The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-Religious War or Economic Conflict?

The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines: Ethno-Religious War or Economic Conflict? Rizal G. Buendia Introduction The Mindanao conflict, expressed in Muslim armed resistance against the Philippine state, has deep historical roots. The Muslims, who prefer to be called Moros 1 rather than Filipinos, believe that they have never been part of the Philippines and that their present struggle is a continuation of their ancestors war for independence, first launched against Spanish and American rule, and now under the post-colonial Filipino-run Philippine state. On the other hand, the state contends that Muslims have to acknowledge the existence of a sovereign Philippine state, whose territorial jurisdiction, which includes the islands of Mindanao and Palawan, and the Sulu archipelago (regarded as the Moroland), has been defined in accordance with international law and accepted by the international community. Hence, the state views the ongoing armed struggle of the Moros as an act of secession against a legitimate state, while the Moros declare it to be an exercise of the peoples right to self-determination against a state which illegitimately annexed the Bangsa Moro. 2 This divergence in outlook, without underestimating other political, social and economic reasons, has been the underlying cause for the internecine conflict between the state and the Muslim armed movement. The Moro independence movement, now spearheaded by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) after the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) relinquished its struggle that began in early 1970s, and became part of government in 1991, has not only challenged the authority of the state to govern the Moroland, but also questioned the political and moral uprightness of governing a people who do not consider themselves part of the Philippine nation state. Although ongoing peace talks have diminished political violence in the conflict between the state and the MILF, the Moro national question is far from resolved. On the other hand, the state maintains its search and destroy policy with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a Muslim terrorist group (composed of disgruntled MNLF and MILF soldiers), which is alleged to have links with the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Indonesian-based terrorist organization that has a goal of carving a pan-islamic state in Southeast Asian region. In spite of the presence of democratic institutions and processes in resolving conflict in the Philippines, the state has had limited success. The contradiction between the 1 Moro denotes a Muslim inhabitant and non-hispanicized in the unsubjugated southern islands, in contrast to Filipino (collectively referred to as indio until 1872), which symbolizes the Christianized, Hispanicized and subjugated people of the Philippines. For an account of the historical development of the Moro identity, see John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959); Onofre D.Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Vol. 1. (Quezon City: AKLAHI Foundation, 1989). 2 The term bangsa or bansa is a Malay word that usually refers to nations, castes, descent groups or lines, races or estates. The composite term Bangsa Moro, refers to the Moro nation. MNLF and MILF prefer to use it as one word, Bangsamoro. For the purpose of this chapter, Bangsa Moro shall mean the Moro nation and Bangsamoro the people who believe and practise Islam as a religion and way of life, especially those inhabiting the southern Mindanao and Palawan provinces and the Sulu archipelago. 1

state s nation-building process and the Moros state-creating endeavour has been complicated by the failure of the state to conclusively resolve the lingering problem of political powerlessness, economic underdevelopment, social injustice and cultural alienation of the Moros. Moreover, the politicization of the Christian majority and Muslim minority conflict and the use of ethnic identities as a rallying point in engendering the contestation between the state and Muslim social forces have likewise prolonged the conflict. Against this backdrop, the chapter explores the relationship between the country s democratic rule and political violence in the Mindanao conflict. It traces both the historical antecedents and consequences of political violence, the relevant and primary actors involved in the conflict as well as their motives and strategies in realizing their objectives, the roots of the political violence and their outcomes. Towards the end of the chapter, a general assessment and prospect of addressing the conflict is offered. The chapter argues finally that political violence brought about by Muslim secessionism is neither simply a result of conflict over economic and material resources nor an ethno-religious war between Muslims and Christians. It is a combination of the state s centralism that effectively restricts Muslim self-governance, the long-drawn socio-economic deprivation of Mindanao, especially the Muslim areas, and the historical biases and prejudices between Muslims and Christians that have not been completely expunged. Despite the dissimilarities between the MILF and ASG means of achieving their goals, the root causes of violence spring from the same source. Forms, incidences, phases and cycles of violence The peaceful beginning The struggle for self-determination of Muslims in Mindanao started when the Philippines was still a colony of the United States of America (USA). Beginning in the early 1920s, 25 years before the American-sponsored Philippine independence in 1946, Muslim leaders began a peaceful movement that asserted sovereign rule from the would-be Republic of the Philippines. 3 They yearned to live as a separate people from the Christian majority. 4 Although the USA configured the Philippine political system and structure of governance in line with the ideals of democracy and liberalism, the Muslims of Mindanao do not generally feel that such ideals can be effectively put into practice under a Christian-led Filipino government. The Muslim secessionist movement is thus a political undertaking to create a nation state that is seen as not possible under the process of Philippine nation-state building. Nonetheless, the decision of the USA government to grant independence to the Philippines, with the integration of the Muslim people and their lands into a single Philippine statehood, compelled Muslim leaders to abandon their quest for either a sovereign nation state or a semi-sovereign state under American tutelage. Muslim leaders instead focused their attention on creating a political niche for themselves in 3 For an account of the Moro pre-philippine independence struggle see Peter Gowing, Muslim Filipinos Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City, Metro Manila: New Day Publishers, 1979); Samuel Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City, Metro Manila: The Center for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, Diliman, 1993). 4 Religion may be one of the factors that separated the minority Muslims and Christian majority. History is replete with cases of native converts conscripted to fight the Moros in the interest of the Spanish Crown and the Church. This kept the people apart, facilitating the rule of the Spanish colonizers for more than three centuries. 2

