EUROCITIES CITY RESPONSES ON PREVENTING RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SOCIAL INCLUSION AS A TOOL? October 2016
CONTENTS Introduction...3 1. Executive summary and key findings...4 2. Approaches...6 3. Strategies...7 3.1. Social inclusion and fighting inequalities...7 3.2. Beyond social inclusion...8 3.2.1 Diversity management and integration...8 3.2.2 Engaging with police and enforcement agencies...8 3.2.3 Exit and prevention programmes...9 4. Organisation...10 4.1 Internal organisation and delivery of prevention activities...10 4.2 Funding of activities and investing in human resources...10 4.2.1 Funding...11 4.2.2 Human resources...11 4.3 Multilevel governance...12 4.4 Cooperation with other cities and networks at national and European level...12 5. Challenges...13 5.1 Impact of recent terrorist attacks in Europe...13 5.2 Impact of the refugee situation...13 5.3 Other challenges...14 6. Lessons learned and next steps...15 Further reading...16 2
INTRODUCTION There is growing concern in Europe about security threats coming from radicalised individuals and violent extremists. Recent terrorist attacks have influenced the political agenda at all levels and are becoming a policy priority for city authorities. EUROCITIES carried out a scoping exercise among our members in June 2016 to collect information on cities actions to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism. A total of 28 cities from across Europe replied to the survey, giving details of their approaches, challenges and plans on the prevention of extremism and radicalisation at local level. Our report presents the main findings of this survey and lessons learned so far, and is illustrated by examples from cities. The report is divided into the following sections: - executive summary and key findings - approaches - strategies - organisation - challenges - lessons learned and next steps Our report is based on responses from the following 28 cities, submitted before 1 July 2016¹: Aarhus Amsterdam Antwerp Bilbao Bologna Brno Dortmund Dresden Edinburgh Eindhoven Gdansk Ghent Gothenburg Hamburg Helsinki Leeds London Malmo Manchester Nice Rotterdam Stockholm Sunderland Tampere Toulouse Twente Utrecht Vienna 1. Additional information submitted by the city of Nice after the 14 July attack was included in this report. 3
1 Executive summary and key findings Key findings Prevention of radicalisation is a multidimensional issue. Rather than addressing the challenge from a purely security angle, most cities opt for an integrated approach and link anti-radicalisation work with other issues such as social inclusion, integration, dialogue and participation. Activities, competences and responsibilities at city level vary across Europe. While some cities work with comprehensive strategic bottom-up plans, other cities operate under national frameworks that they are required to implement. Others are only at the pilot phase and often work on an ad-hoc project basis. Target groups are very diverse. Identifying target groups is a complex task. It is important to avoid stigmatisation that can arise from focusing, for example, on a single religious or political group. Cooperation at local, regional, national and European level and with all local stakeholders is crucial. No city works in isolation and all have adopted cross-departmental approaches involving public agencies (police, educational institutions, etc.), civil society organisations and local communities. Cities interact with regional and national governments, with some also starting to build links with EU institutions as well as other European cities, either to showcase their approaches or learn from each other. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have not brought about any major changes to city strategies so far. These events have however led to greater public awareness, media interest and political tension. It is crucial to address all forms of extremism and radicalisation and tackle the full range of radical ideologies. While radical Islamism is a pressing concern for many cities, prevention activities address a wider range of concerns, including hate crimes, political extremism and Islamophobia. Social inclusion is at the heart of prevention strategies. It is a means of tackling some of the factors leading to radicalisation. It can include measures to address education, poverty and inequalities, diversity management and community relations. Cities are not exclusively focusing on social inclusion however, with many also attempting to reach out to well-integrated individuals at risk of radicalisation. Working on radicalisation is politically very sensitive. Cities have to deal with social inclusion issues and public order concerns; they are under media scrutiny; and they have to interact with different levels of government, often with varying agendas and priorities. There is a risk of running counterproductive programmes that stigmatise certain communities. Establishing preventative measures that target specific groups, such as those focusing only on Muslim communities, can be counterproductive in highly polarised societies. They risk generating more conflict and stigmatising parts of the population, and can lead to a greater sense of alienation among target groups. 4
