The American Influence on the Chinese Civil War: A Project Presented to. the Faculty of the Undergraduate. College of Arts and Letters

The American Influence on the Chinese Civil War: 1927-1949 A Project Presented to the Faculty of the Undergraduate College of Arts and Letters James Madison University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts by Kathryn Elizabeth Barela May 2012 Accepted by the faculty of the Department of History, James Madison University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts. FACULTY COMMITTEE: HONORS PROGRAM APPROVAL: Project Advisor: Michael J. Seth, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, History Barry Falk, Ph.D., Director, Honors Program Reader: Steven W. Guerrier, Ph.D. Professor, History Reader: Thomas P. Ward, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, History

Dedication To all those who served in China during the Chinese Civil War, and to all those who serve overseas, be it Military or Foreign Service. 2

Table of Contents Acknowledgements 4 Introduction and Background 5 Aid, Influence, and Important Figures Prior to WWII 11 World War II 15 The End of a Dynasty 54 Bibliography 62 3

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Dr. Michael Seth for being my project advisor, and Dr. Steven Guerrier and Dr. Thomas Ward for being my readers. I would also like to thank the Department of History and the Department of Asian Studies for a wonderful 4 years, and I hope this shows some of what I learned from every one of my instructors. 4

Introduction and Background One of the most important events in the twentieth century is the Chinese Civil War that occurred from 1927-1949. It directly affected the relationship between the United States and China because the United States policies of intervention during the Chinese Civil War. The United States played a key role in the events of the Chinese Civil War because of their support, both monetarily and militarily, of the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), in its struggle against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This intervention was a very important event in not only Chinese and American history, but in world history. It is a critical series of events that connects other important world events, such as Neo-Imperialism, the Second World War, and the Cold War. The policies of the United States, and the uncertainty and confusion that sometimes surrounded them, also contributed to the overall actions of the United States. The intervention and actions of the United States, including the policy of giving of money, supplies, and advisors to the Nationalist government was a significant part of the events of the Chinese Civil War, and played an important part in its outcome. 1 1 The secondary sources on revolutionary China are John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987); John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, 2 nd enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China ( New York: WW Norton & Company, 1990). Secondary sources on the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek include Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009); Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. 1985); Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). The secondary sources that discuss westerners in China before and during the Second World War include Charles F. Romanus, and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell s Command Problems. (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China- Burma-India Theater: Stilwell s Mission to China (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1953); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1959); Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisors in China 1620-1960 (New York: Penguin Books, 1980); Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Grove Press, 1971); Theodore H White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, INC, 1946. Primary sources include The Claire Lee Chennault papers, 1914-1954. The Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington DC; The 5

The United States aid to the Kuomintang arose right before and continued after the Second World War because of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists during the Communist revolution. To understand the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party during the revolution, and the reason for the United State s support of the Kuomintang, as opposed to the Chinese Communist Party, it is crucial to understand the two backgrounds of the two parties. It is also crucial to understand the situation and political and social events in China previous to the revolution that caused the creation of these parties. This inevitably also will lead to understanding the extent of and outcome of the extensive aid given to the KMT, and how greatly it impacted relations afterwards with the People s Republic of China. In the early twentieth century, China was in a fragile state, having had many influential and dramatic events occur. Starting at the outset of trade with Europe and other foreign areas, China had enacted strict trading rules on foreign trade. China s growing internal difficulties benefitted the foreign powers, and some countries used this advantage to smuggled opium into China. The United States and China signed a treaty in 1844 that put legal governance of Americans in China under American jurisdiction. 2 This treaty, dubbed the Treaty of Wanghia, also allowed Americans in the five Chinese treaty ports to build hospitals, churches, and cemeteries. It also gave Americans the right to hire a tutor to learn Chinese, a privilege previously withheld by the Chinese Government. This treaty was to be reviewed in twelve years. 3 This treaty was just the start of American involvement in China. Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, Department of State, Washington DC; Lyman Van Slyke, ed., The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); Theodore H. White, The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, INC, 1948). 2 Michael Kort, China under Communism (Brookfield, CT: Millbrook, 1994), 30-33. 3 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), 161. 6

