Taiwan and the South China Sea Conflict: the «China connection» revisited

Taiwan and the South China Sea Conflict: the «China connection» revisited Kristen Nordhaug Research Fellow, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo In the territorial conflict in the South China Sea there are conflicting claims between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, the People s Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). The PRC is the stronger party in the conflict. Southeast Asian claimants worry about its huge claims and growing naval presence in the area. In this paper I investigate the claims and policies of one less well-known party in the Spratly conflict, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). My discussion focuses on how Taipei relates to the conflict between the PRC and Southeast Asian claimants. ROC PRC relations and ROC s South China Sea policy There are uncertainties with regard to ROC s stance in the South China Sea dispute. ROC claims the same islets and banks as the PRC. Chinese nationhood and a likely reunification with the PRC once in the future may incline Taipei to ally with Beijing. Economic integration across the Taiwan Strait promotes common interests between Taipei and Beijing in resource development in the South China Sea. This would dovetail with views held by Mark Valencia, who emphasises that ROC is co-operating with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the South China Sea conflict. His summary of Taipei s policies goes as follows: «While Beijing stresses the importance of shelving the disputes, Taiwan seems to want to band the two together to go against the other claimants. Taiwan s policy on this issue seems first, to gain international recognition for the Republic of China, and second to support China s sovereignty over An extended version of the paper can be obtained from the author.

the South China Sea while leaving the military responsibility of enforcement to China.» 1 It may be objected that Taipei s policy of seeking international recognition enhances tension with the PRC, and disturbs co-operation in the South China Sea. Taipei is resisting the PRC s attempts to increase the pace of reunification talks. Its current priority is to promote ROC s sovereignty and international diplomatic status. The PRC is considered a major security threat. These considerations may induce Taipei to take a neutralist stance in the South China Sea conflict. Taipei may even have an interest in siding with Southeast Asian claimants against the PRC in order to protect its sea lanes of communication through the South China Sea from assaults by the PRC. Chen-yi Lin pursues this line of argument in a study of ROC s South China Sea policies. 2 These two widely diverging interpretations of ROC s behaviour in the South China Sea conflict both stress that relations with the PRC is the ultimate «independent variable» in explaining ROC s South China Sea policies. Valencia s data sources end at the year 1995, while Lin draws on sources until 1997. This may be important, since ROC's relations with the PRC were declining during 1995/96,. If ROC s South China Sea policy is a function of its relationship with the PRC, it may have changed in 1995-96 from a pro-prc to a neutralist or pro-south East Asian stance. Let us see how this argument can be elaborated. A starting point may be the realist assumption that foreign policy-making is a product of a reasonably rational, unitary and autonomous executive power striving to maximize its security interests. Conditions of uncertainty may however complicate long-term planning, so that policies are oriented to the current situation. We may assume that when relations are good, or improving, Taipei tends to ally with Beijing. Taipei and Beijing co-operate in developing territorial claims on behalf of a future reunified China, while concerns about cross-strait military tension are reduced. Taipei relaxes its restrictions on economic relations across the Taiwan Strait, and allows for cooperation in oil exploration or fisheries in the South China Seas. On the other hand, when relations are poor or declining, there is little communication between Beijing and Taipei. This lack of communication reduces the potential for joint co-ordination of their territorial policies. Taipei becomes more concerned about the security threat of growing control by mainland China in the South China Sea as this control may jeopardise its sea lanes of communication through the South China Sea. As a result Taipei discontinues previous policies of co-operation with Beijing. Taipei also tightens its restrictions on sensitive forms of economic cooperation between Taiwan and the mainland such as common oil exploration activities, and attempts to redirect foreign investments from the Chinese mainland to other areas, including Southeast Asia. Taipei pursues a conciliatory policy towards Southeast Asian claimants in order to balance off the PRC. Its main concern is about the military threat from the mainland, and it is careful not to «overstretch» its airforce and navy into the South China Sea. In the next sessions I will review the development of cross-strait relations and Taipei s policies in the South China Sea 44