The refugee situation contributes to cities concerns. There is concern about the potential radicalisation of asylum seekers who may be susceptible to recruiters. There are also fears around the rise of extreme rightwing groups and support for these among citizens, as well as violence towards asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. Many cities are embarking on exit programmes to help radicalised individuals or returnees from conflict zones to escape violent networks. Sustainability of activities is a challenge. Cities often either have to finance this new stream of work from their own budgets, or bid for temporary projects at regional, national or European level. There is a lack of evidence on the impact and effectiveness of anti-radicalisation activities. Identifying the added value of activities to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism is crucial. Many approaches have the potential to generate positive results. They include transparent communication with citizens, engaging all stakeholders, partnerships between the local, national and European level, and addressing all forms of radicalisation and violent extremism. 5
2 Approaches Most cities are taking steps to address radicalisation but their approaches differ considerably across Europe. Antiradicalisation activities are a longstanding priority in some cities, such as Amsterdam, where filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was murdered in 2004; Rotterdam since 2005; and Aarhus, which launched its first pilot project in 2007. The UK cities of Edinburgh, Leeds, London, Manchester, and Sunderland work on the issue under the national counterterrorism strategy CONTEST. The strategy was reviewed in 2006 in response to the 2005 London terrorist attacks. This process strengthened the role of local authorities and their partners in efforts to prevent future terrorist attacks by working more closely with communities to stop individuals and groups from becoming radicalised. The publication by the UK government of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act in 2015 further reinforced the obligations of public bodies by introducing the Prevent Duty, which obliges local authorities and other public bodies to protect people from being drawn into radicalisation and violent extremism. Other cities have only recently started work on the issue in response to the rise of so-called Islamic State and its appeal among some young radicalised Muslims. Examples include Antwerp and Malmo in 2012, Hamburg in 2014, and Stockholm in 2016, with the release of its city-wide guidelines for work against violent extremism. While many cities cite radical Islamism as their most pressing concern, prevention activities cover a much wider range of issues. Countries such as Finland, Germany and Sweden have made addressing non-religious violent extremism, hate crimes and Islamophobia a priority. Ghent s local action plan does not address target groups based on religion, as this is seen as having a divisive effect ( them against us ) which can be counterproductive and lead to further radicalisation. Brno, Dresden and Tampere focus primarily on right and left-wing extremism and de-escalation of violence between rival groups. Similarly in Gdansk problems are related to violent extremism from nationalist, xenophobic and racist groups. Dortmund has a dedicated structure to deal with the extreme right under its Coordination Office for Diversity, Tolerance and Democracy, while religious extremism is dealt with by other units. Rotterdam focuses on violent religious extremism but also monitors risks and warning signs of right-wing extremism. Hamburg founded a prevention network in 2014 to address both violent religious extremism and Islamophobia. The refugee situation in many European cities raises two main concerns relating to anti-radicalisation: fear of radicalisation of asylum seekers who may be vulnerable to recruiters targeting refugee shelters, and concerns about rising violence of extreme right-wing groups towards asylum seekers, refugees and migrants. This is especially true in Germany and Sweden. 6
3 Strategies 3.1. Social inclusion and fighting inequalities Many cities place social inclusion at the heart of their prevention strategies. Radicalisation is seen as a multidimensional issue and most cities opt for an integrated approach to anti-radicalisation that addresses other issues such as social inclusion, participation, dialogue, and integration. In Tampere most city services work towards greater inclusion, integration and prevention of exclusion, which is seen as the best way to prevent radicalisation. Utrecht organises its work on prevention under the Together we are Utrecht action plan to create a more inclusive society. Gothenburg created the S2020, a long-term multiagency approach led by the city council to address social, economic and democratic matters. Depending on city competences, working with the education system is commonly accepted as the cornerstone of a city s work on anti-radicalisation. School staff and teachers who spot signs of or want advice on how to deal with radicalisation in Amsterdam can contact the city s Reporting and Advice Centre. Amsterdam also provides training and workshops for professionals on how to recognise and deal with radicalisation. A similar approach is used in many other cities, including