Terrorism, Governance, and Development

Terrorism, Governance, and Development U.S. Department of Defense Minerva Research Initiative (FA9550-09-1-0314) 2013 AFOSR Trust and Influence Program Review 16 January 2013 Principal Investigators: Eli Berman, Ph.D., UC San Diego Joseph H. Felter, Ph.D., Stanford University David D. Laitin, Ph.D., Stanford University Jason Lyall, Ph.D., Yale University Jacob N. Shapiro, Ph.D., Princeton University Jeremy M. Weinstein, Ph.D., Stanford University

Agenda Research questions How we try to answer them Core scientific approach Where we fit in the Trust and Influence portfolio Findings Progress since last review Data Publications People Transitions Conclusion 2

Research Questions What explains the variance in how governance and development relate to terrorism and insurgency across conflicts? How can the U.S. and its allies implement governance and development policies to more efficiently (re)build social and economic order in conflict and post-conflict areas? TGD Research Agenda: Development programs A Improved quality of life B Reduced violent conflict and insurgency C 3

Why This Matters USAID top 20 recipients, 2011 Country FY2011 1 Afghanistan 1,438,596,449 2 Haiti 970,910,372 3 Kenya 498,728,751 4 Jordan 460,251,837 5 Pakistan 393,000,846 6 Tanzania 371,859,231 7 South Africa Republic 348,995,068 8 Nigeria 336,053,916 9 Democratic Republic of Congo 265,018,524 10 South Sudan 264,407,305 11 West Bank/Gaza 245,378,605 12 Iraq 242,860,393 13 Zambia 229,272,026 14 Uganda 221,891,934 15 Colombia 192,362,083 16 Israel 190,526,897 17 Indonesia 182,565,755 18 Ethiopia 182,143,079 19 Mozambique 175,572,408 20 Liberia 168,738,471 Two policy motivations: 1. Traditional development in places with ongoing conflict 2. Development as a tool of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency More than 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by violent conflict. The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development 4

TGD Approach Collect best possible data and test theories about the relationships between governance, development, and conflict with attention to identifying causal relationships That requires three research tracks Develop new data sources by working with partners Surveys and field research Randomized impact evaluations 5

Findings Six key results from TGD research program Development programs can be politically stabilizing (JPE) Design of development programs is critical (R&R AER, AER P&P) Wealthier regions see more violence and support for VEOs (AJPS, JCR) Both sides pay for causing civilian casualties (AJPS, R&R APSR) Expanded cellular coverage hurts insurgents (R&R AJPS) ICT-based election monitoring displaces corruption (R&R AER) BLUF: Civilian decisions are critical But not in the ways we often think Not about participation on one side or about their political views About creating conditions for them to make small decisions 6

Development and CT/COIN: A Three-Sided Game GOVERNMENT Suppression/COIN Attacks REBELS SERVICES Personal Security Dispute Adjudication & Justice Education Health Infrastructure Representation CIVILIAN POPULATION SERVICES Personal Security Dispute Adjudication (Education) (Health) (Representation) 7

Development and Violence: What Works? Incidents vs. CERP Spending Outliers dropped SIGACTs per 1000 not Explained by Controls -3 0 3 6 CERP w/controls Unexpl ai nedcerp -100-50 0 50 100 coef =.012, (robust) se =.004, t = 2.88 Unexpl ai nedvi ol ence -3 0 3 6 CERP in FD, 2004-2008 Unexpl ai nedcerp -100-50 0 50 100 coef = -.011, (robust) se =.004, t = -2.51 Unexpl ai nedvi ol ence -3 0 3 6 CERP in FD, 2007-2008 Unexpl ai nedcerp -100-50 0 50 100 coef = -.018, (robust) se =.006, t = -2.96 CERP Spending per 1000 not Explained by Controls Source: Berman, Shapiro, Felter, Journal of Political Economy, August 2011. 9

Development and Violence: What Works? Incidents vs. Large Projects (n=2,230) Outliers dropped SIGACTs per 1000 not Explained by Controls -4-2 0 2 4 Large w/controls -200 0 200 400 600 800 Unexpl ai nedlarge coef =.000, (robust) se =.001, t =.31 e(p_s1 X) -4-2 0 2 4 Large w/fe Unexpl ai nedlarge -200 0 200 400 600 coef = -.000, (robust) se =.000, t = -.04 e(p_s1 X) -4-2 0 2 4 Large w/fe, 2007 on Unexpl ai nedlarge -200-100 0 100 200 AidnotExplainedbyControls coef = -.003, (robust) se =.002, t = -1.45 Aid Spending per 1000 not Explained by Controls Source: Berman, Shapiro, Felter, Journal of Political Economy, August 2011. 10

