THE DOMINO EFFECT: SPECIAL VOTING AND ZIMBABWE S 2013 ELECTION There was an old lady who swallowed a cow, I don't know how she swallowed a cow; She swallowed the cow to catch the dog, She swallowed the dog to catch the cat, She swallowed the cat to catch the bird, She swallowed the bird to catch the spider, She swallowed the spider to catch the fly; I don't know why she swallowed a fly - Perhaps she'll die! There was an old lady who swallowed a horse... She's dead, of course! 1 Until the ruling by the Constitutional Court on 31 st May, 2013 in the case of Mawarire v Robert Gabriel Mugabe N.O. and Ors CCZ1/13 many lawyers and politicians assumed that the latest date for Zimbabwe s 2013 general election was the 29 th October. 2 In this jurisprudentially questionable judgment, the Constitutional Court, however, decided otherwise. It held that the general election had, in terms of its interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions, to be held before dissolution of Parliament on the 29 th June, 2013. If the judgment was ill-conceived, the accompanying order of the court was more so. With the 29 th June no longer legally possible as a date, the Court directed that the election had to be held as soon as possible and that, the Court directed, was the 31 st July, 2013. 3 The Order of the Constitutional Court set in motion a train of illegalities, each perpetrated in an attempt to cure the last. It was not possible to comply with both the court order and various other legislative provisions relating to the election. The new Constitution provides for a mandatory intensive 30 day voter registration period, which, at the time of the ruling, had yet to commence. 4 The Electoral Act provided that registration had to end the day before the nomination court sat, and the Constitution that elections could be no sooner than 30 days after such sitting. So there needed to be a sixty day period between the start of the intensive registration period and the election. When the start of the intensive voter registration period was delayed until the 9 th June, 2013, the Nomination Court could not sit before the 9 th July if registration was to be done over 30 days in terms of the Act and the Constitution, and the election thus could not be before the 9 th August, at the earliest. Mugabe sought to deal with these illegalities by perpetrating another. Under the cover of legislative powers granted to him under the Presidential Powers (Temporary) Measures Act, 5 Mugabe purported to effect extensive changes to the Electoral Act by presidential regulation 6 to provide, not only for the system of proportional representation required by the new Constitution, amongst other provisions, but also to allow voter registration to continue 1 The last verse of a children s nursery rhyme. 2 Including, presumably the President himself. Although agreeing with the application to compel elections by 29 th June, or as soon thereafter as possible, Mugabe advanced no reasons why, if this was his view, he had not proclaimed the date as he thought was required. 3 For a discussion of the judgment see D. Matyszak Before and After : Old Wine in New Bottles RAU June 2013. 4 Paragraph 6(3) of Part Thee of the Sixth Schedule. 5 Chapter 10:20. 6 S.I. 85 of 2013.
beyond the sitting of the Nomination Court. 7 On the same day, 13 th June, 2013, the election dates were proclaimed, 8 setting the sitting of the Nomination Court for the 28 th June, 2013, and thus leaving the 30 day period required until the elections, with a few days to spare. While this dealt with the possible illegality of a failure to hold the 30 day intensive voter registration period, it did so through a further illegality. The Presidential Powers (Temporary) Measures Act (PPTMA) cannot be used to make or amend electoral legislation. The Constitution is clear that elections must be conducted under an Act of Parliament, not presidential regulations, and the Presidential Powers (Temporary) Measures Act, itself says that the Act may not be used to legislate any measures which must be done by, rather than in terms of an Act of Parliament. 9 And as a matter of basic equity, a contestant in the election should not be allowed to set the rules. Several applications to the Constitutional Court after these Regulations were made, which challenged their validity, were dismissed. We are yet to be told why, as the reasons for the judgments are to be given later. The legal foundations for the validity of the Electoral Act, as purportedly amended, and thus the election itself, remain unknown. No doubt the Constitutional Court not so deftly stepped around the law pertaining to the validity of the use of the PPMTA to amend electoral legislation. They had no choice. Had they ruled the amendments invalid, we would be left with an Electoral Act which does not align with the Constitution, and, with Parliament dissolved, no means to correct it. A constitutional crisis would have followed. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission(ZEC) thus had to proceed on the basis of the precipitate election date. The Nomination Court sat, as required, on the 28 th June, 2013 to determine the candidates. ZEC s next task was to deal with the poll of Special Votes. Special Votes were introduced into the Act following the last election after it became clear that provisions whereby members of the ZRP and other security sectors cast their vote at police stations or barracks under a postal voting system had been abused, and security personnel had been compelled to cast votes in accordance with the wishes of their commanders. 10 The Act provides that Special Votes must be cast over two days and at least 16 days before the election on the 31 st July. 11 This left ZEC only 14 days to deal with the highly complex issue of special votes. Either on account of haste, or more ominously, to appease the security sector, or for other reasons unknown, ZEC then compounded its problems by failing to deal with the Special Vote in accordance with the law. A Special Vote is only granted to a member of the police force who: will be unable to vote at a polling station in his or her constituency because he or she..will be performing security duties during the election. 12 7 Section 26A of the amended Act. 8 S.I. 86 of 2013. 9 See D. Matyszak The 2013 Elections: Zimbabwe s Ground Hog Day RAU July 2013. 10 Evidence of this was recorded by hidden cameras - see Exclusive: Secret Film Reveals How Mugabe Stole an Election http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/200 8/jul /04 /zimbabwe1. 11 Section 81A(1)(a) of the Electoral Act. 12 Section 8 of the Electoral Act.