the soon-to-be formed Philippine Republic by trying to redefine their identity from Moro to Filipino-Muslim. 5 After the establishment of the Philippine republic in 1946, most members of the Muslim political élite aligned themselves with the new state and advocated its policies, including state sponsorship of large-scale Christian migration to the Muslim south. The shift of loyalty of the Muslim élite exhibits not only the sense of political opportunism, some say pragmatism, but also the malleability of ethnic identity. As shown later in the chapter, the secessionist movement is not singularly trained against the failure of the state to create a more responsive government, but also on the inability of the Muslim élite, especially politicians, to represent, advance and defend the collective interest of the Muslim masses in various instrumentalities and organs of the state. First Phase: Escalation of state violence The violence of the state in the infamous Corregidor Jabidah 6 massacre on 18 March 1968, almost 50 years after the peaceful clamour for independence, finally sparked the Muslim separatist war against the Philippine state. The massacre, otherwise known as the Corregidor 7 Incident, took place when about 28 out of less than 200 Muslim military trainees (called Jabidah commandos ), mostly Tausug and Samal 8 from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, undergoing guerrilla warfare training in Corregidor Island were summarily executed. 9 Notwithstanding a few senate and congressional hearings on the issue, no one was arrested and held responsible for the ghastly massacre. 10 The Jabidah mass execution enflamed Christians and Muslims alike and stoked up the extant revolutionary environment in the late 1960s to early 1970s. Filipino- Muslims experienced the contradictions of their hyphenated identity and felt the frustrations in their bid to be integrated in the body politic. Six weeks after the Corregidor incident, Datu Udtog Matalam, then Cotabato province governor, proclaimed the birth of the Muslim (later renamed Mindanao, to include Christians as well as non-christian/non-muslim indigenous tribes) Independence Movement (MIM). Matalam s call for secession came in the wake of political violence in Cotabato that was then beginning to take shape as a Muslim- Christian conflict. 11 However, Matalam relinquished his idea of secession soon after 5 Patricio Abinales, The Muslim-Filipino and the State, Public Policy 2(2) (April-June 1998), p. 49. 6 Jabidah is a name of a beautiful woman in Muslim folklore. Jabidah might refer to Sabah, a state of Malaysia, whick Project Merdeka (Freedom) [a military operation] intends to occupy. See Marites Danguilan Vitug and Glenda Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute for Popular Democracy, 1999), p. 4. 7 Corrigidor is a tadpole-shaped island guarding the mouth of Manila Bay. It is part of Cavite Province, south of Manila. 8 Tausug and Samal are two of the 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic groupings in the Philippines. The others are: Maranao, Maguindanao, Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kalibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawani, Molbog and Kalagan. 9 The case was uncovered by opposition senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. Then President Ferdinand Marcos charged that the exposé was politically motivated and meant to discredit him. 10 For a detailed account, see Vitug and Gloria, 1999, pp. 2-23. 11 Violence involving Muslims and Christians escalated and plunged Mindanao into a virtual war in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s. Not a few analysts believe that this violence between Muslims and Christians was what gave rise to the mistaken notion that the so-called Mindanao conflict is a religious war. 3

then President Marcos co-opted him to a government post as presidential adviser on Muslim affairs. In 1969, the secessionist movement was resurrected with the formation of the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO). Among those who joined BMLO s series of training sessions in Malaysia were Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim, 12 but they eventually left the organization along with other intellectuals to establish the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in mid-1971. 13 MNLF had a different view of the BMLO, believing that the problems besetting the Muslims were partly caused by the collaboration of their own Muslim leaders with the Manila politico-economic elite. Misuari s vision of a revolutionary organization was emphatically nationalist and secular in orientation rather than Islamic. Finally, MNLF leaders renounced their identities as Filipino-Muslims and affirmed their Moro identity the descendants of the unsubjugated and uncolonized peoples. The imposition of martial law in September 1972 sharpened the conflict between the state and Muslim insurgents. It was Marcos dictatorial regime that fanned the fire of Muslim rebellion. 14 Likewise, it precipitated the unification of Muslims against the state, which has been perceived as anti-islamic. The MNLF serves as the concentrated organizational expression of Muslim resistance in opposition to the state s domineering power. The war in Mindanao was gory, brutal and costly. The price paid included an estimated 60,000 to 80,000 people killed, more than a million people made homeless and destitute, approximately 200,000 to 300,000 Muslim refugees forced to flee their communities and resettle in other parts of the country (including Metro Manila) and nearby Malaysia (Sabah), and about 10,000 to 11,000 Philippine soldiers were killed, extinguishing almost the entire 1974 batch of graduates of the élite Philippine Military Academy (PMA) at the height of the conflict in the mid-1970s. 15 In the same period, it was reported that about 80 per cent of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) combat strength was concentrated in Mindanao and Sulu, indicating the seriousness of the Muslim rebellion. 