CHINA AS A DOMINANT NAVAL POWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

CHINA AS A DOMINANT NAVAL POWER IN THE INDIAN OCEAN Sithara Priyadarshana Department of Economics, University of Kelaniya, Sri Lanka - 116000 ABSTRACT China is a country with historic legacy in the maritme affairs which traces back to its hoary civilization. And China is known to the world as a greate naval power for centuries. Its naval power and interest in maritime affairs has been well-demonstrated by many sea voyages by famous seafarers like Zeng He. Many imperial powers such as the Portuguese,the Dutch and the British could conquer and colonize other continents due to their naval power during the colonial period. Even China has played a greater role in its naval affairs which they were able to become a powerful and a prosperous nation in the world. This is very much obvious from its silk road trade initiative implemented by China for centuries. At present, in the 21st century, China is a dominant naval power in Asia and it contnues to expand her naval power in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). it has been a serious issue and a threat for other regional and extra-regional powers like India, the US as greater maritime powers in the 21 st century. This article discusses China s greater interest in naval power to keep up with regional and extra-regional challenges and it explores the responses of regional countries like India and extra-regional powers such as the US. Further, it describes China s new naval initiatives taken for the foreseeable future. It concludes with some observations with regard to security implications on littoral countries in the Indian Ocean region and the involvement of extra-regional powers in the regional security environment as well. Key Words: China, India, Naval Power, Indian Ocean, Rivalry 393

INTRODUCTION China is a country with a lon naval history other than India and the United States. It can be seen by the voyages of Zeng He, 1 who was a sea explorer in the 15 th century. These voyages were not primarily commercial but in addition, it intended to demonstrate naval power under the Ming Dynasty. These naval expeditions were included well-armed contingents of soldiers and they had intervened in political affairs of South East Asia 2. Being a great maritime power in Asia for over centuries, China historically has been a continental power with considerable land forces defending against the threats from northern and western parts of Asia. Some Chinese naval analysts have been criticizing that China does not have a declared, a comprehensively written maritime strategy, Beijing has published many documents and white papers on maritime affairs. This policy document concerns National Ocean Policy of China published in 1998. It has identified important areas of maritime affairs. It includes safeguarding the new international maritime order, marine rights and interests of China etc. Another provision is that China will strengthen the development and administration of its coastal areas. Further, China is very much concerned about forming coastal economic belts and maritime economic zones. Nevertheless, China s Ocean Policy is designed and plan to implement the development of marine resources and the protection of maritime environment, with all surveillance operations, monitoring, Law enforcement and management of maritime environment. Additionally, there are some other strategic objectives ssuch as enforcement of oceanographic technology, research and development, setting up of a marine management system and participate actively in the field of marine development with international cooperation are very important. Chinese Ocean policy includes the following provisions; I. Harmonize national and international maritime law. II. Integration of China s maritime security agencies. III. Coordinating in traditional and non-traditional maritime security concerns. IV. Focus on traditional maritime issues, both national and international. For instance, sovereignty disputes in the East and South China seas and threats of anti-piracy in the Gulf of Aden can be mentioned 3. In a white paper published in 2010 has described that China, in its defense policy has focused its attention on safeguarding their national sovereignty, security and commitment for national development. This was 1 He was a eunuch with a Mongolian origin who was a sea explorer in the 15 th century in the Ming Dynasty and he was an admiral, travelled to China, East India, Ceylon, Persian Gulf and the horn of Africa. (Kaplan, 2011, pp. 11) 2 Cole, 2013, p. 92 3 Cole, 2013, p. 92-93. 394