In 1894-5, China fought a war with Japan for control over Korea and lost, which led to foreign powers taking advantage of the now delicate situation in China. Different countries claimed spheres of influence, which were large areas of control, and the powers had free reign away from the Chinese law. Then Chinese peasants in 1900 responded with the anti-foreign uprisings called the Boxer Rebellion. 4 This ill treatment of the Chinese clearly demonstrates why there would be a foundation for animosity for foreigners. This situation already demonstrates a clear contempt for foreigners that the Communists would continue after gaining control in 1949. In the year 1912, the last Manchu emperor abdicated, resulting in chaos. The economic situation was disorganized and the financial situation was difficult. Many intellectuals had expressed dissatisfaction with the old regime, and now these problems now had to be addressed. 5 As the government and control of the emperor deteriorated, Yuan Shih-k ai became premier under the Manchu dynasty, and exercised considerable power. 6 As time passed, he became the president of the newly declared provisional government, and found himself trying to fill the place of the emperor when he really did not have any right or basis to do so. Revolutionary groups had come together in 1905 to form a new Revolutionary League under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen. 7 In 1911, sixteen provincial assembly delegates recognized Sun s leadership, and elected him provisional president of the Chinese republic. He sent a delegate to Yuan Shih-k ai stating that he understood how weak his power really was, and how the position 4 Kort, 33-36. 5 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 275. 6 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 266-7. 7 Hilda Hookham, A Short History of China (New York: St. Martins, 1970), 188. 7

and the power was really waiting for Yuan. At this time, the end of the Machu dynasty really occurred, and the provisional republican government came to be. 8 Yuan appealed to Sun to come to Peking to talk about a single nationalist party. Sun agreed, and declared his confidence in Yuan. Meanwhile, the drafting of a new provisional constitution was underway. It was in August 1912 that a merger occurred of four small groups into one Revolutionary Alliance. This alliance now formed the new Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang. Yuan s regime, however, would gradually fall apart as time went on, for several reasons. One of the young Alliance leaders, Sung Chiao-jen, helped elect the Kuomintang (KMT) to a majority in the parliament, and many felt at the time that he would become Prime Minister, and would keep Yuan s power in line through legal parliamentary means. However, Yuan viewed this as treachery and shot Sung, and shortly afterwards dissolved the KMT as a public body. The rule of warlords became stronger as Yuan s power faded, and their influence would continue until 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek would revive the KMT. 9 The United States was one of the only countries to recognize Yuan Shikai s regime. The idea of a new republic and of Yuan, who had won the respect of the American people, was favorable. The United States began to see a special relationship with China. Full diplomatic recognition was given to the new government, making the connection official. 10 This initial founding, fraught with complication, demonstrates a reason why the United States chose to support them, despite their problems. It sprung from Nationalism and popular support, which gave it the edge over the Communists. The popular support it gained would have possibly caused the United States to be more inclined to support the Nationalists. 8 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 267. 9 John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row, 1987),167-172 10 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 282-283. 8

After the fall of Yuan Shih-k ai, the warlords controlled the government. In 1923, when, as mentioned, the CCP was still in a stage of developing, they two groups conceived a strategy of coalition. The KMT felt sympathetic with the Soviet Union, especially because of the points Lenin made about imperialism, which was a crucial issue to China at the time. The Soviet Union saw that it was in their interest that China be strong enough to keep Japan s ambitions there at bay. 11 However, Sun Yat-sen, who was now in control of the party, rejected this idea of an alliance, and it was then that Communists started to join the KMT while keeping their membership in the CCP a secret. However, Sun was later desperate for aid, and contacted the Soviet representative in Peking about discussing mutual relations. In 1924, the first Kuomintang Party Congress stated its acceptance of the entrance of Communists if they accept KMT principles. During the next few years, there were several strikes and the revolutionary movement spread rapidly across China, which started to cause some concern among some KMT members. By 1926, tensions in pro and anti-communist groups in the KMT rose, and Chiang Kai-shek 12, a high ranking member and future leader of the KMT, began to take an open stand against them. The end of the cooperation between the KMT and the CCP was because the most radical of the KMT agreed with and felt sympathy for Great Britain, whose policies the Communists did not agree with, because of the Communist s anti-imperialist policies. 13 It was during this period that a Chiang Kai-shek would really take power, and change China dramatically. Following this, starting in 1926, Chiang Kai-shek began his Northern Expedition, where he attempted to seize warlord territory, and large cities fell to his troops. It was then he 11 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 335-6. 12 This version of Chiang s name is the most popular. In documents of the time, he is also referred to as Generalissimo, and some use the alternate name Jiang Jieshi. The author will use this version of his name, and will call him Chiang for short. 13 Lyman P. Van Slyke, The Chinese Communist Movement; a Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 17-20. 9