ZEC received some nearly 66 000 applications 13 for special votes from the Zimbabwe Republic Police and accepted 63 268, 14 a number which appeared massively inflated against what the Minister of Finance claimed was an establishment on the payroll of no more than 44 133. Allegations were made that the number had been increased by the inclusion of spouses of members and general hands employed at police stations. 15 The police spokesperson claimed that the large figure was due to the inclusion of the Special Constabulary that would be on duty during elections. 16 Given that for the March, 2008 election ZEC issued only 4 350 postal votes 17 for the entire security sector, the number certainly seemed unlikely. 18 In response to queries about this improbable number, the Chair of ZEC, Rita Makarau stated: We are relying on the information that we have from the police that all the applicants are members of the uniformed police.they have given us their names, force numbers and EC numbers and that information will say they are all members of the police force. 19 However, whether or not the 66 000 was the full and genuine establishment of the ZRP and constabulary was not in fact the issue. In order to allow Special Votes for all 63 268 members ZEC had to credulously believe that all would unable to vote in their constituencies on polling day as they would all be away from their constituencies performing election related duties. 20 This required ZEC to believe that the entire police force would be relocated from their normal places of residence ahead of the poll. This is inherently implausible. 21 ZEC however, did not query the applications as it ought to have, 22 thus creating an intractable problem for itself. In addition to the usual requirements for a poll, such as establishing polling station infrastructure and providing election materials, ZEC had, in respect of each of the 63 268 special votes, to process the applications; notify the applicants whether the request had been granted and supply them with written authorisation to cast a special vote; inform the applicants of the days on which they were to cast their special vote and the place and times at which they could do so. Once this was done, ZEC then had to prepare a unique and customised envelope for each and every one of the 63 268 special voters clearly inscribed with the words Special Ballot Papers and the name of the constituency and ward in which he or she is registered, together with instructions on how to cast the vote. 23 13 Originally reported as being 69 222 - Special Vote Court Case Postponed as ZEC u-turns on Voters Roll SWRadio 17.087.13. 14 The revised numbers were reportedly supplied by Joyce Kazembe, the Deputy Chair of ZEC see Zec Starts Ballot Paper Distribution The Herald 24.07.13. 15 Flawed Special Voting System The Zimbabwean 10.07.13. 16 Police Clarify Special Voting Numbers The Herald 13.07.13. 17 Report on the 2008 Elections ZEC February 2008 p28. 18 This increased more than tenfold to an improbable 48 410 applications for the discredited presidential run-off poll a number still far short of 63 268 applications made for 2013 see pages 7 and 10 respectively of ZEC's report. 19 New Row as 69 000 Cops Seek Special Vote New Zimbabwe 11.07.13. 20 The fact that every member of the police force is apparently registered as voter, despite registration being, in theory, voluntary, seems to have passed without comment. 21 It may legitimately be asked as to why the police hierarchy wished to have the entire force utilise the special voting system. The implication is that the hierarchy may have believed that it would still be able to influence voting in some manner, raising suspicion about the entire process. 22 Section 81D. ZEC must be satisfied that each applicant is entitled to a special vote. 23 Section 81(6)(b).