expected to guard against and resist any aggression, protect her lands, inland waters and territorial waters while safeguarding its maritime rights and interests. Moreover, the People s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was to accelerate the modernization her naval combat forces, increase strategic deterrence capability and counter-attack capacity, improve conducting operations in distant waters and counter non-traditional security threats. PLAN continued to develop new types of submarines, frigates, aircrafts and large support vessels to ensure combat and military operations. And it has taken measures to strengthen logistical support to sustaining long-time maritime missions. Internationally, Beijing emphasized its Navy s increasing role to maintain maritime security through peaceful means. It has highlighted Beijing s plan to visit foreign ports with more than twenty naval ships visiting more than thirty countries. Over the past few years, Beijing has dispatched their frigates in a way to demonstrate their naval power and to demonstrate their military power to the world. The sovereignty dispute over the past few years for sea resources and claims for islands in the East and South China Sea is a clear indication of Chinese consideration of territorial integrity, maritime rights and interests. They often highlight homeland security and the security of territorial waters as an integral part of their maritime aspirations. In 2006, in a speech to the party s central committee, former Chinese President Hu Jintao urged the PLAN to develop their naval capabilities to deal effectively with external security threats. The 2010 defense white paper emphasized the need to have improved surveillance operations in fisheries administration, and maritime affairs. China s increased maritime focus can best be seen by her 10,250 nautical miles coastline and more than 6,500 claimed islands. China has claimed to grab eight of the world s ten largest harbors. Liu Huaquing 4 : In Chinese naval history, Liu Huaquing has been an influential figure and he has been an advocate of Chinese naval power in the party s central committee. His naval strategy comprised three factors. First, by 2000 the PLAN was expected to be capable of defending China s maritime security interests. Second, by 2020 it is expected to defend China s security interests of the second island chain from Kurils through Japan and the Bonin islands, the Marinas islands, Palau and Indonesian archipelago which includes Java and the navy s control of Singapore and Malacca strait. Finally, by 2050 the PLAN has an expectation to possess aircraft carriers with the capacity to operate globally for the defense of China s maritime interests. Liu has viewed these island chains as barriers to be overcome. Liu has impressed the civilian leaders that the Chinese navy need to be modernized to fulfill China s regional and global aspirations economically and politically. As Cole 4 He has served as an army general and as a navy admiral in China s People s Liberation Army. He has made greater influence in advocating Chinese naval power into the mid-1990s and his plan to modernize Chinese Navy was very significant. 395

(2013) points out, mmaintaining a vibrant national economy requires much attention to maintain her economy. A country s ability to guarantee secure maritime conditions is important to its overall economic success 5. Maritime Interests of China: China has political, economic and security interests in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Unification of Taiwan gives much importance to China s maritime interests and it will help protect the Sea lines of communication in Taiwan Strait to promote her regional and global economic relations. And unification will guarantee her national security. But the supply of US arms to Taiwan and their air-sea battle concept is seen as a threat to Chinese aspirations. China is assertive of her territorial interests. China was grappling with territorial water disputes with eight countries in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. This territorial interests can be considered as a primary national interest of China and China is unlikely to give it up. Over the past years, China made extraneous effort to negotiate, consult and cooperate with countries involved in maritime competition in the Indian Ocean. For example, China signed the Declaration on the delimitation of Tonkin 2000 and the Declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries in 2012. China s paramount interests in the Indian Ocean is energy security. China is the second largest petroleum consumer in the world, next to the United States and therefore, any disruption to her energy supply will impede its economic development 6 and it will browbeat to compete over sea ports and marine resources. The US National Intelligence Council has predicted that Chinese oil consumption will be increased by 150 percent in 2020 in a way to drive her economic growth. This dire need of energy has compelled China to be very cautious of maritime security of the Indian Ocean Region and its strategic sea lanes. But there is a drawback to Chinese maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean. That is the dominant power and the influence of India as a naval giant and a competitor to China. India is considered to be the dominant power in the Indian Ocean and it has over the past decade continued to improve her power potential and therefore, whenever there is a Chinese presence and playing an assertive role in the Indian Ocean, India will not hesitate to take countermeasures 7. Further, China is very much concerned with India s Look East policy because India supposed to increase partnerships with ASEAN in the areas of maritime security, counter-terrorism and transnational threats, which is seen as an economic challenge by China. Protection of China s maritime trade and infrastructure is another strategic area of China s interest in maritime affairs. Chinese economy depends to considerable extent on its exports and imports and therefore, 5 Cole, 2013, p. 97. 6 Holmes and Yoshihara (2008), pp. 368. 7 Ibid. pp. 369. 396

