strategic asia 2004 05 confronting terrorism in the pursuit of power Edited by Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills Regional Studies South Asia: A Selective War on Terrorism? Walter K. Andersen restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact <publications@nbr.org>. To purchase the print volume in which this chapter appears please visit <http://www.nbr.org> or contact <orders@nbr.org>. 1414 NE 42nd Street, Suite 300 Seattle, Washington 98105 USA 206-632-7370 the national bureau of asian research
South Asia 227 SOUTH ASIA A SELECTIVE WAR ON TERRORISM? Walter K. Andersen ABSTRACT Adjustments in foreign and domestic policies in post-cold War Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India have provided opportunities for the growth of terrorism. The mixed record of the war on terrorism in South Asia has resulted from challenges posed by differing interpretations of terrorism among South Asian states, the U.S. emphasis on counter-terrorism at the expense of addressing social and political causes of radical sentiment, and the distraction of Iraq. Tough measures against terrorist groups in Pakistan and closer economic cooperation among South Asian states could expand the number of important stakeholders in regional peace. Terrorism will continue to pose a regional challenge unless key problems are addressed. These are the strengthening of the central government in Afghanistan, an end to cross-border terrorist movement into India, a serious attempt on the Indian side to address Kashmiri Muslim discontent, and a regional consensus of what constitutes terrorism among South Asian states. Walter Andersen is Associate Director of the South Asia Studies Program and Professor of South Asian Studies at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. He is grateful to the South Asia Studies research assistants Shakti C Ganti and Ravi Satkalmi for their many hours of assistance collecting data for this project.
228 Strategic Asia 2004 05 Introduction South Asia remains at the epicenter of the fight against international terrorism. The participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington had links to leaders of the Al Qaeda terrorist network in Afghanistan. 1 Prior to September 11, the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan had hosted Osama bin Laden and other senior figures in the Al Qaeda network as well as a large part of its international cadre. Even after the defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda after the U.S.-led military efforts in late 2001, many of their cadre remain in the mountainous area straddling the border of Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they are increasingly a threat both to the new political order in Afghanistan and to Pakistan s President Pervez Musharraf. Also contributing to regional tensions are Pakistan-based radical Islamist groups, some with Al Qaeda links, that use violent methods in the pursuit of a theocratic state at home and an end to Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir, a Muslim majority state claimed by both India and Pakistan and the dispute over which has been the cause of two wars and several military confrontations since the partition of British India in 1947. India was the first country to sign up unconditionally to Operation Enduring Freedom to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban inside Afghanistan, and saw this as part of a larger effort to defeat the terrorism that confronted it in Jammu and Kashmir. 2 The geographic position of Pakistan made it a more central player in that effort than India and the recipient of substantial military aid. Washington s perception of President Musharraf as critical in keeping his country committed to the war on terrorism has contributed to a U.S. reluctance to hold Musharraf accountable for his backsliding on commitments to build democratic institutions at home and to prevent the movement of Pakistan-based Islamic fighters into India. One consequence of this is that Indian leaders are skeptical about U.S. counter-terrorism objectives and have dropped references to a strategic relationship in which the United States and India would work together to keep peace in the Indian Ocean littoral area. A new Indian government elected in mid-2004 has said it will keep a principled distance from U.S. security policies while maintaining a close working relationship with the United States so as to benefit from trade and investment considered necessary for the continued growth of its economy. A more independent Indian foreign policy is likely to show a renewed emphasis on relations with Iran and an independent Iraq, two countries with which India historically has had close political and economic ties, as well as with China and Russia. This chapter first addresses the different efforts of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India to adjust their foreign policies of the pre-september 11 period to fit the new circumstances and analyzes why those differences
