Annual Security Assessment Report 2015

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 Acknowledgement. The credit for conducting research and preparing this Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 goes to tireless efforts of the entire Research and Publication team of Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) including Mr. Abdullah Khan (Managing Director/ Security Analyst), Ms. Reema Asim (PRO & Research Assistant) Mr Arfa Mehmood (Research Assistant), Ms. Haleema Amin (Research Assistant), Mr. Muhammad Ishaq (Research Assistant), and Mr Muhammad Rafiq (Internee). Special thanks to Senator (r) Akaram Zaki, Chairman PICSS, for his kind supervision and guidance throughout the preparation of this report. Gul Dad (Director Research & Publications)

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 Table of Contents 1 Sources, Methodology and Working of PICSS... 1 1.1 Sources:... 1 1.2 Methodology:... 1 1.2.1 Violent Militant Activities... 1 1.2.2 Security Forces Actions... 2 1.3 Focus:... 2 1.4 Defining anti-state violence:... 2 1.4.1 Target:... 2 1.4.2 Perpetrator:... 3 1.4.3 Circumstances:... 3 1.4.4 No Doubtful Entry:... 3 2 Overview... 4 3 Overall Security Situation/ National Security Profile... 7 3.1 Countrywide Militant Attacks... 9 3.1.1 Type of Militant Attacks and their Impact...13 3.1.2 IED Based Attacks...14 3.1.3 Suicide Attacks...16 3.1.4 Militants Physical Assault...17 3.1.5 Target Killings...17 3.2 Nationwide Security Forces Actions...18 4 Provincial Security Profile...21 4.1 Security Situation in Balochistan...21 4.2 Security Situation in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)...24 4.3 Security Situation in Khyber Pakhtoonkha (KPK)...26 4.4 Security Situation in Sindh...29 4.5 Security Situation in Punjab...32 4.6 Security Situation in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB)...35 4.7 Security Situation in Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT)...35 4.8 Security Situation in Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K)...35 5 Significant Security/Political Developments...36 5.1 Daesh/ ISIS in Af-Pak Region...36 5.1.1 Emergence...36

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 5.1.2 Levels of Associations with IS in Af-Pak Region...36 5.1.3 First Category...37 5.1.4 Second Category...38 5.1.5 Third Category...38 5.1.6 Groups Playing the Middle...39 5.1.7 Sunni Sectarian Outfits...39 5.1.8 Challenge to Afghan Taliban...39 5.1.9 Setbacks to DAESH in the region...40 6 Militant Groups Operating in/from Pakistan...42 6.1 Anti-Pakistan with Global Ambitions and Connections...42 6.1.1 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP):...42 6.1.2 Al-Qaeda...43 6.1.3 DAESH or Islamic State...43 6.1.4 East Turkistan Islamic Movement:...44 6.1.5 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan:...44 6.2 Anti-State religious groups with local focus...44 6.2.1 Lashkar-e-Islam:...44 6.2.2 Toheed wal Jihad...45 6.2.3 Lashkar-e-Khurasan...45 6.2.4 Ahrar-ul-Hind:...45 6.3 Militant Groups based in FATA having objectives in Afghanistan,...45 6.3.1 Haqqani Network:...45 6.3.2 Hafiz Gul Bahdur Group:...46 6.3.3 Mullah Nazir Group...46 6.4 India-Focused Groups...46 6.4.1 Indigenous Kashmiri Groups...47 6.4.2 Pakistan-Based groups fighting in Kashmir...47 6.5 Sectarian Militant Groups...49 6.6 Secular Anti-State Groups...50 6.7 Political Militant Groups...52 6.8 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Present Status and Security Challenges...52 7 Pakistan s Regional and International Relations...56 7.1 Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations and Afghan Reconciliation Process...56 7.2 India- Pakistan Relations and Dialogue Process...59

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 7.3 Pakistan-Saudi Relations and Pakistan s Approach to Issues in ME...61 8 Year 2016: Trends and Challenges...63 List of Tables Table 1: Overall violent incidents of the year 2015... 9 Table 2: Provincial Distribution of Militant Attacks in 2015...12 Table 3: Break up of Type of Attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries (2015)...14 Table 4: Geographical distribution of IED attacks (2015)...15 Table 5: Geographical distribution of Suicide Attacks (2015)...16 Table 6: Geographical distribution of Militants Physical Assaults (2015)...17 Table 7: Geographical distribution of Incidents of Target Killings (2015)...18 Table 8: Geographical distribution of SFAs (2015)...20 Table 9: Monthly break up of militant Attacks in Balochistan...22 Table 10: Type of Attacks in Balochistan (2015)...23 Table 11: Monthly break-up of militant attacks in FATA...26 Table 12: Type of Attacks in FATA...26 Table 13: Monthly break up of militant attacks in KPK and their human impact...29 Table 14: Type of militant attacks in KPK and their human impact...29 Table 15: Monthly break up of militant attacks in Sindh and their human impact...31 Table 16: Type of militant attacks in Sindh and their human impact...32 Table 17: Monthly break up of militant attacks in Punjab and their human impact (2015)...34 Table 18: Type of militant attacks in Punjab and their human impact (2015)...35 List of Figures Figure 1: Death and injuries in 2015 - Monthly Graph... 7 Figure 2: Regional distribution of overall incidents... 8 Figure 3: Overall violent incidents and resultant deaths/ injuries since 2008... 9 Figure 4: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks and resultant deaths since 2008...10 Figure 5: Monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2015...11 Figure 6: Categories of deaths in Militant Attacks in 2015...12 Figure 7: Geographical distribution of Militant Attacks (2015)...13 Figure 8: Geographical distribution of deaths resulting from Militant Attacks (2015)...13 Figure 9: Percentage share of Type of Militant Attacks (2015)...14 Figure 10: Monthly Comparison of IED based Attacks (2015)...15 Figure 11: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact since 9/11...21 Figure 11: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact (2015)...23 Figure 13: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and resultant deaths & Injuries...24 Figure 14: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and their impact (2015)...25 Figure 15: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in KPK...27 Figure 16: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in KPK (2015)...28

