Running head: THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 1. The Negative Effects of Taiwanese Nationalism

Similar documents
American interest in encouraging the negotiation

Taiwan Goes to the Polls: Ramifications of Change at Home and Abroad

The U.S. factor in the Development of Cross-strait Political Relations: Positive Energy or Negative Energy?

Cross-strait relations continue to improve because this trend is perceived as being in the

Understanding the Controversy of ECFA Ernest CHU, March 2016

Critical Readings on China-Taiwan Relations Volume I 0. Introduction I. The History of China and Taiwan

China Faces the Future

CRS Report for Congress

CRS Report for Congress

Comparative Connections A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations

10th Symposium on China-Europe Relations and the Cross-Strait Relations. Shanghai, China July 28-31, 2013

Cross-Taiwan Straits Relations: Opportunities and Challenges

TSR Interview with Dr. Richard Bush* July 3, 2014

China and Taiwan: A Future of Peace? A Study of Economic Interdependence, Taiwanese Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations

The Significance of the Republic of China for Cross-Strait Relations

Line Between Cooperative Good Neighbor and Uncompromising Foreign Policy: China s Diplomacy Under the Xi Jinping Administration

Comment: Political Risks as Perceived by Businessmen from Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in China: A Preliminary Comparison

A MOMENT OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT?

Curriculum Vitae. Yu-tzung Chang ( 張佑宗 )

Prospects for Taiwan and Cross-Strait Relations: Dafydd Fell: School of Oriental and African Studies

POST COLD WAR U.S. POLICY TOWARD ASIA

The China ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and Taiwan

Dr. Sarah Y Tong List of publications

CRS Report for Congress

Running head: DOMESTIC POLICY VERSUS FOREIGN POLICY 1

U.S.-China Relations in a Global Context: The Case of Latin America and the Caribbean. Daniel P. Erikson Director Inter-American Dialogue

10th Symposium on China-Europe Relations and the Cross-Strait Relations. Shanghai, China July 28-31, 2013

part i National Identity

Anthony Saich The US Administration's Asia Policy

TAIWAN ENTERS THE TSAI ING WEN ERA AND THE IMPACT ON CROSS STRAIT RELATIONS

China-Taiwan Relations: A Little Sunshine through the Clouds. David G. Brown The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies

China-Taiwan Relations: Cross-Strait Cross-Fire. by Gerrit W. Gong, Director, Asian Studies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Talking ASEAN on Cross-Straits Relations 14 May Cross-Straits Relations: Changes and Prospects by Liang Jen Chang

Understanding Taiwan Independence and Its Policy Implications

Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: US Strategies towards China and Taiwan

UNDERSTANDING TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE AND ITS POLICY IMPLICATIONS

What Xi Jinping said about Taiwan at the 19th Party Congress

Current Cross-Strait Relations: Problems and Prospects. Dr. Feng Tai. Fellow. The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

12th Annual Conference on The Taiwan Issue in China-Europe Relations Shanghai, China September 21-22, 2015

* National University of Singapore. 1 See, e.g., Chai 2008; Copper 2008; Copper 2009; and Lin, Chuo-shui 2009, 421.

China Faces the Future

Curriculum Vitae. Ching-Hsing Wang

INTRODUCTION. Chapter One

The Political Environment: A Critical Concern

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

5 th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS) Berlin, September 30 - October 1, 2010

U.S. Policy after the Taiwan Election: Divining the Future Address to the SAIS China Forum (as prepared for delivery) March 10, 2004

Address: Room 5507, #135 Yuandong Rd., Zhongli City, Taoyuan County 32003, TAIWAN Phone: ext

Hearing on The Taiwan Relations Act House International Relations Committee April 21, 2004 By Richard Bush The Brookings Institution

U.S.-Taiwan Economic Relations: Domestic and International Drivers

Cross-Strait Relations and Electoral Politics in Taiwan

PLENARY SESSION TWO Monday, 30 May 2011

China After the East Asian Crisis

Beijing s Taiwan Policy After the 2016 Elections

The Construction of Taiwanese as Chinese: A Public Relations Approach to Explore Chinese Leader s Discourse