maritime transportation should be of paramount important to China. In 2009, China s import and export volume was about $ 2.12 trillion and more than 90 percent of which depend on maritime transportation. It depends on ports, shores, waterways and ships. To protect and promote maritime trade, China will strengthen its maritime administration, it legal framework, container management, border security and freedom of navigation. In 2013, China published a defense white paper which highlighted its maritime development 8. It has suggested that Beijing needs to safeguard maritime rights and interests and further, to protect its overseas maritime interests too. During President Hu Jintao s presidency, there was a discussion to safeguard its maritime rights and interests and also to uplift China as a maritime power 9. At the National People s Congress (NPC), a new National Oceanic Commission was also created to formulate and empower with oceanic policy 10. All these changes were aimed at safeguarding China s maritime rights and interests. It was also highlighted the growing shift in Beijing s policy from land to sea 11. Further, China has given her much attention to the Bay of Bengal area where China has been building and upgrading commercial and naval bases in Burma, constructing roads, waterways from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan province. By these measures, China seeks to get the strategic advantage over India. And China can escape from the problem of being landlocked in the region 12. Just two weeks after these policy changes were formally declared, a Chinese naval fleet arrived at James Shoal with Type 071 amphibious assault vessel and it made other states worried about Chinese naval presence in the region. This might have been expected to increase pressure on other states 13. For the past few centuries, China had not given its much attention to the Sea routes. Given China s stable economy, it has apprehended the importance of becoming a major naval power in the region. This earnest naval build-up since 1990s was seen as a threat by other peripheral countries in the region including India and the US. On the contrary, these neighboring countries have a threat perception due to China s naval dominance in the region. But China has contributed to countering pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean, including in and around the Gulf of Aden. With its strategic ambitions, China gives due consideration to sea lines of communication. That is to safeguard her energy transport in the Indian Ocean. For example, 40% of China s oil imports are being transferred through the Strait of Hormuz and 82% of China s oil imports pass through the Malacca Strait 14. Therefore, China wants to keep these naval choke points undisturbed to advantages from sea trades and to 8 Cole (2013), pp. 94-95. 9 Christian (2013), pp. 1-2. 10 This is a series of biennial defense white papers first published in 1998 which is considered to a most recent policy document in 2011. 11 Cole, 2013, p. 92-93. 12 Kaplan (2011), pp. 10. 13 Christian (2013), pp.1-2. 14 Brewster, 2014. 397

ensure their supply of energy needs. China s strategic focus and presence is clearly reflected by her increased investments and trade relations with some of the countries in the region such as Pakistan and Myanmar. But over the years, China has seen strategic vulnerability for her Sea lines of communication and therefore, according to John Brewster, China began to project both their naval and air power into the Indian Ocean and tried to forge economic and military ties with many countries in the region. Naval Power of China: China has established their Blue water navy in 1980s. In her naval affairs, much focus has been given to Taiwan Strait. Over the last decade or so, China has made strenuous efforts to modernize and expand its naval power. In that expansion program, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier and has developed anti-access area denial capabilities. Although China exceed India in naval capacity both in qualitative and quantitative terms, China s power projection, according to Brewster, is very limited in the Indian Ocean due to China is being located with a long distance from the Indian Ocean region. There are some other constraints to Chinese power projection in the region. They are; lack of logistical support and difficulty in accessing into naval choke points which are strategically important to China. According to many previous studies, it is obvious that China has a considerable naval power but this naval power is not at present well represented with offensive behaviors in the Indian Ocean. This is very much clear from the fact that Beijing has not resorted to military option to protect sea lines of communication. Chinese naval presence was well-demonstrated in the Indian Ocean region with the immergence of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden in 2008, where two Chinese registered ships were hijacked by Somali pirates. To counter that pirate attacks, China has deployed three warships. Since then, China has made successful naval deployments and began to act very cautiously. But these military deployments, China could build her image as a great naval power in Asia. Further, China has improved her economic relations with the Indian Ocean states, and her sphere of influence in the region has made India to reconsider to the use offensive methods and on the other hand, it would persuade India to take her own security measures to retain India s backyard- the Indian Ocean region. India sometimes, might think, if India allow China to dominate and control the Indian Ocean, their image as a naval power and as a leader in the Indian Ocean region will be tarnished. China s influence in the Indian Ocean has been elevated further by its close relationship between Pakistan and Burma. Over the past two decades, China built strategic relations with Pakistan and it has supplied Pakistan with arms, and considerable diplomatic push for Pakistan against India. It has created a security dilemma amongst Indian strategic thinkers. Besides, China factor has taken a fertile ground in other smaller states such as Sri Lanka. It can be observed that Sri Lanka s big brother, over the years India has been 398