in order to test the usefulness of this hypothesis. Cross-strait relations 1987-98 In the late 1980s relations between Taipei and Beijing began to improve after more than three decades with mutual hostility. In the 1980s Beijing launched the formula «One country Two Systems». Taiwan would be a special administrative region of the PRC and be permitted a high degree of executive, legislative and judicial powers and control of its own armed forces. Beijing also encouraged contacts over the Taiwan Straits and demanded that Taipei abandoned its restrictions on communication and economic contacts with the mainland. However, Taipei remained cautious. Its official policy was the «three nos», no contact, no trade and no travel links with the Chinese mainland. In November 1987 ROC allowed its citizens to visit relatives on the Chinese mainland. This was followed up by the legalization of trade with the Chinese mainland via Hong Kong in 1988. Indirect investments in the Chinese mainland were also tacitly approved. After 1987 there was a permanent and strong growth of economic relations with the mainland facilitated by the liberalization of travels to the mainland, and investment by ROC citizens in the mainland started to grow at a rapid pace. The «three nos» were watered down. «No contacts» became no official contacts, but informal contacts flourished. «No trade» became no direct trade, while triangular trade and investment expanded, especially through Hong Kong. A new political breakthrough occurred in April 1993 when informal talks about cross-strait relations started between the two sides in a three-day meeting in Singapore. A series of informal negotiations about the regulation of cross-strait relations followed. However, it also became apparent that there were strong disagreements on the two sides as Beijing insisted on starting talks on reunification, while Taipei only was willing to discuss «low-politics». Beijing was also annoyed about Taipei s policy of enhancing its international diplomatic status. Nevertheless, relations appeared to be cordial during the first half of 1995. On 30 January 1995 PRC s president Jiang Zemin issued a proposal for reunification that stressed the need for negotiation, and new cross-strait talks were scheduled for July 1995. Then, a dramatic decline of relations occurred after President Lee Teng-hui's «informal» visit to the United States in June 1995. The PRC leadership regarded this a Taiwan independence policy of seeking diplomatic recognition from the United States. Beijing cancelled the cross-strait talks scheduled for July 1995. Four PRC missile tests followed in the Taiwan Strait during July- November 1995, and again during ROC s presidential election in March 1996. The U.S. government then sent two aircraft carrier battle groups towards the Taiwan Strait. After this showdown, Beijing and Taipei were careful not to escalate tension further, and there was some 45

improvement of relations during 1997-98. In April 1997 ROC lifted some of its restrictions on cross-strait shipping. In February 1998 the two parties agreed to renew the informal cross-strait talks. Cross-strait talks were resumed in October 1998, but these talks did not produce any significant agreement. If ROC s policy is an outcome of these cross-strait relations, there should be a strengthening of a PRC-ROC alliance until mid-1995, and a move in a more neutralist direction from mid-1995 through 1996, and possibly a somewhat uncertain period of muddling-through at present. ROC s claims in the South China Sea ROC s actual territorial control in the South China Sea is restricted to the Pratas Island in the north and Itu Aba, the largest islet in the Spratlys. Its territorial claims are however huge. In July 1989 a special committee was created under the Land Administration Department of ROC s Ministry of Interior for drafting baselines and demarcating ROC s territorial sea and exclusive economic zone. In 1990 this committee proposed that ROC should claim large parts of the South China Sea as its historical waters. 3 On 16 July 1991 ROC s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Tungsha (Pratas), Hsisha (Paracels), Nansha (Spratly) and Chungsha (Macclesfield) islands in the South China Sea were integral parts of the Republic of China's territory. This claim was reiterated by ROC's representative in the Bandung Conference 18 July 1991, and again during the South China Sea workshop in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on 2 July 1992. 