Thom Brooks University of Newcastle, UK

Equality and democracy: the problem of minimal competency * Thom Brooks University of Newcastle, UK ABSTRACT. In a recent article, Thomas Christiano defends the intrinsic justice of democracy grounded in the principle of equal consideration of interests. Each citizen is entitled to a single vote, equal in weight to all other citizens. The problem with this picture is that all citizens must meet a threshold of minimal competence. My argument is that Christiano is wrong to claim a minimum threshold of competency is fully consistent with the principle of equality. While standards of minimal competency may be justifiable, these standards justify political inequality. This paper explores the relationship between equality and democracy in terms of minimal competency, demonstrating how minimal competency is justified and why it is inegalitarian in interesting ways. KEYWORDS. Children, Thomas Christiano, Robert Dahl, democracy, equality, egalitarianism Thomas Christiano defends the intrinsic justice of democracy grounded in the principle of equal consideration of interests. 1 This intrinsic justice is foremost expressed in the doctrine that each citizen is entitled to a single vote, equal in weight to all other citizens. 2 I agree with Christiano that this conception of justice may require equality in say despite differences in competence as long as individuals meet a threshold of minimum competence. 3 That is, we both agree that voters must satisfy a minimum threshold of competency prior to electoral participation. However, I do not hold as Christiano does that the requirement of a minimum threshold of competency is fully commensurable with the principle of equality: this threshold guarantees the political inequality of some * I am most grateful to Ger Casey, Fabian Freyenhagen, John Hymers, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ETHICS NETWORK 14, no. 1 (2007): 3-12. 2007 by European Centre for Ethics, K.U.Leuven. All rights reserved. doi: 10.2143/EP.14.1.2021809

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2007 persons, either de facto or in truth. Instead, I argue that standards of minimal competency may well be just, but these standards create political inequality. The importance of demonstrating the problems with Christiano s account are simple. Many democratic theorists argue that minimal competence is not incommensurable with political equality, a view put forward forcefully and persuasively by Christiano s recent work. Whilst my discussion centres on his work, the implications for democratic theory extend far beyond it. Christiano defends a just system of governance where: (P1) No one s good is more important than anyone else s. (P2) No one s interest matters more than anyone else s. (P3) Each person has a life to live and the interests of each person are combined into a special unity within that life. (C1) Thus, the principle of equal consideration of interest requires that the interests of individuals be equally advanced in terms of lifetime prospects. 4 The only political system that satisfies these conditions is democracy. 5 Indeed, Christiano defends a version of modern, liberal, representative democracy where no particular conception of the good exists beyond those goods that individuals deem best for themselves. 6 Society cannot dictate what the good is simply by requiring consensus on principles of justice, even if these decisions were limited to reasonable citizens. 7 Instead, he advocates a principle of respect for the judgement of each citizen, treating all citizens as having something to say and of being worthy of being listened to and responded to. 8 As a result, the equal consideration of each citizen is respected despite the views of some prevailing over others. 9 Christiano s principle of respect for the judgement of each citizen only requires responsiveness to those who satisfy a minimum of competence in 4

T. BROOKS EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY moral reflection. 10 Those citizens who possess competence deserve equal consideration for their political judgements. Those who fail to satisfy minimum standards of competence are justifiably excluded from holding equal political rights stemming from citizenship. Thus, the ability to form facts of judgement is crucial for political participation. 11 Persons who can form such a judgement adequately (a) reflect on ideas of justice, (b) voice ideas that reflect their true interests, (c) learn by appealing to conceptions of principles, and (d ) understand what is at issue in policy debates. Possession of minimal competence makes possible the ability to form such a judgement and, thus, only those who have minimal competence can participate fully in democratic affairs. In addition, Christiano says: If the facts of judgement do not hold for some group of people, then there is no basis within a welfarist theory of thinking that failure to respond to a person s judgements is an injustice to them. 12 The implications are, on the one hand, that persons of sufficient competence have rights to an equal consideration of their political judgements such that failure for the state to do this is itself an injustice to them. On the other hand, not only do persons of insufficient competence lack rights to an equal consideration of their political judgements, but it is not an injustice for the state to be dismissive of these judgements. The latter are in a position of political inferiority to the former. Interestingly, Christiano rejects so-called normative epistemic authoritarianism because he does not accept that someone can legitimate his power on the basis of being in possession of superior wisdom. 13 On the contrary, he adheres to what he considers just standards of minimal competence, whose direct consequence is that those who fail to satisfy these standards shall be governed by those who possess competence. 14 In fact, Christiano rejects this brand of authoritarianism because of the difficulty in determining a criteria of sufficient reasonableness for political participation and yet his own standard of minimal competence is precisely such a criteria. Indeed, the satisfaction of minimal competence is itself sufficient reasonableness for democratic participation. 5

