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Dynamic Elite Partisanship: Party Loyalty and Agenda Setting in the US House Web Appendix René Lindstädt and Ryan J. Vander Wielen Department of Government, University of Essex (email: rlind@essex.ac.uk); and Department of Political Science, Temple University (email: vanderwielen@temple.edu). 1

Data Sources Variable Party Unity Party Votes Party Support Days to Election Source Author coding using Voteview roll call data at http://voteview.com/ Author coding using Voteview roll call data at http://voteview.com/ Author coding using Voteview roll call data at http://voteview.com/ Voteview roll call coordinates data at http://voteview.com/; House Clerk website at http://clerk.house.gov Retirement Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Ideological Extremism Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Seniority Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Lagged Vote Share Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Lagged Quality Challenger Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Lagged Spending Gap Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Lagged District Partisanship Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) In-party Midterm Carson, Koger, Lebo and Young (2010) Vote Types: a. Regular Passage Votes Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013) b. Suspension Votes Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013) c. Miscellaneous Passage Votes Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013) d. Amendment Votes Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013) e. Partisan Procedural Votes Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (2013) Ultra-consensual Votes Disagreement Score Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/ Author coding using Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/ Polarization Vander Wielen and Smith (2011) Issue Types Preceding Election Lame Duck Session Votes Election Cycles Budget Votes Policy Agendas Project at http://www.policyagendas.org/; Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/ Voteview roll call coordinates data at http://voteview.com/; House Clerk website at http://clerk.house.gov Voteview roll call coordinates data at http://voteview.com/; House Clerk website at http://clerk.house.gov Voteview roll call coordinates data at http://voteview.com/; House Clerk website at http://clerk.house.gov Political Institutions and Public Choice (PIPC) House roll call data at http://sites.duke.edu/pipc/data/ 2

Omitting Random Slopes from Hierarchical Models Party Vote Ultra-Consensual Disagreement Score Days to Election 0.0004 0.0006 0.0001* (0.0003) (0.0004) (4.09e-05) Days to Election 2 1.53e-06* 1.57e-06* 3.23e-07* (5.07e-07) (5.54e-07) (6.11e-08) Regular Passage Votes 0.5298* 0.1387* 0.0986* (0.0590) (0.0612) (0.0075) Suspension Votes 1.4935* 1.2585* 0.2318* (0.0791) (0.0712) (0.0087) Miscellaneous Passage Votes 0.8206* 1.0583* 0.1560* (0.0787) (0.0769) (0.0096) Amendment Votes 0.8810* 1.8702* 0.0702* (0.0570) (0.0705) (0.0073) Partisan Procedural Votes 0.8536* 0.9691* 0.1568* (0.0602) (0.0687) (0.0077) Polarization 0.1096 0.0503 0.0482* (0.0638) (0.0553) (0.0105) Constant 1.6354 1.4181 0.1185 (1.4434) (1.4499) (0.1955) Issue Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes SD Constant 0.3586 0.3044 0.0597 Regular Passage Suspensions Amendments Partisan Procedural Days to Election 0.0004* 0.0039* 0.0019* 2.71e-05 (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (9.75e-05) Days to Election 2 4.88e-06* 1.97e-06* (7.41e-07) (5.27e-07) Polarization 0.4577* 0.2122* 0.3791* 0.0027 (0.0862) (0.0867) (0.1362) (0.0513) Constant 0.7480* 3.5055 3.1382* 0.6418* (0.3428) (0.3732) (0.5347) (0.2126) Issue Type Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes SD Constant 0.4902 0.4786 0.7803 0.2801 Table 1: Agenda Setting Models Used in Prediction Figures Without Random Slopes Included. Notes: See footnote 90. * denotes p 0.05. 3

Non-Parametric Specification of Member-Level Model Probability of Party Support 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89 600 400 200 0 Days to Election Figure 1: Member-Level Model Using Spline Specification. Notes: See in-text discussion. 4