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 Figure 17: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in Sindh...30 Figure 18: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in Sindh (2015)...31 Figure 19: Yearly Comparison of militant attacks in Punjab...33 Figure 20: Monthly Comparison of militant attacks in Punjab (2015)...33

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations AJK Arst C CBA FATA FC GB GrA IED ICT IS, ISIS ISI ISPR JuD KP, KPK K KK Kdnp LeI LeJ LOC M MA MAs MC MrS NACTA NAP Nos PAF PGR, RZ, R RA SFAs SFP SA TK TTP TTP JA Azad Jammu & Kashmir Arrested by Security Forces Civilian Cross Border Attack Federally Administrated Tribal Areas Frontier Corps Gilgit-Baltistan Grenade Attack Improvised Explosive Device or Handmade bombs Islamabad Capital Territory Islamic State, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Inter-Services Intelligence Inter-Services Public Relations Jamat-ud-Dawa Khyber Pakhtoonkha Kidnapping Kidnapping and Killing Kidnappings by Militants Lashker-e-Islam Lashker-e-Jhangvi Line of Control Militant Militants (Physical) Assault Militant Attacks Militant Clash Mortar Shelling National Counter Terrorism Authority National Action Plan Number of Incidents Pakistan Air Force Razakar (Pro government tribal militias) Rocket Attack Security Forces Actions Security Forces Personnel Suicide Attack Targeted Killing Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistani Taliban Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamatul Ahrar

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 1 1 Sources, Methodology and Working of PICSS 1.1 Sources: Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), an Islamabad based think tank, collects information from all available sources and makes an utmost effort to record each and every violent incident available from reliable and quotable sources. PICSS uses following sources: 1. Open Sources e.g. newspapers, TV Channels, news websites, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), government websites, militant websites, forums and their social media accounts; 2. Government offices, e.g. ministry of interior, police, ministry of health, etc.; 3. Own correspondents: PICSS employed own network of two types of correspondents: a. PICSS own correspondents in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan. b. Volunteer's network: Local journalists and volunteers contribute voluntarily in reporting violent incidents and other militancy related developments. 1.2 Methodology: PICSS corroborates every incident from as many sources as possible to make sure the information recorded in the database is correct to the best possible level. Database is continuously reviewed and updated. Incidents are recorded mainly in two categories. 1.2.1 Violent Militant Activities a. Militant Attacks against government, public, or private targets. These targets can be against life or property e.g. government installations such as gas pipe lines, electricity transmission lines, etc. b. Militant clashes among different militant groups

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 2 1.2.2 Security Forces Actions a. Violent responses in which arms/weapons are used b. None-violent responses such as arrests without using/firing weapons and defusing bombs etc. Drone strikes are recorded in separate database. Statistics of drone strikes are not mixed with other incidents related to anti-state violence. 1.3 Focus: PICSS is focused on anti-state violence and related response. Sectarian violence, general crimes, ethnic or linguistic based violence are not recorded. However, there is overlapping trend related to actions of certain sectarian groups who were previously involved only in sectarian violence but now have nexus with anti-state armed groups thus, PICSS tries to record those violent incidents of such groups which have connection of anti-state intentions. Sectarian violence has different dynamics and requires separate analysis. 1.4 Defining anti-state violence: Following factors are considered in deciding whether an incident is anti-state or not. 1.4.1 Target: a. Generally target of a violent militant activity helps to define the nature of attack. Activities in which government installation are targeted are considered anti-state. b. Attack against on-duty uniformed personnel of security forces are recorded as anti-state militant activities. c. Attacks against a group of government officials where circumstances show that target was not an individual official but government functioning was targeted are also recorded as anti-state. d. Attacks against individual officials whether in uniform or part of civil government is evaluated from different aspects. Only being a member of

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 3 government or military is not enough to determine whether the aim was to target state or it was due to personal enmity. In such cases perpetrators and other circumstances are used to determine the nature of the attack. 1.4.2 Perpetrator: a. If an activity is perpetrated by known militant groups fighting against state such as Al-Qaeda, TTP, BLA, etc. is recorded as anti-state activity. b. In case a sectarian militant group perpetrates a violent act then it is determined from the nature of target. If the target was of sectarian nature only then it is not recorded in anti-state database. c. If perpetrator is not known then nature of the target is used to determine whether it is anti-state or general crime. 1.4.3 Circumstances: Sometimes target of the violent activity and perpetrator both remain unclear then nature of the incident is determined based on the circumstances of the incidents. For example, a blast occurs at a place where no one is targeted and apparently it is not known who carried out the blast. There are possibilities that militants were transporting some explosives which could detonate accidently. This will be anti-state activity. However, it is also possible that criminals other than militants were transporting the explosives and it got detonated. In such cases police investigations and different dimensions of the incident are kept in view to determine the exact nature of the incident. This type of situation arises rarely during the data collection operations thus, it is least likely that an error can influence overall pattern of violence. 1.4.4 No Doubtful Entry: PICSS researchers use this principle while recording violent incidents "when there is a doubt, cut it out'. Only those incidents are recorded in the database where PICSS has no doubt about the nature of incident being related to anti-state violence.

