BRADY Case Law Florida Brady V. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Exculpatory and/or impeachment evidence must be given to the defense by the government whether asked for or not. United States v. Biaggi, 675 F.Supp. 790 (SDNY 1987) Brady applies to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Cipollina v. State, 501 So.2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) Brady violation where State fails to tell defendant of alibi witness they learn from co-defendant. Boshears v. State, 511 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) Violation of due process occurs if material evidence is withheld from the defendant after a defense request for such information. Jones v. State, 514 So.2d 432 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) A material discovery violation occurred when State did not inform defendant as person who shot victim. Court failed to conduct adequate hearing. State identified witness as one of its witnesses and furnished defendant with sworn statement in which witness related that victim said, "Man, you don shot me." Once discovery has been made to criminal defendant, State has continuing duty to notify defendant of substantial and material change in report or witness statement containing important actual scenario. Waterhouse v. State, 522 So.2d 341 (Fla. 1988) The prosecutor is required to disclose evidence that affects a witness' credibility as well as evidence that tends to negate a defendant's guilt. Preston v. State, 528 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1988) It is not a violation of Brady for the State to fail to disclose to defense an unfavorable personnel evaluation of its hair analysis expert who later testified at trial. State v. Powers, 555 So.2d 888 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) An accused due process rights are violated irrespective of good or bad faith on part of the
prosecution if prosecution suppresses material, favorable evidence. Duest v. Dugger, 555 So.2d 849 (Fla. 1990) Tests for measuring the effect of failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, regardless of whether failure constitutes a discovery violation, is whether there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, result of proceeding would have been different. Roberts v. State, 568 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1990) There is no Brady violation where alleged exculpatory evidence is equally accessible to defense and prosecution. Anderson v. State, 574 So.2d 87 (Fla. 1991) Government misconduct that violates defendant's due process rights under state constitution requires dismissal of criminal charges. Kight v. Dugger, 574 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1990) State commits "Brady violation" by failure to tell defense about concessions made to jail house informant in return for his testimony against defendant. Cruse v. State, 588 So.2d 983 (Fla. l99l) Evidence is material for Brady purposes where there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense that the result of the proceedings would have been different. Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1991) To establish a Brady violation, defendant must prove that state had evidence favorable to him and that defendant did not possess that evidence and could not obtain it with any reasonable diligence. It must also show prosecution suppressed evidence and that had evidence been disclosed there would be a reasonable probability that outcome of proceedings would have been different. Also, prosecutor has duty to correct testimony which is known to be false if witness conceals bias against defendant through that false testimony. Mendyk v. State, 592 So.2d 1076 (Fla. 1992) In order to prevail on a Brady claim, defendant must establish: 1. The State possessed evidence favorable to defendant; 2. Defendant did not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; 3. Prosecution suppressed favorable evidence; 4. Had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, reasonable probability exists that
outcome of proceedings would have been different. Gorham v. State, 597 So.2d 782 (Fla. l992) The State Attorney is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence withheld by other State agents, such as law enforcement officers. The State violates Brady through its nondisclosure of confidential police informant status of its key witness. The withheld evidence was material insofar as evidence linking defendant to murder was largely circumstantial and witness' credibility could have been attacked by showing of that status. A motion by State's key witness in murder case for mitigation sent to Judge who tried her case is not Brady material where the motion was never served upon the State and the Order denying the motion did not mention alleged mitigation recommendation and no mitigation deal was ever offered to witness. Duarte v. State, 598 So.2d 270 (3rd DCA l992) Drug defendant was entitled to new trial based on State's failure to disclose fingerprint technician's report concluding that fingerprint found at drug lab was not defendant's. Report was material and favorable to defendant. Muhamad v. State, 603 So.2d 488 (Fla. 1992) Where state fails to disclose exculpatory employee statements in violation of Brady, an evidentiary hearing is required in order to determine whether violation would require a new trial. Glendenning v. State, 604 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) Suppression by prosecution of evidence favorable to accused upon request violates due process where evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Glendenning v. State, 604 So.2d 839 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) A Brady violation occurs, requiring a new trial where State failed to disclose evidence of a reward for testimony given to witness. Melendez v. State, 612 So.2d 1366 (Fla. 1992) In order to prove Brady violation, defendant must show that government possessed evidence favorable to defendant (including impeachment evidence), that defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence, that prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence, and that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Provanzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428 (Fla. 1993)