4 In March 1993 the legislature (Legislative Yuan) of ROC adopted the «Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea» with major claims in the South China Sea. 5 Taipei based its claims on a map developed by the government of the Republic of China in 1947-1948 before the termination of the civil war on the Chinese mainland and the establishment of an exile government in Taipei. A u-line on this map included about 90 percent of the South China Sea. ROC claimed the Spratly Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank and the Pratas Islands that all were within the u-line with reference to «history, geography and international law». 6 ROC s claims resembled those forwarded by the PRC, and they both justified their claims with the u-line map. However, ROC unlike the PRC claimed the waters within the u-line as its historic waters. The legal base of this claim is a weak one, regardless of whether it is a claim for internal waters, for territorial waters or for archipelagic waters. ROC s historic waters claim is also weak because it was not forwarded before 1990.7 In December 1997 it was announced that the South China Sea interministerial task force considered an agreement to «temporarily put aside its sovereignty over the special historic waters and find practical means of reinforcing the ROC's sovereignty over the disputed waters claimed by a number of countries in the region» 8 46

Defending territorial interests in the South China Sea ROC maintained 5-600 naval troops on Itu Aba from 1956 until the late 1980s. In the 1990s this force was reduced. The current level is about 110 troops. 9 In October 1992 ROC s Ministry of National Defence declared a 4,000 meter prohibited sea zone and a 6,000 meter restricted sea/air zone around the islands it controlled in the South China Sea. ROC also wanted to take part in the military race in the region. In July 1993 it was reported that the government considered building an airport, a lighthouse and a fishing boat harbour on Itu Aba (Taiping) Island. The announcement came after the disclosure that the PRC was building an air base on the Paracel Islands and reports that several Southeast Asian countries also were planning to build airstrips on the islets that they controlled. 10 In April 1994 marine police boats from Taiwan were sent to the Spratlys. Their stated mission was to protect Taiwan fishing boats from pirates and to crack down on smuggling, but this was also a «symbolic move» to underscore ROC s sovereignty in the area. There was no protest from other claimants against the patrol. 11 A new police boat patrol was scheduled for April 1995. But by this time the situation in the South China Sea had changed. There were strong tension between the Philippines and the PRC over the Chinese construction on the Mischief Reef and there had also been an episode between ROC and SRV a few days before the planned patrol. On 25 March, ROC marines had fired at a Vietnamese vessel near Itu Aba. This incident was later protested by Hanoi, which also charged ROC with undertaking a construction project on a reef. Taipei denied the latter claim, while it asserted its right to fire at the Vietnamese vessel which it claimed had sailed into the prohibited zone around Itu Aba. 12 Both Hanoi and Manila protested ROC s police boat patrol to the Spratlys. The patrol was called back on 2 April after having reached the Tungsha (Pratas) Island. It was now decided that the situation in the region was too tense for patrolling. Later ROC decided to postpone its patrols. There has been no further police boat patrols in the Spratly area afterwards. 13 Vietnam and the Philippines reinforced their garrisons on the disputed Spratly Islands after the February 1995 Mischief Reef Incident, while ROC s Minister of Defense stated that Taiwan would not send more troops to the Spratly region. 14 ROC airstrip plans were also abandoned. I have not managed to find any certain information about when the plans were abandoned, but one of my informants assumed that it might have been in 1995. Co-operating with the PRC in the South China Sea? a. Co-operation between armed forces - In March 1988 forces from PRC and SRV fought a sea battle at the Union Bank. Three Vietnamese vessel were sunk by Chinese warships and more than 47

70 Vietnamese soldiers were killed. The PRC then occupied seven features claimed by the SRV.15 The political establishment in ROC responded with support of the PRC. In a briefing to the Legislative Yuan (ROC s legislature), defence minister Cheng Wei-yuan said that if asked by the PRC, ROC would assist in the defence of the Spratlys against a third party. He was careful to add that the PRC was fully able to deal with Vietnam on its own, so ROC forces would probably not need to become involved. 16 Some covert co-operation may have taken place. It has been claimed that PRC garrisons received freshwater supplies from the ROC troops on Itu Aba in that year. 17 Apparently, this was the end of co-operation between the armed forces in the South China Sea. During spring 1995 the PLA Navy offered the ROC garrison on Itu Aba supplies of desalinated water, but the offer was turned down. 18 b. Overall co-ordination of policies - The PRC and ROC started to promote informal coordinating of their South China Sea policies in the early 1990s. Starting in May 1991, they arranged conferences where scholars and officials met to discuss co-operation in the South China Sea, including legal strategies, exploration of oil and gas resources and fishery resources. At a joint conference in Taipei in June 1994 a participant from Taiwan urged the two governments to map jointly waters in the South China Sea and exercise jurisdiction accordingly. 