Robustness Checks Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Days to Election 3.94e-05 8.72e-05 0.0001 7.51e-06 (5.81e-05) (8.04e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) Days to Election 2-7.52e-07* -9.86e-07* -5.69e-07* -2.05e-07 (1.96e-07) (2.70e-07) (2.76e-07) (2.66e-07) Days to Election 3 1.02e-09* 1.21e-09* 5.65e-10* 2.12e-10 (1.96e-10) (2.66e-10) (2.68e-10) (2.59e-10) Party Votes -0.3800* -0.3514* -0.2788* -0.2775* (0.0224) (0.0266) (0.0277) (0.0230) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0009* 0.0006* 0.0006* 0.0007* (9.29e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -2.98e-06* -1.93e-06* -1.69e-06* -2.26e-06* (3.12e-07) (4.21e-07) (4.29e-07) (4.12e-07) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 3.36e-09* 2.39e-09* 2.04e-09* 2.62e-09* (3.09e-10) (4.15e-10) (4.21e-10) (4.05e-10) Table 2: Member-Level Models Excluding the Lagged Spending Gap Variable. Notes: See footnote 50. * denotes p 0.05. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Days to Election 3.73e-05-0.0001 0.0002 5.04e-05 (5.85e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Days to Election 2-5.79e-07* -5.70e-07-9.44e-07* -5.78e-07 (1.99e-07) (3.71e-07) (3.76e-07) (3.72e-07) Days to Election 3 8.27e-10* 9.78e-10* 1.07e-09* 7.02e-10 (2.00e-10) (3.70e-10) (3.70e-10) (3.67e-10) Party Votes -0.3789* -0.2942* -0.2275* -0.2468* (0.0224) (0.0324) (0.0342) (0.0313) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0009* 0.0012* 0.0010* 0.0011* (9.34e-05) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -2.94e-06* -4.39e-06* -3.20e-06* -3.68e-06* (3.15e-07) (5.47e-07) (5.68e-07) (5.56e-07) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 3.31e-09* 4.90e-09* 3.54e-09* 4.02e-09* (3.12e-10) (5.40e-10) (5.57e-10) (5.45e-10) Table 3: Member-Level Models Using Fixed Effects for Election Cycles Rather than Congresses. Notes: See footnote 60. * denotes p 0.05. 5

Party Vote Ultra-Consensual Disagreement Score Days to Election 0.0005 0.0005 0.0001* (0.0005) (0.0004) (7.18e-05) Days to Election 2 1.54e-06* 1.51e-06* 3.18e-07* (7.39e-07) (6.18e-07) (1.07e-07) Regular Passage Suspensions Amendments Partisan Procedural Days to Election 0.0003* 0.0038* 0.0023* 4.46e-05 (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001) Days to Election 2 4.39e-06* 2.65e-06* (8.81e-07) (6.65e-07) Table 4: Agenda Setting Models Using Random Effects for Election Cycles Rather than Congresses. Notes: See footnote 69. * denotes p 0.05. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Days to Election 6.44e-05-0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Days to Election 2-1.28e-06* -1.41e-06* -1.75e-06* -1.28e-06 (3.75e-07) (7.18e-07) (7.19e-07) (7.14e-07) Days to Election 3 1.70e-09* 2.15e-09* 2.00e-09* 1.58e-09* (3.75e-10) (7.10e-10) (6.97e-10) (6.93e-10) Party Votes -0.7064* -0.5872* -0.4625* -0.4545* (0.0406) (0.0618) (0.0659) (0.0588) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0016* 0.0021* 0.0017* 0.0020* (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -5.41e-06* -7.48e-06* -5.55e-06* -6.75e-06* (5.76e-07) (1.03e-06) (1.08e-06) (1.06e-06) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 6.16e-09* 8.39e-09* 6.13e-09* 7.38e-09* (5.71e-10) (1.02e-09) (1.06e-09) (1.04e-09) Table 5: Member-Level Models Using Logit Rather than Probit Link. Notes: See footnote 61. * denotes p 0.05. Party Vote Ultra-Consensual Days to Election 0.0002 0.0003 (0.0002) (0.0002) Days to Election 2 1.04e-06* 1.05e-06* (3.25e-07) (3.71e-07) Regular Passage Suspensions Amendments Partisan Procedural Days to Election 0.0002* 0.0020* 0.0011* 1.91e-05 (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) Days to Election 2 2.30e-06* 8.95e-06 (4.58e-07) (7.77e-06) Table 6: Agenda Setting Models Using Probit Rather than Logit Link. Notes: Disagreement model is excluded because it is a linear model. See footnote 61. * denotes p 0.05. 6