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 4 2 Overview Following two watershed incidents in 2014 including attack on Karachi Airport in June and Army Public School Peshawar in December, the government responded by initiating operation Zarb-e-Azb and devising National Action Plan to fight militancy, respectively. While the former had been mainly use of kinetic force, the latter contained broad based measures including use of power and other elements that the political and military leadership contemplated to be mandatory for ending militancy in the country. As was projected in Annual Security Assessment Report 2014, the measures adopted under the National Action Plan would help reduction in violence in the country but total elimination of it would not be possible. Year 2015 proved exactly as was projected by PICSS. Notwithstanding some sporadic incident of violence including some high profile attacks, year 2015 witnessed a substantial decrease in militant attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries and the year proved to be a much better in terms of security situation in Pakistan when compared with previous year(s). This year, anti-state violence reached to the minimum level than previous years and was almost equivalent to the average attacks of year 2008. Security situation improved in KPK while Baluchistan witnessed most number of anti-state violent activities than rest of provinces. The year witnessed 56 percent decline in militant attacks than year 2014, while there was 48 percent decline in resultant deaths and 57 percent reduction in injured persons. In 2015, there were 1901 overall incidents of anti-state violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the state in which 3368 people were killed including 2312 militants, 641 civilians, 382 security forces personnel and 33 pro-government Razakars while 1774 others were injured including 994 civilians, 516 security forces personnel, 250 militants, and 14 pro-government Razakars. 6392 suspected militants were arrested by the security forces while 89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Among the total deaths, almost 69 percent were militants, more than 19 percent civilians, more than 11 percent security forces personnel and almost one percent was pro-government Razakars. Among those injured, 56 percent were civilians, 29 percent security forces personnel, 14 percent militants and less

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 5 than one percent was pro-government Razakars. In terms of deaths during 2015, militants were on the receiving end while the civilians were the worst sufferers in terms of injuries. As compared to year 2014, there has been 33 percent decrease in overall number of incidents with 37 percent reduction in deaths and 55 percent reduction in overall injuries. Thus, reduction in violence in 2015 can be attributed to continued military offensive against militants in tribal areas and country wide intelligence based operations (IBOs) that badly damaged urban networks of the militant outfits. However, continued violence in the country, albeit of comparatively lessor scale, suggests that militants are yet to be completely neutralized and they are able to plan and execute attacks intermittently. Substantial reduction in militant attacks and resultant deaths as well as injuries across the country was observed in 2015 as compared to previous year. In 2015, as many as 706 militant attacks were observed in which 1325 people were killed including 619 civilians, 348 SFPs, 33 PGRs, and 325 militants while 1464 others were injured including 988 civilians, 417 SFPs, 14 PGRs, and 45 militants. 89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Thus, there has been almost 56 percent reduction in militant attacks across the country with 48 percent reduction in deaths and 58 percent reduction in injuries as compared to the previous year. The highest number of militant attacks (40 percent of total) was recorded from Balochistan while the highest number of deaths and injuries in militant attacks were reported from FATA. While the military continued its offensive in 2015 in North Waziristan under the operation Zarb-e-Azb and in Khyber Agency under operation Khyber-I, it entered into second phase of operation in Khyber Agency code named Khyber-II wherein it targeted militants in Tirah Valley and areas adjoining Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While majority of area in North Waziristan had been cleared of the militants except some pockets in Shawal Valley, it made notable success in Khyber Agency and got control of some strategic passes from where militants were believed to be making their to and fro movement into Afghanistan. In addition to military operations in FATA, security forces focused on intelligence based operations across the country to keep a check on militants to carry out their attacks in settled areas and establish sleeper cells. Security forces conducted as many as 1195 actions/ operations across the country in which 2043 people were killed including 1987 militants, 22 civilians and 34 SFPs while 310

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 6 others were injured including 205 militants, 99 SFPs and six civilians. At least 6349 suspects were arrested. Almost 33 percent of these security forces actions were reported from Balochistan where forces conducted in which 290 people were killed including 277 suspected militants and 13 SFPs while 42 others were injured including 24 SFPs and 18 militants. At least 250 security forces actions were conducted in KPK where 52 people were killed in these operations including 38 suspected militants, eight SFPs and six civilians while 21 others were injured including 16 SFPs, four civilians and one SFP. At least 1925 suspects were arrested in the province. Most of the killings and injuries resulting from security forces actions were reported from FATA where at least 1410 people were killed including 1389 suspected militants, 11 civilians and 10 SFPs while 196 others were injured including 186 militants, eight SFPs and two civilians. 325 suspected militants were arrested in FATA. In Sindh, forces conducted as many as 218 operations in which 231 people were killed including 228 suspected militants, two civilians and one SFP while 30 SFPs were injured in these operations. 653 suspected militants were arrested in Sindh. In Punjab, forces conducted 128 operations killing 38 suspected militants while eight civilians and eight SFPs were also killed. 769 suspects were arrested in Punjab. One of the most worrying trend of the year was increasing footprints of Daesh/ ISIS particularly in urban areas with increasing threat of educated, well-off youth (both men and women) being attracted to Daesh. Although there is no organized presence of the militant outfit but there are elements who have either joined the ISIS or having sympathies with ultra-violent Middle Eastern group.