Antwerp, Eindhoven, Gothenburg, Leeds and Sunderland. In Ghent, each school has a contact person trained to recognise signs of radicalisation and report these to the radicalisation in reversal team (TRIK in Dutch). Helsinki puts the focus on increasing participation and inclusion of students through student associations and by involving students in the planning of school activities and events. Student welfare services also play their part in preventing radicalisation. Bilbao takes a proactive approach to anti-radicalisation, with an intervention programme targeting unaccompanied foreign minors, mostly of North African origin. This programme consists of training workshops, cultural activities, and sports programmes. Addressing spatial segregation at city level is seen as important for preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. Helsinki s housing policy has traditionally favoured mixed ownership and funding models. Its goal is to create a socially diverse community structure in both old and new residential areas. Cities also aim to address social and economic factors that contribute to inequality, such as poor access to opportunities and entrenched poverty. In Leeds, Prevent Duty activity is delivered through the Strong and Resilient Communities project, which forms a key component in the city s priority programme, Strong Communities Benefitting from a Strong City. Dortmund works with parents and families to address educational disadvantages and child poverty. In Vienna, the De-radicalisation and Prevention Network emphasises the importance of protecting children from all family backgrounds from violence and poverty. 7
3.2. Beyond social inclusion Many cities are not focusing solely on social inclusion. In some cities, like Amsterdam and Vienna, it is not just marginalised young people who have joined extremist groups. In others, there appears no demonstrable link between radicalisation and lack of social perspective, exclusion, discrimination or feeling of alienation from society. In general though, radicalised young people do seem to share some common characteristics, such as troubled or disrupted family background and lack of contact with one or both parents, often due to divorce, mental health issues, neglect, abuse or violence. A study carried out among a small group of returnees from Syria in Amsterdam revealed that the majority are under 25, have a criminal record, and commonly display multiple problems such as mental health issues, negative self-image, low self-confidence, or unsafe home lives. However, among the target groups there are also people with a good education and/or job who have left or want to go to Syria. It is important then that cities work with all communities to build resilience and that they adopt approaches that go beyond the remit of traditional social inclusion policies. 3.2.1 Diversity management and integration Integrating newcomers has an important role to play in preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. The recent sudden arrival of large number of asylum seekers and refugees often in major cities has led to increased social polarisation in some parts of Europe. Various extremist organisations have exploited this situation in order to recruit supporters, spread propaganda and incite violence. Helsinki has strengthened its integration policies in response to this threat and allocated a further 10 million to ensure good conditions for integration (http://bit.ly/1u81ztu). Vienna, which is host to over 50,000 asylum seekers and refugees, cites integration as a mutual process as part of its overall city strategy on prevention of radicalisation. Vienna s view is that integration is only successful if it is based on non-segregation, education, work, and participation. In Rotterdam, the focus is on fostering dialogue between citizens of all origins. The city organises meetings where citizens can voice their concerns to the city council. After the attacks in Paris, for example, hundreds of people from different backgrounds in Rotterdam spoke openly at these meetings on issues such as freedom of expression, radicalisation, extremism, discrimination and integration. Bilbao incorporates the prevention of radicalisation into its programmes for managing religious diversity in the city, developed by maintaining relationships and collaborating with various religious communities. The Helsinki city board recently allocated funding for multicultural outreach work carried out by the youth department. This work is intended to improve safety, trust and dialogue between asylum seekers and the general population. 3.2.2 Engaging with police and enforcement agencies The majority of cities responding to this survey have comprehensive strategies for working with the police and intelligence services. This seems to be a good channel to at least share information about people at risk of radicalisation or preparing to travel to Syria, for example. In Amsterdam, the mayor, chief of police and public prosecutor determine together the priorities in terms of threats and target groups. Target groups include recruiters, foiled departures, returnees, and family and friends of people known to have left for conflict areas. The Safe in Gothenburg initiative, a collaboration between the police department and the municipality, is part of a local action plan to strengthen the efforts of individuals, local municipalities and NGOs to make Gothenburg a safe city, free from criminality and violent extremism. Many cities are engaged in continuous dialogue and collaboration with the police, often as part of wider networks, taskforces, core groups and coordination teams involving social workers, teachers, associations or religious groups. This is the case in Bologna, Helsinki, Malmo, Stockholm and Twente. 8