looking at Sri Lanka cautiously as a result of Sri Lanka s close economic, political, military and cultural engagement with China. China is also strengthening her political and economic relationships with other smaller countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean. China s sphere of influence in Sri Lanka has made India to revise her strategic plans because New Delhi is fear of China s close relations with Sri Lanka. Because it will marginalize India s sphere of influence in the region 15 and it will be a threat to regional security environment. This fear psychosis of India has been further aggravated by Chinese infrastructure investments in the littoral states in the region. India s former economic partners in the region such as the Maldives, Mauritius have come forward to build close economic relationships with China. This has made India very worried about China s increased influence in its own backyard. Therefore, this prompted India to take offensive measures to defend themselves from her main naval rivalry, China. This in turn, could lead to a fierce competition between these two countries in the Indian Ocean. In addition, China has entered into Indian Ocean through transport links. China has built overland transport connections which could link China to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan and Myanmar. Another project has been designed to build connection between the Arabian Sea and China through Pakistan. Regional Response to China s Naval Power: Regional concerns about territorial and naval disputes in the Asia-Pacific are on the rise. The Pew Research Center s Global Attitudes Project conducted public opinion polls in several regional nations in 2013 to assess the extent of these concerns. In response to the question How big a problem are territorial disputes between China and your country? the proportion that said the disputes are a very big or big problem was 82 percent in Japan, 90 percent in the Philippines, 62 percent in Indonesia, 36 percent in Malaysia, and 77 percent in South Korea. An important change from the past was that Southeast Asian governments no longer see a danger of US dominance and a growing number of states view closer ties with the US as a useful hedge against potential domineering behavior by China. Virtually every country in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia has been publicly or privately supportive of the US rebalance to Asia and hopes that the US will sustain its role as balancer and counterweight to growing Chinese power. Nevertheless, doubts persist about the credibility and constancy of US policy. Some regional states are worried that the US may once again be drawn into crises in the Middle East or elsewhere and leave them exposed without adequate capability to fend off Chinese pressure. US policy toward the South China Sea is the 15 Brewster, 2014, p. 05. 399