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 7 3 Overall Security Situation/ National Security Profile The year 2015 witnessed substantial improvement in security situation across the country as compared to past few years. There were 1901 overall incidents of anti-state violence by militants and counter-insurgency operations by the state in which 3368 people were killed including 2312 militants, 641 civilians, 382 security forces personnel and 33 pro-government Razakars while 1774 others were injured including 994 civilians, 516 security forces personnel, 250 militants, and 14 pro-government Razakars. 6392 suspected militants, their handlers, and supporters were arrested by the security forces while 89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Among the total deaths, almost 69 percent were militants, more than 19 percent civilians, more than 11 percent security forces personnel and almost one percent was pro-government Razakars. Among those injured 56 percent were civilians, 29 percent security forces personnel, 14 percent militants and less than one percent was pro-government Razakars. In terms of deaths during 2015, militants were on the receiving end while the civilians were the worst sufferers in terms of injuries. Monthly graph of deaths and injuries is given in Figure-1 while provincial/regional distribution of overall incidents and break up of overall incidents (SFAs and MAs) is given in Figure-2 and Table-1, respectively. Figure 1: Death and injuries in 2015 - Monthly Graph 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Deaths Injuries

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 8 Figure 2: Regional distribution of overall incidents GB 0% Punjab 8% Sindh 16% Balochistan 36% ICT 1% KPK 21% FATA 18% As compared to year 2014, there has been 33 percent decrease in overall number of incidents with 37 percent reduction in deaths (with 41 percent decrease in SFPs killings, 59 percent decrease in killing of Razakars, 32 percent decrease in militants deaths, and 48 percent reduction in civilian deaths) and 55 percent reduction in overall injuries (with 42, 77, 51 and 60 percent reduction of injuries caused to SFPs, Razakars, militants and civilians, respectively). Since overall figures contain deaths/injuries resulting from both, security forces actions and militant attacks, this data will not be used for regional/ provincial analysis of security situation. Instead, militant activities in each region/ province will provide the basis for assessing security situation in those areas, which is covered in depth in the Section Provincial Security Profile. Although the number of incidents might be higher yet the number of causalities and injuries has returned to the status that of 2008 when new era of militancy started after Lal Masjid Operation in 2007. As it was projected in PICSS Annual Security Assessment Report 2014, military actions and measures adopted under National Action Plan post-aps attack, security situation in the country would improve but the militant activities would not completely diminish as the measures adopted were more focused on eliminating militants instead of militancy since the measures adopted mostly fell in the domain of hard measures. Thus, this reduction in violence in 2015 can be attributed to continued military offensive

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 9 against militants in tribal areas and country wide intelligence based operations (IBOs) that badly damaged urban networks of the militant outfits. However, continued violence in the country, albeit of comparatively lessor scale, suggests that militants are yet to be completely neutralized and they are able to plan and execute attacks intermittently. Table 1: Overall violent incidents of the year 2015 Category Nos Deaths Injuries SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Arst Kdnp SFAs 1195 34 0 1987 22 2043 99 0 205 6 310 6349 0 MAs 706 348 33 325 619 1325 417 14 45 988 1464 43 89 Total 1901 382 33 2312 641 3368 516 14 250 994 1774 6392 89 Figure 3: Overall violent incidents and resultant deaths/ injuries since 2008 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 Nos Deaths Injuries Year-2008 Year-2009 Year-2010 Year-2011 Year-2012 Year-2013 Year-2014 Year-2015 3.1 Countrywide Militant Attacks Substantial reduction in militant attacks and resultant deaths as well as injuries across the country was observed in 2015 as compared to previous year. In 2015, as many as 706 militant attacks were observed in which 1325 people were killed including 619 civilians, 348 SFPs, 33 PGRs, and 325 militants while 1464 others were injured including 988 civilians, 417 SFPs, 14 PGRs, and 45 militants. 43 militants were arrested during militant attacks while 89 people were kidnapped by the militants. Thus, there has been almost 56 percent reduction in militant attacks across the country with 48 percent reduction in deaths (41, 59,

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 10 53, 48 percent reduction in deaths of SFPs, PGRs, militants and civilians, respectively) and 58 percent reduction in injuries (46, 77, 77 and 60 percent reduction in deaths of SFPs, PGRs, militants and civilians, respectively) as compared to the previous year. Figure-4 shows a comparison of militant attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries since 2008. As the figure shows, militant attacks have gone to the level of the year 2008 (even less than that) and number of deaths and injuries far less than the year 2008 suggesting that this heightened phase of militancy started after Lal Masjid Operation has ended. Figure 4: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks and resultant deaths since 2008 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 Nos Deaths Injuries Year-2008 Year-2009 Year-2010 Year-2011 Year-2012 Year-2013 Year-2014 Year-2015 Militant activities and resultant deaths witnessed a continuous pattern of variations (as reflected in Figure-5) but these variations were comparatively much smaller than the previous year. Strong military tactics in the form of operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Wazriistan and operation Khyber-I in Khyber Agency as well as measures adopted under National Action Plan devised after APS tragedy brought about a substantial change in security situation in the country as the militants found it expedient to go into hide to protect themselves. Resultantly, reduction in militant attacks was observed. Moreover, in March 2015, military also started operation Khyber-II in the pockets of Khyber Agency which were earlier not covered in operation Khyber-I. Operations in Khyber Agency in particular improved security situation in the adjoining settled areas of KPK as majority of militants operating in Khyber

