PEGIDA PERMANENT PROTEST AND LACK OF REPRESENTATION?

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Philosophische Fakultät Institut für Politikwissenschaft Lehrstuhl für Politische Systeme und Systemvergleich PEGIDA PERMANENT PROTEST AND LACK OF REPRESENTATION? Michael Hilbert, M.A.

Preliminary Remarks One year of weekly protests = took its toll on the political climate in Dresden publicly and privately (highly partisan discourse) Confrontations on the streets and at the kitchen table PEGIDA, Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West BUT: If one can detach oneself (not easy) and become an observer, PEGIDA offers rare chances to research motivation, gestalt, and change of a protest movement over longer periods of time

What do we know? Four surveys Only partially comparable but nevertheless usefulin a complementary fashion = similar findings in all surveys Sample Methods Interviewer Interviews /handout Response rate Date Patzelt Quota Face to face 15/71/37 242 (492) /271 (568) /434 (1124) 49%/ 48%/ 39% 01.25.15 04.27.15 05.04.15 Vorländer et al. Random Face to face 15 400 (1142) 35% 01.12.15 (12.22.14/ 01.05.15) Walter et al. Random Online/focus groups/observ ation 547 (3500?) 15% (21%/37%) 01.12.15 Rucht et al. Random Online/observ ation 123 (670) 7%(18%) 01.12.15

Socio-economic Background On average, protesters exhibit the following characteristics Mostly male (77%), 49 years old Unaffiliated with any religion (78%), married (53%), based in Dresden (61%) or the vicinity of Dresden (24%) Received professional or vocational education (24% degree of higher education) working (67%) or retired (23%) wages below average (2800, 52%/26%) protesters are certainly not part of any precarious lower class

Socio-economic Background Vorländer et al. Walter et al. Rucht et al. Age (years) 48 >56 (18,2%) <35 (27,1%) 40,5 Sex ( ) 75% 81,5% 76% Higher Education Residence Metro-area: 36% Saxony: 38% East Germany: 9% 28% 39,8% 35% Dresden: 37,8% Vicinity: 31,4% Saxony: 17,6% Dresden: 44,2% Vicinity: 41,7% East Germany: 9,8% protesters are certainly not part of any precarious lower class

Three identifiable groups of demonstrators 1 Patriotic/xenophobic (53%) To the right of center Self-identified patriots Meritocratic view on politics and society (influence through achievement) Feel a strong disconnect between parties/politicians and themselves (lack of representation) Participate frequently in PEGIDA-Demonstrations See their movement as having positive effects on Germany as a whole Cannot find common ground with opponents of PEGIDA Demand numbers of foreigners to be reduced, especially numbers of asylum seekers Strongly doubt that a peaceful Islam or peaceful Muslims can blend into the German society

2. Conditionally xenophile (30%) Believe that Germany should continue to grant asylum to refugees from civil war and politically persecuted persons Closer to the political center Open to the idea of a peaceful Islam and peaceful Muslims Strongly disagree with the media coverage of PEGIDA Doubt that discussions of on PEGIDA s FB-page is balanced and fair 3. Right-wing xenophobes (17%) Do not reject the use of violence against political opponents Younger and farther to the right Want to reduce the number of foreigners in Germany, without distinguishing between asylum and other modes of migration

Representation gap? Werner J. Patzelt Neglect of voters Positions right of center lack represenation Result of a decade-long process PEGIDA representating underlying pattern of neglect on a national scale At the core of PEGIDA disdain for parties and elites, not Islam

SELF-EVALUATION LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION 70 65,2% 60 60,9% 50 40 30 20 22,5% 28% n = 227 (January) n = 259 (April) n = 404 (May) Mean: Januar: 3,2 April: 3,3 May: 3,3 10 0 2,2% 1,7% 5,7% 5,2% far left left exactly in the middle right 4,4% 4,2% far right January April May

TRUST IN POLITICAL PARTIES 70 60 50 n = 232 (January) n = 249 (April) n = 419 (May) 53,9% 66,4% 40 33,6% 30 28,2% 20 10 0 4,7% 3,5% 1% 1,7% 2% 2,2% 1,8% 0 0 0 0,4% 0,5% Linke SPD Grüne FDP CDU AfD NPD non January April May

WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR IF FEDERAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD THIS SUNDAY? 70 60 50 n = 214 (January) n = 237 (April) n = 392 (May) 57,5% 53,3% 40 30 20 22,4% 31,9% 10 0 5,1% 2,6% 1,4% 0,5% 1,4% 0 0 0 5,6% 2% 3,3% 8,7% Linke SPD Greens FDP CDU AfD NPD nonvoter January April May

Voter turnout Saxon state elections 2014: 49,1% I FEEL REPRESENTED BY OUR PARTIES AND POLITICIANS! 90 80 70 January: n = 239; mean: 4,6 April: n = 270; mean: 4,7 May: n = 430; mean: 4,8 74,5% 74,5% 60 50 Representation Gap? 40 30 20 10 0 0 0 2,1% 2,1% 7,5% 7,5% 15,9% 15,9% fully agree mostly agree undecided mostly disagree fully disagree

