NOT FOR REPRINT Click to Print or Select 'Print' in your browser menu to print this document. Page printed from: New York Law Journal Miguel A. Pastrana, Plaintiff v. Kira Samija, Defendant, 700871/2011 September 18, 2014 Cite as: Pastrana v. Samija, 700871/2011, NYLJ 1202670317576, at *1 (Sup., QU, Decided September 2, 2014) 700871/2011 Justice Robert J. McDonald Read Summary of Decision Decided: September 2, 2014 ATTORNEYS Attorney for Plaintiff: Dominic L. Chiariello, Esq., Chiariello & Chiariello. Attorneys for Defendant: Diana Lapadula, Esq., Pacciano & Scahill, PC. The following papers numbered 1 to 15 were read on this motion by defendant, KIRA SAMIJA, for an order pursuant to CPLR 3212 granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's causes of action for common law negligence and violations of Labor Law 200, 240(1) and 241(6) and dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for failure to set forth a prima facie case: Papers Numbered Notice of Motion-Affidavits-Exhibits 1-8 Affirmation in Opposition-Affidavits-Exhibits 9-12 Reply Affirmation 13-15 *1
In this action, plaintiff, Miguel A. Pastrana, seeks to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained as the result of his fall from a ladder on April 26, 2009, while performing construction in the interior of the home owned by defendant, Kira Samija. *3 Plaintiff commenced an action by filing a summons and complaint on May 3, 2011. Plaintiff's complaint asserts causes of action alleging common-law negligence and violations of Labor Law 200, and 240(1) and 241(6). The complaint alleges that at the time of the accident, the plaintiff was performing construction at defendant's home located at 60-77 56th Street, Maspeth, New York. *2 The complaint states that on April 26, 2009, while engaged in performing construction services inside the premises, the ladder on which the plaintiff was working slipped, collapsed, and/or fell from under him causing him to sustain a fractured left ankle. The complaint alleges that the defendant was negligent and violated Labor Law sections 200, 240(1) and 241(6) in failing to provide the plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work; in failing to provide the plaintiff with the proper means of ascending and descending from an elevated work site; in permitting plaintiff to use an improper ladder; in failing to secure or hold the ladder; in failing to warn that he ladder was improper; in failing to provide protection for the plaintiff; and in failing to comply with certain sections of the Industrial Code of the State of New York and Federal Occupational Safety and Health Regulations (OSHA). Issue was joined by service of defendant's verified answer with affirmative defenses dated April 24, 2012. Plaintiff filed a note of issue on October 30, 2013. This case is presently on the calendar of the Trial Scheduling Part for October 9, 2014. In support of the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff annexes copies of the pleadings; a copy of the plaintiff's verified bill of particulars; and the deposition transcripts of plaintiff, Miguel Pastrana and defendant, Kira Samija. In his deposition taken on April 29, 2013, and continued on November 6, 2013, Miguel A. Pastrana, age 50, testified that he is employed as the superintendent of a building located at 61-01 55th Street, Maspeth, New York and also works on the side doing construction jobs. The plaintiff testified that he does not own a ladder and usually borrows a ladder or uses a ladder from the owner of the building where he is working. With respect to the subject accident, he stated that he arranged with Kira, the homeowner, to be paid at a rate of $100.00 per day. He did not have a helper but he stated that Kira's husband was supposed to help him. He was asked to install insulation and sheetrock in the ceiling of a storage area. On the first day of the job he arrived at 5:30 p.m. He brought a few tools with him including a drill and a hand saw. The owner provided the sheetrock and the insulation. When he arrived, Kira showed him the room in which he would be working. The materials were in the room. Plaintiff testified that he asked Kira's husband if he would help and the husband said he would at a later time but he never came back to help. He used a ladder on the premises which was 7-8 feet tall. He did not remember the color or whether it was made of metal, wood or fiberglass.