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 11 Agency found it safer to sneak into Afghanistan as the security forces shown constant vigil and were proactive in intelligence based operations in all parts of the country. These military operations in Khyber Agency particularly targeted militants affiliated with TTP, TTP Jamatul Ahrar and Lashker-e-Islam. Due to these factors, militant activities in the country were constantly decreasing till April but witnessed a sudden increase in May 2015 as TTP, TTP Jamatul Ahrar and Lashker-e-Islam formed an alliance to fight collectively with the State machinery. In May, Pakistan openly blamed Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) for supporting anti-pakistan elements in carrying out attacks in FATA/ KPK, Balochistan and Karachi. In this regard, statements were issued by the Pakistan Army, Defence Minister and Foreign Secretary. Around May, Daesh/ Islamic State also came into play and local militants got inspiration from the Middle Eastern group who had shown its presence in Afghanistan s eastern provinces bordering with Pakistan. The leadership of local militant outfits who was hiding in Afghanistan also developed understanding with Daesh, which provided both of them protection and breathing space. In subsequent months, militant attacks in Pakistan hovered around 50 attacks (on average) suggesting that hard measures adopted by the state attained their maximum utility. Figure 5: Monthly comparison of militant attacks in 2015 250 200 150 100 50 0 Nos Deaths Injuries As reflected in Figure-6, civilian casualties formed 47 percent of total deaths, while casualties of militants, security forces personnel and pro-government razakars stood at 25,

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 12 26 and two percent, respectively. This percentage is not different from that of 2014 when civilians deaths resulting from militant attacks stood exactly the same (47 percent) while militants, security forces personnel and pro-government razakars were killed at the percentage of 27, 23 and three, respectively. Figure 6: Categories of deaths in Militant Attacks in 2015 Civilians 47% Security forces personnel 26% Razakar 2% Militants 25% The highest number of militant attacks (40 percent of total) was recorded from Balochistan while the highest number of deaths and injuries in militant attacks were reported from FATA as shown in Table-2 and Figures 7 & 8. This shows that militant attacks in FATA were comparatively more lethal as compared to attacks in Balochistan. Table 2: Provincial Distribution of Militant Attacks in 2015 Province Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Arst Kdnp Balochistan 280 95 1 57 202 355 112 1 3 217 333 14 52 FATA 170 108 29 183 76 396 161 11 39 220 431 20 35 GB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ICT 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 KPK 139 84 3 34 103 224 103 2 1 147 253 6 0 Punjab 25 7 0 34 69 110 11 0 0 232 243 0 0 Sindh 89 54 0 17 169 240 30 0 2 171 203 3 2 Total 706 348 33 325 619 1325 417 14 45 988 1464 43 89

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 13 Figure 7: Geographical distribution of Militant Attacks (2015) Punjab 3% Sindh 13% Balochistan 40% KPK 20% ICT 0% GB 0% FATA 24% Figure 8: Geographical distribution of deaths resulting from Militant Attacks (2015) Punjab 8% Sindh 18% Balochistan 27% KPK 17% ICT GB 0% FATA 30% 3.1.1 Type of Militant Attacks and their Impact A detailed break-up of various types of attacks and their impact is given in Table-3. As reflected in Figure-9, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) based attacks were highest in number with a share of 38 percent in total attacks. These 267 IED based attacks caused 268 deaths and 671 injuries. Highest number of deaths resulted from suicide attacks which caused 252 casualties and 436 injuries. Militants physical assaults and target killings were other notable types of militant attacks. A detailed analysis of major type of attacks is given following sub-sections.

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 14 Table 3: Break up of Type of Attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries (2015) Type Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Arst Kdnp GrA 31 1 0 1 7 9 6 0 0 34 40 7 0 IED 267 78 16 43 131 268 219 11 8 433 671 17 0 K 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71 KK 15 4 11 1 53 69 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 MA 180 177 3 213 89 482 153 1 17 52 223 10 10 MC 4 0 0 28 0 28 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 RA 31 8 0 12 2 22 17 0 12 11 40 0 0 SA 18 21 0 27 204 252 10 0 7 419 436 1 0 TK 143 59 3 0 133 195 12 2 0 30 44 8 0 Total 706 348 33 325 619 1325 417 14 45 980 1456 43 89 Figure 9: Percentage share of Type of Militant Attacks (2015) TK 20% GrA 4% SA 3% RA 4% MC 1% IED 38% MA 26% KK 2% K 2% 3.1.2 IED Based Attacks As reflected in Figure-9, IED based attacks formed 38 percent of total militant attacks during 2015 and these attacks caused more injuries than compared to any other type of attacks. The number of people killed in IED attacks was 268 people including 131 civilians, 78 SFPs, 43 militants and 16 PGRs while the number of those injured was 671 with more than 2/3 of them being civilians (433 people), 219 SFPs, 11 PGRs and eight militants. As compared to previous year, there has been much reduction in IED based attacks but the percentage of these attacks out of total incidents were exactly the same (38 percent). As shown in Table-4, highest number of IED based attacks were observed in Balochistan but the number of