19 This cooperation was disturbed by the decline of relations between ROC and the PRC after Lee Teng- Hui s travel to the United States in June 1995. The PRC delegation decided not to attend a meeting scheduled for October 1995, and there has been no further meeting afterwards. 20 Later there was some indication that Taipei wanted to handle its territorial disputes independently of Beijing. This was seen when a conflict was building up in the East China Sea between Japan, ROC, PRC and Hong Kong over the Senkaku (Tiaoyutai) Islands during the summer of 1996. Taipei announced that one of its principles to handle this conflict would be that there was no need for co-operation with Beijing. 21 Taipei has never made a similar announcement relating to the South China Sea conflict. c. Joint exploration - During the Indonesian South China Sea workshop in July 1992 the PRC invited ROC to co-operate in exploration for oil and other resources near the Spratlys. 22 A stateowned Taiwanese oil company, the Chinese Petroleum Company was invited to participate with a mainland company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). However, Taipei did not accept participation, since state-owned companies in Taiwan were not allowed to invest in the Chinese mainland. These restrictions were later bypassed as the ROC company technically was represented by a subsidiary in Panama. 23 In August 1995 the two companies reached a preliminary agreement on undertaking joint oil exploration off the Pearl River Delta near Pratas in the northern end of the South China Sea. In July 1996 the two parties signed a contract about joint seismic study of a 15,400 square kilometre area. 24 This agreement was however frozen as Taipei tightened its control with 48

Taiwanese investment projects on the Chinese mainland during summer 1996. In March 1998 ROC s Mainland Affairs Council allowed for resumption of co-operation between the two oil companies. In August 1998 the head of the Chinese Petroleum Corporation visited the Chinese mainland to resume the agreement of joint exploration. 25 So far there is no evidence that oil exploration co-operation will be extended to the Spratlys. Instead ROC authorities have presented a multilateral approach to joint development there. In August 1995 ROC s president Lee Teng-hui specified a proposal he had launched two years earlier for joint development in the South China Sea, a joint company where 12 «nations and territories» with an interest in the region would be invited to invest a total of 10 billion dollar. Lee had reportedly also forwarded a similar proposal two years earlier, but the 1995 proposal added on more detail to his previous proposal. Taipei s multilateral approach differed from that of Beijing. The PRC proposal for joint development was based on bilateral co-operation between the Chinese side (that might also include ROC) and other claimants. Summing up: Is ROC s South China Sea driven by its relations with the PRC? I started this discussion with a hypothesis that ROC s policy in the South China Sea follows its overall cross-strait relationship with the PRC, and that declining relations from the summer of 1995 would lead to a change in Taipei s South China Sea policies. There is some evidence that supports this view. Joint conferences on co-operation in the South China Sea were terminated during autumn 1995, albeit one may object that these conferences were terminated by the mainland side, so this severance of co-operation cannot be ascribed to policy changes in ROC, from Taipei s point of view this severance of ties took place «by default». Unlike Beijing, Taipei strengthened its commitment to multilateral joint development in the South China Sea in August 1995, and it presented its own policy in the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku islands in autumn 1996 independently of the PRC. Taipei froze cross-strait co-operation in oil exploration after the 1996 strait crisis. The renewal of this co-operation in March 1998 may be related to improved cross-strait relations by then. There is however also contrary evidence. Taipei s decision to put aside its historical waters claim in favour of more practical policies in autumn 1997 came «one year too late». This may possibly be accounted for by inertia in the decision making process, but that is not convincing in the cases when changes in the South China Sea came before the decline of relations with the PRC. Taipei s South China Sea policy became less aggressive during spring 1995 when relations with the PRC still were good. The forces on Itu Aba also declined to accept water supply assistance during spring 1995. How should we account for these «anomalies»? Decomposing the state 49