Three Agendas for the Future Course of China-Taiwan Relationship European Association of Taiwan Studies Inaugural Conference, SOAS, April 2004

Berlin Roundtable Meeting

To Be or Not to Be Part of Greater China: Social Development in the Post-Ma Taiwan

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE TURNOVER OF POLITICAL POWER IN TAIWAN

13th Annual Conference on The Taiwan Issue in China-Europe Relations Shanghai, China October 9 11, 2016

UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PARADIGMS, POLITICS AND PRINCIPLES: 2016 TAIWAN ELECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CROSS-STRAIT AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Track Two Dialogue on EU-China-Relations and the Taiwan Question Shanghai, 5-6 June 2010

Europe China Research and Advice Network (ECRAN)

Presidentialized Semi-Presidentialism in Taiwan: View of Party Politics and Institutional Norms. Yu-Chung Shen 1

Options in Brief. International Trade in a Globalized World Options 25

The Impact of Direct Presidential Elections on. The following is an abridged version of a paper. presented by Dr. Su Chi at the conference, Direct

Returning Home or Selling Out? Taiwan s China Debate

CHINA POLICY FOR THE NEXT U.S. ADMINISTRATION 183

Triggering or Halting? Tasks and Challenges in Xi s China

TSR Interview with Andrew Nathan* February 20, 2015

CRS Report for Congress

FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC PERSUASION IS CHINA COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE US NEW ROLE IN ASIA?

Chien-Kai CHEN ( 陳建凱 )

Does the Anti-Secession Law Signify. Greater Irrationality of China s Policy Toward Taiwan?

Chien-Kai CHEN ( 陳建凱 )

Xi Jinping s Taiwan Policy

Taiwan s international visibility in the twenty-first century: A suggestive note

12th Annual Conference on The Taiwan Issue in China-Europe Relations Shanghai, China September 21-22, 2015

A European Role in Cross-Strait Relations? 1. Jean-Pierre Cabestan Senior Researcher, CNRS (Institute of Comparative Law, University of Paris 1)

China s Uncertain Future. Laura DiLuigi. 19 February 2002

The National Institute for Defense Studies News, January 2011 Issue (Issue 150) Briefing Memorandum

BOOK REVIEW MARK TUNG*

Contending Identities: Taiwan and China's Cross- Strait Relations

The Evolution of the DPP and KMT s Policies of the National Identity Issue. Shelley Rigger Davidson College

Country Studies. please note: For permission to reprint this chapter,

IS CHINA S SOFT POWER DOMINATING SOUTHEAST ASIA? VIEWS FROM THE CITIZENS

Growing Cross- Strait Cooperation Despite Political Im passe

On 13 December, 2017, the Vice President

Leiden University Department of Political Science. Political Reform in East Asia Fall 2007 Time and Day: Tuesdays and Fridays 9-11 am 5A37 / 5B04

Lee 61. Korea and Taiwan The Politicization of Constitutional Courts: Establishing Judicial Independence in South Korea.

Rise of China and the Cross-Strait Relations

Sigur Center for Asian Studies The George Washington University New Actors and Factors in Cross Strait Relations January 29, 2009

Floor. explains why. the fallout from the

Dr. CHEN Chien-Hsun List of Publications: Articles in Refereed Journals:

Perception gap among Japanese, Americans, Chinese, and South Koreans over the future of Northeast Asia and Challenges to Bring Peace to the Region

A Strategic Analysis of the Taiwan Independence Issue

Research interests Population studies (including historical demography), urban studies, community studies, and immigrant studies

Teacher Overview Objectives: Deng Xiaoping, The Four Modernizations and Tiananmen Square Protests

China Perspectives. Paris, Karthala, 2013, 519 pp. Tanguy Le Pesant. 2013/ Chinese Visions of Japan. Translator: N. Jayaram

The R.O.C. at the End of WWII

Transcription:

Running head: THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 1 The Negative Effects of Taiwanese Nationalism Johanna Huang Section B07 Fourth Writing Assignment: Final Draft March 13, 2013 University of California, San Diego