State's failure to disclose psychiatric report, accused jail records and notes of one of state's expert witnesses did not amount to Brady violation because such information either was in possession of defense or could have been obtained from sources other than state. Garcia v. State, 622 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 1993) A Brady violation occurred where prosecutor failed to disclose a witness statement that defendant's accomplice used an alias that defendant had contended actually shot victim. Prosecutor then argued that individual did not exist. Walton v. Dugger, 634 So.2d 1059 (Fla. 1993) State is required to disclose to defendant any exculpatory document within its possession or to which it has access, even if such document is not subject to public records law. Porter v. State, 653 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1995) Fact that prosecution witness had been booked as accessory after the fact and released was not material fact that state was required to disclose to defense under Brady. Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.2d 107 (Fla. 1995) In order to establish Brady violation, defendant must prove that state possessed evidence favorable to defendant, that defendant did not possess the favorable evidence, nor could defendant obtain it with any reasonable diligence, that state suppressed the favorable evidence, and that reasonable probability exists that had the evidence been disclosed to defendant the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Kyles v. Whitley, 63 U.S.L.W. 4303 (1995) In order to show a Brady violation, the defense need not prove that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in the defendant's acquittal. Hunter v. State, 660 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1995) To probe there has been a Brady violation, defendant must prove: that undisclosed evidence actually exists; that the evidence was suppressed; that the evidence was exculpatory; and that defendant was prejudiced by nondisclosure. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (1995) In deciding whether Brady violations will result in a new trial where a defendant files a motion for post conviction relief, the Court must determine the totality of the violations in making the decision whether a new trial should be granted. That is, it is not each individual violation that is determinative, but rather all violations taken as a whole. The test to use whether a new trial should be granted is as follows:
1) The defendant does not have to show by a preponderance of the evidence that disclosure of the suppressed evidence "would have resulted" in the defendant's acquittal. Instead, the reasonable probability test applies which is less than preponderance. A reasonable probability of a different result is one which "undermines confidence in the outcome of a trial." 2) The analysis does not include a process whereby after taking the Brady material into account there was enough untainted evidence left to convict. 3) Once a Brady constitutional error is found, there is no need for further harmless error review. 4) The suppressed evidence should be considered collectively, not item by item. McArthur v. State, 671 So.2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) State is charged with constructive possession of all information and evidence in hands of its agents, including police. State v. Pinder, 678 So.2d 410 (4th Dist. 1996) Due process requires government to turn over evidence in its possession favorable to accused and material to guilt or punishment. Wood v. Bartholomew, 116 S.Ct. 7 (1995) A critical witness for the State underwent polygraph examination and failed it with respect to certain vital facts. Before trial, the prosecution disclosed neither the fact that a polygraph test was conducted nor the results of the test. The Supreme Court found no Brady violation because the evidence was not admissible at trial. Craig v. State, 685 So.2d 1224 (Fla.S.Ct. 1996) Under standards of conduct for state bar, prosecutor had duty to disclose co-defendant's work release status during capital sentencing proceedings, in light of jury's great responsibility in sentencing and its consideration of sentence received by co-defendant as factor in evaluating his credibility and in recommending sentence for defendant. To show that prosecutor had duty to correct testimony of prosecution witness concealing bias, defendant must show that testimony was false, that prosecutor knew testimony was false, and that statement was material. If there is no reasonable possibility that such false evidence may have affected judgment of jury, new trial is required. Co-defendant's testimony and prosecutor's subsequent argument to jury, during capital
sentencing proceeding, that co-defendant was serving two consecutive life sentences for murders and that prosecutor had blocked co-defendant's efforts to obtain parole, when prosecutor knew that co-defendant already had been granted work release and had presumptive parole release date, mislead jury regarding sentencing disparity between defendant and co-defendant and deprived it of ability to assess co-defendant's credibility, requiring new sentencing proceeding. Johnson v. Butterworth, 707 So.2d 334 (Fla. 1998) Upon request, State is obligated to disclose any document in its possession which is exculpatory. This obligation exists regardless of whether particular document is work product or exempt from discovery under public records law. When defendant makes only a general request under Brady it is the State that decides what information must be disclosed. Prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Robinson v. State, 707 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1998) To