16 The mid- 1970s period of the war was the country s most serious military challenge since Philippine independence in 1946. Second Phase: De-escalation of political violence under authoritarian and democratic rule There were attempts to scale down political violence between the state and the Muslim secessionists in both authoritarian and democratic regimes. While Marcos martial law was able to assert the authority and power of the government to address the cause of the MNLF rebellion, the post-marcos regime laid down the mechanisms 12 Nuraladji Misuari and Salamat Hashim are the two key figures of the Muslim secessionist movement. The former led the secular Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in war and peace for 30 years while the latter led the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) after MNLF settled for Muslim political autonomy under the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 13 See Eliseo Mercado, Culture, economics and revolt in Mindanao: The origins of the MNLF and the politics of Moro separatism, in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. by Lim Joo-Jock and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984). 14 Leila Noble, The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Pacific Affairs, 49(3) (1976). 15 Manifesto of the Muslims of the Philippines Supporting the Call for National Reconciliation and Unity, Dansalan Quarterly, 5(1) (1983): 46-48. 16 The late former senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. reported that during the mid-1970s at the height of the campaign against the MNLF, the government spent some US$4 million a day. See his testimony at a hearing before the US House of Representatives, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, 23 June 1983. 4

and processes of Muslim self-governance in Mindanao, despite their inadequacies. In both regimes, however, the de-escalation of political violence, through peace talks and agreements as well as the provision of an autonomous regional government in Muslim Mindanao, did not bring the Mindanao conflict any closer to an early solution. Marcos decision to initiate a political settlement of the conflict came after two years of martial law. He was aware that the MNLF was not acting alone in its war against the state but was well supported by countries belonging to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 17 primarily with the active backing of Libya and Malaysia. 18 Marcos acknowledged that the only way to deal with the MNLF was to deal with its sponsors, especially the oil-rich members of the OIC in the Middle East where the country s major oil requirements come from. 19 Marcos took the diplomatic offensive to neutralize the Moro rebellion in 1974. He successfully moved for the adoption of Resolution 18 that allowed the Philippine government to solve the Muslim problem within the framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines 20 on the OIC s Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference (IFMC) convention in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Resolution 18 compelled the MNLF to officially ditch secessionism and reluctantly gave the Philippine government the sole power and jurisdiction to determine the appropriate solution to the Bangsamoro struggle. The OIC on the other hand assumed a supporting role in the conflict-resolution process. On 23 December 1976, the most debatable peace agreement under martial law was signed between the government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF the Tripoli Agreement (inked in Libya, Tripoli). Under the auspices of the OIC, the three-articled agreement 21 tied the hands of contending parties to a nonviolent process of conflict settlement without addressing the roots of conflict and political violence. During the entire period of martial law (1972-1986) the state was not able (or did not really intend) to institutionalize Muslim self-rule and political autonomy in Mindanao. Instead, Marcos deftly used the agreement to divide the ranks of the MNLF and allow the Muslim traditional élite (most of whom were members of his monolith political party, the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan or KBL [Movement for New Society]), to control the Autonomous Region 22 in Mindanao. 17 The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), founded in 1971, is composed of 54 countries (including the non-state, Palestine), whose function it is to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim people with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence, and national rights (OIC Charter, 1972). 18 For the extent of Libya s and Malaysia s support to the MNLF secessionist struggle, see Gowing, 1979. 19 In 1974, 96 per cent of the Philippines oil requirements were imported from the Middle East; in 1975, it was 81 per cent; in 1976, 75 per cent (Rodney Tasker, A Butterfly in the Oily Spider s Web, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 January 1978, pp. 41-42, quoted in Gowing 1979, p. 231). 20 See Resolution 18, Political Committee at the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on 21-25 June 1974. 21 The Tripoli Agreement identified the 13 provinces in southern Philippines where Muslims shall enjoy political autonomy as well as provided the creation of a Muslim governmental and judicial system in the area of autonomy. See the 1976 Tripoli Agreement for details. 22 In implementing the Tripoli Agreement, Marcos created two autonomous regions, rather than one consolidated provisional government as contemplated under the Agreement. Marcos effectively divided and diluted the quest of Muslims to be governed under one Muslim-defined government. 5