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2007 Those of insufficient competence conveniently fall into at least one of two groups: children or the mentally disabled. Christiano says: Children and those who are severely mentally disabled do not have full liberal or democratic rights because they are not capable of assessing the significance of their actions for their own interests or the interests of others, nor can they grasp the limits of those rights. 15 The withholding of rights to full democratic participation is based upon a lack of competence not due to physical or social status. Thus, the fact that one is a child or mentally disabled is not itself a reason to deny voting privileges. Instead, a person s incapacity to comprehend adequately his or her personal and interpersonal rights is a reason to deny these privileges. While it may well be quite difficult to determine who possesses minimal standards of competence, it is rather easier to determine who is a child or a mentally disabled person. 16 Indeed, there are advantages to using age, for example, as a means of determining minimal standards of competence as age requirements are more or less common and uncontroversial grounds in every country... for limiting the right of citizens to vote. 17 Crucially, Christiano commits himself to standards of competency, not standards of age requirements. For this strategy to work, all children should be expected to lack competency. Children who possess competency should any exist ought to be granted full rights of participation. Moreover, adults who lack competency possess illegitimate rights of participation. Indeed, Christiano believes that all sane adults satisfy demands of competence in virtue of their being sane adults. 18 A number of studies of both electoral politics and public opinion suggest that not all sane adults would possess competence. 19 Moreover, Christiano recognizes that the fallibility of moral judgement is pervasive, even when confined to parameters set by his principle of equality. While he admits that individuals are rarely able to give as much as rough sketches of their own interests in social life as well as their relationship 6

T. BROOKS EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY with fellow citizens, Christiano argues that it would be perverse and often self-defeating to rule out of court the judgements of those who disagree with one [intelligent person] on matters of justice. 20 The difficulty is that most people would be unable to provide competent moral judgements, owing to a corresponding inability to give more than a mere rough sketch of their own interests let alone the interests of others. The solution, for Christiano, seems to be that the great difficulty of governments making justified moral judgements will simply even itself out through democratic governance, rather than accelerate the problem. Thus, Christiano uses social status based upon age to determine who has full rights to political participation and not a standard of minimal competence, contrary to precisely what he claims to defend. Of course, it would be foolhardy to suggest that only democracies exclude children from full political participation, on whatever grounds. Robert Mayer notes: All regimes, democratic or not, exclude children from the demos, and they do so on the paternalistic ground of unequal competence. What makes authoritarian regimes different is that they often exclude sizable groups of adult subjects from power for the same reason that children are excluded. 21 In other words, all systems of governance exclude children from full participation for failure to satisfy demands of minimal competence. This is not necessarily an argument to continue to do so, but it points to a fact of political organization. The major difference between democracies and authoritarian governments on this view is that the latter excludes large numbers of adults from full participation for their failure to satisfy standards of minimal competence. Mayer suggests that a democracy may still legitimately exclude adults from full participation for lack of competence, as long as the number of adults is not sizable. 22 Mayer s position would exclude persons lacking competence from full participation similarly to Christiano. The major difference is that Mayer suggests competence, not age 7