The plaintiff began the job by insulating the roof above the jacuzzi. For that portion of the job he stood on the jacuzzi. He then used the ladder to install the rest of the insulation. He opened the ladder and locked it so that the legs would remain steady. He had no difficulties with the ladder and found it to be steady. He next started installing sheetrock in the ceiling. He stated that he was putting a screw in the sheetrock when the ladder gave out. On the second day of his deposition, the plaintiff testified that there were three ladders at the residence when he arrived and he chose the eight-foot, A-frame fiberglass ladder. In order to complete the insulation job he had to go up and down the ladder more than five times. Before he first used the ladder he stated that he inspected it and "it was fine." he did not notice any problem with the ladder before he went up the first time. He stated that the two cross bars on the A-frame ladder were locked. He stated that the ground was not wet where he was working. He stated that all four legs of the ladder were on the ground when he got onto the ladder. He did not notice anything physically wrong with the ladder. After he finished installing the insulation he began to install the sheetrock on the ceiling. He stated that he had done the same job alone many times before. He was standing on the third step from the top of the ladder. His plan was to hold the sheetrock up to the ceiling and use a drill to screw it into the ceiling beams. A portion of the sheetrock was being supported by a wooden plank. After he drilled in two screws, he let go of the sheetrock and was attempting to reach for a screw to put in the drill when the ladder moved and he lost his balance. He stated: "I was trying to grab onto the drill and that's when the ladder moved." He hurt his left wrist and left leg when he fell. After he fell he called out to the husband who was in the basement. He stated that the husband, Willie, seemed drunk. The husband gave him crutches to get home and a neighbor took him to the emergency room at Wycoff Hospital. The next day he went to Woodhull Hospital where they x-rayed his left leg and ankle and found that two bones in the ankle were fractured. He had a closed reduction and a cast for six weeks. After the cast was removed he had no other medical treatment for his injury. Kira Samija, age 52, the homeowner, testified at an examination before trial on November 20, 2013. She stated that she has owned her two-family home since 2001. The upstairs of the house contains a separate apartment. She is divorced from her husband Willie Samija. She hired plaintiff in April 2009 to install sheetrock in a closet, to paint, and to put in a new door. She was not present in the house when he fell. He returned to her *4 house later that evening and told her that he broke his ankle falling off of a ladder. She testified that he told her he lost his balance and fell off the ladder. She stated that he had a flexible work schedule and could work at his convenience. He would be paid $100 per day. It was agreed that she would pay for the materials. They went together to buy the materials and he chose them. She did not give him anything else to use for the job. She did not provide him with any safety devices because she didn't feel it was necessary. She saw him when he first arrived at 4:00 or 5:00 pm. She saw him standing in the closet. She didn't know if he used his own ladder or hers. She testified that plaintiff never told her he needed a helper. She did not tell the plaintiff how to install the sheetrock. She was not aware of her husband helping the plaintiff. She had no conversations with plaintiff other than hello and goodbye. Two weeks after the accident plaintiff's girlfriend approached
the defendant to ask for money for a doctor. The defendant gave the plaintiff $250.00 in cash for medical care. In her affirmation in support of the motion, counsel for the defendant, Lisa LaPadula, Esq. asserts firstly that plaintiff's alleged violations of Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) must be dismissed because those provisions of the labor law, by their terms, do not apply to one and two-family houses where the owner neither directs or controls the work. Counsel contends that the owners of one and twofamily homes are entitled to a "homeowners exemption from liability." Counsel asserts that the express language of sections 240(1) and 241(6) focus on whether the homeowner supervised the methods and manner of work (citing Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54 [2d Dept. 2008][the language of Labor Law 240 (1) expressly exempts "owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work." This exemption is intended to protect residential homeowners lacking in sophistication or business acumen from their failure to recognize the necessity of insuring against the strict liability imposed by the statute]; Boccio v. Bozik, 41 AD3d 754[2d dept. 2007] [owners and contractors are subject to liability pursuant to Labor Law 240 (1) and 241 (6), except owners of one-and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work]). Here, counsel contends that other than a brief conversation with the owner and the owner purchasing the materials, there is no evidence in the record indicating that the owner supervised the methods and manner of the defendant's work. Although the owner went with the plaintiff to purchase the materials, plaintiff told her what to buy. In addition the owner contends that she did not tell him how to install the insulation and sheetrock or how to do his job. Further, although the plaintiff used the owner's ladder, defendant's counsel alleges *5 that using the ladder is not the equivalent of of directing or controlling the work (citing Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121 [2d Dept. 2008]). With respect to the cause of action under Labor Law 200, counsel asserts that there can be