substantiate Brady claim of due process violation, defendant must prove (1) government possessed evidence favorable to defendant, including impeachment evidence; (2) defendant does not possess the evidence and cannot obtain it with any reasonable diligence; (3) prosecution suppressed it; and (4) had evidence been disclosed, reasonable probability existed that outcome of proceedings would have been different. Buenoano v. State, 708 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1998) In order for defendant to be entitled to relief based on Brady claim that State withheld critical exculpatory evidence, defendant must establish that: (1) State possessed evidence favorable to defendant, including impeachment evidence; (2) defendant did not possess evidence and could not obtain it with any reasonable diligence; (3) evidence was suppressed; and (4) had evidence been disclosed, a reasonable probability exists that outcome of proceedings would have been different; "reasonable probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512 (Fla. 1998) Brady violation in withholding favorable evidence is established by showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put whole case in such a different light as to undermine the confidence in the verdict. Elements that defendant must prove in order to obtain reversal are: (1) that government possessed evidence favorable to defendant, including impeachment evidence; (2) that defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that prosecution suppressed favorable evidence; and (4) that had evidence been disclosed to defense, reasonable probability exists that outcome of proceedings would have been different. State is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence withheld by other State
agents, including law enforcement officers. In order to be considered newly discovered for purposes of setting aside conviction, evidence must have been unknown by the trial court, by party, or by counsel at time of the trial, it must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known of it by using due diligence, and evidence must be of such a nature that it would probably produce acquittal on retrial. In determining whether newly discovered evidence warrants setting aside conviction, trial court is required to consider all newly discovered evidence which would be admissible at trial and then evaluate weight of both the newly discovered evidence and the evidence which was introduced at trial. Johnson v. Butterworth, 713 So.2d 985 (Fla. 1998) Upon request, State is obligated to disclose any document in its possession which is exculpatory. This obligation exists regardless of whether particular document is work product or exempt from discovery under public records law. Prisoner made no more than general request for exculpatory material under Brady, and thus, State's decision on what information had to be disclosed was final. Lewis v. State, 714 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) Information that is intentionally withheld from criminal defendants involves the ethical duty of prosecuting attorneys in Florida. Under Brady tests, new trial is required when defendant can establish that: (1) the State possessed evidence which was favorable to defendant; (2) evidence was not given to defendant; (3) defendant did not have evidence nor could defendant have obtained it with reasonable diligence; and (4) had evidence been disclosed, reasonable probability exists that outcome of trial would have been different. Whites v. State, 730 So.2d 762 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) State had constructed knowledge and constructed possession of ballistics report for the purposes of discovery rule because report was contained in records of police department, and thus State's failure to timely deliver report to defense counsel constituted a discovery violation. Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1999) Brady obligation exists even if document is work product or exempt from the public records law. Young v. State, 739 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1999) Capital murder defendant was entitled to new penalty phase proceeding based on State's failure to disclose Brady evidence of State Attorney notes of witness interviews, which showed trooper's
and other witness' uncertainty as to whether shotgun or pistol was fired first, where notes would have provided impeachment to trooper's testimony but shotgun fired first and could have corroborated defense witnesses, aggravator of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest was found based on testimony as to which gun was fired first, and trooper's certainty was critical to aggravator being upheld on direct appeal. Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506 (Fla. 1999) To establish claim based on State's withholding of material, exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, the defendant must establish the following factors: (1) that government possessed evidence favorable to defendant; (2) that defendant does not possess evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that prosecution suppressed favorable evidence; and (4) that had evidence been disclosed to defense, reasonable possibility exists that outcome of proceedings would have been different. Bryan v. State, 748 So.2d 1003 (Fla. 1999) To establish that State withheld material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady defendant must show: (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the defendants; (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903 (Fla. 2000) Under Brady, evidence is considered exculpatory merely if it is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching. The cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence must be considered when determining materiality for Brady purposes. In order to comply with Brady, individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. Rose v. State, 774 So.2d 629 (Fla. 2000) In order to establish a Giglio violation, a defendant must show that: (1) the prosecutor or witness gave false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the statement was material. Rogers v. State, 782 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2001) Government's suppression of favorable evidence violates a defendant's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