South Asia 229 contributed to the rise of terrorism in the region and to continued tensions among regional states. It then analyzes the mixed record of the war on terrorism in South Asia, focusing on the challenges posed by differing definitions of terrorism by regional states, as well as the U.S. emphasis on military responses at the expense of efforts to address the social and political causes that give rise to radical anti-western sentiment. 3 Addressing causes is most urgent in the case of Pakistan, where considerably more attention and money needs to be directed to expanding education and strengthening the country s weak civil society and its political and governmental institutions. 4 Finally, it analyzes the benefits for the United States of a foreign policy that aims to build a long-term relationship with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to enhance U.S. interests in South Asia. Among the more important of those interests are denying terrorist groups a regional safe haven and popular support, reducing tensions among regional states (two of them India and Pakistan nuclear-capable), and increasing U.S. influence in the region. The continuing Indo-Pakistani tensions over Kashmir have an adverse impact on all of these interests, an important reason for the United States to retain influence with both countries. A ceasefire along the Line of Control in November 2003 laid the groundwork for a decision by President Musharraf and then-indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee two months later to revive bilateral talks on all outstanding issues after a five-year hiatus. Pakistan must keep a rein on movement of cross-border Islamic militants in order for these talks to continue, and Washington can play a constructive role by pressuring President Musharraf in this direction as it continues its diplomatic efforts to get the two sides to bridge their differences. Such pressure may be critical to sustain these bilateral talks because President Musharraf s present conciliatory stance could represent a tactical position rather than a strategic change in policy regarding the use of Pakistan-based militants to confront India in Kashmir. South Asia on the Eve of September 11 On the eve of September 11, 2001, only India among the three South Asian states had made a relatively smooth transition in the decade following the end of the Cold War. While India lost its superpower benefactor with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Indian security in the post-cold War period was enhanced by the termination of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan and improved relations with China. India consequently had the diplomatic space to pursue good relations with countries that helped it achieve the faster annual economic growth rates that are an important goal of the market reforms adopted in the early 1990s. Good relations with the United States
230 Strategic Asia 2004 05 have been of great importance for economic development. In the final years of the Clinton administration, Indians, impressed by the U.S. criticism of cross-border incursions from Pakistan, began to look at the United States as a potential security partner, replacing the long-held view that America was hostile to India s interests in South Asia and beyond. 5 India also began to take a more relaxed view of China s South Asia policy in the late 1990s, and rapidly expanding Sino-Indian trade assumed an important role in driving the relationship. 6 Indian relations with Pakistan, however, remained tense during the decade prior to September 11, as Pakistan-based militants became increasingly assertive in Jammu and Kashmir and even in the Indian capital, New Delhi. Periodic efforts to revive talks between the two states broke down over differences on the Kashmir issue, with each side unwilling to compromise on long-held positions rejected by the other. In its own counter-terrorism moves, India began in the late 1990s to cooperate with Iran and Russia to support the Northern Alliance, a group opposed to the Taliban. Contributing to the Indian decision to help the Northern Alliance was the training of anti-indian militants headed for Kashmir at camps in Afghanistan run by the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 7 In contrast to India, Pakistan was wracked by domestic political crises and a stagnant economy, which exacerbated its sense of vulnerability to its much larger next-door neighbor. Pakistan supported the Taliban in Afghanistan to ensure itself a safe western border and backed anti-indian Islamic militants to tie up Indian forces on Pakistan s eastern border and elicit international sympathy for the Kashmir insurgency. Not only did these intrusive policies undermine Pakistan s relations with India, Iran, and Russia, but it also brought the three states closer together in their efforts to support the Northern Alliance a loose and often fractious alliance of mainly ethnically non-pushtun commanders who constituted the last remaining obstacle to complete Taliban control of Afghanistan 8 and by extension to undermine Pakistani influence in Afghanistan. By the late 1990s Pakistan s ties with the Taliban also strained relations with the United States. The Taliban drew international attention because its leader, Mullah Omar, provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda operatives. Afghanistan was plunged into a civil war among the various mujahidin groups that had once fought the Soviet Union and its client regime. This chaotic situation provided an opening for radical Islamic groups to establish a presence in the country. The most successful of these groups, Osama bin Laden s Al Qaeda, developed a symbiotic relationship with the Taliban after his return to Afghanistan in 1996. 9 Despite the U.S. identification of Al Qaeda as the source of several attacks on U.S. targets prior to September 11, the Clinton