3.2.3 Exit and prevention programmes Exit programmes are designed to help radicalised individuals or returnees from conflict zones to escape radical terrorist networks. Some cities are starting to adopt this approach. The well-known Aarhus model comprises aftercare for returnees, such as debriefing, psychotherapy, medical care, mentoring contacts and participation in the city s exit programme. A number of coaches have been trained in the city since autumn 2014, two of whom facilitate parent networks and offer advice and guidance. Antwerp s Houvast (Hold fast!) project had two social workers - a youth worker and a family counsellor - working intensively together on a single case for six months. They worked with the family to restore trust, communication and parental authority, while also acknowledging the importance of school, social life and leisure time. Dortmund has two programmes and projects for people wanting to escape radical and violent organisations: Come Back, for people wanting to opt out of radical right-wing groups; and Wegweiser (Signpost), to protect people attracted to extreme Islamist groups or ideologies. Hamburg s Legato helpline (http://bit.ly/2d8vajb) opened in July 2015. It provides counselling for parents and detainees with religious concerns and works in cooperation with Muslim communities, self-help groups and exit programmes. In Finnish cities, an organisation called Vuolle Setlementti Ry (http://bit.ly/2du9lgz) has developed an exit programme under its Radinet (http://bit.ly/2du9lgz) project. This supports individuals looking to leave extremist groups. Assistance is also offered to family members if required². In Stockholm, an individual-based approach has been used since 2011 to help young people leave a life of crime. This is achieved through Community Intervention Teams, and is helpful also for combatting ideologically-motivated crime. The city also works with defectors to reach out to people at risk of radicalisation. UK respondents to our survey (Edinburgh, Leeds, London, Manchester, and Sunderland) are involved in the national Channel Process. This provides early stage support to people who are considered at risk of being drawn into terrorism. The programme uses a multiagency approach to protect vulnerable people. Support programmes are provided by national staff and their duration is tailored to individual needs: there is no one-size-fits-all approach with regards to when an individual leaves the programme. The beneficiary will only finish the programme when the risk of radicalisation is deemed to have been removed or significantly decreased. Other cities are considering implementing similar exit programmes. Malmo and Stockholm already each have a unit working on exit programmes targeting gangs and criminal networks, and the cities intend to apply this experience to extremist groups. 2. Radinet is a national project delivered by an NGO in cooperation with the ministry of the interior and other NGOs working on violence prevention. Radinet is a part of the European Commission s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN - http://bit.ly/1e7kqi6) exit working group, which deals with the process of moving from a radicalised and violent mindset or environment towards mainstream society. 9
4 Organisation 4.1 Internal organisation and delivery of prevention activities Prevention of radicalisation is clearly considered a cross-sectoral and multidimensional issue in all responding cities. Cities use an integrated approach that involves different departments, such as social inclusion, diversity, education, active participation, integration, and youth. Because of the multidimensional nature of the radicalisation process, it is important that cities carry out their preventative work as a cross-departmental effort underpinned by clear leadership. In Nice for example, all programmes and activities relating to anti-radicalisation are managed by the special advisor to the mayor responsible for security issues. The special advisor leads the taskforce for monitoring and action against radical extremism. Meanwhile in Hamburg there is a greater degree of independence to organise activities on anti-radicalisation due to it being a city-state. Many cities have chosen to dedicate specific teams or entire departments to the prevention of radicalisation. These staff often play a strong coordination role at the intersection between civil society organisations, city services and other public services operating at city level, national agencies and national or international networks of cities. In 2010, Aarhus established an information centre staffed by the police - dealing directly with inquiries - and social services. Public sector employees and private citizens can use this information centre to discuss concerns they may have about radicalisation. Multiple municipal departments in Amsterdam, such as public order and security, education, health, youth, diversity, and sport, as well as city districts and various agencies, meet regularly and cooperate on certain activities. Helsinki has had a local cooperation network in place since 2013 for the prevention of violent extremism. This is a cross-departmental working group tasked with monitoring issues relating to violent extremism and preparing measures to address extremism. 