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 15 casualties and injuries resulting from such IED attacks were higher in FATA suggesting that militants operating in FATA are more capable of acquiring/producing good quality of explosive and required devices as well as planting them where more destruction was possible than militants operating in Balochistan. Despite military claims that it has destroyed militants infrastructure (including IED factories) in North Waziristan from where most of the militant attacks in other parts of the country were originated, the continued IED based attacks suggest that militants still have access to explosive material and that such resources could not be completely dried out. However, Figure-10 depicts that reduction has been witnessed when IED based attacks are monitored on monthly horizon suggesting that military offensive in North Waziristan and Khyber Agency did impact occurring of such type of attacks. Table 4: Geographical distribution of IED attacks (2015) Type Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Arst Kdnp Balochistan 117 14 1 8 48 71 61 1 0 150 212 0 0 FATA 95 58 15 31 55 159 113 10 5 145 273 16 0 KPK 37 4 0 2 12 18 33 0 1 16 50 1 0 Punjab 2 0 0 2 10 12 0 0 0 77 77 0 0 Sindh 16 2 0 0 6 8 12 0 2 45 59 0 0 Total 267 78 16 43 131 268 219 11 8 433 671 17 0 Figure 10: Monthly Comparison of IED based Attacks (2015) 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 Nos Deaths Injuries

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 16 3.1.3 Suicide Attacks During 2015, a 40 percent reduction in suicide attacks was observed as 18 suicide attacks were observed across the country in 2015 as compared to 30 recorded in the previous year. As reflected in Table-5, the highest number of suicide attacks were observed in Punjab, which is quite contrary to previous pattern of militants suicide attacks as such attacks were more rampant in FATA/ KPK region but increase in suicide attacks suggests that militants have tried to open up new avenues of their militant activities. Most notable suicide attacks in Punjab included attacks of sectarian nature when, in two separate incidents, Imambargahs (mosques) of Shia Muslim community were targeted in Rawalpindi, attack on Christian Churches in Lahore, attack on Punjab Home Minister Col. (r). Shuja Khanzada killing him in his home town Attock, an attack on political office of PML-N parliamentarian in DG Khan, and attack on Police Headquarters in Lahore. Other notable suicide attacks in other parts of the country included suicide attack on Imambargah in Shikarpur (Sindh), suicide attack in Peshawar targeting another Imambargah, suicide attack on the convey of Qaumi Watan Party Chief Aftab Ahmed Sherpao in Charsadda (KPK), suicide attack targeting Deputy Commandant of Frontier Reserve Police in Peshawar, suicide attack targeting the office of political administration in Jamrud (Khyber Agency), suicide attack targeting Shia Muslim community in Kacchi (formerly known as Bolan) district of Balochistan, and suicide attack targeting Shia Muslims in Jacobabad (Sindh). Out of total 18 suicide attacks, seven were targeted against Shia Muslim community in different parts of the country suggesting the secretion violence was on the increase in 2015 when overall violent militant activities were decreasing. Table 5: Geographical distribution of Suicide Attacks (2015) Killed Injured Region Nos Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Balochistan 2 1 0 0 12 13 0 0 0 21 21 0 0 FATA 2 10 0 19 2 31 3 0 7 56 66 1 0 KPK 4 3 0 0 46 49 6 0 0 108 114 0 0 Punjab 7 5 0 7 57 69 0 0 0 148 148 0 0 Sindh 3 2 0 1 87 90 1 0 0 86 87 0 0 Total 18 21 0 27 204 252 10 0 7 419 436 1 0

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 17 3.1.4 Militants Physical Assault During the year, 180 incidents of militants physical assault were monitored in which 482 people were killed and 223 others injured. Militants physical assaults constituted 26 percent of total militant attacks during the year. The highest number of such attacks were monitored in Balochistan (See Table-6 for provincial breakup), followed by FATA and KPK. This type of attacks holds significance since militants, mostly in groups, carry out such attacks with higher probability of being killed in retaliation by the forces but also signify the confidence of the militants and their ability to mobilise armed fighters. Considering the risks attached to such attacks, sometime such attacks are carried out in sheer frustration when militants find it difficult to carry out other type of attacks. In addition to these factors, such attacks also signify the fragile law and order situation as approaching target with guns and ammunition could never be easy in majority of the cases. The highest number of such attacks in Balochistan clearly suggests that the province is still lacking effective policing and security forces are not fully able to control large swath of area. Table 6: Geographical distribution of Militants Physical Assaults (2015) Region Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Arst Kdnp Balochistan 63 54 0 29 17 100 45 0 3 21 69 9 0 FATA 44 39 3 114 5 161 34 1 14 12 61 0 10 GB 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 KPK 42 52 0 31 20 103 54 0 0 13 67 1 0 Punjab 7 0 0 24 0 24 8 0 0 2 10 0 0 Sindh 23 32 0 15 47 94 12 0 0 4 16 0 0 Total 180 177 3 213 89 482 153 1 17 52 223 10 10 3.1.5 Target Killings During 2015, as many as 143 incidents of targeted killings were reported in which 195 people were killed including 133 civilians, 35 SFPs and 18 PGRs while 44 others were injured including 30 civilians, 12 SFPs and two PGRs. Balochistan, where law and order situation remained less than the ideal despite considerable improvement, witnessed highest number of incidents of target killings followed by KPK and Sindh. Table-7 provides a detailed