no liability under this section against an owner unless the owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the defective condition complained of and exercised supervision and control over the work (citing Wojcik v. 42nd St. Dev. Project, Inc., 386 F.Supp. 2d 442 SDNY 2005][the sine qua non of a 200 action against an owner or general contractor is that the defendant maintained supervisory control over the method employed by the subcontractor in accomplishing a specific task, operation or activity]; Wilson v. City of New York, 89 F.3d 32 [2d Cir. NY 1996][an owner is not liable under 200 unless it had "actual or constructive notice of the condition complained of and exercised supervision or control over the work performed by the plaintiff]). Counsel claims that the courts have held that Labor Law 200 and common law negligence claims must be dismissed in the absence of proof of the owner's actual control or supervision. Here, defendant claims that there was neither supervision or control by the owner over plaintiff's work nor any notice on her part of a defective condition. Further, defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to identify a defective or dangerous condition. Counsel states that simply falling from a ladder does not provide a cause of action (citing Esteves-Rivas v. W2001Z/15CPW Realty, LLC, 104 AD3d 802 [2d Dept. 2013]). Counsel agues that the plaintiff opened the A-frame ladder and locked the ladder so the legs would remain steady. Plaintiff testified there was no difficulty with the ladder at all and that he went up and down the ladder many times while completing the installation of the
insulation. Counsel claims that the evidence shows that the plaintiff fell because he lost his balance. Therefore, with respect to the allegations of common law negligence and violation of Labor Law 200, defendant asserts that those causes of action must be dismissed as there was neither direction nor control by the owner over the manner in which plaintiff performed his work or any evidence of a defect in the ladder. In his affirmation in opposition, counsel for the plaintiff states that he concedes that Labor Law 240 and 241 do not apply to the facts of this case and withdraws those causes of action. He also annexes a copy of an affidavit from the plaintiff dated April 25, 2014, in which the plaintiff states that he was hired by the defendant, Kira Samija, to install insulation and sheetrock on the ceiling of a storage area in defendant's home. He stated that *6 the defendant provided the materials and an A-frame ladder. He provided his own hand tools. He states that prior to starting the job he was told by the defendant that her husband would help him if he needed help. He stated that the defendant's husband was present when he arrived but then went down to the basement. He states that after he installed the insulation into the ceiling he asked the defendant's husband for some help installing the sheetrock because it was heavy and he needed someone to hold the ladder. He went down to the basement and he said he would be up later. He states that because he was unable to obtain defendant's husband's help he began installing the sheetrock himself. While installing the sheetrock and on the third step from the top of the 8 foot, A-frame ladder, he reached for his drill and the ladder tipped over causing him to lose his balance and fall. Plaintiff now argues that the defendant, Kira Samija was negligent in failing to provide a helper to secure or hold the ladder and as a result of that negligence the ladder fell over causing the defendant to suffer severe injuries. Citing Chowdhury v. Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121 [2d Dept. 2008], plaintiff asserts that where a property owner permits a worker to use its equipment that causes injury, the defendant in moving for summary judgment must establish that it neither created the alleged danger or defect in the instrumentality nor had actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous or destructive condition. Plaintiff argues that he the evidence demonstrates that the defendant lent her ladder to the plaintiff and created the dangerous circumstances surrounding the use of the ladder by failing to provide the requested assistance in holding or steadying the ladder. Counsel argues that the defendant knowing how heavy the sheetrock was, disregarded the plaintiff's plea for assistance. He asserts that the failure to hold the borrowed ladder in the face of plaintiff's request created a dangerous condition, to wit, making the ladder dangerous to use under the circumstances. In reply, the defendant argues that the statements contained in the plaintiff's affidavit regarding his request for assistance contradicts the plaintiff's deposition testimony and are statements designed to create feigned issues of fact. Counsel states that the plaintiff testified in his deposition that the only conversation he had with the plaintiff before she left the house was to tell him that she was leaving and to close the door when he left. Further, defendant states that the alleged conversations with the defendant's husband are hearsay and not competent as evidence for a summary judgment motion. The defendant argues that the failure of the husband to help the plaintiff cannot be a basis for liability against the defendant who was not