The Tripoli Agreement was contentious and could not be implemented due to its inherent vagueness and inconsistencies. 23 It took another 20 years, under two presidents after Marcos, to approximate the fulfilment of the agreement. In 1996, President Fidel Ramos solved the political dilemma generated by the agreement through the conclusion of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA). It was designed to allow MNLF Chairman Misuari to assume two government posts: regional governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 24 and as chairman of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). 25 Ramos thought that Misuari s election and appointment to the ARMM and SPCPD, respectively, would both satisfy the provision of the 1987 Constitution (on the election of local government leaders) and the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. It was believed that the SPCPD s development efforts would be able to attract popular support from the people in the areas of autonomy (composed of 15 provinces and 14 cities known as the Special Zone for Peace and Development [SZPD]), where a future plebiscite would be conducted to determine the new political jurisdiction of the ARMM. Thus, it was expected that the widening of ARMM s coverage from four provinces to roughly the area of the SZPD would effectively meet the requirements of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. However, the 1996 FPA did not terminate the secessionist movement. Misuari s reign as ARMM governor and SPCPD chairman for five years (1996-2001) did not bring about the promised peace and development in Muslim areas of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. Misuari was co-opted by the government and consigned to manage a regional government deemed to accomplish the unrealizable. Evidently, the process of transforming the conflict-ridden and poverty-stricken Muslim areas in the southern Philippines into a tranquil society thriving in a robust economy in a matter of five years would have been nothing short of a miracle. Misuari inherited the sociocultural, economic and political problems that resulted from more than half a century of negligence and gross inattention of the central government with regard to the welfare and rights of the Muslims in particular and Mindanaoans at large. The failure of Misuari to achieve the impossible dream broke the hopes of his own constituents and led to his ignominious ouster as ARMM governor, SPCPD chairman 23 Sections 15 and 16 made the Tripoli Agreement difficult to execute. Section 15 mandates the government to immediately create a provisional government in the areas of autonomy. Section 16, on the other hand, allows the Philippine government to take all necessary constitutional processes to implement the agreement. Despite Marcos awesome power under martial law, he did not decree the formation of a provisional government. Instead, he invoked the 1973 Constitution as the framework wherein autonomy is to be defined and raised the democratic provision of the Constitution that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them (Article 2, Section 1). This made it imperative for the people to be consulted, that is through referenda and plebiscites, on matters that affect them. Hence, Marcos used section 16 to obstruct the implementation of section 15. 24 ARMM was created on 1 August 1989 under Republic Act 6734 as a fulfilment of Article 10, sections 15-21 of the 1987 Constitution. It was initially composed of four provinces (Lanao del Sur; Maguindanao; Sulu; and Tawi-Tawi) and increased to six when the province of Basilan and city of Marawi joined ARMM after a plebiscite was conducted on 14 August 2001. 25 SPCPD was established through Executive Order 371, issued on 2 October 1996. It acts as a transitory administrative arm tasked to spur development in 14 provinces and nine cities (as of 1996) in Mindanao and Sulu archipelago. The covered area is known as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). On the dissolution of the SPCPD under Executive Order 80 of 11 March 2002 all of its functions, duties and responsibilities were transferred to the new ARMM under Republic Act 9054. (For details of the provisions, see Executive Orders 371 and 80 and Republic Act 9054). 6

as well as MNLF chairman. 26 The MNLF, the revolutionary organization of about 65,000 regulars that Misuari had led for 30 years, both in war and peace, is now headed by the Council of 15, 27 which was later recognized both by the government and the OIC (on the Tenth OIC Summit Meeting held in Putrajaya, Malaysia, on 15 October 2003) as the legitimate Central Committee of the MNLF and the sole representative of Muslim community in the Philippines. 28 Misuari s expulsion from government was followed by his incarceration and he is currently facing trial for charges of sedition 29 and corruption. 30 Despite the acknowledgement of the MNLF and ARMM as the Muslims organizational expression and institutional spokesperson, respectively, in the Philippines, the OIC and government nevertheless admit that Muslim political autonomy and self-governance has not been fully realized. In a general sense, the advent of democratic rule after the fall of the dictatorial Marcos regime in 1986 did not accelerate the process of Muslim self-rule, nor did it substantially reduce the threats of secessionism. While the new regime afforded the opportunity for new players to participate in the mitigation of conflict in the Mindanao political theatre, the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic regime was the most difficult period. It was in this stage of Philippine nation-building that political institutions of democracy were to be rebuilt and strengthened, and a vision of national unification re-imagined or crystallized. Third Phase: The resurgence of political violence amid peace overtures The uncertainty of the state-sponsored autonomy package has contributed not only to the insecurity of development in southern Philippines but also to anxiety about safeguarding, preserving and protecting the integrity of Muslim identity, culture and religion. Although the MNLF had relinquished its separatist struggle in 1976 before becoming part of government in 1996, the Muslim armed independence movement continued, this time spearheaded by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). 26 Mahendra Alih Madjilon, Attempts to Unseat Misuari, http://mnlf.net/attempts_to_unseat.htm (accessed on 14 June 2004) and Ann Corvera, Nur Misuari: Has the Good Warrior s Long Struggle Come to a Disgraceful End?, Philippine Star (online), 16 January 2002, http://www.philstar.com/philstar/misua.htm (accessed on 12 June 2004). 27 This was the second major split in MNLF s leadership. The formation of the Council of 15 was engineered by the MNLF s senior leaders. Misuari s deputy chairman, Hatamil Hassan, was elected as the Council s chair while MNLF s Foreign Affairs Committee chair, Parouk Hussin, was elected ARMM s new regional governor in November 2001 under the new ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054). 28 Allan Nawal and Juliet Javellana, OIC Rejects Anew RP Application for Observer Status, Gloria in KL, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 16 October 2003. 29 In November 2001, while still serving as ARMM governor and chair of SPCPD, Misuari convened the Fifth National Bangsamoro Assembly in Parang, Sulu, and resurrected his call for an independent Muslim Mindanao. He later led some armed MNLF guerrillas to attack the army headquarters in Jolo, Sulu, on 19 November 2001. The event prompted the government to charge Misuari with sedition. He is now languishing in jail on charges of rebellion, and, if found guilty, he could face up to 20 years imprisonment. 30 It was also reported that Misuari pocketed funds allotted for the poverty alleviation programme and allegedly spent some P42 million (US$840,000) to buy high-powered weapons. 7