The Act requires that police officers granted a special vote, must cast their vote at the special polling station for the district in which are they performing duties away from the constituency. 24 Thus ZEC had to determine, in 63 268 instances, exactly where to dispatch the customised envelope. This was a mammoth logistical undertaking which was never going to happen in the time available. It did not. ZEC s Deputy Chair, and former member of the discredited 2008 Electoral Commission, Joyce Kazembe, weakly tried to claim that the resultant chaos was on account of the printers being unable to supply the ballots timeously. That failure itself was blamed on the fact that the final list of candidates at ward and constituency level was not known until the appeals in this regard had been determined by the courts only a few days before and that some candidates had not submitted their photographs. 25 However, this could only have affected a score of ballots, and should not have extended, as did the chaos due to the absence of ballot envelopes, to all 210 constituencies. 26 Anecdotal accounts reported commissioners themselves stuffing the special voting envelopes deep into night to try to avert the impending debacle which they had created by accepting the vast number of special votes. During the attempted poll, hastily trained polling officers reportedly neglected to ask voters for their special voting authorisation as the Act requires and worked from a polling officer handbook which failed to advise polling officers to demand to see that voters hands were not marked with the indelible ink designed to prevent multiple voting. Riot police (curiously not lining up to cast votes themselves) arrived to quell rowdy police officers whose patience in waiting for their ballot envelopes had since long expired. 27 Voting apparently extended into the third day, thus breaching the requirement that balloting end 16 days before Election Day. Despite this illegality, in the event, 26 160 members of the ZRP were still unable to vote, with only 37 108 casting their ballots. 28 To deal with the problem ZEC proposed yet another illegality. ZEC announced that all those members of the ZRP who had not cast their ballot, would be able to vote normally on the 31 st July. 29 In so doing ZEC appeared to have forgotten that the precise basis upon which they had been granted a special vote was because ZEC believed that they were unable to vote on that day. And once a person has been granted a special vote, the die is cast. On the grant of the special vote a line is drawn through the voter s name on the ward voters roll and marked special vote. 30 Section 81H(1) of the Act provides, that any person granted a special vote who: casts or attempts to cast a vote at an ordinary polling station, shall (whether or not he or she has cast a special vote at the same election) be guilty of an offence. 31 24 Section 81B(1) of the Electoral Act. The provision is peculiar as the it would be unlikely that the officer would have been deployed to the area of his duties 16 days ahead of the election, suggesting that the police officer would need to travel there to cast his vote, return home, and then return to the area of his or her duties during the poll. 25 ZEC Blames Delays on MDCs Appeals The Herald 15.07.13. 26 ZEC now seems to have conceded that the chaos was caused, at least in part, by the logistical challenges inherent in the special voting procedure itself see ZEC Files Application for Special Vote Reprieve The Herald 24.07.13. 27 Riot Police Deployed Amid Special Vote Chaos New Zimbabwe 15.07.13. 28 See fn 14 above. 29 Zec Gives Relief to Special Voters The Herald 17.07.13. 30 Section 81D(3) of the Electoral Act. 31 Section 81H(1) of the Electoral Act.
The Act does not provide for the withdrawal of special votes. It was thus apparent that ZEC could not meet the constitutional requirement that the election is conducted efficiently, freely, fairly, transparently and in accordance with the law. 32 On Monday 22 nd July, 2013 ZEC met with the political parties to consider how some reprieve could be afforded to special voters. 33 There were various possibilities, all of which, however, would involve an illegality of one sort or another. Firstly, ZEC could have sought to rely on section 192(5)(a) of the Act, which allows ZEC to make regulations amending the time limits within which anything must be done under the Act. This was the provision under which ZEC extended the period for the holding of the presidential run-off election in 2008, from 21 days under the old Act, to three months. It was no doubt reluctant to use this provision to allow special votes less than 16 days ahead of the poll, as the inherent logistical challenges remain, and polling day is very close at hand. Secondly, the President, a contestant in the elections, could have considered whether failure of members of the ZRP to vote is to his disadvantage. If he believed that he commands the loyalty of the rank and file of the police force, he might have been agreeable to again illegally deploy the PPTMA to amend electoral law to allow the 26 160 members of the ZRP who failed to exercise their special vote, to vote on the 31 st July, 2013. Both these solutions faced the difficulty that the new Constitution provides that once the election dates have been proclaimed, electoral law may not be changed, and that electoral law must be in terms of an Act of Parliament and not Regulation. Both approaches would have breached these requirements. 