAH and Haitian National Police (HNP) officers arrested 30 people amidst reports of assault and sexual violence in displaced persons camps in Port-au-Prince. 26 If conditions in the displaced persons camps are not rapidly improved, more outbreaks of violence will become increasingly likely. Haitian politics are often colorful and the November 2010 presidential election promises to be no exception. The international media has frequently chosen to focus on issues related to celebrity rather than serious policy questions, particularly the candidacy of former Fugees singer Wyclef Jean. More critically, these elections are vital for the success of Haitian reconstruction efforts. Nick Caistor recently asserted that donors have been reluctant to disburse the $5.3bn (3.2bn) pledged to help relief and reconstruction efforts in Haiti until President Rene Preval has left office. 27 MINUSTAH and its domestic and international partners will need to assist Haiti s electoral officials, 22 International Monetary Fund (IMF), IMF Executive Board Cancels Haiti s Debt and Approves New Three-Year Program to Support Reconstruction and Economic Growth Press Release No. 10/299 July 21, 2010 23 Ban Ki-moon, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti S/2010/200 April 22, 2010 p. 2. 24 Mark Doyle, Quake-stricken Haiti bears scars six months on BBC News July 12, 2010. 25 Deborah Sontag, In Haiti, the Displaced Are Left Clinging to the Edge New York Times July 10, 2010. 26 International Crisis Group (ICG), Crisiswatch July 1, 2010. 27 Nick Caistor, Crowded race for Haiti presidency BBC News August 8, 2010.
particularly in light of the fact that nearly one fifth of Haiti s election workers and officials were killed in the January 12, 2010 earthquake. The Haitian Diaspora and its effects in the Caribbean and North America Approximately one quarter of all Haitians live abroad, with the largest numbers settling in the United States. Haitians have typically migrated abroad seeking both economic advancement and personal security. During the dictatorships of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier as well as the military junta led by Raoul Cédras from 1991-94, large numbers of Haitians fled to avoid political repression. Haitian migration to the Bahamas, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, France, and the United States has created considerable political tensions, surfacing directly in the 1994 mid-term election season in the United States and serving as a continuing source of tension in the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic. Regardless of the legal status of Haitian migrants, they have frequently been the targets of discrimination and racism, especially those seeking employment in low skill industries, agriculture, and the informal sector. Discrimination against the Haitian community has attracted the attention of local and international civil society and the international community. 28 As the international community and various non-governmental organizations (NGO s) investigate the discrimination and violence committed against Haitian immigrants and refugees, these same Haitian immigrants and refugees contribute approximately 35% of Haiti s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) through the remittances they send back to Haiti. 29 The UN System and Haiti MINUSTAH is also responsible for coordinating with other UN agencies and regional organizations. The list of UN agencies currently operating in Haiti include: UNDP, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN Division for the Advancement of Women, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Children s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the World Health Organization (WHO). Regional organizations that are working in Haiti, and in conjunction with the UN System agencies and MINUSTAH, include the Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IABD). While the work of these agencies is generally well-regarded in Haiti, the efforts of international financial institutions (IFI s), including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have been far more controversial, requiring as they do the elimination of tariffs and capital controls, the selling off of state-owned enterprises (SOE s), the severance of government subsidies for social spending, and frequently reductions in the minimum 28 International Crisis Group (ICG), Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad December 14, 2007 p. 7. 29 ICG, Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad December 14, 2007 p. 9. In 2006, these remittances totaled $1.65 billion USD.
wage. The austerity measures that typically comprise vital elements of IMF assistance packages may affect countries like Haiti adversely. Haiti s per capita annual health spending was a mere $21 USD in 1999, compared with an average of $38 USD in sub- Saharan Africa. 30 At the same time that Haiti s economic and development statistics firmly establish it as one of the world s Least Developed Countries (LDC s), its debt service obligations continue to escalate. Mark Schuller of the Americas Program at the Center for International Policy recently noted that Debt drains resources that could otherwise be invested in national production. For example, in 2003, Haiti's scheduled debt service was $57.4 million, whereas total foreign pledges for education, health care, environment, and transportation added up to $39.21 million. 31 Creating a sustainable Haitian economy is a necessary condition for long-term peace, stability, and development. Conclusion: Proving that the international community cares about Haiti Haiti s tenuous situation is not solely Haiti s or the Caribbean s concern. State failure is a serious concern for the international community because of the ever-present concerns about economic contagion, refugee outflows, and the likelihood that criminal and terrorist organizations will use failed states as havens and sanctuaries. The Security Council will likely extend MINUSTAH s mandate past its current October 15, 2008 expiration and will need to examine if that mandate is sufficient. As the international community considers new aid packages and assistance for Haiti, it must examine the reasons for the deep-seated mistrust of many international organizations, especially the IMF. Haiti s current buffeting by the global food and fuel price shocks means that the most vulnerable segments of the Haitian population will require greater domestic and international assistance. In April 2008, riots sparked by anger over rapidly escalating food and fuel prices killed at least 7 people and forced the resignation of the prime minister; political disagreements have prevented President Préval from naming a replacement. When Préval s government announced that fuel subsidies would be cut in June 2008, prices soared to $6.14 USD per gallon, further burdening an impoverished people as the government redirected money to other programs. 32 The World Food Programme (WFP) announced at the beginning of July 2008 that it would expand its efforts in Haiti by providing extra meals to school children to prevent them from joining street gangs or searching for work. 33 President Préval has also alarmed the United States, Canada, France, and the IMF by continuing Aristide s policies of accepting assistance from both Cuba and Venezuela. While these governments and the IMF may disagree with Haiti s decision to accept this aid, their strongest positive arguments for discontinuing this policy may well be to increase their own assistance to Haiti as well as loosening the conditionality of that aid. The international community will have a tremendous opportunity to prove that its concern for Haiti is genuine by continuing to provide financial, legal, security, and technical assistance after the television crews and reporters have turned to the latest international emergency or natural disaster. 30 Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood 2007 p. 7. 31 Mark Schuller, Haitian Food Riots Unnerving But Not Surprising worldpress.org April 29, 2008. 32 Jonathan M. Katz, Haiti halts gasoline subsidy; prices soar The Washington Post June 27, 2008. 33 UN News Service, UN agency steps up efforts to help Haitians cope with food crisis July 2, 2008.
Guiding Questions: Does your country contribute soldiers and/or police officers to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)? Is MINUSTAH s force composition appropriate and sufficient to allow it to fulfill its mandate? Does MINUSTAH s mandate need to further evolve in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake? How might MINUSTAH improve its efforts, in coordination with local, national, and international authorities and organizations, at disarmament, dismantlement, and reintegration? What steps might MINUSTAH and Haiti s government and security forces take to quell violence and stabilize the country? What constructive roles can Haiti s Caribbean neighbors play? How might governments, international organizations, and civil society representatives more effectively contribute to ongoing development initiatives in Haiti? How can the talents and resources of Haiti s diaspora community be most effectively harnessed to accelerate and enhance existing domestic and international development initiatives?