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Days to Election 5.09e-05 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) Days to Election 2 1.29e-06* 1.03e-07 2.12e-08 4.67e-07 (6.04e-07) (1.07e-06) (1.09e-06) (1.10e-06) Days to Election 3 1.76e-09* 8.06e-10 4.22e-10 2.16e-11 (5.78e-10) (1.03e-09) (1.04e-09) (1.05e-09) Party Votes 0.7316* 0.6215* 0.5022* 0.5054* (0.0197) (0.0335) (0.0350) (0.0355) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0017* 0.0026* 0.0023* 0.0027* (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) Days to Election 2 Party Vote 5.58e-06* 9.49e-06* 7.70e-06* 9.22e-06* (8.24e-07) (1.43e-06) (1.46e-06) (1.49e-06) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 6.29e-09* 1.02e-08* 8.00e-09* 9.59e-09* (7.86e-10) (1.37e-09) (1.40e-09) (1.43e-09) Retirement 0.1233 0.1134 (0.1039) (0.1053) Ideological Extremism 1.9201* 1.9711* (0.0897) (0.0913) Seniority 0.0025 0.0024 (0.0031) (0.0031) Lagged Vote Share 0.0041* 0.0041* (0.0005) (0.0005) Lagged Quality Challenger 0.0155 0.0156 (0.0145) (0.0147) Lagged Spending Gap 0.0010 0.0005 (0.0047) (0.0047) Lagged District Partisanship 1.5189* 1.5244* (0.0848) (0.0860) In-party Midterm Election 0.0667* 0.0711* (0.0147) (0.0148) Member-level Characteristics (Factor Score) 0.4466* (0.0327) Factor Score Days to Election 0.0007 (0.0004) Factor Score Days to Election 2 Factor Score Days to Election 3 2.56e-06 (1.33e-06) 2.80e-09* (1.28e-09) Factor Score Party Votes 0.6825* (0.0436) Factor Score Days to Election Party Votes 0.0001 (0.0006) Factor Score Days to Election 2 Party Votes Factor Score Days to Election 3 Party Votes 5.88e-07 (1.83e-06) 1.01e-09 (1.75e-09) Constant 2.0352* 2.5827* 2.7866* 2.9709* (0.0341) (0.0772) (0.0817) (0.0442) Vote Type Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Issue Type Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Congress Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes SD Constant 0.5354 0.4562 0.4661 0.5360 Log Likelihood 624051.07 209862.42 204334.39 202885.11 Pr > χ 2 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 N 1,616,582 560,925 560,794 560,794 Groups 2,123 862 862 862 Table 7: Hierarchical Member-Level Models For 20% Sample. Notes: See footnote 62. * denotes p 0.05. 7

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Days to Election 3.94e-05-5.80e-05 0.0002 0.0001 (5.81e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Days to Election 2-7.52e-07* -7.61e-07* -1.04e-06* -8.09e-07* (1.96e-07) (3.71e-07) (3.74e-07) (3.74e-07) Days to Election 3 1.02e-09* 1.20e-09* 1.18e-09* 9.78e-10* (1.96e-10) (3.65e-10) (3.63e-10) (3.65e-10) Party Votes -0.3800* -0.2899* -0.2234* -0.2435* (0.0224) (0.0324) (0.0342) (0.0313) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0009* 0.0011* 0.0009* 0.0010* (9.29e-05) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -2.98e-06* -4.00e-06* -2.84e-06* -3.38e-06* (3.12e-07) (5.47e-07) (5.68e-07) (5.55e-07) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 3.36e-09* 4.46e-09* 3.13e-09* 3.67e-09* (3.09e-10) (5.41e-10) (5.57e-10) (5.43e-10) Table 8: Member-Level Models Excluding Lame Duck Session Votes. Notes: See footnote 75. * denotes p 0.05. Model 2 Model 3 Days to Election 5.80e-05 0.0002* (7.31e-05) (7.51e-05) Days to Election 2-7.61e-07* -1.04e-06* (2.44e-07) (2.49e-07) Days to Election 3 1.20e-09* 1.18e-09* (2.35e-10) (2.39e-10) Party Votes -0.2899* -0.2234* (0.0079) (0.0081) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0011* 0.0009* (0.0001) (0.0001) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -4.00e-06* -2.84e-06* (3.35e-07) (3.42e-07) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 4.46e-09* 3.13e-09* (3.21e-10) (3.27e-10) Retirement -0.1197* -0.1294* (0.0204) (0.0206) Ideological Extremism 1.0097* 1.0469* (0.0068) (0.0069) Seniority -0.0001-0.0002 (0.0003) (0.0003) Lagged Vote Share 3.66e-05 9.68e-05 (9.16e-05) (9.29e-05) Lagged Quality Challenger 0.0149* 0.0142* (0.0028) (0.0028) Lagged Spending Gap -0.0088* -0.0091* (0.0008) (0.0008) Lagged District Partisanship -0.2896* -0.3221* (0.0107) (0.0108) In-party Midterm Election -0.1030* -0.1094* (0.0030) (0.0030) Table 9: Member-Level Models Without Clustering on Individual Members. Notes: We present only the independent variables relevant to footnote 77. * denotes p 0.05. 8