4.2 Funding of activities and investing in human resources Planning and implementing anti-radicalisation programmes often comes at a cost for city services. This is a new and very sensitive task requiring additional resources and highly-trained staff. There are a diverse range of funding streams being used in cities, from own funding to national programmes, agency funding and EU funding. There is however a general lack of certainty around the financing of these activities and availability of necessary human resources. 10
4.2.1 Funding Many cities finance prevention activities mainly through their own resources, as is the case in Antwerp and Gdansk. They also use their own resources to fund NGOs and civil society organisations to coordinate temporary projects and pilot schemes implementing prevention activities, such as in Dortmund and Gothenburg. Funding for projects may also come from private foundations and sponsors, like in Helsinki and Gdansk, or from other external stakeholders. The Vienna De-Radicalisation and Prevention Network, founded in 2014, has no dedicated funding source, but is a network linking various administrative units within the city council as well as external organisations. All are part of a centre of competence for de-radicalisation committed to dealing with this topic, for example by organising and financing further education for staff, and all are committed to working together with the members of the network. Some UK cities like Leeds and Manchester are designated as priority areas under the national UK s counterterrorism strategy, Prevent. These cities receive funding from the Home Office (ministry of interior) to employ dedicated staff to deliver Prevent duties and provide a programme of targeted activities to address the threat of violent extremism and radicalisation. German cities such as Dortmund, Dresden and Hamburg make use of various sources of financing from different ministries at regional and federal level, such as the ministries for youth, education and security. Bologna uses mostly EU funding to support its activities, currently drawing from the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument objective development education (DCI). 4.2.2 Human resources Hiring and retaining qualified staff is an issue for many cities. Some have to work with limited numbers of staff as teams are being put together. Ghent recruited two new city staff to work on anti-radicalisation in November 2015, while Gothenburg has employed two local coordinators since March 2015. Antwerp s team is composed of a programme leader and two case officers. They work on both individual approaches - outreach towards young people at risk of anti-radicalisation - and group approaches - concentrating on informing, awareness-raising, and supporting various groups in the city, including NGOs, schools, education facilities, welfare organisations, healthcare organisations, child support organisations and mosques. In general, cities that are expected to invest in anti-radicalisation activities will need to hire and train more staff in the coming years. Stockholm has a coordinator in each of its 14 district councils and each relevant specialist committee or company within the city administration will also appoint a coordinator. This city-wide work is overseen by a central coordinator in the city s executive board. Rotterdam, meanwhile, organises training sessions for civil servants on anti-radicalisation. 11
4.3 Multilevel governance Cities cannot handle this challenge alone. They work in close cooperation with other levels of government at regional and national level. Initiatives can be either top-down, with the local level delivering a national strategy, or bottom-up, designed around local needs and priorities. The national Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015 requires UK cities such as Edinburgh, Leeds, London, Manchester and Sunderland to deliver the national Prevent programme. In France, city competences to deal with anti-radicalisation reflect the centralised system at the state level. The city of Nice acts within the limits of powers delegated by central government and in Toulouse the training of city staff is carried out in cooperation with the national level. German cities such as Hamburg, Dortmund and Dresden participate in regular meetings and conferences with regional and national authorities. In Bilbao, city programmes for the prevention of radicalisation are organised under the Basque government s Strategy for Immigration, Citizenship and Intercultural Coexistence. Cities that report little collaboration with the national level, such as Antwerp and Ghent, have developed their own extensive strategies to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism. Bologna reports no particular national institutional engagement in this field beyond traditional public order and security issues and a proposal for a national law on measures to prevent radicalisation and jihadist extremism. Other countries work around a clearer multilevel governance system. In Sweden there is a national coordinator working with cities such as Stockholm, Malmo and Gothenburg. Recommendations from this national coordinator have been used by Gothenburg to prepare a local action plan against violent extremism. Finland s ministry of the interior leads a cross-administrative and multilevel national cooperation network for the prevention of violent extremism (http://bit.ly/2cq5paz), involving major cities. 