But the Details Matter Entire Program Period Pre-program Casualties/month.05.1.15 Casualties/month 0.05.1.15-6 -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rank relative to cutoff -6-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rank relative to cutoff Mean Quadratic fit Nonparametric fit Mean Quadratic fit Nonparametric fit Social preparation phase Remaining program period Casualties/month 0.1.2.3.4 Casualties/month.04.06.08.1.12.14-6 -5-4 -3-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rank relative to cutoff -6-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rank relative to cutoff Mean Nonparametric fit Mean Nonparametric fit Quadratic fit Quadratic fit Source: Crost, Felter, Johnston, R&R at American Economic Review 11

As Do the Supporting Conditions Source: Berman, Felter, Shapiro, and Troland, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2013 13

As Do the Supporting Conditions Source: Berman, Felter, Shapiro, and Troland, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2013 14

Unlikely Effects Are Driven by Economic Growth Support for Policy Source: Blair, Fair, Malhotra, Shapiro, American Journal of Political Science, 2013 15

Both Sides Pay a Price for Harming Civilians Source: Blair, Imai, and Lyall, 2012, R&R American Political Science Review 17

And There is a Behavioral Response Marginal Effect of Coalition Killings SIGACTS/100000 -.1 0.1.2-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Period from treatment Marginal Effect of Insurgent Killings SIGACTS/100000 -.1 0.1.2-5 -4-3 -2-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Period from treatment Source: Condra and Shapiro, American Journal of Political Science, January 2012 18

Likely Due to Information Sharing Table 7. Impact of Increased Cell Phone Coverage by Attack Type at Different Thresholds Dependent Variable: (1) All Attacks (2) Direct Fire (3) Indirect Fire (4) Total IED Attempts Panel A: Coverage Threshold for `New Towers = 20% -0.147-0.168-0.0213-0.0725 Post (0.19) (0.11) (0.042) (0.088) Post*New -0.920** -0.248 0.0629-0.427*** (0.37) (0.19) (0.050) (0.13) Observations 29744 29744 29744 29744 R-squared 0.75 0.64 0.31 0.80 Panel B: Coverage Threshold for `New Towers = 50% -0.219-0.189* -0.0253-0.0898 Post (0.18) (0.10) (0.041) (0.085) Post*New -0.677** -0.164 0.124** -0.452*** (0.31) (0.16) (0.056) (0.13) Observations 29744 29744 29744 29744 R-squared 0.75 0.64 0.31 0.80 Notes: Unit of analysis is tower areas for 15-day periods in relative time from tower onair date. Coverage areas created by a 4km radius around cell phone towers in urban areas and 12km radius in rural areas. Robust standard errors, clustered at the tower level in parentheses. All specifications include tower and quarter fixed effects. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.10, 0.01) level are marked with at ** (*, ***). Violent Events based on data on MNF-I SIGACT-III database. Cell tower data provided by Zain Iraq. Population data from LandScan (2008). Source: Shapiro and Weidmann, R&R American Journal of Political Science 20

And Earning Goodwill May Not Be So Hard Police Should Resolve Disputes (=1) Reducing Fraud Increases Support for the Government Outcomes Important to Report IED to ANSF (=1) Afghanistan is a Democracy (=1) MP Provides Services (=1).075.05.025 0.025.05.075.1 Share of responses favorable (Treatment) Share of responses favorable (Controls) Note: Reflects estimates from specifications controlling for stratum FEs and covariates including whether respondents were aware of monitor visits. Source: Berman, Callen, and Long, Working Paper 22

Hearts and Minds Theory GOVERNMENT Suppression/COIN Attacks REBELS SERVICES Personal Security Dispute Adjudication & Justice Education Health Infrastructure Representation CIVILIAN POPULATION SERVICES Personal Security Dispute Adjudication (Education) (Health) (Representation) 23

Progress/Data Impact evaluations* Afghanistan Colombia Pakistan Philippines Planning for others * Includes work funded through synergistic grants Micro-level conflict data (w/esoc) ESOC website AFG, COL, EGT, IRQ, KEN, MEX, PHL, PAK, SOM, UGN, VNM, YEM Survey data* Colombia Mississippi Northern Ireland Pakistan Palestinian Territories Philippines Somalia 24