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Preceding Election 0.0798* 0.1039* 0.1017* 0.1234* (0.0096) (0.0187) (0.0189) (0.0190) Party Votes -0.1097* 0.0583 0.0005 0.0275 (0.0233) (0.0358) (0.0365) (0.0375) Preceding Election Party Votes -0.2530* -0.3236* -0.2508* -0.2844* (0.0162) (0.0301) (0.0302) (0.0301) Table 10: Member-Level Models For Votes occurring Immediately Before and After Elections. Notes: The variable Preceding Election is equal to one when the vote occurred in the two months immediately preceding an election, and is equal to zero for votes following election within the given Congress. We find that for non-party votes, there is a slightly higher probability of party support among individual members in the period preceding the election relative to the period immediately following election. However, for party votes, there is a markedly lower probability of party support in the period preceding election relative to the period following election. See in-text discussion. * denotes p 0.05. Party Vote Ultra-Consensual Disagreement Score Preceding Election 0.6608* 0.6523* 0.6399* 0.9815* 0.9770* 0.9228* 0.2208* 0.1961* 0.1606* (0.1441) (0.1431) (0.1462) (0.1576) (0.1581) (0.1615) (0.0335) (0.0284) (0.0238) Polarization Variable No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Issue Type Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Regular Passage Low Conflict Votes Suspensions Preceding Election 0.3365* 0.3455* 0.3414* 0.3919* 0.3660* 0.0953 (0.1521) (0.1493) (0.1510) (0.1809) (0.1801) (0.1922) Polarization Variable No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Issue Type Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes High Conflict Votes Amendments Partisan Procedural Preceding Election 0.5867 0.5644 0.4277 0.4299* 0.4291* 0.3630* (0.3230) (0.3410) (0.3416) (0.1594) (0.1588) (0.1612) Polarization Variable No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Issue Type Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes Table 11: Agenda Setting Models For Votes occurring Immediately Before and After Elections. Notes: The variable Preceding Election is equal to one when the vote occurred in the two months immediately preceding an election, and is equal to zero for votes following election within the given Congress. See footnote 94 for complete discussion. * denotes p 0.05. 9