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 18 breakup of the incidents of target killing across the country. Although target killings provide a better option for militants, particularly when spaces for militants to engage in other major type of attacks are squeezed. As compared to previous year, there has been more than 48 percent reduction in such type of attacks with more than 50 percent reduction in resultant deaths. In Sindh, there has been almost 60 percent reduction in incident of target killings courtesy Rangers led Karachi operation in the metropolitan. In 2015, a new style of target killing of security forces personnel was introduced by the militants in KPK and Karachi. They use to target small number of security forces personnel usually one or two, mostly from police or traffic police with sharp shooting from close range. Such attacks took place against Rangers, Military Police, Police and Traffic Police in Karachi, Peshawar, Mardan and Swabi districts. In almost all cases, militants fled away from scenes undetected. Table 7: Geographical distribution of Incidents of Target Killings (2015) Region Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Arst Kdnp Balochistan 51 16 0 0 78 94 2 0 0 14 16 5 0 FATA 9 3 0 0 8 11 0 0 0 1 1 3 0 ICT 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 KPK 42 20 3 0 19 42 6 2 0 5 13 0 0 Punjab 4 2 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Sindh 35 18 0 0 26 44 4 0 0 9 13 0 0 Total 143 59 3 0 133 195 12 2 0 30 44 8 0 3.2 Nationwide Security Forces Actions While the military continued its offensive in 2015 in North Waziristan under the operation Zarb-e-Azb and in Khyber Agency under operation Khyber-I, it entered into second phase of operation in Khyber Agency code named Khyber-II wherein it targeted militants in Tirah Valley and areas adjoining Pakistan-Afghanistan border. While majority of area in North Waziristan had been cleared of the militants except some pockets in Shawal Valley, it made notable success in Khyber Agency and got control of some strategic passes from where militants were believed to be making their to and fro movement into Afghanistan. In addition to military operations in FATA, security forces focused on intelligence based operations across the country to keep a check on militants to carry out their attacks in

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 19 settled areas and establish sleeper cells. As shown in Table-8, security forces conducted as many as 1195 actions/ operations across the country in which 2043 people were killed including 1987 militants, 22 civilians and 34 SFPs while 310 others were injured including 205 militants, 99 SFPs and six civilians. At least 6349 suspected militants, their supporters, handlers and financiers were arrested. Almost 33 percent of these security forces actions were reported from Balochistan where forces conducted as many as 399 operations in which 290 people were killed including 277 suspected militants and 13 SFPs while 42 others were injured including 24 SFPs and 18 militants. 2478 suspected militants were arrested by security forces in Balochistan. After Balochistan, at least 250 security forces actions were conducted in KPK where 52 people were killed in these operations including 38 suspected militants, eight SFPs and six civilians while 21 others were injured including 16 SFPs, four civilians and one SFP. At least 1925 suspects were arrested in the province. Most of the killings and injuries resulting from security forces actions were reported from FATA where at least 1410 people were killed including 1389 suspected militants, 11 civilians and 10 SFPs while 196 others were injured including 186 militants, eight SFPs and two civilians. 325 suspected militants were arrested in FATA. In Sindh, forces conducted as many as 218 operations in which 231 people were killed including 228 suspected militants, two civilians and one SFP while 30 SFPs were injured in these operations. 653 suspected militants were arrested in Sindh. In Punjab, forces conducted 128 operations killing 38 suspected militants while eight civilians and eight SFPs were also killed. 769 suspects were arrested in Punjab. As reflected in Figure-11, security forces actions across the country witnessed a consistent pattern with some small variations across the months. However, deaths, injuries and arrest resulting from these security forces actions witnessed some variations with comparatively more variations in the latter. As compared to previous year, security forces not only expanded their operations in FATA but also tried to consolidate their gains. As reflected in Table-8, security forces did not shy away from employing encounter policy in various parts of the country particularly in FATA, KPK, Balochistan and Sindh despite the fact that military courts were established after amendment in the Constitution. This encounter policy has instilled fear among the militants and, along with intelligence based operations, badly damaged urban networks of the

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 20 militants. Prominent successes among these operations were arrest of Abdul Salam Regi, who is the top commander of Iran based militant outfit Jaish-el-Adl, and killing of Usman Saifullah Kurd, who was heading Balochistan chapter of sectarian outfit Lashker-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Killing of Kurd is significant development as he managed to escape from a jail in Army Controlled area in 2008. He was operational head of the LeJ and was involved in various sectarian killing including attacks on buses carrying Shia pilgrimages in addition to massacre of Hazara Shia community. Extending this policy, LeJ Chief Malik Ishaq was killed during an encounter in Muzaffargarh along with his two sons and other top leaders of the outfit. Similarly, Haroon Bhati, another key commander of LeJ who was brought from Dubai through the help of Interpol was also killed in such an encounter. Table 8: Geographical distribution of SFAs (2015) Region Nos Killed Injured Arst Kdnp SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total Balochistan 399 13 0 277 0 290 24 0 18 0 42 2478 0 FATA 177 10 0 1389 11 1410 8 0 186 2 196 325 0 GB 4 0 0 1 0 1 10 0 0 0 10 11 0 ICT 19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 188 0 KPK 250 8 0 38 6 52 16 0 1 4 21 1925 0 Punjab 128 2 0 54 3 59 11 0 0 0 11 769 0 Sindh 218 1 0 228 2 231 30 0 0 0 30 653 0 Total 1195 34 0 1987 22 2043 99 0 205 6 310 6349 0