The MILF, a faction of the MNLF that broke away in 1977 (after the conclusion of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement), 31 and was chaired by Salamat Hashim until his death on 13 July 2003, had been sidelined by the government in the 1996 peace talks. The GRP- MILF peace process only began in 1997, although informal peace overtures started a year earlier. As a party outside of the GRP-MNLF peace process, the MILF was able to focus its efforts on expanding and consolidating its military strength while awaiting the results of the FPA. A seemingly minuscule armed force when it severed ties with the MNLF, the MILF has grown from 5,000 fighters (with some 3,000 firearms) in early 1980s to 15,000 fighters (with more than 11,000 firearms) by the end of 1999. 32 A US intelligence report estimates a stronger force, with 35,000 to 40,000 armed fulltime guerrillas, 33 while the MILF claimed in the late 1990s that its armed force (Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces or BIAF) had about 120,000 fighters (80 per cent armed) and 300,000 militiamen. 34 Even though the AFP puts the MILF strength at much less than what it claims between 8,000 and 15,000 operating mainly in the provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and North Cotabato the government does not deny that rebels ranks swelled by 14 per cent in the first six months of 1999 and 11 per cent in terms of firearms in the same period. Apart from its military strength, the MILF was able to establish 46 camps or community bases, also known as MILF territories (13 major and 33 satellite camps) in 13 out of 15 provinces of the Mindanao and Sulu archipelago. Although formal peace negotiations between the GRP and the MILF had started with the signing of the GRP-MILF Agreement for the General Cessation of Hostilities (AGCH) on 18 July 1997, the end of Ramos term and assumption of office by President Joseph Estrada in June 1998 failed to yield any substantial results. In fact, armed hostilities between the government and the MILF forces intensified under Estrada s All Out War policy against the MILF in April 2000 and completely disregarded the 1998 General Framework of the Agreement of Intent (GFAI) 35 between the GRP and the MILF peace panels, inked under his own administration. The human and social costs of the April 2000 conflict are enormous. For instance, during the five-month military offensive (April to September 2000), at least 810 soldiers and an unaccounted number of Muslim rebels died, 381 civilians perished, 2,156 soldiers and 356 civilians were wounded, and 90 soldiers are missing. 36 In 31 MILF, then known as New MNLF, started as a reformist group in 1977 that advocated Muslim autonomy rather than independence. In 1984, it adopted the name Moro Islamic Liberation Front and made Islam as its official ideology. 32 Richard Baker and Charles Morrison, eds, Asia Security Outlook 2000 (Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2000), p. 130. 33 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 June 2000, cited in Raymund Jose Quilop, The Uneasy and Costly Road to Peace in Mindanao, Panorama: Insights into Southeast Asian and European Affairs, 3 (Manila: Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung, 2000). 34 Moro National Liberation Front, http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=92 (accessed on 24 August 2004). 35 The GFAI, signed by the GRP and MILF panels on 27 August 1998 in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, enjoins both parties to reach a peaceful settlement of the conflict and requires them to implement the joint agreements/arrangements previously signed, and to protect and respect human rights. 36 Fermin Adriano, Lourdes Adriano, Elisa Buctuanon, Alexandra Tanada-Medina and Ronald Amorado, Mindanao s Agenda for Peace and Development, Focus Asien Nr.3: Peaceful Conflict Transformation: Civil Society s Responses to the Conflict in Mindanao (Essen: Asien-Stiftung, 2001), p. 38. 8

addition, roughly 8 per cent of the total population in 19 provinces and cities or close to 160,000 families were driven out from their homes. Moreover, an estimated half a billion pesos (US$10 million) worth of damage was inflicted on property, infrastructure and facilities. 37 In the ARMM and Central Mindanao, 24,000 hectares of rice and corn farmlands were destroyed at a loss of more than 40,000 metric tonnes of corn and 10,000 metric tonnes of palay (unhusked rice). Moreover, the AFP was reported to have spent P50-100 million (US$1-2 million) a day on its military operations at the height of the war. Cost of relief and rehabilitation in those areas directly affected by the war has been estimated at P1.063 billion (US$20 million); and since September 2000, the government has already spent about P815 million (US$16.3 million). 38 Apart from the MILF, the Abu Sayyaf ( sword bearer ) Group (ASG), estimated to be between 300 and 1,000 armed guerrillas (mainly young and disgruntled elements of the MNLF and MILF), constitutes another bloc of Muslim rebels (largely composed of Tausug and Samal ethnic groups) battling the state. Founded in 1991by Abdurajak Janjalani, who was later killed in an encounter with policemen in 1998, ASG intends to set up an Islamic state through extremist means. Its first chilling statement to the country was in December 1993 when it bombed the packed San Pedro Catholic Cathedral in Davao City (a Christian-dominated city in southern Mindanao). It was a brazen assault, delivering a clear message that a new force devoid of any pretensions to ideology was stalking the land. In June 1994, the government launched a massive artillery and ground attack on Paticul Island, then believed to be the lair of the extremists. The heavy fighting caused the exodus more than 2,500 families from the island. The operation nonetheless backfired. The ASG guerrillas killed 17 civilians in the nearby islandprovince of Basilan, triggering the displacement of nearly 500 families. The group likewise bombed two shopping malls in Zamboanga City, and bombed another in Gen. Santos City. In December 1994, the ASG claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Philippine Airlines jetliner, which killed a Japanese national and wounded ten others. In April 1995, some 200 heavily armed ASG attacked Ipil a town of 120,000 people in Zamboanga del Sur, razing its commercial centre to the ground, robbing seven banks, killing more than 50 civilians, soldiers and policemen, and wounding several others. 