instigated what is known as the White Terror, where thousands of Communists were rounded up and killed. By 1928, Chiang Kai-shek had brought more unity to China than anyone had since the regime of Yuan Shih-k ai. 14 The country now united, the main military figures gave support to the Nationalists. Chiang Kai-shek was now head of a one-party government structured according to a plan outlined by Sun Yat-sen. However, Communism remained strong. 15 Some of the Communists who had not been eliminated by Chiang, led by Mao Zedong, controlled a small area of land in the southern mountains which was proclaimed the Chinese Soviet Republic in 1931. Under constant threat of attack they were finally forced to flee from the area. The retreat, which lasted for a year, is now called The Long March. The Red Army, the Communist army, commanded under strict rules, marched over 6,000 miles. 16 Animosity between these two parties, the KMT and the Communists, culminated in initial fighting before World War II, and the resulting US involvement in China would influence the revolution and foreign relations with China for years to come. 14 Kort, 44-46. 15 Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese Their History and Culture, 4th revised ed (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 331-332. 16 Kort, 46-55. 10

Aid, Influence, and Important Figures Prior to the Second World War The decade after World War I and before the Japanese invasion of China was one of changes in the position of China in the minds of Americans. It also brought many ideas and policies that would be important to understand later United States foreign policy. Prior to the aid given during the period of the Chinese Civil War, the United States policy towards China had changed rapidly since the end of World War I. The Versailles Treaty had made it so Japan was now in the forefront of East Asian priorities and played a more dominant role than China. The United States made agreements with other foreign nations to protect its interests in East Asia, and desired to end the British-Japanese alliance in East Asia. Britain wanted to keep its empire safe, so it also desire to have dialogues on the subject. Japan was thrilled at the prospect of these discussions, because they cemented its place as a great power. The meetings lasted from November 1921 until February 1922, and brought satisfying results for the United States. The old British-Japanese military assistance was ended, and a new four-power agreement between Britain, France, the United States, and Japan replaced it. It was soon after this that the powers signed the Nine- Power Treaty. It condemned the spheres of influence that existed in China, and it stated that China should be independent, and maintain its own sovereignty. Shi Zhaoji, who headed China s delegation, presented a ten point program to define China s territory and end extraterritoriality. 17 The relationship between the United States and China developed and became stronger. In the early 1920 s, the United States began to develop a more active position in East Asia, 17 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 379. 11

including both Japan and China. Through most of the 1920s, the US policy when it came to China was very low key. The Communists and their actions were monitored, and the gain of power by Chiang Kai-shek was welcomed by many in the United States. However, there was lobbying for more cooperation and aid by T.V. Soong. Soong, the son of a businessman from Shanghai, was educated at Harvard, and his sisters were married to powerful men. They included Madame Sun Yat-sen, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and Madame H.H. Kung (the Minister of Industry, Labor, and Commerce at the time 18 ). He was well versed in financial matters, and this made him one of the most valuable members of the government. Later, in 1940, Soong would become very involved with foreign affairs because of his position first as Chiang Kai-shek s personal representative in the United States, and then as Minister of Foreign Affairs. 19 This shows how diplomatic links developed between the United States and China started to develop, starting with trade, and developing as times changed. It demonstrates how influential and important their relationship with the United States was to China, because Chiang s own brother-in-law became so instrumental over time in relations. It showed also how much Chiang also wanted the relations to remain and to succeed. These initial loans given to China, however, were just the tip of the iceberg compared to the later aid given. Meiling Soong, who became Madame Chiang Kai-shek, also became very instrumental at this time to the image of the new Chinese Government. Chiang had realized that the easiest way of receiving support was through the Soong family. T.V. had connections with foreign banks and institutions which had influence in Washington D.C. Ailing, or Madame H.H. Kung, thought it 18 Latourette, 331. 19 Joseph Esherick, ed, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service (New York: Random House, 1974), 77. 12

was a strategic marriage. 20 After Meiling married Chiang, she became a power behind the throne and Chiang s interpreter to the Western world. 21 She wrote many articles and gave interviews. It gave Americans a new fascination with China, feeling like a "brainy college girl had taken over China, and was providing a running commentary on what was true and false in the affairs of that mysterious and complicated nation. She was very American in nature, and was Christian, which increased her popularity in the United States. 22 This marriage and its results reflect the increasing importance of the United States in the mind of the Chinese. It also reflects how the Americans thought of China, because of its new First Lady, whom they could relate to easily, and who put a face on the New China. Diplomatic ties between the United States and China were extremely complicated, and had many different elements and aspects. China started to become more and more dependent on aid from the United States, and the United States and the KMT realized this. However, some historians feel that Chiang Kai-shek was using this dependency in an attempt to receive as much money from the United States as possible. 23 In any case, the aid from and interactions with the United States developed over time, and included different areas. The fact that the KMT depended on the aid from the United States, and that fact that this was widely acknowledged by both governments, shows the extent already of the United States influence in China. It also shows how it affected the relations during the war between the two countries. The measures that Chiang took, especially utilizing the Soongs, demonstrates the importance of succeeding in winning the approval of the United States. 20 Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty, (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 258. 21 Seagrave, 284. 22 Seagrave, 284-85. 23 Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western advisers in China 1620-1960 (Fairfield: Penguin Books, 1980), 237. 13