We started from the assumption that ROC s policies in the South China Sea is a product of its relations with the PRC. We must then be able to identify a coherent South China Sea policy. The various agencies that implement ROC s policies in the South China Sea should co-ordinate their action, and ROC s South China Sea policies should also be co-ordinated with more general policies towards the PRC and Southeast Asia. An alternative view would be that various government agencies implement diverging policies. This may result from insufficient policy co-ordination, weakness or neglect on the side of the executive power, as well as overt rivalry between government agencies, parties, party factions and lobby interest groups. One cannot take for granted that there exists a coherent South China Sea policy or that South China Sea policies are related with ROC s overall mainland policies in a consistent way, not the least because ROC s mainland policies by themselves are contradictory. 26 Let us see if this approach can explain our «anomalies». Party politics and ROC s South China Sea policy During 1991-92 a power struggle took place within the KMT between the so-called mainstream faction led by Lee Teng-hui and the conservative «non-mainstream». This power struggle also had important implications for Taipei s mainland policies. The non-mainstream favoured broader economic, cultural and political contacts with the PRC and a stronger commitment to a «one-china policy». The mainstream faction insisted on retaining the ban on direct contacts across the Taiwan Strait until Beijing recognized ROC as an equal political entity and renounced is threat to use force to settle the reunification issue. At the outset there was a rough balance of power between the two factions within the government and the KMT. By the end of 1992 the KMT mainstream faction had won the battle and controlled most of the central positions of the KMT and the government. 27 In 1993 prominent non-mainstream members broke out of the KMT and established the «New Party». The first round of developing Taipei s new historic water claim in 1989-90 took place before the manifestation of this faction struggle when the non-mainstream still had a strong position within the KMT and the government. The non-mainstream also had a strong position in the committee that developed the initial claim. 28 As the political balance later changed in the favour of the mainstream, Taipei s South China Sea policy was already established, and these claims had a considerable degree of inertia, not the least because the government, parties and the public in ROC consider the South China Sea issue to be rather unimportant. Nevertheless, the KMT has been challenged by the major opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP). The DPP has a political platform of independence from the PRC, although its independence policy has been moderated during the past few years. ROC s sovereignty claim in the South China Sea should be limited to the two islands under its actual control. On the other side of the political spectrum the New Party favours stronger co-operation with the PRC, also in the South China Sea. The ruling KMT takes a middle position. It is 50

committed to a long-term one-china policy, while it actively attempts to enhance ROC s diplomatic status in the short term. Apparently there has been some compromise between the DPP and the KMT. The agreement to temporarily set aside the historic waters claim was reached during a «non-partisan negotiation» in September 1997. 29 Thus, the changes of Taipei s South China Sea policies should be related to changes of the balance of power in ROC s party system during the 1990s characterised by the weakening of the non-mainstream/new Party and the strengthening of the mainstream/kmt and the DPP. Bureaucratic co-ordination and South China Sea policies The administrative apparatus that should implement Taipei s South China Sea policies was compartmentalised and weakly co-ordinated, although there was some attempt at institutional coordination. In October 1992 an inter-ministerial South China Sea Task Force was established. It included the Ministry of Interior, the Mainland Affairs Council, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the National Science Council, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Department of Health, the Environmental Protection Administration and the Kaohsiung Municipality. The task force was under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. 