39 It gained international prominence with the kidnapping of 20 civilians, mostly foreign tourists, on Sipadan Island (Malaysia) on 23 April 2000. While the government is seeking a peace agreement with the MILF, it maintains a search and destroy policy with regard to the ASG because of its active involvement in numerous abductions, acts of extortion, robberies, arson attacks, bombings, murders, massacres, beheadings and other terrorist acts victimizing Christian and 37 See Strategic Action Plan for the Immediate Relief and Short-Term Rehabilitation of the Conflict- Affected Areas, Mindanao Coordinating Council [MCC] Technical Committee Secretariat (2000) for details of the collateral damage. 38 Strategic Action Plan, MCC Technical Secretariat Committee, 2000. 39 Fidel V. Ramos, Erap: Reform or Resign: Hindsights and Insights into E-Mindanao Peace and Development, keynote address on the Prospects of Recovery and Reconstruction in the Light of the Recurring War and Current National Economic and Leadership Crisis, Kusog Mindanao Conference, 3 November 2000. 9

Muslim civilians alike in the name of Islam. 40 Collectively, the MNLF and MILF have officially disassociated themselves from the ASG and condemned their activities as un-islamic. Inasmuch as Muslim rebels can conveniently shift their organizational affiliation for the purpose of either gaining privileges or avoiding repression from the state, their identity as believers of Islam (in varying degrees) cannot be underestimated. Muslim-Filipinos, regardless of ethnic origin and organizational affinity have communally advanced their interest towards the creation of political structures and institutions of self-governance. Even though the state upholds its overture of peace in dealing with the MILF, it remains determined to use force to pursue its political objective preserving peace and order and protecting its territorial rights. In February 2003, a month before the start of another round of formal peace talks between the GRP-MILF panels under the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, 41 a military campaign was launched in the Muslim village of Buliok 42 in the towns of Pagalungan and Pikit off the Ligawasan Marsh in the province of North Cotabato. The offensive took place on the day of the Holy Feast of the Sacrifice (Eid-ul Adha, end of the Hajj or holy pilgrimage) one of the biggest celebrations in Islam. This angered the MILF and other Muslims and has given a religious colour to the war that is fuelled by poverty and injustice. Fighting erupted after Manila accused the MILF of harbouring members of the socalled Pentagon Gang, a kidnap-for-ransom gang. The campaign was purportedly to go after the gang, but government officials subsequently commented that the then MILF chair Salamat Hashim was the real target. Moreover, the MILF was blamed for attacks against civilian communities and the bombing of civilian targets, particularly Davao International Airport and Kabacan marketplace in North Cotabato a week after the military attack against Buliok. Both attacks were officially denied by the MILF. The civilian casualties pointed to the brutal and ugly visage of a resumption of the all-out war between the GRP and the MILF during the Estrada administration. Arroyo suspended the talks in May after a series of bombings and raids on civilians in March and April claimed hundreds of lives and displaced hundreds of thousands in Mindanao. The government blamed the separatists for the carnage and civilian casualties, accusing the MILF of being a terrorist group or giving refuge to terrorists, namely the ASG and elements of Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community), an Indonesia-based terrorist group intent on establishing a pan-islamic state in Southeast Asia comprising the southern Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. 43 The MILF have consistently denied perpetrating the bombings and assaults on civilians, saying a third force (referring to hawkish officials in the military) was muddling the peace process. Criminal charges in a Philippine court were then filed 40 Mark Turner, Terrorism and Secession in the Southern Philippines: The Rise of the Abu Sayaff (sic), Contemporary Southeast Asia, 17(1) (1995), pp. 1-19. 41 Then Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the reigns of the presidency when President Joseph Estrada was unseated by People Power on 20 January 2001, following widespread charges of corruption, abuse of power and inability to govern effectively. 42 Buliok and about four adjacent villages have been the headquarters of the MILF since its Camp Abubakar stronghold fell in 2000; it is regarded as their main base, their new Abubakar. The place is referred to as the Buliok Complex by the government while the MILF calls it the Buliok Islamic Centre/Mosque. It has a land area of 220,000 hectares on the borders of the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato. 43 For the details on the possible link between the Jemaah Islamiyah and the MILF see International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous, Asia Report No. 63 (Jakarta/Brussels, 26 August 2003), pp. 16-23. 10

against 185 MILF leaders but were lifted a year later in August 2004 in the interest of speeding up the peace talks. 44 Seven years after the signing of the AGCH during Ramos presidency, the GRP-MILF negotiations, although resumed in 2001 with the signing of the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, have yet to be concluded. The Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 45 that defined three major agenda items security, rehabilitation and ancestral domain has been limited to exploratory talks rather than the discussion on the aforesaid agenda. 