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2007 qualifications, ought to be the deciding factor, although it privileges adults over children. 23 On the other hand, Christiano seems to do just the opposite, privileging age over competence. Christiano s argument is a bit sloppy as he argues both (a) that children and the mentally disabled ought to be excluded from full rights of political participation due to lack of competency and (b) that each adult is denied the recognition of her moral personality whenever her judgement about that society is never taken seriously by others is treated in effect like a child or madman. 24 This second claim is that an adult citizen must have an equal share in political judgement making in order for her political judgement to be taken seriously. The claim may well be true, but it categorically denies the right of moral personality recognition to children and the mentally disabled. The recognition of one s moral personality by others seems to be both a fundamental right of all persons and an argument for political equality. Only adults should enjoy full recognition on grounds of political equality, not because they all possess minimal competence. Children are assumed to lack minimal competence and, thus, they are denied full recognition. Christiano wants to link full recognition of moral personality to those who possess minimal competence. Instead, we find full recognition based upon age, not competence. As a result, his arguments in favour of (a) and (b) are incompatible. A final point is worth raising at this point. Christiano s support of minimal competency qualifications to determine simply who is entitled to fully participate politically is only a claim about who should and who should not fully participate in democratic life. It is not a claim in support of empowering further those of particularly superior competence over those with average competence. He says: We have rejected the idea that competence rankings can justify unequal responses to citizens; still, competence rankings play an important role in the organization of society... In a complex society with a division of labour we need to have a way to choose who is to perform each task. The optimal division of labour is one in which each task is performed by the most competent at that task. In addition, we often need advisors 8

T. BROOKS EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY who are reliable guides to truth. The most reliable guides to truth are the best advisors. Furthermore, we must sometimes choose partners in joint ventures and it is important that we choose competent partners because we have to live with the results. So competence rankings play a very important role in social organization. And this holds for moral competence as well. 25 While there are a number of substantive issues raised beyond the limited scope of this article, is it worth asking if, as Christiano purports to believe, (a) competence rankings have an important role in social organization, (b) we live in a complex society whose optimal division of labour necessitates having only the most competent perform tasks in which they are most competent, and (c) the importance of competence rankings holds for moral competence as well. Such views clearly suggest that persons of particular competence ought to participate in moral and political decision-making more substantively than those of less competence. Indeed, if competence rankings have an important role, namely, in determining who is most competent to perform complex tasks of political governance, then we might think that those with greater competence ought to have a special place in democratic governance: we should accept some degree of political inequality as justified. 26 Nevertheless, Christiano rejects proportional power distribution beyond a separation of those who can fully participate and those who cannot. 27 It is not the purpose of this article to reject the principle of minimal standards of competence. Nor do I want to suggest that only democracies deny children equal rights of citizenship granted most adults. 28 Instead, I agree with Christiano that liberal democracies do, in fact, demand the satisfaction of minimal standards of competency for full political participation. What I do reject is the argument that a democracy can both demand minimal competence and possess political equality at one and the same time. Unless all citizens meet these standards, then political inequality will exist in some variety. Indeed, political inequality is a likely consequence of holding any such standards and Christiano is not adverse to 9

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2007 such a view, given his argument that no child or mentally disabled will be satisfactorily competent. This inequality between adults and children need not be considered an injustice, if standards of competence are applied justly. Thus, democracy may still possess political equality amongst the many that possess minimal competence. The main problem with Christiano s views is that they fail to satisfy his own demands of democratic equality. In fact, he offers a defence of justified political inequality. The view that democracies are governments where everyone is equal is common to most democratic theorists. This view sits uncomfortably with a second position that only adults should enjoy full participation in democratic life. The virtue of Christiano s work is that he best exemplifies an interesting and persuasive account of how these two positions might be harmonized. My task has been to argue that the tension between equal participation and restriction of participation to adults is problematic insofar as we claim that rights to equal participation rest upon possession of minimal competence for full political participation. Indeed, there is reason to think that some adults will fail this standard and some children (especially those close to eighteen years in age) will satisfy the standard, while allowed or denied full participation because of their age, not competence. I believe that minimal competence is an appropriate standard for full political participation, although its use may deny an appropriate degree of autonomy and it is very difficult to see how any relevant test might be employed. Such reservations then tell against such a standard. If these reservations have some weight, then perhaps we should avoid speaking of minimal competence as a standard for full political participation after all contra Christiano and others. NOTES 1. Thomas Christiano, Knowledge and Power in the Justification of Democracy, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2001): 198. See my Can We Justify Political Inequality? Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 89(3) (2003): 426-38 for more extended criticisms of this paper. 10