The Japanese at this point in time had started their offense in China, and they were poised to attack. This forced the Nationalists and the Communists into an alliance, called the Second United Front, in which both leaders from each side sought something: Chiang to build prestige, and Mao wanted to build the CCP s strength. The first invasion by the Japanese took place in 1937, and the fighting proved detrimental to Chiang Kai-shek s troops, and the strategy became to retreat into China s interior. 24 By 1938, there were one million Japanese troops in China, and the Japanese had stopped advancing. 25 After Pearl Harbor, the United States then decided to play a more active role in China s problems. 26 Their influence up until now had been important, but soon it would be exponentially more influential. 24 Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern China (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 312. 25 Kort, 46. 26 Kort, 57-58. 14

World War II The Second World War and its events were extremely influential in how Sino-US relations took place. The conduct and decisions made in order to win the war, and the people who were involved in it, were critical in all decisions of foreign policy. Understanding the Sino- U.S. foreign policy during the Second World War also helps understand how the United States interference in the Chinese Civil War was so influential. Early Help The years leading to Pearl Harbor was an important precursor to formal support and assistance to China after December 1941. Both Chinese and United States officials had been working together to help China, while at the same time not committing United States military intervention. The actions taken by the United States when it was not formally at war with Japan are extremely At this time the United States also provided quite a bit of military aid and support to China. By 1937, Chiang Kai-shek was in a desperate situation militarily, and his forces were low and spread thin. Chiang sent General Claire Chennault, who was a retired member of the US Army Air Corps and employed by the Chinese government to improve the Chinese Air Force, to the United States to recruit pilots for a volunteer group of Chinese Air Force, and to purchase more modern planes. One hundred and one men from the US Army and Navy Air Corps volunteered for a salary of seven hundred and fifty dollars a month, plus five hundred dollars bonus for every Japanese plane they shot down. In 1941, China and the US entered into a lend- 15

lease agreement, and a fifty million dollar loan was confirmed, as well as the availability of one hundred P-40 fighters. 27 In 1939, it was unlikely that the situation in Europe would allow any European powers to provide arms and technical assistance to the Chinese. The Chinese decided to approach the United States, who had expressed its sympathy for the situation in China, though not enough to enter the conflict. The American Export-Import Bank lent the Universal Trading Corporation, a Chinese owned company, $45,000,000, which was to be used to buy civilian supplies. 28 In June of 1940, T.V. asked the United States for military arms for China, and there were several factors in China s favor. The United States was beginning to realize that if there was a conflict with Japan, that having China s resources, including manpower and geographic advantage, would be a beneficial. The United States was hesitant however to possibly provoke any reaction from Japan that might end with it allying itself with Germany. There were also not enough supplies to provide the United States in a possible conflict, as well as providing for the plight of Great Britain, which was perceived as more important. 29 However, in September of 1940, Japan entered northern Indochina, and four days later Japan, Germany, and Italy signed a pact which vaguely said that they would take offensive action against Britain and the United states. The United States decided to give China $25,000,000 credit to China. However, this did not placate the Chinese s desire for arms. Also, this occupation closed the Yunnan-Indochina Railway, which made the Burma Road 30 the only link that the Chinese could use to receive supplies. It unfortunately was not in good condition for 27 Spence, To Change China, 228-231. 28 Charles F Romanus, and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell s Mission to China (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953),7. 29 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 8 30 This was a road that extended from Chungking to the Burma railways 16