critical indicator for countries in Southeast Asia, although recently some Southeast Asian nations have begun to view developments in Northeast Asia (such as the ADIZ 16 announcement) as warning signals of Chinese willingness to employ coercion generally 17. Southeast Asian states are looking to the US to stand up for rule of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes through diplomacy both through rhetoric and action. At the same time, they want to use the framework of ASEAN-based multilateral dialogue and seek greater support for ASEAN centrality and the use of ASEAN s collective diplomatic initiative to change Chinese policies. China s neighbors are worried about the conflicting and competing events in Asian Maritime domain. For years, Japan has been skeptical of China s defense modernization, its growing submarine force, ballistic missiles, aircraft carriers etc. The Senkaku/Diaoyu 18 confrontation has persuaded China to equip their navy with increased naval power. When compared with Peoples Liberation Army Navy, defense strategies and military capabilities of other countries are negligible. Therefore, these small countries try to defend themselves with the support of big naval powers such as the US and get assistance in organizing their command and control. For example, US helped carrying out surveillance in maritime areas of its interests. As a result, there has been a considerable regional response to China s encroachment in diplomatic and legal terms. The Philippines has been one of the vocal critique of China s naval power in the region. The Philippines used UNCLOS 19 as a legal tool to Challenge China s claim to the rights and jurisdiction in the maritime space. String of Pearls Strategy: String of Pearls Strategy has become highly debated over the past few years, especially among the Indian public because Indians perceive that China has the intention of establishing military bases in the Indian Ocean 20. From this strategy China wants to construct large ports and a listening post at the Pakistani port of Qwadar on the Arabia Sea 21. Then they can monitor ship traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, they planned to develop another port at Pasni, seventy five miles east of Gwadar which is joined by a new highway, 16 It mean Air Defense Identification Zone that requires all non-commercial air traffic to submit flight plans prior to entering the area. 17 Council on Foreign Relations- Info guide, http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritimedisputes/p31345#!/?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_infoguide#resources 18 Ibid. 19 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force on November 16, 1994, is an international treaty that provides a regulatory legal framework for the use of the world s seas and oceans, to ensure the conservation and equitable usage of resources and the marine environment and to ensure the protection and preservation of the living resources of the sea (Source: Permanent Court of Arbitration - www.pca-cpa.org). 20 Brewster, 2014, pp. 07. 21 Kaplan, 2013, pp. 400

building a port at Hambantota in Sri Lanka which is a Calling station for their ships 22. At the Chittagong port of Bangladesh, China wanted to build a container facility including access to Chinese Navy. In Burma, Beijing was constructing and upgrading commercial and naval bases. These Indian Ocean ports would help China s economic prosperity. But Washington was very skeptical of this String of Pearls Strategy 23. They see China seeks an outright control of the Gwadar in Pakistan. As Robert D. Kaplan puts it in his book Monsoon, it is not the port projects that are most important to China but it is China s desire for access to modern deep water ports in friendly countries because it gives an opportunity to Beijing to ensure their presence in the Indian Ocean 24. Chinese companies have funded and constructed commercial port facilities in countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. The proponents of this Strategy of Strings of Pearls are of the view that China has negotiated secretly with some countries to get access to some of the ports with strategic importance to China. Indian public believe that China s regional engagement is directed against India 25. Some others believe that it is intended to encircle India by China or to challenge Indian Ocean power balance to the best interests of China. To justify this argument, it is said that China has been building close relations with some countries in the Indian Ocean region. Another criticism by India was that China wants to take hold of some islands with strategic importance to spy on Indian naval activities and ports operations and monitor commercial traffic through the Malacca Strait and also to be alert on Indian missile tests. Once India has accused Myanmar of providing facilities to China at Coco Island. In response to this criticism, Myanmar government invited the Indian navy for an inspection tour and it was after that India could see that there was no such facilities provided by Myanmar government. China has been developing political, economic relations in the Indian Ocean region and building alliances with Burma, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Also, China has been contributing immensely to develop commercial facilities in above countries. It has been speculating that China was building their intelligence facilities in these countries. Therefore, Indian government was very much concerned with and skeptical about the Chinese assertive behaviors in the region. India keep accusing that China is overpowering in their sphere of influence 26. Former Indian Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh once described India s sphere of 22 Ibid, pp. 10 23 To project China s power into the Indian Ocean has been limited being distanced from ports in Southern China and the lack of logistical support in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, China has to gain the access to naval choke points through strategic choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca. Hence, to overcome this limitations is called the String of Peals Strategy. 24 ibid, p. 25 Brewster, 2014, p. 07. 26 Brewster (2010), pp. 5-6. 401