46 Likewise, the GRP-MILF Peace Talks in 2003 were not very fruitful. Negotiations were entirely focused on making ceasefire agreements more respectable and implementable as these have oftentimes been breached rather than applied. Generally, the peace talks have been highly volatile, tenuous and insubstantial, and have been limited to ceasefire agreements. The ongoing process has run on longer than the 1992-1996 GRP-MNLF talks, with negotiations in their eighth year in 2005 and the substantial agenda still not discussed. In 2004, attempts were again made to contain armed clashes between the GRP and MILF forces to enable both panels to commence discussions on the more substantive issues behind the 26 years of MILF secessionist struggle. In spite of the government s pronouncement in late August 2004 that the GRP-MILF peace negotiations are on track, 47 armed conflict has yet to cease completely. Conflict genealogy: Relevant actors, motives and strategies The continuing political violence in Mindanao is borne out of the conflict between the state and the MILF on the one hand and the state and the ASG on the other hand. Non-state actors, the MILF and ASG, have incessantly engaged the state in a battle (both conventional and guerilla) for the past 20 and ten years, respectively, an enduring and lasting solution for which seems uncertain in the near future. Although the state has officially maintained a ceasefire agreement with the MILF pending the conclusion of a final peace agreement, sporadic armed skirmishes between them still occur. On the other hand, the state has been steadfast in its policy of all-out-war and search and destroy against the ASG, as it perceives the ASG as no more than an Islamic fanatic group with dubious political objectives and legitimate demands, whose modus operandi consists of kidnappings for ransom, robberies, arson, bombings, murders, massacres, beheadings and other terrorist acts victimizing both Christian and Muslim civilians and non-combatants. For the Philippine state, the defence and preservation of its territorial integrity at all costs (armed and un-armed) is its primordial interest. With the support of the OIC, the United Nations (UN), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Philippines maintains that any attempts to alter the country s political and geographical jurisdiction have to be done within the constitutional framework and processes of the country. Hence, the MILF s ultimate agenda to secede, set by the 44 Gov t Drops Criminal Charges against MILF Leaders, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 26 August 2004. 45 Also known as the Agreement on Peace between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, signed in Tripoli, Libya on 19-22 June 2001. It was the first comprehensive peace agreement signed by GRP and MILF panels after negotiations were severed in April 2000 due to the all-out war policy of then President Estrada. 46 Rizal G. Buendia, The GRP-MILF Peace Talks: Quo Vadis?, Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004). 47 MILF Peace Talks on Track, Clashes Contained, Says Gov t, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 30 August 2004. 11

MNLF in 1971, is a non-negotiable subject in the GRP-MILF peace talks. In other words, as far as the state is concerned, secession is neither an issue nor an agenda in the negotiation. While the MILF recognizes peace negotiations as the only peaceful, civilized, and democratic way of solving the Bangsamoro problem, 48 it repeatedly emphasizes that independence should be the main agenda and framework for the formal talks. The MILF negotiators declared that There is no point proceeding if the negotiations do not lead to independence. The late MILF Chairman Hashim believed that what the GRP-MNLF FPA resolved was the government s problem and not the Bangsamoro problem: the agreement never touched the core of the Bangsamoro problem which is the illegal and immoral usurpation of their (referring to the Moros) ancestral homeland and legitimate rights to freedom and self-determination. 49 Hashim further argued that the MILF would never agree to any solution other than the full independence of the Bangsamoro homeland the establishment of an Islamic State. 50 Hashim s successor, Al Haj Murad, also expressed in a message on the occasion of Ramadhan in November 2003 that there can be no genuine peace and development unless the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination is adequately addressed. 51 East Timor s (now Timor-Leste) experience in 1999 served as the MILF s inspiration for achieving their own political independence. A great deal of effort has been spent gathering popular support from the UN and OIC for a supervised referendum, under the banner of the right to self-determination, as had happened in Indonesia. 52 For the MILF, the conduct of a referendum is one of the options and mechanisms that it can utilize outside of the peace talks; an exercise of the plebiscitary right to secede 53 or the use of the institution and process of democracy to achieve the end of Muslim self-governance. In an effort to pursue the self-determination agenda in the talks, the MILF is pushing the issue of ancestral domain. It hopes that government s recognition of the right of the Bangsamoro over their ancestral domain will eventually result in an acknowledgement of the Moros territory. In the words of MILF information chief, Mohagher Iqbal, 54 We just want a physical space where we can freely practice our religion and apply our ways of life. There is no need to seize power. 48 Murad Extends Greetings of Peace and Solidarity to Muslim Believers, 10 November 2003, http://www.luwaran.com (accessed on 29 August 2004). 49 The Moro Struggle for Self-Determination and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, http://www.db.idpproject.org/sites/idpprojectdb/idpsurvey.nsf/alldocweb/4f62c40ace5a0370c12 568F70058401C/$file/MILF_self-determination.PDF (accessed on 2 August 2004). 50 Bangsamoro Muslims Determination to Establish an Islamic State, Crescent International, 16-31 March 1999. 51 Murad Extends Greetings of Peace and Solidarity to Muslim Believers, 10 November 2003, http://www.luwaran.com (accessed on 29 August 2004). 52 In June 1999, Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, then President of Indonesia, announced that a referendum would be held in East Timor, offering independence or wide-ranging autonomy within Indonesia. In the UN-supervised referendum held in August 1999, about 80 per cent of the people voted for independence. The results were recognized by Indonesia and the UN, finally completing the process of de-colonization and self-determination of East Timor. 53 Daniel Philpott, In Defense of Self-Determination, Ethics, 105 (1995): 352-385. 54 Romy Elusfa, Is there hope for a GRP-MILF peace pact?, MindaNews, 12 December 2002. 12