major supply because of neglect. The events of September made the Chinese and British anxious about the Japanese and how close they were to China. Britain could do little to help the situation. 31 In October, Chiang met with Nelson T. Johnson, the U.S. Ambassador to China of the time, and stated his plight, and made proposals. He said that the Japanese had weakened China s economy and morale. The Chinese Communists took advantage of this situation, and Chiang admitted that he feared them more than the Japanese. Chiang stated that China needed economic aid as well as American airplanes manned by American volunteers, especially with the possibility of Japan capturing Singapore and closing off the Burma Road. With this aid Chiang said that China could be stabilized and that the aircraft could be used to enact major damage on the Japanese Navy. 32 These events so far are extremely enlightening to later events in Sino-U.S. relations, and in the reactions of the United States in particular. We can see that Chiang and the GMD felt that the situation in China seriously depended on whether the United States gave them the aid that they wanted. We also see that the United States already had been supportive of the Chinese cause from a distance, so the events that follow, especially those after Pearl Harbor, are not surprising. In the aftermath of this meeting, there were messages sent by Johnson reporting the meeting and his views on China and the actions that he felt should be taken. These telegrams, though brief, relay interesting information from Johnson and then back from the Secretary of State and the President of the United States demonstrate American sentiment, and the policy the United States government had decided on in regards to China and its plight. 31 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 8-9. 32 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 9. 17

The first telegram gives a good indication of the sentiment of Johnson, and what information he gained from this meeting with Chiang. His first point discusses what Chiang told him of the propaganda attacks by the Communists, and the resulting social and economic deterioration of the people s morale that Chiang knew was occurring. He then mentions in his second point that there appeared to be an understanding with the Communists about problems that Johnson had mentioned in his political summary for September of that year. He mentions how relations appear to be positive, but that there is still tension on the matter of the removal of the Fourth Army to North China. 33 So, this so far gives a good indication that the diplomatic mission to China at the time is very devoted to being a supporter of the Nationalists. Though there is not a need at this point in time to choose one over the other, it is interesting to see the sentiments of this time. The third point then describes the Communist s goals, based on what Johnson was told by an informant. This informant said that the Communists refused to move their forces, and that they desired to prolong the Sino-Japanese conflict in order to consolidate their position in China. Johnson says that to put it another way, they therefore are taking advantage of Chiang s difficult situation to increase their own power base. Johnson says it is common knowledge that they have not engaged in conflict with the Japanese for eighteen months, and that they have been focusing on building military bases, and mobilizing the people. Johnson concludes his telegram by saying that the Nationalists and Communists in his opinion will not have an open break under the present circumstances, and that they will compromise to expel the Japanese. However, he warns that if aid is not given to China by Great Britain and the United States, the end result might be a Communist takeover of China. He ends this last point by saying that the current situation 33 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 429. 18

benefits the Communists more than the Nationalists, because the Communists have the chance to consolidate power in a country that is becoming more unstable with the Japanese forces pressing on. 34 This last part of the telegram gives a very interesting insight into the situation in China, and is very prophetic in many ways. It shows that Johnson, who was the Ambassador in China, and who had access to all the most current information of the time, felt that the situation required continued commitment of the United States. Not only this, but he also predicted the Communist takeover of China nine years before it happened. It is something which demonstrates the sentiments of the time, and which provides information on what Americans at the Embassy in China might have felt, and what the policy was shaping towards. The telegram of October 24 th, 1940 from the Secretary of State to Ambassador Johnson also provides interesting information. It give an enlightening insight into Washington s policies and sentiments towards China at the time. It starts by saying that this is both his and the President s response to Chiang and Johnson s message and concerns. The telegram then goes on to state that peace in the Far East does not seem to be feasibly possible in the near future, because the Japanese would not be open to making a peace that would be beneficial for all involved. It then says how the American people are aware of the plight of China, and that there is surprise at the statement saying that there is no aid coming from Russia, which is contrary to their information. 35 The telegram then becomes extremely interesting in how it is worded and organized. It discusses the desire of China for more economic aid, and its response is to say that on this 34 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 430. 35 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 680. 19

subject: There is of course no need to recount the various steps which the United States has already taken which have had the effect of assisting China. Chiang Kai-shek is fully familiar with these terms. 36 This gives a clear indication that the continuous request for aid from Chiang was becoming a little aggravating for the President and Secretary of State. It also shows that they probably heard about the need for aid quite constantly from Chiang and other Chinese officials and delegates, and did not need to hear it from their own ambassador. The telegram then discusses the topic of making military supplies accessible to the Chinese. It says that there have been two hundred and seventy nine airplanes, which value at $22,000,000. It also says that China has been among the top buyers for American planes in the past three years, and that there are even some airplanes on their way to China. The next topic was that of the Burma Road, which the telegram says, despite Chiang s concerns, they feel will not be closed by the Japanese, because of the efforts of the Chinese. It then goes into how the European theater is extremely important to the efforts towards stalling the goals of the Axis powers, and how it is interconnected with the situation in the Far East. 37 This next part is very interesting and is typical of the isolationist mindset the United States was in previous to Pearl Harbor: The Government of the United States has consistently endeavored in relations with the Far East, while serving the interests of the United States, to avoid and avert disservice to the interests of China. At the present moment we are in no way forgetful of either of these objectives and we are intent upon both. As Chiang Kai-shek is of course aware, it is a traditional policy of the United States, except when this country is at war, to avoid entering into alliance or entangling commitments, although we believe in cooperative effort with other countries by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles to which this country is committed. Just as Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders have foremost in their minds the interests of China, 36 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 680. 37 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 681. 20