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 2 Abstract During the late 20 th to 21 st century, the growing separation between the identity of Taiwan and China became the main cause of tension between these two nations. Sometimes, the tension worsens with U.S. intervention and unsuccessful diplomacy. In this essay, I will argue that nationalism has an overall negative effect on Taiwan because it isolates Taiwan from the outside world, disrupts cooperative relations, and threatens its global security. Using the works of Robert S. Ross (2006) and Kenneth Lieberthal (2005), I provide background information on the history of China as a military prowess which threatens Taiwan s global security. Moreover, scholars such as Scott L. Kastner (2007) and Hung-Mao Tien and Chen-Yuang Tung (2011) emphasize China s economic leverage on Taiwan s political policies. Finally, the works of Shu Keng and Gunter Schubert (2010), Yang Zhong and Chen-hua Shen (2008), and T. Y. Wang and G. Andy Chang (2006) provide further support for my thesis. In addition, I have provided alternative approaches to Taiwanese nationalism from the works of Yung-mei Tsai, Mei-lin Lee, Temu Wang (2006) and Taiwan s former pro-independence President, Lee Teng-hui (1999). By exploring the reasons for tension in the Taiwan-strait relation, I seek to find alternative approaches to foreign diplomacy that could cost Taiwan its potential to be recognized in the global world.

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 3 The Negative Effects of Taiwanese Nationalism The tension between Taiwan, China, and the U.S. has sparked interest on the international stage from the late 20 th to early 21 st century. The belief that Taiwan belongs to China stemmed from a period during which the Kuomingtang (KMT) China s Nationalist Party colonized Taiwan. As time progressed, however, the colonies in Taiwan gradually became more politically isolated from the authoritative mainland and eventually transitioned into a young democracy that fostered Taiwan s new identity. As Taiwan solidified its distinct identity, China used its military prowess and economic leverage to prevent Taiwan from making steps toward international recognition of sovereignty. Although the U.S. played an advocate for democracy and temporarily protected Taiwan from China s pressures to reunify, the U.S. has yet to promote diplomatic policies that would alleviate these tensions. The struggle between the U.S. and China to steer Taiwan s future have caused Taiwanese leaders to be uneasy about its place in the global world. Taiwanese leaders have responded negatively to China s pressures and, out of frustration, increased their nationalistic tendencies which further strained China-U.S. relations. To make matters more complex, Taiwan is also conflicted by domestic problems caused by its young, faction-ridden democracy. The aforementioned facts have led me to ask: Does Taiwanese nationalism have a positive or negative effect on its security in the global sphere? As a response to this question, I will argue that nationalism has an overall negative effect on Taiwan because it isolates Taiwan from the outside world, disrupts cooperative relations, and threatens its global security. Before I present my supporting articles, some of my sources weaknesses must be addressed to ensure full understanding that this topic is not as simplistic as it seems. Many scholars disregard other, less obvious factors that come into play when examining the cause and

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 4 effect of Taiwan s security in the global world. For example, the focus on China determining the future of Taiwan s international status ignores the fact that Taiwan s half-century isolation has fostered identities and governments that are separate from China s. Unification will be a difficult process between authoritative China and the young democratic Taiwan especially when Taiwan already claimed to be a sovereign country. In former President Lee Tung-hui s (1998) essay Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the Perception Gap, Lee argued against the One- China policy by recalling Taiwan s historical events within the past century (p. 10). According to Lee (1998), China had already been divided when its Nationalistic Party (KMT) escaped to Taiwan for refuge after losing a revolutionary war against China s Communist Party (p. 10). After this escape, the KMT proclaimed its reign of Taiwan in 1949 and was recognized as a separate entity from mainland regime (Lee, 1998, p. 10). Therefore, Lee (1998) concluded by definition, Taiwan has been independent since 1949 and is completely capable of governing itself without being an extension of authoritative China (p. 13). In addition, existing sources rarely consider the negative domestic economic consequences of globalization. According to Yung-mei Tsai, Mei-lin Lee, and Temu Wang (2006) in their article, The Personal Consequences of Globalization, Taiwan has accelerated the growth of its economy from fostering labor intensive industries to capital-intensive industries (p. 275). The move towards capital-intensive industries allowed for more global visibility that comes with international trade; however, Tsai et al. (2006) provided personal interviews with workers whose industries were being driven out by increased foreign competition. Laborintensive textile industries no longer brought foreign currency into Taiwan; instead, capitalintensive electronic exporting industries drove up Taiwan s standard of living and increased the cost of labor (Tsai et al., 2006, p. 275). As Taiwan s economy became more integrated into the