In reviewing the impact that withheld materials might have on defendants, courts must assess the cumulative effect of the evidence. Withheld information, even if not itself admissible, can be material under Brady if its disclosure would lead to admissible substantive or impeachment evidence. In considering Brady claims, courts should consider not only how the State's suppression of favorable information deprive the defendant of direct relevant evidence but also how it handicapped the defendant's ability to investigate or present other aspects of the case. Rose v. State, 787 So.2d 786 (Fla. 2001) A Brady violation of the due process clause arises if the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching, it was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, and prejudice ensued. Even where the prosecutor does not know about the existence of the exculpatory material, a suppression may still be deemed to have occurred under Brady and the due process clause, if the State s agents possess the evidence and it is not disclosed. State v. Huggins, 788 So.2d 238 (Fla. 2001) Prosecutor s failure to disclose witness statement that he saw person resembling defendant s wife driving vehicle similar to murder victim s truck violated due process obligations under Brady, even though the witness name was on lead sheet given to defendant; the witness statement conflicted with wife s denial that she had been in the truck, it could support a finding that the wife possessed the truck contrary to her testimony that the defendant had driven it to her mother s house, the statement also could negate the allegation that the defendant possessed the victim s truck, and the lead sheet stated that the witness identified the driver as male. Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553 (Fla. 2001) The tests for materiality under Brady and Giglio are different: Under Brady, the non-disclosed evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceedings would have been different; under Giglio, which is more defense-friendly, the prosecutor s knowing use of perjured testimony, or the prosecutor s failure to correct what he subsequently learned was false testimony, is material if there is a reasonable probability that the false evidence may have affected the judgment of the jury. Hoffman v. State, 800 So.2d 174 (Fla. 2001) State was required to disclose to murder defendant result of scientific hair analysis performed upon strands of hair found in one victim s hand, rather than mere presence of a hair analysis, where test result, obtained after State answered defendant s discovery demands, excluded defendant, his co-defendant, and both victims as possible sources of the hairs. Defense counsel was not obligated to make continuing inquiries once generally informed of existence of hair
analysis, and serologist s trial testimony to effect that hairs had been recovered from murder scene was not equivalent of proper disclosure. State was required to disclose existence of other suspects, especially where other person had confessed to murders, and at least one detail of that confession matched forensic evidence, and State had results of hair analysis indicating that hairs found clutched in one victim s hand did not belong to defendant. Foster v. State, 810 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2002) There are three components that the defendant must show in order to be successful in a Brady claim: (1) the evidence must be favorable to the defendant because it is either exculpatory or because it is impeaching, (2) the evidence must have been withheld by the State, either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) prejudice to the defendant must have ensued. State v. Thomas, 826 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 2 nd DCA 2002) The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused violates due process, where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, regardless of the good faith or the bad faith of the prosecution. The loss or destruction of evidence that is only potentially useful to the defense violates due process only if the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police or prosecution. Cardona v. State, 826 So.2d 968 (Fla. 2002) Materiality inquiry under Brady is not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting inculpatory evidence in light of undisclosed evidence, remaining evidence is sufficient to support jury s conclusions. Rather, question is whether favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put whole case in such different light as to undermine confidence in verdict. Cumulative effect of suppressed evidence must be considered when determining materiality, for Brady purposes. Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 934 (Fla. 2002) In order to establish Brady violation, defendant must prove the following: (1) that evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that evidence was suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that prejudice ensued. State v. Lewis, 838 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 2002) In reviewing whether prejudice ensued from the State s failure to disclose material evidence, the question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Lightbourne v. State, 841 So.2d 431 (Fla. 2003) For Brady purposes, the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence must be considered when determining materiality. United States v. Ruiz, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002) Prosecutors are not required to provide exculpatory evidence to defendants who are considering entering into a plea bargain prior to trial. This is limited to individuals who are contemplating a plea before trial. Taylor v. State, 848 So.2d 410 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2003) Allegations in post-conviction motion brought in connection with guilty plea to DUI manslaughter that State failed to reveal blood test results showing that other driver had alcohol and drugs in her system, that it also failed to disclose a witness statements to police that indicated other driver was intoxicated, driving erratically, and talking on cell phone at time of collision, and that defendant would not have entered plea if she had known about the additional evidence, were factually sufficient to support a claimed Brady violation. Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 2003) Fact that defendant knew that State had performed analysis of hairs found on murder victim did not excuse State from disclosing results, which excluded defendant as source of hairs. Once State obtained results of hair analysis, it was required under Brady to disclose them to defendant. State v. Knight, 866 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2003) Question for determining whether prejudice has ensued under Brady analysis is not whether the defendant would have more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Banks v. Dretke, 124 S.Ct. 1256 (2004) The prosecution withheld evidence that would have allowed Banks to discredit two essential prosecution witnesses. The State did not disclose that one of the witnesses was a paid police informant, nor did it disclose a pre-trial transcript revealing that the other witnesses trial testimony had been intensively coached by prosecutors and law enforcement officers. At trial, the prosecutor failed to correct or disclose the false information. A Brady violation occurred when the Supreme Court declared that the prosecutor may hide, defendant must seek is not tenable in providing due process. Mordenti v. State 894 So.2d 161 (Fla. 2004)
To comply with Brady, the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence and to disclose that evidence to the defense. This includes impeachment evidence. Bell v. State, 930 So.2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) State has obligation under discovery rule to disclose to defendant prior to trial the child victim s trial testimony would differ from that which she gave at her deposition to the extent that she would effectively admit to perjury at deposition, in prosecution for sexual battery on a child and other offenses, as State learned of victim s planned change in testimony during week before trial began. Archer v. State, 934 So.2d 1187 (Fla. 2006) For Brady purposes, Defendant is not required to compel production of favorable evidence which is material, in that the evidence tends to negate the guilt of the accused or tends to negate the punishment. Ponticelli v. State, 941 So.2d 1073 (Fla. 2006) A true Brady violation requires that a defendant establish the following three elements: (1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to him, either because it is exculpatory or because it is impeaching; (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the state, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) that the suppression resulted in prejudice. Curry v. State, 1 So.3d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) The state is charged with constructive knowledge of information in the hands of law enforcement officers. An assistant state attorney is charged with knowledge of information held by other lawyers and agents working in the state attorney s office. Deren v. State, 15 So.3d 723 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) State s withholding of workers compensation letter detailing bouncer s receipt of approximately $24,000 was a Brady violation in prosecution for battery and disorderly conduct arising from incident in which defendant intervened in altercation between his friend and bouncer at bar where a worker s compensation statute precluded compensation if the injury was occasioned primarily by the willful intention of an employee to insure or kill another, the defense wanted to use the letter to demonstrate bouncer s financial motive to paint defendant and his friend as instigators of initial fight, and that type of financial interest was a proper subject of cross examination. Hurst v. State, 18 So.3d 975 (Fla. 2009)
The government s obligation to disclose materially favorable evidence extends to both exculpatory and impeachment evidence, and to evidence that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor. Undisclosed information that is not itself admissible can still be material under Brady if it would lead to admissible substantive or impeachment evidence. State v. Gilson, 56 So.3d 146 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2011) The trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the charge of attempted murder in the first degree of a law enforcement officer on the basis of a Brady violation for destruction of a shirt that defendant was wearing at the time of the incident where the defendant could make the argument that the victim misidentified the perpetrator by utilizing a photograph of a shirt coupled with the officer s testimony confirming that the photograph accurately depicted what the defendant was wearing on the night of the shooting and there was no reason why the actual shirt would have to be introduced to assert the argument. Wyatt v. State, 78 So.3d 512 (Fla. 2011) In order to establish a Brady violation, the defendant must demonstrate that (1) favorable evidence, either exculpatory or impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the state, and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was prejudiced. Mungin v. State, 79 So.3d 726 (Fla. 2011) The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial. King v. State, 146 So.3d 505 (Fla. 1 st DCA 2014) Defendant s duty to exercise due diligence in reviewing Brady material applies only after the state discloses it.