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 21 4 Provincial Security Profile 4.1 Security Situation in Balochistan Balochistan witnessed the highest number of militant attacks and security forces actions as compared with other geographical areas/ provinces during the year suggesting volatility in security situation. However, overall security situation in the province witnessed a positive change when compared to previous year (See Figure-11). During the year, militant attacks witnessed visible variations as reflected in Table-9 and Figure-12. Figure 11: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact since 9/11 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Nos Deaths Injuries Improvement in security situation in Balochistan could be attributed to multiple factors including behind the scene efforts for engaging angry Baloch leaders including Khan of Kalat and Brahamdagh Bugti, improved governance of Dr Abdul Malik Baloch as Chief Minister, announcement of Pur-Aman Balochistan Program for insurgents to surrender in return for financial gains and reintegration, enhanced security measures and conducting of operations by paramilitary forces/ police, killing/ arrest of some top tier insurgent (including killing of chief of the Balochistan chapter of outlawed Jaish-ul-Islam Mehmood-ur-Rehman, arrest of Abdul Salam Regi belonging to Jundullah, etc). In addition to these factors, tussle between insurgent groups have also weakened them while killing of their leaders by security forces, surrender of some of the insurgents, etc. created disorientation among the foot

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 22 soldiers of the insurgent groups that helped improved security situation the province. As reflected in Table-9 and Figure-12, militant attacks in the province were higher at the start of the year as militants from FATA, where military operations were conducted, started to move into Balochistan and started their militant activities there. However, the situation witnessed improvement from April onward with some variation May. In Balochistan, an effort was made to pitch Balochs against Pashtuns when 22 passengers (of Pashtun origin) were kidnapped and later killed in Mastung district. It was expected that situation will turn violent across the province with retaliation from Pashtun elements but the sanity prevailed. Table 9: Monthly break up of militant Attacks in Balochistan Month Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total M Arst Kdnp January 42 22 1 1 11 35 13 1 0 11 25 0 23 February 43 8 0 3 10 21 18 0 0 22 40 0 17 March 30 17 0 3 16 36 7 0 0 12 19 0 5 April 13 2 0 2 26 30 3 0 1 28 32 0 1 May 34 2 0 1 41 44 18 0 0 33 51 2 3 June 21 11 0 20 13 44 9 0 0 2 11 5 2 July 21 7 0 1 16 24 0 0 1 24 25 0 0 August 13 6 0 5 9 20 12 0 0 6 18 0 1 September 11 2 0 1 12 15 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 October 17 7 0 5 32 44 9 0 0 47 56 0 0 November 19 5 0 5 10 20 7 0 0 26 33 5 0 December 16 6 0 10 6 22 15 0 0 6 21 2 0 Total 280 95 1 57 202 355 112 1 3 217 333 14 52 The province also witnessed militant attacks of sectarian nature including suicide blast on an Imambargah in remote Bhaag area of Bolan (Kachhi) district killing at least 12 Shia Muslims and injuring 21 others. Militants also attacked leaders of various political parties in the province in addition to targeting non-settlers as in one incident reported from Godgan area of Turbat (Kech) district, 20 labourers hailing from Sindh and working on road projects, were killed by militants. In another incident reported from Loralai district, at least 12 government employees including police SHO were killed after being kidnapped from a bus. Attack was also observed on ill-fate Rawalpindi bound Jafar Express in Dasht area of

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 23 Mastung district killing at least four passengers and injuring 12 others. Figure 12: Monthly Comparison of Militant Attacks in Balochistan and their impact (2015) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Nos Deaths Injuries As reflected in Table-10, IED based attacks were highest in the province that caused more than 2/3rd of total injuries reported from the province while militants physical assaults were more lethal causing higher average number of deaths and injuries. Similarity, target killings remained one of the widely used type of attacks. Continuing with the past trend, rocket attacks were also witnessed including those carried out against military installations and FWO units working on road/ bridge construction in the province. Table 10: Type of Attacks in Balochistan (2015) Type Nos Killed Injured SFP RZ M C Total SFP RZ M C Total M Arst Kdnp GrA 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 0 0 IED 117 14 1 8 48 71 61 1 0 150 212 0 0 K 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 44 KK 10 4 0 0 47 51 0 0 0 1 1 0 8 MA 63 54 0 29 17 100 45 0 3 21 69 9 0 MC 1 0 0 20 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RA 17 6 0 0 0 6 4 0 0 6 10 0 0 SA 2 1 0 0 12 13 0 0 0 21 21 0 0 TK 51 16 0 0 78 94 2 0 0 14 16 5 0

Annual Security Assessment Report 2015 P a g e 24 4.2 Security Situation in Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) Courtesy continued military operations, security situation in FATA has seen a much positive change in 2015 as number of militant attacks and resultant deaths/ injuries witnessed a nose dive as compared to previous year(s) as being reflected in Figure-13. The year 2015 witnessed 170 militant attacks in which 396 people were killed including 183 militants themselves, 108 SFPs, 76 civilians and 29 PGRs. The killing of comparatively less number of civilians and comparative higher number of SFPs is due to displacement of people from FATA and overwhelming presence of security forces. The number of militant attacks in 2015 has gone even lower than the years 2007 and 2008 when an upsurge in violence in FATA was observed after formation of TTP as an umbrella organization and reaction of Lal Masjid operation in federal capital. Due to on-going military operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan and operations Khyber-I and Khyber-II conducted sequentially in Khyber Agency, a large number of militants were either killed or felt it expedient to disperse into other areas including settled area of Pakistan, rest of FATA agencies and moved into Afghanistan. Forces cleared more than 90 percent areas of North Waziristan and Khyber Agencies and operations are continuing to clear remaining pockets close to Pakistan-Afghanistan border in Shawal Valley of North Waziristan and Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency. Figure 13: Yearly Comparison of Militant Attacks in FATA and resultant deaths & Injuries 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 Nos Deaths Injuries In 2014, when government initiated peace talks with TTP, a fragmentation was observed in the umbrella organization. However, when military operations were started,