so we have foremost in our minds the interests of the United States. We are fortunately situated in that our interests and those of China usually run along parallel lines. Both the United States and China believe in peace, and the United States desires to see China establish and maintain herself along the lines of the democratic ideals in which we believe. It has long been a premise of American policy that the Chinese are capable of creating and maintaining a well-ordered state. 38 This clearly reiterates the overall message of the telegram; that the United States will continue to be supportive of China, but that it at the same time still considers providing resources for the United States itself as the first priority. It shows that even a year before Pearl Harbor, when the United States clearly was siding in spirit with the Allied Powers, they still were in an isolationist mindset, and it influenced their aid to China. It makes it even more interesting when looking at the United States actions after Pearl Harbor. The year before Pearl Harbor continued aid to China. After the purchase of one hundred P-40 airplanes, the U.S. War Department told the Chinese that the program for aid, and to wait for developments. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 39 had decided because of the increasingly limited funds that Britain had to purchase supplies. Instead, aid would be given to countries based on whether their defense was thought to be important to American Security. This gave Britain and China both access to the many resources of the United States, as well as continuing the race that was taking place between the United States on one side, and Germany and Italy on the other. 40 When the Lend-Lease Act went before Congress on January 6 th, 1941, China had played a smaller role in the legislation than Great Britain had. This was partially because of the limited 38 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 681. 39 The author will use the common abbreviation FDR or President Roosevelt from now on when mentioning this President. 40 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 13. 21

information that the United States had on what materials in China needed. They had provided only one or two specific programs, whereas Great Britain had provided many details and specifics for their programs, which was the basis for their lend-lease appropriations. Chiang asked that one of the President s administrative assistants, Dr. Lauchlin Currie, come to China to examine the situation, both militarily and economically. Currie came back, after a short time, with the information about how Chiang was working on airfields and the Burma Road. He also brought and presented the various requests of the United States. 41 On March 11 th, 1941, President Roosevelt signed the Lend Lease Act. On the 31 st of March, T.V. made a proposal to Major General James H. Burns, who was the forerunner of the Lend-Lease Administration. The request included three different projects: 1. An enlargement of the Mao-Chennault proposals, calling for a modern air force of 1,000 aircraft, with American training and technical help. 2. Arms which, if issued on the basis of organization finally presented by the Chinese in March 1942, would equip thirty divisions. 3. An efficient line of communications between China and friendly powers, with: a. A narrow-gauge railway from Yunnan to the Burma Railways b. A highway from Sadiya, India, across north Burma to China c. Trucks, repair shows, and resurfacing for the Burma Road d. Transport aircraft to supplement the road and railways. 42 So, these proposals definitely show that the China continues its concerns over the Burma Road, and that aircraft is a priority as well. This will also become evident in later events, with the creation of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as the Flying Tigers. 41 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 13-4. 42 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 14. 22

When he returned to the U.S., Currie had the task to expedite Chinese lend-lease aid. However, when presented to the War Department, officials said that China was not yet prepared to utilize the full extent of the Lend-Lease Act, because of their very vague requests. The program promised to provide more detail in the future, but as time passed, it appeared that it would not come. On April 22 nd, a preliminary report about this program and what could be spared without interfering with the current American and British programs. These allocations and study would be the basis of Lend-Lease Aid to China before Pearl Harbor. 43 44 However, when looking over the proposals prepared by Soong, the War Department found there was not much that could be spared from the existing stocks, or the materials under production. However, they said that if President Roosevelt were to allocate $184,000,000 from 43 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China,15. 44 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China,16. 23