4.4 Cooperation with other cities and networks at national and European level Beyond interaction between different city services and with the national level, cities are increasingly engaging with each other and with the EU institutions to discuss shared challenges and find common solutions. Some EUROCITIES members, for example, are part of the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) and participated in the LIAISE (http://bit.ly/2deuwlv) and LIAISE 2 (http://bit.ly/2dbf5an) projects, financed by the EU Internal Security Fund (ISF). These cities include Bologna, Brno, Malmo, Rotterdam and Toulouse. Rotterdam is also one of the leaders of the local authorities working group within the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)³, created by the European Commission in 2010. The working group brings together local authorities in charge of coordinating practitioners at local level and organising their multiagency work and structures. Malmo is part of this RAN working group and also a member of both the Nordic Safe Cities and the Strong Cities Network, of which London is also a member. Mayors and officials from the four biggest municipalities in the Netherlands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht) meet regularly to share experiences and policy plans. In Sweden, Stockholm works closely with the municipalities of Gothenburg, Orebro and Borlange. Likewise in Finland, the four cities in the Helsinki Metropolitan Area (Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa and Kauniainen) cooperate on preventing radicalisation and violent extremism. 3. RAN is supported by European Commission DG Home: http://bit.ly/2dabb92 12
5 Challenges 5.1 Impact of recent terrorist attacks in Europe Generally, the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels and Nice in 2016 have not prompted any major changes in cities that already had established strategies to prevent radicalisation but have increased the visibility of these strategies and put more pressure on services. In some cases external stakeholders were motivated to work more directly with the city level, as reported in Antwerp, Ghent and Twente. Immediately following the 14 July attack in Nice, the city set up the House for Support to Victims (MAV) to bring together all relevant partners (police, Interpol, justice services, psychologists, etc.) and support relatives of the victims. City staff involved in anti-radicalisation activities and engaging with families of radicalised individuals played a role in coordinating the various stakeholders. This coordination included a 24-hour hotline and the opening of several services across the city to provide psychologists, social assistants and lawyers⁴. Many cities, including Malmo, Tampere and Twente recognise the need to communicate more clearly with citizens about the actions they have already taken. There has been a correlation between terrorist attacks in Europe and an increase in referrals and requests for support from various social and educational agencies. The terrorist attacks have led to an increased polarisation of society. Prevention work in Vienna became more difficult as the political climate became more turbulent, especially at national level, and debates were fuelled by extreme right-wing groups. There are also serious concerns in communities about an anti-migrant and Islamophobic climate and the rise of hate crimes, for example in Manchester, Malmo, and Gdansk. 5.2 Impact of the refugee situation The refugee situation has put the spotlight on the potential risk of radicalisation among asylum seekers and refugees in cities such as Hamburg. Establishing prevention activities in a highly polarised society can cause conflict, as Nice acknowledges, and there is also the risk of exclusively focusing on Muslim communities, mentioned by Sunderland. The same can be said for cities where the social situation is extremely stable, such as in Tampere. In these cases the challenge is raising awareness and improving knowledge among citizens while avoiding conflicts. Helsinki noticed that the current refugee situation has to some extent led to an increase in far-right activities, at least in autumn 2015 when a large number of asylum seekers reached the city. However, these extreme right-wing groups ceased their propaganda activities within a few weeks. A rise in tensions, discrimination and racism are all factors contributing to radicalisation. 4. This information was provided by the city of Nice after the survey was completed. 13