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 5 globalization process, Taiwanese industrialists had to deal with the rising costs of domestic labor, environmental constraints, and escalating land values (Tsai et al., 2006, p. 275). Eventually, Taiwanese industrialists relocated their factories to places with cheaper labor, less environmental costs, and affordable land values (Tsai et al., 2006, p. 275). The relocation of these laborintensive factories fostered high unemployment rates; it was too late for the older generation of workers to enter into the technological industries of today (Tsai et al., 2006). Oyster fishermen, flower farmers, and fruit farmers are now relying on imported goods, reducing Taiwan s sustainability (Tsai et al., 2006). In addition, uncertain market conditions for these farmer drives out the need for such domestic industries (Tsai et al., 2006). As a result, Taiwan s disparity between the wealthy and the disappearance of labor-intensive jobs all pointed to the inevitability of polarization and increased the number of domestic issues already at hand (Tsai et al., 2006). These two points exemplify other approaches to Taiwan s security in the global place and demands attention on their own. Although the perspectives mentioned above are equally as important to the study of Taiwanese nationalism and its effects, I will focus on Taiwan-strait relation s military, economic, and political aspects. I argue that blind nationalism and global proclamation of independence will draw negative effects on Taiwan s international security, and China s status as a global superpower should not be undermined because of its military and economic hold on Taiwan. In addition, domestic cooperation between Taiwan s faction-ridden polities must come to a consensus in dealing with foreign policies in order to build a successful democracy in the long run. First, China s military threats against Taiwan s independence are imminent and unavoidable. In Taiwan s Fading Independence Movement, Robert S. Ross (2006) described

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 6 an incident in 1995 during which China threatened Taiwan under Chinese suspicion of U.S.- Taiwan alliance (p. 142). Former Taiwanese president Lee Tung-hui was invited to speak as an advocate for Taiwan s independency at Cornell University in the U.S. in mid-1990 s, to which China responded immediately by testing missiles on the waters surrounding Taiwan (Ross, 2006, 142). In addition, Kenneth Lieberthal (2005) stated in his article Preventing a War Over Taiwan that the likelihood of previous military threats have increased since China passed an Anti-Secession Law that justified its reasons for using military force on Taiwan (p. 57). This Anti-Secession Law removed Taiwan s doubts on China s use of force and demonstrated Chinese President Hu Jintao s hostile response to Taiwan s movement towards sovereignty (Lieberthal, 2005, p. 58). All of the aforementioned facts display China s military prowess and determination to acquiesce Taiwan into unification, which makes the need for an alternative solution towards eventual independency more reasonable than hostilities created by blind nationalism. Second, economic leverage on Taiwan allows China to send costly signs that warn Taiwan against its declaration of independency. Scott L. Kastner (2007) demonstrated the significance of these economic signals in his article, When Do Conflicting Political Relations Affect International Trade. According to Kastner (2007), the large amount of Taiwanese investments in China makes Taiwan vulnerable to China s sanctions because China can easily closer borders and enact embargoes to enhance their economic leverage (p. 668). China was Taiwan s largest exporting partner, which resulted in an accumulation of Taiwanese investments that exceeded US $100 billion during 2006 (Kastner, 2007, p. 669). Moreover, China s exclusion of Taiwan from Free-Trade-Agreements (FTA) in Asia caused foreign corporations to move their businesses to the mainland as a result of the rising costs of doing business in the strait (Lieberthal,