34 The suggestion has also been made that ZEC should simply ignore the Electoral Act which makes it an offence for those granted special votes, to cast votes normally on the 31 st July. 35 The grounds for doing so, it is held, are because of the constitutional requirement of allowing every Zimbabwean entitled to cast a vote to do so. Section 155(2)(b) of the Constitution is cited in support of this: The State must ensure that every citizen who is eligible to vote in an election or referendum has an opportunity to cast a vote ZEC has now reportedly 36 filed an application to the Constitutional Court to request that those granted a special vote be allowed to vote on the 31 st July. This approach is more commendable than simply deciding for itself which provisions of the Electoral Act are or are not constitutional. However, the saga raises a host of questions. Carefully elided from the Herald article suggesting that the Constitution requires that lower Electoral Law should be ignored to comply with the quoted constitutional requirement, is the 32 Section 239(a) of the new Constitution 33 ZEC Grants Special Voters Reprieve The Herald 23.07.13. 34 Section 157(5) After an election has been called, no change to the Electoral Law or to any other law relating to elections has effect for the purpose of that election. Mugabe s advisor on this issue, Minister of Justice Patrick Chinamasa seems well aware of this and hence S.I. 85 of 2013 purporting to alter the Electoral Act was numbered ahead of S.I. 86 of 2013, the proclamation of the election dates. Under the law, being gazetted on the same day, meant they are deemed to have been issued simultaneously. 35 See fn 31. 36 See fn 26.
equivalent and similarly worded provision immediately preceding the one cited, section 155(2)(a), to the following effect: The State must ensure that all eligible citizens are registered as voters. When the intensive voter registration period came to an end with many people still wishing to register, there was no recourse to the Constitution, despite vociferous protests about the predicament. 37 To the contrary, instead the Chair of Commission stated: The law stipulates that voter registration and inspection would end on 9 July and we do not operate outside the law. 38 So why, one may ask, must the Electoral Act be strictly applied, frustrating would be voters from registering, but not applied if it will frustrate the security sector? Why is there recourse to section 155(2) of the Constitution for one, but not the other, when both situations are similarly covered there? And if ZEC is so committed to complying with the provision that allows all eligible Zimbabweans to vote, why did it not apply this right in respect of prisoners 39 or seek to enforce it for those in the diaspora? 40 Furthermore, on a broader level, why did ZEC not object, when the Constitution Court ordered elections by the 31 st July, that the date imposed impossible timeframes upon it? Why did ZEC not object when the President set the electoral law for the poll without consulting it, as the Constitution requires? 41 Why did ZEC not complain when the law thus set, reduced the time limits that ZEC had previously successfully asked be extended, precisely so that there would be sufficient time for it to attend to the necessary logistics between the sitting of the nomination court and the election? Why did ZEC not complain when an improbable and impossible number of applications for special votes was received? Had it done so it could have prevented these illegalities and events from unfolding. ZEC s silence in this regard suggests to many an undue attention paid to political considerations and presidential preference, rather than its duties and mandate under the Act. 42 A special approach has clearly been adopted for the security sector. In the last election 24 000 votes represented 1% of the total vote. The 26 160 members of the ZRP who did not vote on the days for special voting thus might be worth just over 1% of the next poll. In a closely fought contest, as the presidential election promises to be, this 1% might be the difference between victory or defeat. ZEC should thus not be surprised if any confidence that the public may have had in its impartiality and independence has been seriously shaken. 37 Most recently through protests outside ZEC offices on 22.07.13 - Diplomats Cast their Ballots Ahead of July 31 st http://www.swradioafrica.com/ 23.07.13. 38 No Extension to Voter Registration The Chronicle 11.07.13. 39 Prison Inmates Won t Vote: Makarau The Zimbabwe Independent 12.07.13. While acknowledging prisoners constitutional right to vote Makarau cited logistical difficulties as a reason for not putting this into effect. The same reasoning probably was behind the Constitutional Court s ruling dismissing an application to compel ZEC to allow those in the diaspora to vote, though reason are yet to be given - Tavengwa Bukaibenyu v Chairperson, Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and 3 Others SC126/13 (original citation). 40 A point raised by MDC Minister David Coltart - Failed Special Voters to Vote in General Elections http://www.swradioafrica.com/ 23.07.13. 41 Section 157(4) of the new Constitution. 42 See for example Special Voting a Sham:Election Resource Centre http://nehandaradio.com/ 19.07.13.
Derek Matyszak RAU 24/07/13.