influence. According to him, its sphere of influence extends from the Persian Gulf in the west, to the Strait of Malacca in the East 27. US Involvement in Indian Ocean Naval Affairs as an Extra-regional Power: Over the past few years, China s assertiveness in both East and South China Sea issues had become the most important security issue in East Asia. This confrontation have raised concerns throughout Asia as well as the United States. The waters of the East Asian sea are of enormous economic importance to China. Commercial traffic traverse the East China Sea and Yellow Sea to reach six of China s 10 largest ports. East China and Yellow Seas have served as a buffer between Red China and Washington s allies of South Korea, Japan and Taiwan. It is believed that US strategic thinking does not include the idea of containing Asian continental powers. China, for a long period of time understands that these waters as the routes that the West used to cross and attack them. Therefore, Beijing considers them as near seas and embarked on a military program to establish the control over these island chain. On the other hand, South China Sea is another issue for the US governments. In this dispute over sovereignty, China wants to cover virtually the entire sea without the legal considerations, according to some US naval experts. This situation has created a political uncertainty of states affairs in the region. It was to change after the US presence in the region and got involved in this issue to encourage collaborative or multilateral solution to the problem. In this heightened situation, in 2010 Obama sought a combination of diplomacy and enhanced military presence and considered rule-based stability as US national objective. Since 2010, at ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Washington has moved to get involved in South China Sea dispute. Another turning point in this issue is Taiwan issue wherein China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and it would escalate into a military crisis or conflict situation that cannot be completely ruled out. The Senkakus/Diaoyu islands have also become a potential source of direct Sino-US conflict. The US considered the Senkakus to be a part of Okinawa, which was not returned to Japanese control until 1972. Over the past years, China and Japan have been claiming sovereign right over the Senkakus/Diaoyu islands. But so far Beijing, Taipei and Tokyo could avoid direct military involvement with naval warships. Therefore, it is impossible to predict that it would not escalate into military confrontation in the future based on different interests of the countries involved. But the US keep a close eye on these developments and they consider Senkakus to be under the Japanese administration, who is an ally of the US in East Asia. Therefore, they have a security treaty between the US and Japan, which guarantee security for Japan if any threat arises from China and it will bring the US into direct conflict with China. Even in the Philippines 27 Brewster (2010), pp. 16. 402

issue with China over Scarborough Shoal for sovereign rights, the US will come to defend her treaty all, the Philippines. But so far China has tried to keep escalation under control. They have remained moderate although they demonstrated their presence through routine operations in the East China Sea (ECS) and training, exercises etc. Beijing has not deployed PLAN but instead China deployed Civil Maritime Enforcement Agencies (CMEAs) to enforce its claims. But it would not remain the same for the foreseeable future. This however, shows that Beijing tried so far to keep maritime confrontation at a lower level while PLAN has not been an active participant in the dispute which is a good sign. In 2011, China realized that its aggressive attitude was harming its broader foreign policy objectives, specially its ties with regional states. But this could not last long because in 2012, China returned to its previous approach of taking unilateral actions against Vietnam and the Philippines. It realizes that China is going to play a powerful role in the region. It is an obvious fact that these small countries will live in the shadow of China. CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS China, based on the above facts has been and continue to be a greater naval power in the Indian Ocean Region for the decades ahead. Chinese new leadership, under Xi Jinping continue to retain its naval power in Asia including the Indian Ocean. Very recently, in an article published by Shi Yinhong, a Chinese professor at School of American Studies, Renmin University, Beijing has elaborated that China, under Xi Jinping is strengthening its hard power to assert itself as a maritime power in Asian Pacific 28. It seems that China, a greater country in soft power projection, will tend to act as an aggressor when other extra-regional powers like the US act in unison with regional countries like Japan. On the other hand, this situation will escalate further as far as the US is willing to follow a Contain China Front with Japan and with other regional countries. By observing the behaviours of India, China, Japan and the US as an extra-regional power, it seems that the peace and security in the India Ocean is under threat and in turn, it will negatively impact on smaller countries in the region. Therefore, these littoral states in the region need to be cautious and be careful not to get involved in this serious issue of naval competition of major powers. However, China has a responsibility, as a greater maritime power to assure the peace and security in the region and avert any possible military or offensive measures by other regional powers. Also, other regional powers, specially emerging India, Japan etc should not in any way take provocative or retaliatory approaches towards Chinese assertiveness in naval affairs in the region in a way to ensure regional security environment and avoid any military confrontation and rivalry among these major powers. Eventually, it will lead to accrue benefits and advantages for all 28 http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-08/06/content_21519142.htm. 403

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