ESOC Website 25

ESOC Website 26

Progress: Publications and Placements Publications: Building a base of empirical findings 24 peer-reviewed articles published or forthcoming (12 since last review) Seven revise and resubmits (5 at top-three journals in economics or political science) Over 35 working papers, 1 book in press Placements (24 total so far) ESOC Role Post-doc Pre-doc BA Placement Type and Number 6 tenure-track; 1 research professor; 5 industry; 1 acad. researcher 2 tenure-track; 3 post-doc; 1 research professor; 1 government Kennedy School, then government; Stanford PhD; 2 tech industry 27

Transitions Since Last Review DARPA N7 and XFIN projects draw on TGD research. DARPA funding CTC/ESOC/RAND study to build data from insurgent records captured in Iraq in order to test theories developed by TGD team regarding insurgent organization and compensation practices. ISAF and USAF data audits motivated by interactions with TGD team. USAID OTI released data to TGD team to evaluate their programs in Iraq and will do so for Pakistan once OTI finishes work there. USAF released data to facilitate research in Afghanistan. USAID-Afghanistan is working with TGD team on survey instruments and impact evaluation projects. USAID-Colombia and the Government of Colombia are working with TGD team to evaluate program bringing state presence in former FARC areas. Briefings to CNO Executive Panel, DoD COIN Board, CAC, deploying BCTs, USAID, DFID, and DoS. Defense R&D Canada using TGD data to study relative importance of doctrine versus force levels in explaining 2007 events in Iraq. RAND study on impact of CERP in Afghanistan modeled on TGD work. 28

Conclusion When performed correctly, small-scale conditional development programs influence civilian attitudes toward supporting government, encouraging tips. These in turn complement coercive force in suppressing violence and reduce the negative externalities of applying that force. We have a precise, empirically-tested theory of this process. It could enhance current doctrine, which is full of imprecise statements that can endanger forces and civilians by encouraging incorrect deployment of development programs. The theory is applicable to small footprint interventions as well as large. We have built a data infrastructure that will serve others long after our grant is over. 29

Project Goals Project goals were designed in response to scientific problems Problem: Lacking basic facts Goal 1: Collect, refine, and archive new facts in a comprehensive open data source to facilitate independent scholarship Problem: Highly-aggregated measures impede study of sub-national factors and can lead to ecological inference problems Problem: Standards of causal inference utilized to study most social programs are not being applied Goal 2: Test theories across a range of conflicts (multicultural), with a range of methodological approaches to develop better theories (multidisciplinary) Goal 3: Build partnerships with key government and civilian aid agencies and set examples of better program evaluation. 31

Publications Berman, E., Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter. Can Hearts and Minds be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 119, No. 4, (August 2011), pp. 766-819. Berman, Eli, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 55, no. 4, (August 2011), pp. 496-528. Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. Testing the Surge: Why did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007? International Security. Vol. 37, No. 1, (Summer 2012). Blair, Graeme, C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 1, (January 2013), pp. 30-48. 32

Publications (continued) Cederman, Lars-Erik, Nils B. Weidmann, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison. American Political Science Review. Vol. 105, No. 03, (August 2011), pp. 478-495. Chou, Tiffany. Does Development Assistance Reduce Violence? Evidence from Afghanistan. Economics of Peace and Security Journal Vol. 7, No. 2, (July 2012). Condra, Luke N. and Jacob N. Shapiro. Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Impact of Collateral Damage. American Journal of Political Science. Vol. 56, No. 1, (January 2012), 167 187. Fair, C. Christine, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. Faith or Doctrine? Religion and Support for Political Violence in Pakistan. Public Opinion Quarterly. Vol 76, no. 4 (Winter 2012), pp. 688-720. 33

Publications (continued) Heger, Lindsay, Danielle Jung and Wendy Wong. Organizing for Resistance: How Group Structure Impacts the Character of Violence. Terrorism and Political Violence. Vol. 24, No. 5, (2012), pp. 743-768. Johnston, Patrick B. Does Decapitation Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns. International Security. Vol. 36, No. 4, (Spring 2012), pp. 47-79. Shapiro, Jacob N. Terrorist Decision-Making: Insights from Economics and Political Science. Perspectives on Terrorism Vol. 6, Issues 4-5 (October 2012), pp. 5-20. Weidmann, Nils B. Violence from above or from below? The Role of Ethnicity in Bosnia s Civil War. The Journal of Politics. Vol. 73, No. 4, (October 2011), pp. 1178-1190. Weidmann, Nils B. and Michael Callen. Violence and Election Fraud: Evidence from Afghanistan. British Journal of Political Science. (August 2012), pp. 1-23. 34