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 7 2005, p. 55). Thus, it is evident that China s ability to resolve political tensions via economic sanctions threatens Taiwan s economic security. Despite China s isolationist economic policies, Taiwanese political leaders have taken steps toward more liberating economic policies that can benefit both Taiwan and China. Hung- Mao Tien and Chen-Yuang Tung s (2011) described Taiwan s attempt to cooperate with China in their article, Taiwan in 2010 during which President Ma Ying-jeou initiated the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) (p. 81).The ECFA increased trade activities between Taiwan and China because of negotiations about tariff-free products, commodity trades, service trades, investments, and dispute settlements (Tien & Tung, 20011, p. 81). However, Tien & Tung (2011) agreed that the ECFA is not equivalent to an actual FTA; ECFA was only the first step toward economic cooperation because Taiwan required the consent of China prior to FTAs with other countries (p. 81). Therefore, the ECFA perpetuated China s economic hold on Taiwan and posed a great threat to Taiwan s economic prosperity. In this situation, nationalistic tendencies could cause China to implement economic sanctions that will ruin the opportunity to expand Taiwan s own economy through formal FTAs. Furthermore, political cooperation between China and Taiwan would add value to having a positive relationship between these two nations. Shu Keng and Gunter Schubert s (2010) report, Agents of Taiwan-China Unification, described the importance of taishang or Taiwanese business people in shaping the economic policies of the Taiwan-strait relations. According to Keng and Schubert s (2010) study, Taiwanese attitudes toward the mainland depend on one s ethnic identity, his or her position on unification, and most importantly, economic interest (p. 293). Those for pro-unification policies tend to be more optimistic about economic opportunities offered abroad (Keng & Schubert, 2010, p. 294). It is evident that the majority of unification

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 8 advocates will be the taishang, especially when Taiwan is the second-largest investor in China after Hong Kong (Keng & Schubert, 2010, p. 300). As a tactical means against Taiwanese nationalism, China could demonstrate its economic leverage on Taiwan by harming business aboard through selective sanctions for the taishang. These sanctions would have dire domestic consequences in Taiwan, especially when six of twenty foreign currency-generating export companies in China were invested by the taishang (Keng & Schubert, 2010, p. 299). The taishang s large investments supplemented the economic developments of China, thereby adding value to having less political distrust with Taiwan. Therefore, nationalism and pro-independence sentiments will only decrease the value China sees in their cooperation with Taiwan (Keng & Schubert, 2010, p. 306). Finally, nationalism will jeopardize political policies that safeguard the global security of Taiwan. According to Reading China: How Do America s China Scholars View U.S. Relations and China s Future, scholars Yang Zhong and Chen-hua Shen (2008) asked Chinese-American scholars: Whom do you think if most responsible for the current tensions between mainland China and Taiwan? (p. 361). A 41% plurality majority of correspondents in the study agreed that Taiwanese leader s nationalistic attitudes and poor political decisions were at fault for current tensions (Zhong & Shen, 2008, p. 361). For example, former President Chen Shui-bian pushed for a change in the status quo defined as neither unification nor formal independence and abolished the Unification Council and Unification Guidelines that led Taiwan towards independency (Zhong & Shen, 2008, p. 361). Chinese-American scholars also believed the sharp downturn in Cross-Taiwan relations were caused by Lee Teng-Hui s appeal to the U.S. for immediate sovereign recognition (Zhong & Shen, 2008, p. 361). Overall, Zhong and Shen s (2008) study provided insight on the thoughts of Chinese-American scholars who understood