30 Leadership by the Ministry of Interior should indicate that the South China Sea question was a domestic issue. ROC renounced leadership by «professional» foreign policy institutions for the sake of symbol politics. This may indicate that the government regarded the South China Sea issue to be relatively unimportant. It is significant that the Foreign Ministry has been assigned a stronger role in the Senkaku conflict with Japan, as relations with Japan are considered more important to ROC s economy and security than relations with Southeast Asia. 31 The weak leadership by the Ministry of Interior was clearly seen during the police patrol boat episode in March/April 1995. The administrative responsibility of the patrol was with the Ministry of Interior. The patrol fiasco incited heavy criticism from all parties in the legislature, also from the KMT. The very idea of directing lightly armed marine police forces to distant disputed waters without any protection by the Navy was ill-conceived, especially during a period of growing tension in the Spratlys. There had not been any consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense about the mission. 32 Co-ordination among the ministries of defence and foreign affairs was also poor. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs pursued a «go south policy» based on economic aid and policy measures to encourage Taiwan foreign investment in South East Asia. Both the Philippines and Vietnam, were targeted for this aid and investment effort. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs used these measures in an effort to upgrade ROC s relations with Southeast Asia. A major objective was to become ASEAN s dialogue partner and to join the security regime of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). 33 The Navy took a very different 51

approach as it engaged in the escalating armament in the area with its plans for an airstrip on Itu Aba. The airstrip plan was reportedly abandoned due to budgetary constraints and conflicting bureaucratic priorities. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications vetoed the project. 34 It is also likely that the Navy was engaged in some kind of defence-related construction on the Bantam Reef, and that the Vietnamese vessel that was shot at in spring 1995 had come to inspect this construction activity. Thus, a number of events during spring 1995 revealed that Taipei did not have one, but several policies in the South China Sea area, some of them by default. None of these policies dovetail with the initial hypothesis about a co-operation with the PRC until mid-1995. A policy to defend sealanes of communication? I would like to end this discussion with a rather speculative note on the interest of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy in construction activity on Itu Aba. A main concern for ROC is to maintain open sea lanes of communication in the South China Sea to secure its supplies. The most urgent security need in this respect is Taiwan s import of crude oil. Taiwan does not have any recoverable oil reserves itself, and 98 % of its oil imports are carried via the shipping lanes in the South China Sea. Taiwanese vessels on these supply routes have been harassed by the PLA Navy. According to Chien Chung there has been 134 cases during 1992-96 where Taiwanese vessels have been «harassed, inspected, detained, rammed, and fired upon by [ ] PLA naval vessels in the northern part of the South China Sea». 35 Taiwan is building a formidable air and navy fighting force. However, unless there is a radical improvement of cross-strait relations, most of Taiwan's navy will be bound to the defence of the Taiwan Strait. The Spratlys is also outside the reach of the airforce unless there is a landing strip on Itu Aba. 36 The air strip plans by the Navy on Itu Aba may then have been undertaken in order to protect ROC s sea lanes of communication. This may also apply to the disrupted construction activity on Bantam Reef. ROC s policy in the South China Sea may not be a zero-sum game in the sense that good relations with the PRC imply poor relations with Southeast Asian claimants and vice versa. It may at times be a negative-sum game: The Navy s activity to protect ROC s sea lanes of communication provokes Southeast Asian claimants. ROC s Ministry of Defense and the Navy may also impede ROC s support of current efforts at joint exploration in the South China Sea. In January 1999 Ambassador Hasjim Djalal, sent a letter to Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the claimants in the South China Sea with a proposal for zones of co-operation in oil and gas exploration within disputed waters. This proposal will be discussed during the second study group on zones of co-operation of the Indonesian workshop in June/July 1999. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in ROC has been circulating this proposal to other ministries. The Ministry of Defense is reportedly sceptical. 37 ROC s response may indicate the power balance within its foreign policy bureaucracy. 52