5.3 Other challenges Cities face different challenges, from starting out on this rather new area of work to issues of transparency, efficient communication, uncertainty of funding, and lack of evidence about the success of these activities. The prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism remains a relatively new strand of work for most cities. Most have not yet had the time to develop and fully implement operational models on the scale of very large organisations, as is reported in Helsinki. Cities are finding themselves at the centre of this complex issue, affecting policies such as social inclusion and public order. They are working under intense media scrutiny and have to interact with many different layers of government, which often have varying agendas and priorities. Efficient and systematic sharing of information is cited as one of cities top concerns. This requires establishing a strong relationship between social, community and security services. Some cities also try to develop new ways of working with the media around this area to make their approach transparent and to better engage local people. It also means addressing ethical questions such as the balance between social welfare issues and security concerns, confidentiality, and trust between the client and the case worker. This is an issue raised by both Antwerp and Leeds. Dresden, Hamburg and Nice all mention that outreach activities are particularly hard to implement as the messages need to be tailored to different communities. Many cities, including Vienna and Twente, mention a lack of sufficient personnel and dedicated funding to fulfil all the requirements of programmes to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism. Even where dedicated funding is available at national level, cities often have to bid for resources to fund specific projects and programmes, as mentioned by Leeds. Finally, while cities get progressively engaged in anti-radicalisation activities, many are conscious that no evidence yet exists of their impact and usefulness. This is an issue raised by Amsterdam and Malmo. Nevertheless, in Manchester recent research is increasingly able to demonstrate what works and does not. Proving the added value of measures to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism will be a crucial challenge in years to come. 14
6 Lessons learned and next steps Many cities have only recently started to implement projects and programmes to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, so it is too early to draw comprehensive conclusions. However, on the basis of this scoping survey we have been able to identify a number of lessons: It is of the utmost importance to address all forms of extremism and radicalisation. Efficient coordination within the city administration and collaboration with external partners is crucial to the success of programmes to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism. Similarly, it is essential to have a clear structure of responsibilities and people accountable. Investing in awareness raising, training and providing transparent information to staff and professionals is critical for success. Involving communities and reaching the right groups is a major element of the programmes cities have developed. The prevention of radicalisation, especially among young people, must encompass a range of policy areas, such as integration, anti-discrimination, entrenched poverty, inequality and cohesion. In addition, it is important to ensure a functioning and accessible social infrastructure for children and young people. There are a number of initiatives in different cities, but even within a single city it is considered essential to build on different strands of work. Given the range of groups concerned and the differing motives, no one-size-fits-all solutions can effectively address the issue. To tackle radicalisation properly, the programmes being developed need to be tailored to specific needs. A greater sense of community and fewer tensions between citizens are at the heart of preventing radicalisation. It is important to both reach out to affected communities and to actively involve them in activities around anti-radicalisation. Many cities build their anti-radicalisation work on existing multiagency partnerships. Developing stable networks based on good relations with communities and their representatives is essential, and should be done on a continuous basis, even in times of little or no public attention on extremism and radicalisation. 15
Further reading In addition to their responses to the questionnaire, some cities shared internal documents with EUROCITIES. These are available below: Aarhus: Prevention of radicalisation and discrimination in Aarhus: http://bit.ly/2defbnr Amsterdam: Approach to radicalisation: http://bit.ly/2dwjoff Strategic network radicalisation and polarisation: http://bit.ly/2cqfjzz Tightening of approach to radicalisation: http://bit.ly/2cqeznb Dresden: Location Action Programme for democracy and tolerance: http://bit.ly/2dwjtc0 Stockholm: Guidelines for the city of Stockholm s security and safety programme: http://bit.ly/2cfroeq 16
This publication has received financial support from the European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation EaSI (2014-2020). The information contained in this publication does not necessarily reflect the official position of the European Commission. For further information please consult: http://ec.europa.eu/social/easi 17
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