*7 on the premises at the time of the accident and could not have had notice that her husband failed to help the plaintiff hld the ladder. Lastly, the defendant argues that the plaintiff is the sole proximate cause of his injuries because he made the decision to use the ladder and to install the sheetrock himself without the aid of an assistant and thus the accident was an unfortunate consequence of his own actions (citing Stamatatos v. Stamatatos, 95 AD3d 1297 [2d Dept. 2012]; Prairie v. Sacandaga Bible Conf. Camp, 252 AD2d 940 [3rd Dept. 1998]). The proponent of a summary judgment motion must tender evidentiary proof in admissible form eliminating any material issues of fact from the case. If the proponent succeeds, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion, who then must show the existence of material issues of fact requiring a trial of the action by producing evidentiary proof in admissible form, in support of his position (see Vermette v. Kenworth Truck Co., 68 NY2d 714 [1986]; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Labor Law 200 codifies the common-law duty imposed upon an owner to provide his employees with a safe place to work and to maintain a safe construction site (see Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343 [1998]; Colon v. Bet Torah, Inc., 66 AD3d 731 [2d Dept. 2009]; Lane v. Fratello Constr. Co., 52 AD3d 575 [2d Dept. 2008]). Claims involving Labor Law 200 generally fall into two categories: those where workers are injured as a result of the methods or manner in which the work is performed, and those where workers are injured as a result of a defect or dangerous condition existing on the premises (see McLean v. 405 Webster Ave. Associates, 98 AD3d 1090 [2nd Dept. 2012]; Cappabianca v. Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d 139 [1st Dept 2012]; Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54 [2d Dept. 2008]). Where an accident is the result of a contractor's or worker's means or methods, it must be shown that a defendant exercised actual supervision and control over the activity, rather than possessing merely general supervisory authority (Mitchell v. New York Univ., 12 AD3d 200[1st Dept 2004]). However, liability for a violation of Labor Law 200 and common-law negligence may also be imposed upon a property owner where the plaintiff's injuries arose not from the manner in which the work was performed, but rather from an allegedly dangerous condition at the work site, when the owner had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition (see Vella v. One Bryant Park, LLC, 90 AD3d 645 [2d Dept 2011]; Mendoza v. Highpoint Assoc., IX, LLC, 83 AD3d 1 [1st Dept. 2011]; Harsch v. City of New York, 78 AD3d 781 [2d Dept 2010]; Cook v. Orchard Park Estates, *8 Inc., 73 AD3d 1263 [3d Dept. 2010]; Hirsch v. Blake Hous., LLC, 65 AD3d 570 [2d Dept. 2009]; Fuchs v. Austin Mall Assoc., LLC, 62 AD3d 746 [2d Dept. 2009]). Here, the plaintiff does not allege that the defendant exercised actual supervision and control over the activity or that the accident was a result of means or methods rather, plaintiff argues that he was injured as a result of a dangerous condition at the work site, to wit, the failure of the
defendant/homeowner to provide her husband or another assistant to hold the ladder for the plaintiff. However, this court does not find that the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that the defendant, Kira Samija, agreed to provide an assistant for the plaintiff or that she had control over her husband, a non-party herein, such that she would bear liability for his alleged failure to hold the ladder for the plaintiff. The plaintiff testified that he had no substantive conversations with Kira about the job prior to Kira's leaving the house. To the extent that the affidavit contradicts the deposition testimony this court finds that such contradictions were designed to create a feigned issue of fact. As stated above the plaintiff does not assert that there was a defective condition on the premises or that the ladder itself was defective, rather it was the failure of the plaintiff to arrange for someone to hold the ladder that is alleged to be a defective condition. However, here the accident was the result of the manner in which the work was being done and not a defective condition. The plaintiff failed to show that the homeowner or her husband exercised supervision and control over the work performed at the site, or had actual or constructive notice of the allegedly unsafe condition. There is no evidence that the defendant actually controlled the manner in which the work was performed. The defendant was out of the house during the accident. In addition, this court finds that if the defendant believed that it was not safe to ascend the ladder without having it stabilized or having a helper and he disregarded an obvious risk by attempting to do the job without waiting for the husband's assistance, than it was his actions that were the sole proximate cause of the accident (see Stamatatos v. Stamatatos, 95 AD3d 1297 [2d Dept. 2012]; Bruno v. Thermo King Corp., 66 AD3d 727 [2d Dept. 2009]; Marino v. Bingler, 60 AD3d 645 [2d Dept. 2009][where an injury results not from any unsafe condition defendant left *9 uncorrected on his land, but as a direct result of the course plaintiff decided to pursue the law imposes no duty on defendant as landowner to protect plaintiff from the unfortunate consequences of his own actions]; Prairie v. Sacandaga Bible Conf. Camp, 252 AD2d 940 [3rd Dept. 1998]). Accordingly, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence to establish that defendant Kira Samija supervised, directed or controlled the Plaintiff in the means and methods of his work. Further, no issue of fact has been raised as to whether the defendant created an allegedly defective condition on the premises, or that the homeowner had actual or constructive notice of her husband's failure to hold the ladder. There is no evidence that defendant had any knowledge of whether the husband was or was not assisting the plaintiff before the accident (see Ortega v. Puccia, 57 AD3d 54[2d Dept. 2008]). Therefore, as no basis exists to find defendant liable for plaintiff's injuries based upon a theory of negligence, the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability is granted and plaintiff's causes of action sounding in negligence and violation of Labor Law 200 are hereby dismissed. Dated: September 2, 2014
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