T. BROOKS EQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY 2. See Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 37. 3. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 198. 4. Ibid., 202. 5. Ibid., 209. 6. For criticism of this view, see my A Defence of Sceptical Authoritarianism, Politics 22(3) (2002): 152-62 and Can We Justify Political Inequality? 7. Ibid., 203. 8. Ibid., 204. Mayer alerts us to the fact that [p]olitical equality is premised not only on equal competence but on equal stake, the assumption that each is equally interested in, and equally affected by, decisions of the association. (Robert Mayer, Strategies of Justification in Authoritarian Ideology, Journal of Political Ideologies 6 (2001): 151). 9. See Dahl, On Demcoracy, 37-38. 10. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 204. 11. Ibid., 207. Political participation seems to be limited to a right to vote in democratically held elections. 12. Ibid., 207. 13. Ibid., 199. See David Estlund, Making Truth Safe for Democracy in David Copp, Jean Hampton, and John Roemer (eds.), The Idea of Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 71-100. 14. In addition, representative democracies will create a fracture within those of sufficient competence, giving representatives a greater say in political judgement making than the represented whose say appears limited to a right to vote. (See my Can We Justify Political Inequality? and Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes, Elections and Representation, in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (eds.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 50). 15. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 200 and see ibid., 202. Christiano cites at 200n12 Daniel Wickler, Dan Brock, and Allen Buchanan. (See Daniel Wickler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, in Rolf Sartorius (ed.), Paternalism (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1983) and Dan Brock and Allen Buchanan, Deciding for Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).) See also Tamar Schapiro, What is a Child? Ethics 109 (1999): 715-38. 16. This task is often achieved by defining a child as someone under a certain age limit and defining a mentally disabled person as someone under a certain IQ. 17. Richard Rose, Elections and Electoral Systems: Choices and Alternatives. In Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler (eds.), Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 25. 18. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 199. 19. See David Austen-Smith and William H. Riker, Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation, American Political Science Review 81 (1987): 897-918; David Austen-Smith and William H. Riker, Asymmetric Information and the Coherence of Legislation: A Correction, American Political Science Review 84 (1989): 243-45; Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, Voting Correctly, American Political Science Review 91 (1997): 585-98; and William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (San Francisco: Freeman, 1982). On similar conclusions from studies in 11

ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES MARCH 2007 public opinion, see José María Maravell, Accountability and Manipulation, in Przeworski, et al, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, p. 178 and John Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 20. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 205. 21. Mayer, Strategies of Justification in Authoritarian Ideology, 151. 22. If a democratic government did exclude a large number of adults because of political competency, it might be argued that the competency tests are unfair. 23. This is a strategy I would defend, however difficult it would be in practice to implement it. See my Intenciolnálne novy zpusob myslení o volbách, Filosoficky Casopis 52 (2004): 483-88 (reprinted in English as An Intentionally New Way of Thinking about Voting, Review Journal of Political Philosophy 3 (2005): 1-7). 24. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 206. Regrettably, the traditional political discourse often uses madman and mentally disabled person interchangeably. 25. Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 213-14. 26. See my Plato, Hegel, and Democracy, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, forthcoming. 27. See Christiano, Knowledge and Power, 212-14. 28. See Mayer, Strategies of Justification in Authoritarian Ideology, 151. 12