The subject of ancestral domain remains to be the main agenda in the next round of discussions, expected to be held in mid-2005. 55 This is likely to be a thorny issue and could lead to another stalemate. For instance, the government perceives the question of ancestral domain to be within the bounds of the 1997 law, that is the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371. The IPRA seeks to recognize, protect and promote the right of indigenous peoples and cultural communities including Muslims, to claim ownership over their ancestral domain pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, the MILF works within the notion that the right over their ancestral domain is none other than the right to their homeland the Bangsamoro territory, which they believe was illegally annexed by the state. It is not only about claims and rights to obtain ancestral domain titles. The ancestral domain rights contemplated in the IPRA hinge on the concept of indigenous peoples rights as stewards of the earth rather than on the right to selfdetermination and a correction of historical injustices. Furthermore, the law, does not depart from the Regalian Doctrine as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. 56 Nor does it divest the state of the power to determine the use of land as provided for in section 7c: No Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. 57 By asserting its inherent power of eminent domain, the state in effect reserves its right to have the last word on ancestral domains. The MILF regards ancestral domain as the issue that gives substance to the selfdetermination struggle, but the government considers it a question that can be answered within the bounds of the state s power and authority. These different frames of reference might prove a tough obstacle in the upcoming negotiations, but not necessarily one that is insurmountable. Aside from the MILF, the ASG is the more dangerous and violent actor in the Mindanao conflict. It was reported that its inception was supported by the Philippine military (specifically the Philippine Marines) in order to trigger divisions within the Muslim rebel movement. However, this is vehemently denied by the ASG. 58 Based on the limited literature available, the ASG s goals, ideology and method of struggle are summarized as follows: 59 1. It serves as a bridge and balance between the MILF and MNLF; 2. Its ultimate goal is the establishment of a purely Islamic government as the surest guarantee of justice and prosperity for Muslims; 3. Its advocacy of war or Jihad Fi-Sabil-lillah (the lesser Jihad) is a necessity and the paramount duty of every Muslim, especially those who desire martyrdom and paradise in the cause of Allah; it is imperative for as long as oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions and arbitrary claims imposed on the Muslims exist; 55 Joint Statement, 20 April 2005, Port Dickson, Malaysia. 56 The Regalian Doctrine affirms the ultimate right of the state to own, develop and utilize all lands and resources under its political jurisdiction. See also section 2, article 12 of the 1987 Constitution. 57 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act 1997 (IPRA), Republic Act 8371, Republic of the Philippines. 58 Samuel Tan, The Juma a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and Method of Struggle, paper presented to the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) Strategic Studies Group meeting, 2 May 2000. 59 Samuel Tan, 2000. 13

4. It believes that war disturbs peace only for the attainment of the true and real objective of humanity the establishment of justice and righteousness for all under the law of the noble Qur an and purified sunnah. Nevertheless, the ASG s practices of hostage takings, kidnappings for ransom, robberies, beheadings and other ghastly acts that victimize both Muslim and Christian civilians are clear deviations from the teachings of Islam and even the fundamental principles of jihad. Professor Mehol Sadain, a Muslim scholar, finds that the ASG s terrorist acts against non-combatants construed as jihad have no basis in the Holy Qur an and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. 60 Other Muslim groups, particularly the MNLF and MILF, view the ASG with consternation and dismay. The MNLF has given tacit support to AFP military action against the ASG while the MILF renounces its activities and calls it a group of bandits that have given Islam a bad name. 61 Another faction of the Muslim separatist movement, calling itself the National Islamic Command Council (NICC), was formed in the early months of 1995 under the leadership of Melham Alam (former chief of staff of Misuari). In its leadership conference in early 2000, NICC s spokesperson accused Misuari of being a collaborator of the Philippine government and warned that aside from selfdetermination and the establishment of an Islamic state, the only way out here is through mutual destruction. 62 In March 2000, NICC held a press conference and announced that it would resume the guerrilla war against the Philippine government and establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. It claims that it has nearly 90 per cent of the original 20-25,000 MNLF forces, but the military estimates that its membership runs to a few hundreds. Apparently, the NICC does not only reject the state s sponsored political autonomy but also abhors peaceful mechanisms in the creation of an Islamic state. Apart from the aforesaid pronouncement, almost nothing has been heard from this shadowy group. Given the relative similarity between the NICC s and the ASG s beliefs and mode of struggle, there is a strong indication that both groups have been working either collectively or separately in staging terrorist acts against Christian and Muslim civilians masquerading as engagements with political content. A fifth organization emerged recently, in February 2005, and at the time of writing, was engaged the state s armed forces in a running battle in the Sulu group of islands. The military has called it the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) or MNLF renegades, to distinguish it from the mainstream MNLF, which had been part of government in 1996. It was tagged as a terrorist group allegedly linked to the ASG. However, initial evidence has shown that the group was the same faction that Misuari led in the 2001 rebellion against the state for its poor performance in complying with the terms of the 1996 GRP-MNLF FPA. Contrary to the military s claims that the group demands the speedy and fair trial of Misuari, who was incarcerated under charges of treason and corruption, its spokesperson, Ustadz Habier Malik, a religious leader, cited AFP s atrocities in Sulu as the main factor triggering the uprising. 63 Neither the Misuari 60 Mehol Sadain, Twisting Islam, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 5 & 7 May 2000. 61 The author s interview with Mohagher Iqbal (chairman of the Committee on Information of MILF s Central Committee) on 24 January 2000. 62 Manila Times, quoted in http://www.stratfor.com (accessed on 21 June 2003). 63 Sulu Fighting Exposes Filipino Government Claims to Want Peace in Mindanao, http://www.muslimedia.com/phil-sulufight.htm (accessed on 2 April 2005). 14