Notes 1 Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke & Noel A. Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the South China Sea, Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997, p. 95, also Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea Disputes, Oxford: ADELPHI paper 298, 1995, p. 39 2 Chen-yi Lin, «Taiwan's South China Sea Policy», Asian Survey, vol. 37, no. 4, 1997. 3 Christopher C. Joyner, «The Spratly Island Dispute: What Role for Normalizing Relations between China and Taiwan?», New England Law Review, vol. 32, no. 3, 1998, p. 827. 4 Central News Agency (CNA), Taiwan, 26 May 1992 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China (hereafter FBIS-CHI)-92-101, 26 May 1992, p. 66; CNA, 3 July 1992 in FBIS-CHI-92-129, 6 July 1992, p. 83. 5 Kuan-Ming Sun, «Policy of the Republic of China towards the South China Sea», Marine Policy, vol. 19, no. 5, 1995, p. 402. 6 Sun, ibid., p. 408, Appendix 1. 7 Yann-huei Song & Peter Kien-hong Yu, «China's 'historic waters' in the South China Sea: an analysis from Taiwan, R.O.C.», American Asian Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 1994, pp. 94-99. 8 21 Dec. 1997, «Taiwan Ministries to Meet on Handling South China Sea Issue», CNA in FBIS-CHI-97-355. 9 Lin, op. cit., p. 324. 10 Hong Kong AFB, 13 July 1993 in FBIS-CHI-93-132, 13 July 1993, p. 66; CNA, 10 Aug. 1993 in FBIS-CHI-93-152, 10 Aug. 1993, p. 60. 11 Virginia Sheng, «Taiwan to send symbolic `forces to bolster South China Sea claim», Free China Journal, 10 Sept. 1993; Lin, op. cit., pp. 329-330. 12 R.L. Chen, «Vietnam Spratly protest rejected», China Post, 3 Apr. 1995; Zachary Abuza, «Vietnam-Taiwan Relations: Convergence and Divergence», Issues and Studies, vol. 32, no. 7, 1996, p. 124. 13 Tokyo KYODO, 2 Apr. 1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-063, 3 Apr 1995, pp. 87-88; «ROC marine police to stay out of Spratlys», China News, 18 May 1995. 14 Lin, op. cit., p. 329. 15 Bob Catley & Makmur Keliat, Spratlys: The Dispute in the South China Sea, Singapore: Ashgate, 1997,; Joyner, op. cit., p. 821, note 4; Stein Tønnesson, «Resolving the South China Sea Conflict», Paper to the Workshop on the South China Sea Conflict, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo, 24 26 April 1999; Valencia, op. cit., p. 86. 16 Shim Jae Hoon, «Blood thicker than politics», Far Eastern Economic Review 5 May, 1988, p. 26. 17 Valencia et al., op. cit., p. 30; Mark Valencia, communication to the author, 29 March 1999. 18 Lin, op. cit., p. 337. 19 Valencia op. cit., 1995, p. 40; Valencia et al., 1997, p. 96. 20 Yann-Huei Song, communication to the author, 30 March 1999. 21 «Lee dodges Tiayutai controversy», China News, 13 Sept., 1996; Virginia Sheng, «ROC protests Japanese actions in disputed islet group», Free China Journal, 13 Sept., 1996. 22 China Post, 3 July 1992 in FBIS-CHI-92-133, 10 July 1992, p. 66 23 Valencia et al., op. cit., p. 96. 24 CNA, 30 Aug. 1995 in FBIS-CHI-95-168, 30 Aug. 1995, p. 75; «Taiwan, China oil Companies to sign exploration pact», China News, 11 July, 1996. 25 George Hsu, «Taiwan says no immediate Taiwan Strait oil plans», Reuters, 12 May 1998; George Hsu, «Taiwan State oil chief to visit China», Reuters, 6 Aug. 1998. 26 See Yun-han Chu, «Between Market and State: The Business Sector and the Making of Mainland Policy in Taiwan», Paper, IPSA World Conference, Seoul, 17 21 August, 1997; Tse-Kang Leng, Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1996. 53

27 Leng, ibid., p. 47-48. 28 There were three legal scholars in the committee, Fu Kuan-chen from the National Taiwan University was affiliated with the non-mainstream and later became a representative of the New Party. Alfred Hu from the National Sun Yat-sen University was also close to the non-mainstream/new Party. The third legal expert, Huang Yi was not affiliated with the non-mainstream. Yann-Huei Song, communication to the author, 30 March 1999. 29 21 Dec. 1997, «Taiwan Ministries to Meet on Handling South China Sea Issue», CNA in FBIS-CHI-97-355. 30 Sun, op. cit., p. 402. 31 Interview Yann-huei Song, Taipei, 3 Feb., 1999. 32 The mission had been planned before the escalation between the Philippines and the PRC. The National Police Administration had been authorised to determine the date and time of departure. The mission was complicated by leaks to the press that caught the attention of Hanoi and Manila. The Minister of Interior ), Huang Kung-huei claimed that he had tried to change the date of the patrol, but his intervention 31 March came too late, since the ships already had left for the South China Sea earlier in the day. For a number of reasons this was a rather thin excuse. See «Blame for Spratlys fiasco rests with minister alone», editorial, China News, 6 Apr. 1995 for a rebuttal. 33 Samuel C.Y. Ku, «The Political Economy of Taiwan s Relations with Southeast Asia: The Southward Policy», Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 37, no. 3, 1995. 34 Interview Chih-heng Yang, Taipei, 12 Feb., 1999 35 Chien Chung, «Confidence Building Measures in the South China Sea», paper, Conference Asia-Pacific Security Forum, Taipei, 1-3 Sept., 1997. 36 Lin, op. cit., p. 338. 37 Interview Yann-huei Song, Taipei, 3 Feb., 1999. 54