Dealing with change: Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on climate change

The Round Table ISSN: 0035-8533 (Print) 1474-029X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ctrt20 Dealing with change: Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on climate change Ingrid Barnsley To cite this article: Ingrid Barnsley (2006) Dealing with change: Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on climate change, The Round Table, 95:385, 399-410, DOI: 10.1080/00358530600748358 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530600748358 Published online: 24 Jan 2007. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 642 View related articles Citing articles: 3 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalinformation?journalcode=ctrt20 Download by: [46.3.194.22] Date: 16 December 2017, At: 08:04

The Round Table Vol. 95, No. 385, 399 410, July 2006 Dealing with Change: Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change INGRID BARNSLEY Merton College, Oxford, UK ABSTRACT Australia and Canada have been active participants in international climate change negotiations since the early 1990s and have often shared negotiating positions. This paper discusses why, in spite of considerable similarities in national circumstances, the Canadian government chose to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, while the Australian government decided against doing so. It is argued that a range of factors led to a narrower conception of the national interest in the case of Australia, which encouraged a focus on the short-term, economic costs of implementing the Protocol. KEY WORDS: Climate change, Kyoto Protocol, Australia, Canada Introduction Australia and Canada have been active participants in international climate change negotiations since the commencement of international efforts to respond to this phenomenon in the early 1990s. As state parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) both countries were heavily involved in negotiations leading to the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol, with its binding emissions targets for developed country (Annex I) parties, in December 1997. As Annex I parties to the UNFCCC, as key members of the JUSSCANNZ alliance, 1 and with a range of national circumstances that make emissions reduction difficult in both countries, Australia and Canada were concerned with many of the same issues, and often shared negotiating positions, throughout this process. In spite of this, the two countries ultimately took different positions on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, with Australia announcing its intention not to ratify on 5 June 2002 and Canada depositing its instrument of ratification on 17 December of the same year. This paper discusses why, despite seemingly similar national circumstances and shared interests in many aspects of negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, the decisions of Australia and Canada on ratification of the Protocol ultimately differed. Correspondence Address: Ingrid Barnsley, Merton College, Merton Street, Oxford OX1 4JD, UK. Email: ingrid.barnsley@merton.ox.ac.uk ISSN 0035-8533 Print/1474-029X Online/06/030399-12 Ó 2006 The Round Table Ltd DOI: 10.1080/00358530600748358

400 I. Barnsley The findings are based on an analysis of documents from the relevant period, including national submissions on a draft Protocol to the UNFCCC, government press releases, ministerial speeches and parliamentary documents, in addition to information gained from interviews with government officials, politicians and NGO representatives in each country. Analysis of this material was guided by Robert Putnam s two-level game approach to understanding international negotiations. According to this approach, the success of international agreements, in terms of both ratification and implementation, depends upon bargaining at the international level (Level I) as well as on constraints and opportunities within the state (Level II) (Putnam, 1988, pp. 456 457; Evans et al., 1993). Putnam s approach facilitated consideration of factors within and beyond the state, relevant in this context given the complexities of climate change negotiations. Both the international bargaining and domestic ratification phases of negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol were considered. First, the positions of Australia and Canada during negotiations over the Protocol were compared with the final outcome reached at Kyoto in December 1997. Second, the ratification phase the period during which both countries decided whether or not to ratify the Protocol was considered. The analysis reveals that there are two aspects to the differing positions of Australia and Canada on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. First, the Australian government adopted a narrower definition of its national interest, concerned with the relative costs to Australia of implementing the agreement as compared with other countries. The Canadian government took a broader view of its national interest, emphasizing the importance of environmental protection and of acting as a good international citizen. In so doing, the Canadian government overcame domestic industry objections to ratify the agreement. 2 Second, despite their similar national circumstances, fairly different factors affected the ultimate decision of Australia and Canada on ratification. The Australian position was encouraged by the connections between the conservative coalition government and the natural resources and energy sectors, the individual preferences of Prime Minister Howard (1996 present), in particular his narrow conception of the national interest, and the decision of the USA not to ratify the agreement. The Canadian position reflected the ideational imperative of Canada s role as a supporter of environmental protection and multilateral cooperation, an imperative that was important both to the centre-left Liberal government of Canada and to the wider public. 3 Canada s position also reflected widespread public awareness of the Protocol, linked to a general dissatisfaction with the increasing unilateralism of the USA. Finally, the position was enabled by Prime Minister Chre tien s (November 1993 December 2003) role in promoting the Protocol, motivated in part by his desire to leave a legacy from his time as national leader. Bargaining All the Way to Kyoto Given the interlinked nature of the bargaining and ratification phases, the bargaining phase of negotiations over the text of the Protocol, which took place from March 1995 to December 1997 (see Depledge, 2000), is an important part of understanding the final position of each country on ratification. Based on Putnam s contention that

Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol 401 the distribution of gains and losses from an international agreement in Level I affects the chances for ratification in Level II (Moravscik, 1993, p. 18), the key aspects of the final agreement and the potential gains and losses from these provisions for both countries, as well as the overall approach of each government to the negotiation process, were considered. As mentioned, Australia and Canada were largely concerned with the same issues during negotiations over the Protocol, although the approach of each country to the negotiation process differed at times. These issues were: what greenhouse gases should be addressed in the agreement, how to quantify emissions targets, mechanisms for allowing flexibility for Annex I parties in meeting their targets ( flexible mechanisms ) and the extent of developing country participation. In light of their concern with similar issues, the outcome of the final agreement was similar for Australia and Canada in many respects. Both countries achieved success in terms of: comprehensive coverage of the six main greenhouse gases; differentiated emissions targets for Annex I parties; and the creation of the three flexible mechanisms emissions trading, Joint Implementation activities between Annex I parties, and the Clean Development Mechanism for joint activities between Annex I and developing country parties. All these provisions created greater possibilities for Australia and Canada to meet their emissions targets, a crucial step in acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol domestically (Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT), 2001b; Environment Canada, 2001). The differentiation of targets was a particular success for Australia, given the centrality of this issue to its overall negotiating position. In terms of losses, Australia and Canada shared the same disappointment: the failure to reach agreement on a process for the future agreement of developing country commitments to reduce emissions. Given the economic importance of the natural resources and agricultural sectors in both countries, a characteristic more common to the economic profiles of developing country, rather than Annex I, parties to the UNFCCC, this failure was seen as a particular loss for Australia, with its focus on competitive advantage and, to a lesser extent, for Canada. The nature of Canada s statements of support for developing country participation throughout the negotiating period also suggest this loss can be viewed in terms of the political and environmental significance it placed on the multilateral nature of any climate change agreement (Environment Canada, 1997). The main difference in the final agreement for Australia and Canada concerned the emissions target accepted by each country, with Canada agreeing to a far more demanding target than did Australia. Australia had consistently pushed for a less stringent target than most Annex I parties, based on what it claimed to be its unique national circumstances, while Canada adopted a more stringent target at the eleventh hour after other countries in the (then) G-7 did so. This indicates the differing level of commitment of the two countries to legally binding targets, as well as a greater concern, on the part of the Canadian government, with portraying Canada as a responsible international citizen and with matching the efforts of other key Annex I parties. Projected emissions and domestic greenhouse gas reduction policies from the time provide no indication that Canada was better equipped than Australia to reduce its emissions successfully by such a great deal more during the first Kyoto commitment period of 2008 to 2012. Moreover, Canada s final target was considerably greater than that which the country s energy and environment ministers

402 I. Barnsley had mooted only a month earlier. By raising it the government had to prepare for considerable opposition to the Protocol domestically, in particular in Alberta and within the natural resources sector (Bernstein, 2002, p. 222). Yet, at the same time, Canada achieved a gain of a non-material kind. In agreeing to an emissions reduction target that was well within the range of targets accepted by the G-7 countries, the Canadian government contributed to and reflected the country s reputation as a supporter of international institutions and environmental protection (Bernstein, 2002, pp. 222 224; Grubb et al., 1999, p. 117). A reading of government documents and media statements also indicates that, despite their common willingness to participate in Protocol negotiations, their shared membership of the JUSSCANNZ alliance and their common interests in many aspects of negotiations, there was a clear difference in the overall approaches of Australia and Canada to the negotiations. The Australian government s lone objection to the section of the 1996 Geneva Ministerial Declaration concerned with legally binding targets, its aggressive position on the differentiation of targets, and the actual target it finally put forward suggest that, from the outset, it had considerable reservations about addressing climate change through legally binding emissions targets. In this context the Australian government s decision not to ratify the Protocol in 2002, despite having signed the agreement in April 1998, is more understandable. Although indicating little desire to act as a leader on climate change and hesitating to acknowledge the responsibility of developed countries for a greater share of the climate change problem than other countries, the Australian government was clearly conscious of its position in the international system. Its desire to remain engaged in the multilateral process is evidenced by the fact that it continues to participate as a state party at meetings of the parties to the UNFCCC, by its consistently stated intention to try to meet its Kyoto target despite deciding not to ratify the instrument (Department of Environment and Heritage, 2002b), and by its more recent involvement in the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate. The stance of the Australian government is arguably in keeping with much of the middle powers literature comparing Australia and Canada. According to writers such as Gelber and Cooper, Australia has always been less certain about its position in the world than Canada, thanks to its geographical position in the middle of the largely developing Asia Pacific and a long way from its Western allies (Gelber, 1975, pp. 192 193). Australian governments therefore tend to be more concerned with traditional, material conceptions of the national interest and with notions of threats to or protectors of that interest (Cooper, 2003, pp. 249 252; Gelber, 1975, pp. 192 193). In contrast, the Canadian government s attempts to respond to and foster its reputation as a supporter of environmental protection and multilateral cooperation were evident, not least in its final emissions target. This behaviour reflects a fairly consistent pattern of Canadian government support for multilateral environmental institutions and was compounded by the particular historical role that Canada considered itself to have with regard to international cooperation over climate change (Bernstein, 2002, pp. 221 223). Canada also perceived itself to be a mediator, providing a middle-way alternative between Europe and the JUSSCANNZ alliance on issues such as the inclusion of flexible mechanisms and greenhouse gas coverage. To a lesser extent it also saw itself as a mediator between developed and

Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol 403 developing countries (see Environment Canada, 1997). This is in keeping with Canada s more secure position than that of Australia internationally and its history of presenting itself as a neutral mediator in international affairs. Geography and a traditionally stronger economy have meant that Canada has always been more involved in important international decision-making fora such as NATO and the G-8. Australia, on the other hand, remains outside the magic circle economically and strategically (Cooper, 2003, pp. 250 251). It does not follow that the Canadian government acted simply out of altruism or that the Australian government was, or is, opposed to all action to address climate change. A survey of the domestic greenhouse policies of Australia and Canada indicates a clear acceptance of the need to address climate change in both countries. Moreover, the Canadian government clearly negotiated in a manner that was motivated, at least in part, by a concern for the costs of domestic implementation. This was evident in its support for comprehensive coverage of greenhouse gases and the inclusion of the flexible mechanisms (Bernstein, 2002, p. 211). Rather, the shifting and ultimately strong position of the Canadian government on the quantity of its emissions target demonstrates the importance of the Level I game to that government, and its preparedness to take on a greater share of the burden of addressing climate change. The Australian government remained more rigid in its focus on domestic economic concerns, using the Level I game to push its domestic policies, with less concern for an incorporation of the Level I issues into said domestic politics. To Ratify or Not to Ratify? In considering the ratification phase, both the domestic and international contexts are relevant: the key factor in the international Level I game was the US position on Kyoto, while in the Level II game the actions of domestic interest groups and individual leader preferences were of most significance. The International Context The US Position on Kyoto The change of government in the USA in late 2000 brought with it a clarification of the country s position on the Kyoto Protocol. In March 2001 President Bush announced that the USA would not support the Protocol (White House, 2001). Given the political and economic significance of the USA to Canada and Australia and to the operation of the Kyoto regime, there is little doubt that this affected the decision-making process on ratification in each case. In the case of Australia the US decision appears to have encouraged Howard s government to adopt, definitively and publicly, a position towards which it was already moving in private. US concerns regarding the lack of developing country participation and the potential impacts of the Protocol on the domestic economy had great resonance with the Australian government (White House, 2001; Department of Environment and Heritage, 2002a). More broadly, opposition to the Protocol also provided the Australian government with an opportunity to demonstrate its support for the Bush administration, with whom a very positive relationship had been developing since 2000 (discussed further below). However, the Australian decision

404 I. Barnsley cannot be seen simply as a response to the position of the USA. The US decision not to ratify the Protocol was clarified 15 months before Australia s position was announced and Australia still aims to meet its Kyoto target, in spite of its decision not to ratify. In contrast to the Australian government s stance, the Canadian government viewed Bush s decision on the Protocol as uncooperative (Environment Canada, 2002). A search of government records, and the act of Canadian ratification itself, both indicate that, despite the particular significance of the USA to the Canadian economy, the Canadian government overcame economic concerns in siding against the USA on ratification of the Protocol. More broadly, ratification of the Protocol provided the Chre tien government with an opportunity to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the growing unilateralist tendencies of the US administration (see below). The Domestic Context The Role of Domestic Interest Groups Beyond the Level I game, the Australian and Canadian governments also had to consider a range of factors within the state when deciding on ratification. The role of domestic interest groups and individual leader preferences is discussed here as two key factors in the Level II game (Moravscik, 1993). In both Australia and Canada the major industry opponents of the Kyoto Protocol were organizations representing the energy and resources sectors. In Australia these associations strenuously argued that they would be disadvantaged on the world market if ratification were to occur, in light of the growing economic capacity and lack of emissions controls on developing country competitors (JSCOT, 2001a). These industry lobby groups had, and continue to have, considerable access to the Liberal prime minister and Conservative coalition government. Individuals with links to the government and the energy and resource sectors include former minister for resources, Warwick Parer, and Chief Scientist, Robin Batterham, also Chief Technologist for Rio Tinto (AAP Newsfeed, 1998; Pearlman, 2004). The 2002 findings of the Commonwealth Ombudsman on the economic modelling of the costs of the Kyoto Protocol, undertaken for the government by the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics, are also telling in this regard. The Ombudsman concluded that the modelling process was overseen by a steering committee comprised mostly of fossil fuel industry representatives and that environmental groups were excluded (Oberthur and Ott, 1999, p. 71; Hamilton, 2002). Given the proximity and proliferation of such links, it appears likely that the opposition of such groups was a key factor in the government s ultimate position on the Protocol. Research on the Canadian natural resources and energy sectors suggests they were no less concerned about ratification of the Kyoto Protocol than their Australian counterparts (Marbek Resource Consultants, 2002), but there were at least four differences between the Australian and Canadian sectors that highlight why the views of these industries did not prevail in Canada. First, claims that carbonintensive industries would move offshore were diminished by the fact that the Canadian electricity grid is sourced in large part by hydroelectricity, providing energy-intensive industries with opportunities for mitigating greenhouse gas

Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol 405 emissions. Second, Australia s greater degree of trade and competition with developing countries made the loss of competitive advantage argument more compelling in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 18). Third, it would seem that the resource sector had less access to the centre of political power in Canada than in Australia at the time, given the centre-left persuasion of the Chre tien government and the sector s conservative party and Albertan links. 4 Finally, the influence of the Canadian natural resources sector was reduced by a split between the natural resources businesses themselves and their labour forces, with some unions openly supporting ratification (see, for example, Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, 2002; on the split between industry and unions, see also Canadian Autoworkers Union, 2002). Also of importance in Canada was the widespread public awareness of the climate change problem and the Kyoto Protocol, fostered by successful campaigns by the government and by NGOs such as the David Suzuki Foundation and the International Institute for Sustainable Development. Ratification was seen by many as important environmentally and as demonstrating Canada s commitment to multilateral environmental cooperation. Support for ratification among the wider public may also have been linked to growing dissatisfaction with the unilateralist tendencies of the Bush administration. Aside from a short period of strong support for the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Canadian public s view of the Bush administration has been characterized by widespread dissatisfaction (Gatehouse, 2004). In this context, support for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol may have been an indirect part of demonstrating this dissatisfaction for some (Cooper and Bercuson, 2002). The Domestic Context Individual Leader Preferences As the formal link between proceedings at the domestic and international levels, the Chief of Government (COG) may affect the likelihood of an international agreement being ratified (Moravscik, 1993, p. 23; Putnam, 1988). Individual COG preferences may be affected by a desire to enhance political standing in the domestic Level II game, a desire to shift the domestic balance of power towards policies preferred by the COG for exogenous reasons, or by the pursuit of one s personal conception of the national interest (Putnam, 1988). The preferences of Prime Ministers Howard and Chre tien, who held office for six and nine years, respectively, before the ratification decisions were taken, were key to the final outcome in each instance. In two-level game terms Australia s decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol involved voluntary defection, with the federal government, led by the prime minister, choosing to opt out of an international agreement that it had already signed (Moravscik, 1993, p. 26). It is clear that John Howard played a direct role in this decision, as the head of state and as Chair of the Sustainable Environment Committee of Cabinet (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001). Howard s direct involvement is evident from the way in which the ratification decision was announced. It came as a response to a question in parliament (Hansard, 2002, p. 3163), with the then environment minister, in Indonesia at the time, learning of the statement from journalists hours after declaring that cabinet had not yet reached a decision on ratification (Miller, 2002).

406 I. Barnsley John Howard s position on the Protocol did not really involve a desire to enhance his political standing or to shift domestic policy preferences. The prime minister had won a third term in November 2001 and his government supported, and continues to support, actions to mitigate greenhouse gases domestically. Rather, Howard was concerned with the economic consequences of accepting a legally binding target, particularly in the absence of similar commitments by developing countries. This narrow conception of the national interest, which coincided with the views of many within the energy and resources sectors, was arguably informed as much by Howard s conservative ideological orientation as it was by a detailed understanding of the likely costs of implementation. In 2002 Australia projected that, during the first commitment period, it would average 111% of its 1990 emissions, as compared with its target of 108% (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002, p. 86). It is highly unlikely that reducing Australia s annual emissions by an additional 3% on 1990 emissions from 2008 to 2012 would damage Australian industry to the extent suggested by the prime minister (see Howard, 1997). Moreover, the government s pledge to try to meet its Kyoto target in spite of choosing not to ratify indicates that the economic costs of compliance with the Kyoto regime are not likely to be that great. Howard s position on the Kyoto Protocol also reflects a consistent pattern of support for the Bush administration and for George W. Bush himself. As conservative party leaders with a range of shared interests and values, relations between the two leaders have been constructive and Howard has enjoyed unprecedented access to the US president for an Australian prime minister. Examples of Howard s direct and indirect support for the Bush administration include his early and continuous support for America s war on terror, the change in government policy on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court after the election of Bush, and Howard s strong support for the 2003 war in Iraq. In direct contrast to John Howard, Jean Chre tien played an active role in promoting the Kyoto Protocol domestically and declared, in September 2002, an intention to see the Protocol ratified by the end of the year (Privy Council, Information Resources, 2002). This was despite the fact that, in 2002, Canada projected it would emit roughly 113% of its 1990 emissions in 2010, as compared with its 2008 12 Kyoto target of 94% (Government of Canada, 2002). There were three key aspects to Chre tien s position. First, ratification of the Protocol reflected the ideational importance of Canada s support for environmental protection and multilateral cooperation. This was also of importance to the wider public and had been promoted by Chre tien s government throughout negotiations over the Protocol. Second, Chre tien s outspoken support for the Protocol fits with a fairly regular pattern of disagreement with the Bush administration in Chre tien s final years as Canadian prime minister. Examples include his strong support for the International Criminal Court in 2001, his support for gay marriage, his opposition to the war in Iraq in early 2003 and his criticism of a high US budget deficit in 2003 (Fife, 2003; Rodrigue, 2002). Even accounting for the clear ideological differences between Chre tien and Bush, it would seem that the former s firm support for the Protocol was designed to send an implicit message to the USA and to the rest of the world that Canada would not support the Bush administration s move away from multilateral cooperation.

Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol 407 Finally, Chre tien s position on the Kyoto Protocol accords with Putnam s third observation on individual-level preferences a desire to enhance political standing. Given Chre tien s decision not to stand for re-election, political standing in this instance concerned a desire to ensure a lasting legacy of his leadership. That ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was part of the swan song for a prime minister who did not have many concrete legacies, and whose credibility was coming under serious threat with the emergence of the sponsorship scandal (involving government payments to Quebec-based firms supportive of the Liberal Party), was supported by both media reports and personal interviews (Cooper and Bercuson, 2002; Martin, 2002; Travers, 2002; Vallis, 2002). Conclusion In concluding the Kyoto Protocol, state parties to the UNFCCC acknowledged that addressing climate change requires a high level of international coordination, significant bureaucratic and scientific resources, and changes to national industrial activities and economies now to prevent human-induced climate change for decades to come. When the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in February 2005, Australia was one of only four Annex I parties not to have ratified the instrument, despite its significant involvement in climate change negotiations from the outset and in contrast to Canada, which, with similar national circumstances and positions on many aspects of Protocol negotiations, ratified the instrument in late 2002. Understanding the reasons for the divergent positions of Australia and Canada is worthwhile, given the ongoing difficulties of international cooperation over climate change, the large per capita emissions of both countries, the active role played by each in climate change negotiations, and the long history of comparing them in international relations, politics and law. The Canadian and Australian positions on climate change negotiations are also particularly relevant to many countries within the Commonwealth. For the low-lying island states of the Pacific and the Caribbean, climate change is one of the most pressing issues affecting the very survival of their states, and for countries like India and South Africa, the opportunities for involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism with Annex I parties are significant. Applying Putnam s two-level game approach, a comparative analysis of the bargaining and ratification phases of negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol highlights two, related components to understanding Australia s and Canada s divergent positions. First, the approach of each country to the overall negotiation process differed in the light of divergent conceptions of the national interest. The Australian government adopted a more narrowly defined notion of its national interest than did the Canadian government, focusing on the short-term, economic costs of implementing the agreement, in particular the potential loss of competitive advantage for Australian industry. The Canadian government took a broader view, incorporating greater concern for environmental protection and the need to demonstrate Canada s position as a leading industrialized nation and a supporter of multilateral cooperation. While Canada overcame the Level II constraints to ratify the Level I agreement, Australia placed greater priority on the issues in the Level II game.

408 I. Barnsley The second, related component to understanding the two countries s divergent positions concerns the particular factors that influenced these differing conceptions of the national interest and that enabled them to be acted upon by each government in taking a final position on ratification. Despite the similarities between the two in terms of greenhouse gas production and reduction, a fairly different set of factors informed the conception of the national interest in each case. Three key factors were identified for each country. In Australia the considerable connections between the natural resources and energy sectors and the conservative coalition government greatly encouraged a focus on the short-term, material costs of implementation. Second, Prime Minister Howard s view of the Protocol as a threat to Australian industries and jobs indicated minimal concern with the need for Australia to take the lead, with other Annex I parties, on addressing climate change, or to support multilateralism through ratification. Third, the USA s withdrawal from the Protocol meant that Australia could avoid being the sole defector and indirectly provided an opportunity for the Howard government to continue its wider policy of diplomatic support for the Bush administration. In the case of Canada the position of the government was informed by the strong ideational imperative of Canada as a supporter of environmental protection and cooperation over climate change in particular. This view was held by Prime Minister Chre tien, the Liberal government, and many within the wider public. The position also became an important symbol, for the government and the public, of Canada s refusal to condone the USA s unilateralist tendencies under the Bush administration. Finally, Chre tien s personal support for the Protocol, motivated by ideological and personal legacy factors, was crucial. As noted, these findings do not suggest that the Howard government was opposed to addressing climate change in an absolute sense, nor that the Chre tien government was the model actor. The wide-ranging domestic policies of both countries on climate change were, and continue to be, similar in many ways (see www.greenhouse. gov.au; www.climatechange.gc.ca). Australia will still try to meet its Kyoto target for the period 2008 to 2012. The most recent figures suggest Australia could reach its 2008 12 target by 2010, while Canada now projects a figure of 115% of its 1990 emissions averaged across the commitment period (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005, p. 1; Government of Canada 2005). Hence a paradox emerges: while Australia remains outside the Kyoto Protocol system, its projected emissions for the first Kyoto commitment period, as compared with its 1990 emissions, will be similar to, and possibly better than, those for Canada. This is not to suggest that multilateral action over climate change is irrelevant. Clearly one can speculate as to what Australia s projected emissions for 2008 to 2012 might have been under business-as-usual conditions, in other words, in the absence of any international response to climate change, and, at any rate, Australia remains an active state party to the UNFCCC. However, it does lead to questions, beyond the scope of this article, regarding the comparative efficacy of domestic policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Related to this, the divergent approaches of Australia and Canada highlight the difficulty of addressing climate change: a serious problem of the global commons, it requires a highly coordinated multilateral response, yet the success of any such response is highly dependent upon domestic

Australia, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol 409 state action, given the vast areas of national activity involved in greenhouse gas emissions. One can only hope that states continue to consider the potential consequences of global inaction on climate change and attempt to act on a view of their national interest that incorporates the desirability of international agreement to minimize greenhouse gas emissions. Acknowledgement Thanks are due to the anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on an earlier version of the article. Notes 1. JUSSCANNZ is a loose negotiating bloc that often incorporates Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. 2. The Canadian government s approach to meeting its Kyoto target has shifted somewhat since its ratification in 2002, with the revised Climate Change Plan released in 2005 placing greater emphasis on consumer action, industry incentives and the importance of balancing environmental protection and economic prosperity (Government of Canada, 2005, p. 12). 3. The term ideational is used here in the International Relations theory sense, to refer to non-material understandings or explanations for international political action, i.e. the notion that ideas not just guns or material forces matter. 4. During the period under discussion, the Progressive Conservative Party, the Canadian Alliance, and the Reform Party were the important conservative forces in Canadian politics. References AAP Newsfeed (1998) Howard left with three holes in front bench, Nationwide General News; Australian General News, 16 October. Bernstein, S. (2002) International institutions and the framing of domestic policies: the Kyoto Protocol and Canada s response to climate change, Policy Sciences, 35, pp. 203 236. Canadian Autoworkers Union (2002) Taking the First Step: Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and Canada s Role, available online at http://www.caw.ca/campaigns&issues/ongoingcampaigns/pdf/ CAWKyotoPaper.pdf Commonwealth of Australia (2002) Australia s Third National Communication on Climate Change: A Report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Canberra: Australian Greenhouse Office). Commonwealth of Australia (2005) Tracking to the Kyoto Target (Canberra: Australian Greenhouse Office). Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (2002) Smart implementation of the Kyoto Accord, Media Release, 21 November, at http://www.cep.ca/press/cepnews_e.php?id¼197 Cooper, A. (2003) Keeping in touch: patterns of networking in the Canada Australia diplomatic relationship, in M. Margaret and F. McKenzie (Eds), Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the Twentieth Century (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press). Cooper, B. and Bercuson, D. (2002) Alberta needs Klein v. Kyoto, Calgary Herald, 19 December, p. A23 B. Department of Environment and Heritage (2002a) Australian/US climate action partnership, Media Release K019, 27 February, at http://www.deh.gov.au/index.html Department of Environment and Heritage (2002b) Australia s approach to climate change, speech by Dr D. Kemp, MP, to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 15 July, at http://www.deh.gov.au/ index.html Depledge, J. (2000) Tracing the Origins of the Kyoto Protocol: An Article-by-article Textual History, UN Doc. FCCC/TP/2000/2, Distr. General.

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