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 9 that the hardening of Taiwan s identity and political figures nationalistic policies will only intensify the political distrust between Taiwan and China. As China continues to be unyielding, Taiwan must find other alternatives to rash, demands of sovereignty that will jeopardize Taiwan s global security in the long-run. Based on the essay Taiwan in 2010, authors Tien and Tung (2011) provided evidence of China s objectification towards Taiwan s participation in U.N. affiliated bodies (p. 83). China has prevented Taiwan to join the International civil Aviation Organization and the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Tien & Tung, 2011, p. 83). Moreover, China s delegation demanded that Taiwanese delegation use Chinese Taipei as its title during the non-political event of Tokyo International Film Festival (Tien & Tung, 2011, p. 80). The demand provoked the minister of Taiwan s Mainland Affairs Council, Lai Shin-yuan to publically retaliate against China s use of force against Taiwan s attempt at international participation (Tien & Tung, 2011, p. 80). In response, China s minister of Defense Liang Guanglie explicitly stated: China s military build-up is focused on the Taiwan issue to Japan s visiting delegation (Tien & Tung, 2011, p. 80). Tien and Tung further demonstrated the unfavorable result of a blatant demand on the relationship between China and Taiwan and cautioned against nationalistic attitudes. Taiwanese foreign policies based on nationalistic sentiments are ill-advised especially during a time of foreign and domestic political instability. In addition to China s foreign pressures, domestic tension between KMT and DPP are harmful to the prospects of a successful democracy in the long run. T. Y. Wang and G. Andy Chang (2006) analyzed the political tolerance of young democracies in their article, External Threats and Political Tolerance in Taiwan. According to Wang and Chang (2006), political tolerance is specifically defined as the consent of one polity to extend citizenship to another even in the presence of divisive issues (p.

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 10 377). Taiwan s political elites who used phrases such as betraying Taiwan or selling out Taiwan to label their opponents decreases political toleration and widens the political cleavage (Wang & Chang, 2006, p. 386). In the words of Wang and Chang (2006), this action will deepen threat perceptions and animosity between rival groups, which in turn may lead to intolerant political behaviors (p. 386). The polarization between advocates and adversaries of unification policies will not help Taiwanese citizens understand the realistic outcomes of intense nationalism. Intolerant political behaviors will be problematic during a time when Taiwanese political factions must come to a consensus in dealing with China instead of being blinded by the nationalistic sentiments of Taiwanese political leaders. The significance of my essay is to advocate against nationalistic tendencies that could cost Taiwan its potential to be an active participant in the global world. Although the U.S. has proven to be a good diplomatic leader in mediating the tense relationship between Taiwan and China, it has yet to provide a solution to do-away this tension. Therefore, Taiwan should not rely solely on the protection of U.S. military protection because this dependency will not resolve the imminent threat of an all-out war. Most importantly, Taiwan should contain its passions for nationalism if the country wants to be acknowledged on the international stage. Cooperation with China will create more value in having a positive relationship with Taiwan and help maintain the status quo that allows Taiwan to maintain their democratic government. In conclusion, leaders for pro-independence need to consider alternatives to brash demands that provoke China s military tactics & economic sanctions; the people of Taiwan must allow political tolerance in their democracy s polities; and future diplomacy should be based on cooperative policies, not nationalistic tendencies which will endanger Taiwanese economic and political security in the global place.

THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TAIWANESE NATIONALISM 11 References Kastner, S. L. (2007). When do conflicting political relations affect international trade? The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(4), 664-688. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Keng, S., & Schubert G. (2010). Agents of Taiwan-China unification? The political roles of Taiwanese business people in the process of cross-strait integration. Asian Survey, 50(2), 287-310. Retrieved from hppt://jstor.org. Lee, T. (1999). Understanding Taiwan: Bridging the perception gap. Foreign Affairs, 78(6), 9-14. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Lieberthal, K. (2005). Preventing war over Taiwan. Foreign Affairs, 84(2), 53-63. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Ross, R. S. (2006). Taiwan s fading independence movement. Foreign Affairs, 85(2), 141-148. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Wang, T.Y., & Chang, G. A. (2006). External threats and political tolerance in Taiwan. Political Research Quarterly, 59(3), 377-388. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Tien, H., & Tung, C. (2011). Taiwan in 2010: Mapping for a new political landscape and economic outlook. Asian Survey, 51(1), 76-84. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Tsai, Y., Lee, M., & Wang, T. (2006). The personal consequences of globalization in Taiwan. Ethnology, 45(4), 275-285. Retrieved from http://jstor.org. Zhong, Y. & Shen, C. (2008). Reading China: how do America s China scholars view U.S.- China relations and China s future? PS: Political Science and Politics, 41(2), 359-365. Retrieved from http://jstor.org.