Model 2 Model 3 Days to Election 7.32e-05 0.0002 (0.0001) (0.001) Days to Election 2-7.18e-07* -9.90e-07* (3.67e-07) (3.69e-07) Days to Election 3 1.16e-09* 1.14e-09* (3.62e-10) (3.59e-10) Party Votes -0.3076* -0.2429* (0.0326) (0.0343) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0011* 0.0009* (0.0002) (0.0002) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -4.01e-06* -2.87e-06* (5.39e-07) (5.58e-07) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 4.45e-09* 3.14e-09* (5.33e-10) (5.47e-10) Retirement -0.0663-0.0732 (0.1348) (0.1414) Seniority -0.0006-0.0007 (0.0023) (0.0024) Lagged Vote Share -0.0017-0.0017 (0.0009) (0.0010) Lagged Quality Challenger 0.0078 0.0070 (0.0187) (0.0192) Lagged Spending Gap -0.0149* -0.0155* (0.0072) (0.0075) Lagged District Partisanship 0.4420* 0.4365* (0.1324) (0.1365) In-party Midterm Election -0.1776* -0.1870* (0.0177) (0.0183) Table 12: Member-Level Models Without Ideological Extremism Variable. Notes: The Lagged District Partisanship variable is positive and statistically significant after dropping the Ideological Extremism variable. See in-text discussion. * denotes p 0.05. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Days to Election 2.83e-05-6.75e-05 0.0002 0.0001 (5.84e-05) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) Days to Election 2-7.17e-07* -7.31e-07* -1.04e-06* -8.08e-07* (1.97e-07) (3.71e-07) (3.74e-07) (3.74e-07) Days to Election 3 9.80e-10* 1.16e-09* 1.18e-09* 9.77e-10* (1.96e-10) (3.65e-10) (3.63e-10) (3.65e-10) Party Votes -0.3809* -0.2910* -0.2235* -0.2437* (0.0225) (0.0325) (0.0342) (0.0313) Days to Election Party Vote 0.0009* 0.0011* 0.0009* 0.0010* (9.26e-05) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) Days to Election 2 Party Vote -2.93e-06* -3.97e-06* -2.85e-06* -3.39e-06* (3.11e-07) (5.46e-07) (5.69e-07) (5.56e-07) Days to Election 3 Party Vote 3.31e-09* 4.43e-09* 3.14e-09* 3.69e-09* (3.08e-10) (5.40e-10) (5.58e-10) (5.44e-10) Table 13: Member-Level Models Accounting for Budget Votes. Notes: See footnote 89. * denotes p 0.05. 10

Party Vote Ultra-Consensual Disagreement Score Days to Election 0.0004 0.0006 0.0001* (0.0003) (0.0004) (4.09e-05) Days to Election 2 1.52e-06* 1.57e-06* 3.22e-07* (5.07e-07) (5.54e-07) (6.11e-08) Regular Passage Suspensions Amendments Partisan Procedural Days to Election 0.0004* 0.0039* 0.0019* 2.76e-05 (0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001) Days to Election 2 4.85e-06* 1.98e-06* (7.40e-07) (5.28e-07) Table 14: Agenda Setting Models Accounting for Budget Votes. Notes: See footnote 89. * denotes p 0.05. 11

Vote Type Categorization Crespin, Rohde and Vander Wielen (n.d.) Vote Categorization Rubric Final Passage Votes Regular Passage Passage of a Bill Final Passage of Conference Report Final Passage of Joint Resolution Passage over Presidential Veto Suspension Suspension of Rules for a Bill Suspension of Rules for a Joint Resolution Suspension of Rules for Conference Report Motion to Suspend the Rules and Concur Miscellaneous Passage Amendments to the Constitution Final Passage of Resolution Adoption of Concurrent Resolution Suspension of Rules for Concurrent Resolution Suspension of Rules for a Resolution Adoption of First Part of Resolution Adoption of Second Part of Resolution Non-Passage Votes Amendments Straight Amendments (includes en bloc & amendments in the nature of a substitute) Amendments to Amendments Substitute (to an amendment) Motion to Table Amendment Amendment to Amendment to Substitute Perfecting Amendment Amendment to Substitute Perfecting Amendment to Substitute Suspension of Rules to Amend Bill Amendment to Special Rule Procedural Partisan Budget Waivers Motion to End Debate Motion to Rise from the Committee of the Whole Motion to Disagree Passage of Rules (Special Rule) Motion to Recede Motion to Order Previous Question Election of Speaker Motion to Recommit Motion to Instruct Conferees Motion to Recede and Concur Previous Question on Special Rules Miscellaneous Procedural Motion to Discharge Motion to Go into Executive Committee Unanimous Consent Motion to Table Motion to Proceed Appeal of the Chair s Ruling Miscellaneous Motion to Agree Motion to Postpone Motion to Delete Motion to Commit Motion to Consider Motion to Permit to Read from Record Motion to Refer Motion to Strike Vote to Approve House Journal Motion to Adjourn Motion to Table Dispense with Further Proceedings with Quorum Call 12