the lend-lease funds, China s needs might be met by mid-1942. By May 1941, the Secretary of War agreed to allocate $50,000,000 of Lend-Lease funds to help the Chinese with their rearmament, with $23,000,000 from army stockpiles and production. In May China Defense Supplies, the purchasing and supply authority in the United States, approved the program created by Soong. However, there were complaints that the purchasers were not aware of what China exactly needed. 45 So, the aid that came in the years before Pearl Harbor demonstrate that the United States was interested in China, and that it was considered an important part of the possible conflict to come. Pearl Harbor would change the nature of the United State s commitment to China. Pearl Harbor and Aid during the War Pearl Harbor, the attack of the Japanese on December 7 th, 1941, a date engrained in the memories of many Americans, was an important landmark in United States involvement in China. It was a somber event in the United States, which resulted in the United State s involvement in the war, and a more active one in China. However, the news of the attack was met with happiness in China. Kuomintang officials were congratulating each other as thought they had won a great victory. Many in the cities heard the wrong story, and thought that the United States had bombed Tokyo. However, it did not matter which story they heard, because they were happy because the United States was in the war, and that now they had an ally. Chiang immediately took steps to confirm China s global role and prepare for China s great power role in the alliance. He contacted the British and 45 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 25-6. 24

American officials in Chungking immediately, and suggested that those who were against the Axis powers convene a war council, under the leadership of the United States. 46 After Pearl Harbor financial aid started to be given to China in copious amounts. One of the first agreements for aid between the United States and China was in 1940. A loan of twentyfive million dollars was made to China in September, and another fifty million dollars was given to the Chinese when China announced that it was allying itself with the United States and Britain. 47 As the United States became more involved in China, it became evident that there needed to be a strategic plans for action in this new area. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allies suggested in December of 1941 the creation of a China Theater which would be under the jurisdiction of Chiang Kai-shek. However, Roosevelt felt that because of the perceived importance of China Theater, and to make the command of this theater most effective, Chiang would need a staff of British, Chinese, and American officers. 48 On January 2 nd, 1942, the United State s officer who would tentatively be Chiang s Chief of Staff was selected by the War Department. The officer was Lt. General Hugh A. Drum, appointed by the Secretary of War Henry Stimson. General Drum, however, on his arrival to Washington assumed that his assignment would be in Europe, because of conversations he had previously had with President Roosevelt about what would happen if there were to be a war. The offer of the position in China, therefore, was highly surprising to him. 49 46 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: Grove Press, 1971), 233-4. 47 Pakula, 360-2. 48 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 61-3. 49 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 63-4. 25

In Drum s conference with Stimson, Marshall, and other high level military officials, Stimson intimated to Drum that there was some danger that China would accept a separate peace, and China was the most convenient place in which to base operations against the Japanese. Problems had occurred because of the British s refusal to allow Chinese troops to fight and aid troops in Burma. Stimson saw the goals for Drum as securing China as a place for operations, and keeping it in the war. He said that officer who was sent must be able to work between the British and Chinese, and to make sure that the Burma Road problems were taken care of. 50 However, when Drum talked with Marshall, he received a different plan. Marshall did not envision China as a theater, but as a mission. He thought that there should be an emphasis on air power in China. Drum became even further confused when he talked with other military officials, whose ideas were different, yet usually went along one of the already established ideas. This indecision gave Drum the idea that his position had not yet been fully confirmed by the War Department. This was confirmed by a publication by the War Department entitled Notes on China. 51 By the 5 th of January, Chiang had fully accepted the position as Supreme Commander of the Allied China Theater, and had asked Roosevelt formally to send a high-ranking U.S. military officer to be the chief of Chiang s joint staff. However, Chiang did not want the officer to be knowledgeable about China s recent history, especially when it came to military matters. This caused some discomfort to the United States officials. They were afraid that the Chinese wanted 50 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China,64. 51 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China,65. 26

another person who would believe whatever the Chinese told him, and be nothing more than an envoy. 52 The confusion for Drum only increased. In continued meetings with Marshall and Stimson, he confirmed his belief that there was no concrete. Drum also believed that the resources China could provide were limited, and that the amount of resources Marshall proposed to provide would not be enough in his opinion. Though this was not an uncommon occurrence, he felt that he should have more consideration. He told Stimson that he would be happy to go if his plan prevailed, but he felt that this post was a less significant post, where he would not be a large part of the war effort. Stimson felt that Drum had knocked down his plan like a house of cards 53. Drum later stated he understood Stimson s desire to send him to China, and was now very anxious to go. Stimson, however, said that he no long wished Drum for the position. 54 So, this incident demonstrates several aspects of the American view of China, and Sino- U.S. relations as well. The fact that Chiang appeared to want a person that would not question his decisions is very interesting. Despite this knowledge and uneasiness, the United States still was willing to send an officer to be chief of staff, which shows just how important China was in their minds in terms of the efforts of the war. In January 1942, George Marshall proposed the name of General Joseph Stilwell for the position of Chief of Staff. Marshall and Stilwell had both previously served in China together, and Marshall had a very high opinion of Stilwell. 55 In a meeting with Stilwell on January 14 th Stimson, stated that he was no longer considering Drum for the position of Chief of Staff to 52 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 67-8. 53 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 70. 54 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 68-70. 55 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 70. 27

Chiang. Stimson also intimated that he felt that the Chinese would be pleased with an American Commander, even despite Stilwell s doubts. When asked how he felt about the position, Stilwell stated that he would go where he was sent. 56 On January 16 th, in a meeting with Marshall, Stilwell was officially offered the position by Marshall, and he asked the specifics of the job. When Marshall said that it was running and maintaining the Burma Road, he asked Stilwell if the chances of getting results were good, and Stilwell said that if he had control, it would be. Chiang by January 22 nd had given his final approval of his executive power, and of having an American chief of staff. On January 23 rd, Stilwell writes that T.V. Soong had looked into his background, and had conferred with Chiang, and said that there is no better man for the job, or with more experience. 57 The CBI Theater would soon be organized and the hierarchy within it confirmed. Figure 1 shows how the China Command fit into the hierarchy within the military and State Department operations. Figure 2 shows how the China Command fit into the larger CBI Theater, and how that hierarchy was organized. 56 Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, INC, 1948), 24. 57 White, 26-31. 28

58 59 58 Information taken from Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949 (New York, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975), ii. Generated by the author, because of the original was not clear enough. 59 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 195. 29

60 1944 The year 1944 was an important year in Sino-US relations. By this time, China was in a desperate situation. Chungking became more and more corrupt, and the Japanese became more worried by the continual success of American military efforts. It is considered such a critical year that the United States Military dubbed their chapter on the subject in Stilwell s Command Problems: The China Crisis of 1944. The policy change during this time towards China is evident in a Memorandum on May 19 th, 1944 from O. Edmund Clubb, who was of the State Department s Division of Chinese 60 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell s Mission to China, 49. 30

Affairs. The memorandum discussed Sino-Soviet relations, especially in areas in which it concerned the United States. The different sections of the memorandum and the assertions Mr. Clubb makes gives a very clear indication of the American policy and sentiments of the time. The memorandum starts by describing how many of the Chinese officials of the time were afraid of Soviet influence in China. Then Clubb divides the fear of influence into three different areas. They include political influence, philosophical influence, and the international position in the Far East. Some political officials, including Ching-ling and several others, maintained that China should have a good relationship with the USSR. They based their argument on the previous sympathetic feelings that had been present during the time of Sun Yatsen, because of the anti-imperialistic feelings both countries had. However, the memorandum then further states that these officials were a minority, and did not have any real influence on the policy making of the time. Many of the GMD officials continued to maintain a strong anti-soviet train of thought. 61 The memorandum then goes on to explain the motives of the Nationalist government, and why they had these particular policies towards the Soviet Union. The first was that the GMD government wanted to establish control over all of China, including Xinjiang, and to test Soviet policy towards Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, and the CCP. The second was that the GMD wanted to stimulate anti-soviet feelings in China and abroad, and divert the people s attention from the failures of the GMD, and stimulate nationalist sentiments. 62 The next part of the memorandum describes a conversation between Chinese Ambassador to Moscow Foo Ping-Sheung and the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy on March 61 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 785. 62 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China, 787-8. 31

25 th, 1943. In this conversation, Foo describes how the Chinese government is afraid of the Soviet Union s joining in the fight, and occupying parts of China. The GMD was particularly concerned about Russia occupying Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria, because they would then be in a position to help the Chinese Communists. They were also concerned about the possibility of plans that the GMD had for Korea, and its government, because of the Korean troops in the Siberian Army. 63 This memorandum demonstrates that the United States continued to be interested in the Chinese government, and its actions. It also demonstrates that the Chinese Government itself was aware of the waning support that they had among the Chinese people, and the rising popularity of the Communists. The memorandum goes on to explain more about the GMD s fear. The memorandum explains that the GMD had serious concerns about the possible influences that the Soviet Union would have on the Chinese domestic situation. The memo continues saying that this is not an unfounded fear, because the GMD had lost much of its popular support in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. It also had lost their connection and basis of support with the Chinese people, who were becoming dissatisfied with the GMD rule. The memorandum goes on to describe that the GMD would prefer that the Soviet Union not completely destroy Japan, so that it can be powerful enough to check the power and influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East. It also was concerned about the boundaries of Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the political jurisdictions of the two states in Outer Mongolia. 64 This section of the memorandum demonstrates that the United States was fully aware of the GMD losing the popular support of the Chinese people, but continued to support them. However, the 63 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China, 788. 64 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China, 789. 32