Publications (continued) Bahney, Benjamin W., Radha K. Iyengar, Patrick B. Johnston, Danielle F. Jung, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Howard J. Shatz. Insurgent Compensation: Evidence from Iraq. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (Forthcoming). Berman, Eli, Joseph H. Felter, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Erin Troland. Modest, Secure and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones. American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings (Forthcoming). Longer version as NBER Working Paper 18674. Biddle, Stephen, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro. The Surge, the Awakening, and the 2007 Reduction of Violence in Iraq. International Security (Forthcoming). Callen, Michael, Mohammad Isaqzadeh, James D. Long, and Charles Sprenger. Violent Trauma and Risk Preference: Artefactual and Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan. American Economic Review (Forthcoming). 35

Publications (continued) Felter, Joseph H. Why Do Insurgencies Fail? Causes and Effects Governance and Military Force in Counterinsurgency Strategies. Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History (Review Article) (Forthcoming). Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros and Alex Ruiz. Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods. World Development (Forthcoming). Shapiro, Jacob N. The Terrorist s Dilemma: Managing Violence Covert Organizations. Princeton University Press (In Press). Weidmann, Nils B. and Idean Salehyan. Violence and Ethnic Segregation: A Computational Model Applied to Baghdad. International Studies Quarterly (Forthcoming). 36

Publications (continued) Daly, Sarah Zukerman. State Strategies in Multiethnic Territories: Explaining Variation in the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. British Journal of Political Science (Forthcoming). Egel, Daniel. Tribal Heterogeneity and the Allocation of Development Resources: Evidence from Yemen. Journal of Development Economics (Forthcoming). Fair, C. Christine, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. Democratic Values and Support for Militancy: Evidence from a National Survey of Pakistan. Journal of Conflict Resolution (Forthcoming). Felter, Joseph H. Why Do Insurgencies Fail? Causes and Effects Governance and Military Force in Counterinsurgency Strategies. Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary History (Review Article) (Forthcoming). 37

Publications (continued) Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, and Alex Ruiz. Traditional Governance, Citizen Engagement, and Local Public Goods. World Development (Forthcoming). Shapiro, Jacob N. The Terrorist s Dilemma: Managing Violence Covert Organizations. Princeton University Press (In Press). Weidmann, Nils B. and Idean Salehyan. Violence and Ethnic Segregation: A Computational Model Applied to Baghdad. International Studies Quarterly (Forthcoming). 38

Revise and Resubmits Blair, Graeme, Kosuke Imai and Jason Lyall. Explaining Support for Combatants in Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan. American Political Science Review (Revise and Resubmit). Callen, Michael, Jean Imbs and Paolo Mauro. Pooling Risk Among Countries. Journal of International Economics (Revise and Resubmit). Callen, Michael and James D. Long. Institutional Corruption and Election Fraud: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan. American Economic Review (Revise and Resubmit). Crost, Ben, Joseph H. Felter, and Patrick Johnston. Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict. American Economic Review (Revise and Resubmit). Daly, Sarah Zukerman. Former Combatants and Transitional Justice. International Journal of Transitional Justice (Revise and Resubmit). 39

R&R (continued) Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Aila Matanock, and Vidal Romero. Networks of Fear: Mapping the Social Embeddeness of Drug Gangs and Violence in Mexico. American Journal of Political Science (Revise and Resubmit). Shapiro, Jacob N. and Nils Weidmann. Is the Phone Mightier than the Sword: Cell Phones and Insurgent Violence in Iraq. American Journal of Political Science (Revise and Resubmit). 40

Interaction with Other Organizations TGD Team: Six PIs from four universities TGD Advisory Board: Experts from military, civilian aid organizations, and academic institutions Research Partnerships Policy Advice Leveraging Resources Empirical Studies of Conflict Project USAID Colombia Center for Economic Research in Pakistan EVIDINCE Collaboration USAID/CCM ISAF International Growth Centre International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Iraq Body Count Ministry of the Interior, Afghanistan Queens University, Belfast Roshan Harvard Kennedy School Econometria and DevTech (USAID Colombia M&E contractors) Government of Punjab USAID CMM/PPL OSD Policy World Bank Philippines Department of Social Welfare and Development, Philippines Armed Forces of the Philippines DFID Pakistan Other grants (ARO, ATAI, CFSP, CREATE-DHS, NBER, NSF, ONR, UCOP, USAID Development & Innovation Ventures, USAID Higher Education Solutions Network) 41