IS DEMOCRACY, ON THE WHOLE, RATHER BENIFICIAL OR PROBLEMATIC? 80 70 60 65% 67% April: n = 267 May: n = 432 50 40 30 28% 27% 20 10 7% 6% 0 beneficial problematic do not know April May

HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH THE WAY DEMOCRACY IS BEING APPLIED IN GERMANY? 90 January (Walter et al.): n = 530; April: n = 267; mean: 2,8; May: n = 428; mean: 2,7 80 70 77,2% 74,8% 60 50 40 30 20 17,4% 22,2% 10 0 5,4% 3% satisfied undecided discontented January (Walter et al.) April May

Why do parties fail to provide a viable option for protesters discontent? Overall devastatingly low trust in state institutions, esp. parties, (Rucht et al.) BUT: police, courts, NGOs most trusted Maybe because of discontent with the party-system itself? Rooted in perception of democracy, etc.? Or rather a lack of representation? PEGIDA as a sign of national unrest or confined to local/regional sphere?

Why Dresden? Dresden as a stage (Rehberg) High culture, old town = backdrop for (inter-)national attention (Walter et al.) e.g. annually commemoration protests Protesters from the vicinity/hinterland Only a minority from Dresden Dresden and attitudes towards foreigners (Reuband) Decline in resentments since 1990s, 2014 as low point Not significantly different in comparison with other German cities Results of last Saxon state election (2014) Dresden vicinity: nearly 1/5 of all votes to AfD/NPD Dresden as proxy for conservative debates (Fischer) Reunification/architectural reconstruction/commemoration

External causes? Contingent causes Group of organizers (peer group/flood/professional background) PKK demonstration Counter protests following ingrained patterns Blockades and attribution of political labels ( Nazi, Facist, etc.) In sum: phenomenon rooted in developments since 1989 that have been handled clumsy by national politicians and journalists and were countered on a local level in a traditional way (wrong medicine)

THE REPORTING ON PEGIDA IS FAIR AND BALANCED 90 80 70 Januar:y n = 239; mean: 4,6 April: n = 270; mean: 4,7 May: n = 430; mean: 4,8 74,2% 82,5% 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 2,1% 2,9% 7% 2,3% 2,1% 3% 13,8% 9,9% agree strongly agree undecided do not agree disagree strongly

PEGIDA as the seamy underbelly of civil society? Self-positioning within historical continuity 70% claim to have participated in 89 (peaceful revolution) back to 1848 Equation of reunification and multiculturalism 2nd experiment East-German civil society magnified Little experience, state-centered Election - Petition ( Eingabe ) Protest Multiculturalism and the current crisis Immediate impact, felt directly on an individual level Democracy Elites Multiculturalism

BACHMANN AND THE ORGANIZERS DO A GOOD JOB AND FURTHER PEGIDAS POLITICAL AGENDA 70 60 62,9% 56,4% 50 40 30 20 10 0 23,9% 26,7% 9,9% 13,6% April: n = 264; mean: 1,2 May n = 420; mean: 1,7 1,5% 1,9% 1,9% 1,4% agree strongly agree undecided disagree strongly disagree April May

Vergebliche Hoffnungen, denn es kam zur Ausgrenzung! Doch zum Besten unserer Demokratie WILL PEGIDA BRING ABOUT POSITIVE CHANGE FOR THE WHOLE OF GERMANY? 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 88% 88% 30 20 10 0 10% 11% 2% improvement ändern nichts demage January: n = 234; mean: 1,9 April: n = 268; mean: 1,6 May n = 430; mean: 1,6 1% January April May

PEGIDA SHOULD BECOME A PARTY 50 45 May: n = 422; mean: 2,9 40 35 30 25 20 15 30,1% 15,6% 20% 26,3% 10 9% 5 0 agree strongly agree undecided disagree strongly disagree

Possibilities and Limitations of Inclusion Size of Representation Gap? Hard to tell, BUT: something unhinged! 3 Options 1. PEGIDA Party Fuzzy profile of topics as a prerequisite for PEGIDA Fusing of a wide range of topics requires the organizers to stay in the realm of ambiguousness Different tactics = ambiguity, heavy reliance on references to day to day (or more precisely week to week) events, event management (see background of the organizers) Assumption: ritualistic character party Affirmation world view Interpretations on current events (Paris, Refugee crisis, etc.) Bully pulpit (Bachmann in lieu of the audience) to pressure the elites The sense of community and the ritualistic character will be hard to translate into party politics - e.g. Jeder ist ein Ordner, Dresden zeigt wies geht Saxon characteristics of PEGIDA

Possibilities and Limitations of Inclusion 2. Established Party CDU as the obvious candidate attitudes and beliefs towards geopolitical issues So far blind spot of research e.g. TTIP, Ukraine Assumption: highly dualistic world view (East-West) Split dilemma SPD and DIE LINKE How to recuperate lost territory without losing existing one? 3. AfD Highly likely Still, dependent on process of consolidation Pressure from the right wing External and internal communication = walk on a tight rope Pinocchio-Presse

Thank you for your Attention - Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit