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United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division for Public Administration and Development Management Joint Experts Group Meeting and Capacity Development Workshop on Preventing Corruption in Public Administration: Citizens Engagement for Improved Transparency and Accountability General Rapporteur s Report INTRODUCTION The Rapporteur s Report that follows has been put together with remarkable expertise and timeliness by our UN team so may I express great gratitude to that team for their assistance: Angela Capati-Caruso, Gary Manukyan, Anni Haataja, Valentina Resta, Almaz Atnafu Woldekidane, Alphonse Mekolo, Roberto Villarreal, Arpine Korekyan and especially to Alexandra Mills who worked with me from the start to the end. But I take full responsibility for what I am about to share with you. RECOMMENDATIION 1 Enhancing the effectiveness of public sector institutional arrangements for preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives. To continue, encourage and support public sector institutional capacity development. This is needed in order to devise and implement enhanced national development strategies by anti-corruption interventions tailored to local circumstances. We started our expert meeting hearing about the circumstances of Uganda where, despite many relevant oversight institutions to help the fight against corruption, a real challenge is how to move from the establishment of anti corruption institutions and laws towards their enforcement. Alexandra Mills followed by stating that we may have to go beyond considering that our only real challenge is implementation. She argued that there are gaps about how and why corruption happens and so exactly when we can intervene to prevent it. A particular contribution she made was to talk about a cocktail of anti-corruption measures which will inevitably differ from country to country because of different circumstances. And so instead of tackling a wide range of anti corruption measures at the one time, it could be 1

preferable and more cost effective to take a targeted approach. Alexandra Mills quoted from a Portuguese anti-corruption scholar which illustrates this eloquently: If there is one lesson to be learnt from the history of anti-corruption activity, it is that there are no individual solutions but a cocktail of measures, no silver bullets but a mixture of successes and failures and no quick fixes but a long hard learning process. In our discussions we spent some time on the above themes on which I will elaborate (Luis de Sousa, Anti-Corruption Agencies: Between Empowerment and Irrelevance 2009). 1.1 THE NEED FOR ENFORCEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION A major finding was the importance of the quality of regulation. There is a need for simple regulation that is better targeted so it is: easier to understand, to access and to comply with as well as easier to administer. This allows regulatory stakeholders to function as anti-corruption actors. Roberto Villarreal s background paper identified inadequate public regulation as one major cause of corruption. Sometimes regulations can be too costly to comply with. There is a need to study the quality of regulations and how they are introduced and applied. Discussions occurred on the need to simplify regulations which can at the same time lead to reduced costs and reduced corruption. An example given was from Mexico where the amount of regulation recently was reduced from 16,000 norms to 9 handbooks. Another major finding was the importance of societal expectations. In Uganda gifts from subjects are given in search of favours from those in charge of kingdoms; or in Bhutan where there is an engrained practice and much social pressure to provide favours to extended family members. We also heard in a break out group that Greece has come to terms with this in the case of procurement processes where audits of those processes pick up instances where relatives may have been placed on procurement panels; there is a preventative measure in the form of a code of conduct in which it states that relatives should not be appointed to tender panels. Practice under the code can be audited by the Audit Court. Other findings under this head include the following: The role of public shaming by denunciation of corrupt public officials (Mexico) and blacklisting corporations from government contracts who breach procurement rules Mandatory asset declaration for all public officials can be unworkable; e.g. in Bhutan a penalty for non-compliance was seen to be too harsh (impeachment) and so was retracted. Political will is needed for enforcement (Breakout group) as is strong institutional leadership. As in Bolivia, anti-corruption laws can make officials afraid to act, so there is a need to reassure officials; 2

It is possible to reduce the number and categories of licenses and permits (reducing red tape) which can speed up the time for processing permits, and reduce the perception of a need for bribes; When anti-corruption efforts (institutions) are not working, sometimes it may be necessary and effective to conduct drastic actions (e.g. eliminate the corrupt institutions) (e.g. in Georgia, dismantling the department of traffic police and firing its 10,000 employees in one day, and adopting a similar procedure for customs inspectors) 1.2 TARGETING TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES Different countries have different circumstances and different financial capabilities so each country has to adopt tailored strategies. There is a need to obtain correct diagnostic of the perceived problem through public integrity assessment programs (or corruption risk assessments). Some suggestions follow: Municipalities can face unique problems (e.g. in Ecuador) so there is the need to assist municipalities with anti-corruption efforts at that level. Each agency could be required to develop its own program to be approved by the central anti-corruption agency (e.g. Hong Kong; Kenya). The creation of separate conflict of interest agencies and codes could be considered, focusing on guiding and training honest public officials and civilly (non-criminally) punishing low-level conflicts of interest (like the New York City Conflict of Interest agency). Focus could be on high risk areas of procurement (as in Mexico). The Korean Integrity Assessment objectives include the need to: understand trends in the corruption levels of public organizations; to identify corruption-prone areas in the public sector and root causes of corruption; to encourage public institutions to engage in voluntary anti-corruption efforts; and to provide basic data for devising governmentwide anti-corruption strategies. Corruption prevention programs could be mainstreamed by requiring each government agency to come up with corruption prevention measures and the anti-corruption agency could work with agencies to implement them (e.g. Zambia) There is a need to understand why a regulation is being introduced e.g. asset declarations should have different requirements about who declares, how, what and when they declare, depending on whether the purpose is to prevent conflicts of interest or to detect illicit enrichment. Similarly, whether to make the information actively or passively public will be different depending on the purpose to be achieved by the regulation. Mauritius, Mexico, Bhutan and Zambia all had variations of asset declarations that were intended to target illicit enrichment. Australia and the USA had declarations intended to control conflicts of interest The need for ICT applications can be different from country to country and it may also differ within country. Therefore, we need different mechanisms for varying needs. 3

1.3 BUILDING AN EVIDENCE BASE AND A LEARNING CULTURE We concluded that we still have a lot to learn about fighting corruption but what it is important to do is to build up an evidence base as we go and adopt a culture of learning so that we are continuously open to what has worked elsewhere and which might be adapted to the local context. Some conclusions follow: The Korean Integrity Assessment program has already been exported elsewhere: the program replaced data from Transparency International corruption perceptions index which was insufficiently specific. It was designed to regularly measure corruption levels in public sector agencies. The data is used to help target corruption prevention interventions. It focuses on specific services allowing agencies to develop their own practical measures. Good practices exist in the private sector and may be able to be applied in the public sector Formal knowledge sharing networks (e.g. a clearing house) can be used to share good practices such as United Nations Public Service Award cases and Global Integrity Report De Graaf in a background paper argued that any study of causes needs to study different contexts in which corruption occurs: there are almost no empirical studies offering conclusions about which corruption controls are effective under which circumstances. Therefore, there is a need for rich case studies (at individual, organizational and macro levels). Otherwise there is a risk of confusion occurring about which methods work best, where and when. RECOMMENDATION 2 Public sector human resource capacity development for preventing corruption and engaging citizens in anti-corruption initiatives. To promote, encourage and support public sector human resource capacity development so that public administration is more open, transparent, accountable, effective and responsive to citizen needs. John Mary Kauzya s paper pointed out the relative neglect in the MDG context of attention to human resource development in the public sector. His paper urges governments to take into account the importance of public servants working with professionalism, ethics and integrity. He introduced the concept of quiet corruption where a public servant can get paid for a day s work but fail to deliver the services the he or she is paid to do. He emphasized the importance of attention to behavior as equally important as structural factors in efforts to prevent corruption. Main conclusions follow. 2.1 PROFESSIONALISM 4

Professionalism is a combination of expertise and integrity evident in ethical conduct and concern for the general interest (Kauzya) Public servants are in a stewardship role, serving the public. Jose Castelazo from Mexico reminded us, it is a service vocation where public service values needed to be engrained but also understood and spread out to society. Many bureaucrats have no training in how to run organisations and implement legislation The United Nations Convention against Corruption: o Art. 7: stresses the importance of the integrity of public officials, their merit and aptitude to carry out their functions, their constant training on ethical issues and their constant rotation. It also refers to the transparency of funds for political campaigns and candidates. o Art. 8: refers to the importance of having in place codes of conduct, reporting of cases of corruption, financial disclosure from public officials and disciplinary measures. Codes of conduct and regulation are necessary but must be supplemented with early training and competence-based capacity building because their effectiveness is also affected by the political context and the attitudes of civil servants. Training should be continuous and focused on both skills and values and be supported by sources of impartial advice for public officials about ethical and performance issues in order to prevent misconduct. There is the issue of how and when values like integrity and honesty are taught to citizens or covered in public sector training. Hong Kong ensures this starts in the school system, continuing into university e.g. engineers taught what corruption practices they might face. Values need to be consistent with the social context. There is a need to balance performance (outcome focus) with conformance (rule observance); simplification of rules supported by training of all staff may help with this challenge Professionalism in the public service requires a focus on societal norms - the pillar of other actions that is, develop anti-corruption citizenry, institutional capacity, service and development oriented leadership, human resource management practices, training, motivation and incentives as well as professionalization infrastructures (Kauzya). 2.2 AWARENESS OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND CITIZENS The main conclusions under this head include the following: Training and education of public officials should include knowing about what is and is not corruption and corruption prevention (Breakout Group ). Education and training of civil society and citizens is also needed to ensure they have the capacity to engage with public servants for a common purpose. There is a need to understand that corruption prevention takes time There is a need to develop systems allowing honest officials with knowledge of corruption to report it, without exposure to risks (e.g. through allowing anonymity of complaints in Mexico; undercover employees being able to obtain information from middle-level public officials in Uganda) 5

2.3 WHISTLEBLOWING To encourage reporting it is necessary to have: Trusted systems with empathy, security, multiple places to report to and an assurance that something will happen. Protection for reporters in the form of job security, physical safety. Other factors include: education & training, advisory offices and cultural appropriateness. (Breakout Group) Systems developed to allow honest officials with knowledge of corruption to report it, without exposure to risks (e.g. through allowing anonymity of complaints in Mexico; undercover employees can obtain information from middle-level public officials in Uganda) RECOMMENDATION 3 Accountability through transparency: engaging citizens to prevent corruption in the Public Sector such as through ICT. To promote, encourage and support citizen engagement in the management of public affairs to ensure the most efficient and effective use of public resources. The main conclusions relating to this recommendation relate to: access to government information; building the capacity of citizens and civil society; and the building up and maintaining of trust. 3.1 ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT INFORMATION A necessary precondition for effective citizen engagement is accessibility to relevant information. Some better practice examples and conclusions follow: Mexico demonstrated success in increasing transparency using: o Public information o Electronic communication inside government and with citizens o Public agencies were asked to identify information they held that could be useful to the public o Mandatory data sharing between agencies using protocols that limit the number of times that citizens need to give standard information citizens can create their own user profile for interaction with government. (Mexico received a Public Service award for the Public Call to Identify the Most Useless Process ). There are many applications arising from different initiatives such as Open Government Partnership and Global Integrity, which help to increase transparency and prevent corruption. The SMS System from the Ministry of Justice in Turkey and New York City 311 System are good applications which increase citizens access to public services such as fixing potholes, or hotlines such as the New York City initiative fixmystreet. 6

The United Nations Convention against Corruption reminded the forum of: o Art. 10: Stresses the importance of access to public information on processes from citizens, publications and other means to facilitate easy access of administrative processes and results. o Art. 12: Focuses on the role of the private sector and their accounting and auditing systems. It also promotes cooperation between private and public sector to establish transparency and detection of conflict of interests. o Art. 13: Promotes active participation of organized civil society counting with a balanced and objective judiciary system with emphasis in its independence and a media with similar characteristics. The Korean Integrity Assessment: o Collects data about actual citizen experiences of corruption. o The resulting information can also be disclosed to media as appropriate and scores can be used by the parliament and by the prime minister to identify areas for attention. Web-based resources can also be used to provide access to: o Government contracts o Asset disclosures Media can be used to promote success in corruption prevention especially social media. In addition, increasingly it is necessary to ensure active participation of citizens. In Ecuador, for example, there is a role for citizens in electing people to control bodies and in Jordan citizens are brought into anti corruption institutions and trained so they can monitor their operations and their degree of independence from political interference etc. Stakeholders and citizens have to be appropriately engaged in consultation and decisions about procedures and what data should be open. A UNDP anti-corruption expert reported three emerging models for using social media to increase transparency and accountability: o Information sharing: blogs, forums, social networks and video hosting sites like YouTube can disclose information about instances of corruption. o Crowdsourcing: the open source Ushahidi technology allows citizens to monitor service delivery, share information and use Electronic Petitioning. o Crowd-to-community model: combines crowdsourcing with mechanisms that increase the interaction of visitors with a lobbying project and between each other, transforming a crowd into a community. 3.2 BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF CITIZENS AND CIVIL SOCIETY Public complaints are an important part of the cocktail (e.g. Mexico). The role of citizen participation in formulating codes of conduct should be considered provided civil society is ready and has capacity to express relevant values. Online services can be used for public transparency such as in procurement. In other high risk activities ICT can be used to limit individual discretion and secure approvals or access. 7

Training (awareness/ education) should be provided for citizens on their rights and obligations (and the proper processes of government) (Breakout Group) Training is needed for the private sector in government procurement (e.g. Mexico) There are many participation mechanisms for citizens including participation councils, public meetings and open sessions (Ecuador; South Korea) Public education can include education programs for schools even at the lowest grade to teach values; universities could teach students, for example engineers, what corruption problems they would face in practice, and how to address them (as in Hong Kong) In terms of ICT applications, the UN should consider helping those countries where resources are inadequate to develop applications, i.e. how do we match up funders and those who need funds. Countries can also consider allocating certain budget solely for applications including taking into account public private partnerships. Internet-based platforms, e.g. Huduma (Kenya, Nigeria, Philippines and India) provide voice to citizens, offer services and real time actionable data to respond to citizens concerns, measure improvement of service provision. In Kosovo, an online platform Kallxo.com improves corruption reporting. In Turkey the PSA-winning SMS service for informing litigants about their court cases improves the effectiveness and efficiency of court processes and gives citizens a chance to monitor the judiciary and legal process, saves time and resources of both citizens and judiciary. Citizens who sign up for the service receive SMS notification of court process increasing speed of process and reducing the expenses for postal services and paper. Successful use of ICT for increasing citizen engagement might need relevant laws and legislative frameworks to enable the use of technology. And training and capacity building is required to ensure that systems are interoperable and robust or they could create more corruption risks. 3.3 TRUST More mechanisms are needed to build trust in government by delivering tangible results and service to citizens It is important for governments to build trust among people so that the government can deal effectively with public complaints about corruption (e.g. Bhutan); The public fight against corruption can entail increased public perception of corruption, so it is necessary to publicize when an official is caught and punished (e.g. in Georgia, public officials arrests are broadcast on life TV) Trust can be enhanced by the way investigations of whistle blower allegations and retaliation are dealt with investigations of retaliation should be prompt, thorough, effective and with an open process, transparent and trustworthy. Public information about whistle blowing can also endanger trust. Best practice is to publicize as much as possible clear remedies and sanctions for retaliation and periodically evaluate and review the effectiveness of whistle blower protection with annual public reports. Citizens need to be adequately informed, protected, and need to feel that actions directly concern and impact them. Governments need to enhance citizen trust by taking their complaints seriously and punishing corrupt officials. ICT tools assist in overcoming the difficulty by citizens to get involved and allocate time to this action. 8

Governments need to empower citizens to monitor public service delivery through (Breakout group): o Adopting enabling legislation o Setting up institutional/permanent citizen engagement arrangements o Developing innovative and cost-effective mechanisms including ICT tools. CONCLUDING NOTE It would be expected that citizen engagement in a democratic context would assist in aiding accountability and reducing corruption. While there is evidence of a correlation between these two there is also evidence where corruption has been significantly reduced without citizen engagement (Villarreal paper). So voice and accountability are neither necessary nor sufficient for effective control of corruption. Khan s background paper makes the point that it is least likely to work where there are weak institutions and political corruption exists. Relying on citizen engagement will require an education process and will take time. More research is needed: a clearing house for all applications by the UN from around the world would be very beneficial. Open Government Partnerships can be a good example for knowledge repositories. There might be more applications out there but centralization of all those could be helpful not only for citizens but also for researches and policy makers. The open Government Partnership is another venue for knowledge sharing and learning from each other. Meredith Edwards General Rapporteur UN CEPA Member June 2012 9