The Asan Public Opinion Report February 2013 Jiyoon Kim Karl Friedhoff Chungku Kang
The Asan Public Opinion Report February 2013 Below are the key findings from the surveys conducted by Research and Research in February. Where applicable, dates the survey was conducted are in brackets. Upon Kim Yong-Joon s withdrawal for consideration to be prime minister under President Park Geun-Hye, 42.1% blamed Dr. Kim for his failed nomination. Only 21.9% placed the blame with President Park. [Jan 30 Feb 1] 78.9% thought it was important that the government pursue development cooperation with African and Asian countries. [Feb 5-7] 79.0% supported providing aid to developing countries. A plurality (37.9%) among this group cited the fact that Korea also benefitted from receiving development aid. [Feb 5-7] A clear plurality (48.2%) favored keeping spending on development aid at its current level. Only 18.6% supported increasing development aid. [Feb 5-7] Over the next five years, 73.7% expected President Park to perform well on consolidating democracy; 65.9% on economic growth; 58.7% on South-North relations and security; 64.3% on wealth redistribution; 62.1% on public education. [Feb 8-11] 59.9% reported feeling threatened by North Korea s third nuclear test. [Feb 13-15] 59.1% opposed a pre-emptive strike on the North s nuclear test site for fear of it leading to war. 36.3% supported such a strike. [Feb 13-15] 66.5% supported a domestic nuclear weapons program. This was virtually unchanged from when the question was asked in September 2012. [Feb 13-15] A plurality (.3%) supported delaying the OPCON transfer. 35.6% said it should move forward as scheduled. Only 11.4% thought it should be abandoned altogether. [Feb 13-15] On GSOMIA with Japan, 64.7% saw such an agreement as necessary. This was nearly 20pp higher from June, when the question was originally asked. [Feb 13-15] With regard to President Park s proposed policy of trustpolitik toward North Korea, 67.2% supported such a policy directive in the wake of the North s third nuclear test. [Feb 13-15] Job creation remained the country s most important issue (38.3%). Economic democratization (15.7%) and South-North relations (15.4%) were virtually tied as second most important. [Feb 19-21] On his last day in office, approval for President Lee was 34.6%. The sample size of each survey was 1,000 respondents over the age of 19. The surveys were conducted by Research & Research, and the margin of error is ±3.1% at the 95% confidence level. All surveys employed the Random Digit Dialing method for mobile and landline telephones. This report is a product of the Public Opinion Studies Center at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. To subscribe to this report please contact Karl Friedhoff at klf@asaninst.org. 2
A note on this report: This report largely excludes public opinion results regarding North Korea s third nuclear test. These results were used in a separate Issue Brief titled, The Fallout: South Korean Public Opinion Following North Korea s Third Nuclear Test. For a copy of the Issue Brief please contact Karl Friedhoff at klf@asaninst.org Please also note that no data was collected on February due to the Lunar New Year holiday. Introduction At the stroke of midnight on February 25 Park Geun-Hye became Korea s 18 th president. Welcoming her to office are a host of domestic and foreign challenges and setting priorities will be the first major signal about how President Park intends to tackle these problems. Unfortunately, her ministers will not be there to welcome her to office as well. There is now speculation that her Cabinet will not be in place until mid-march, creating problems with hitting the ground running on her policy directives. Former-president Lee leaves office after a turbulent five years in office. Wide-scale protests regarding the import of U.S. beef welcomed him to office, he navigated a global economic crisis, lethal and non-lethal North Korean provocations, and leadership change in the North. Despite all of this, on his last day in office his approval rating was 34.6%, slightly higher than previous presidents. This report looks at the general state of public opinion as President Park takes her first steps as the leader of South Korea, as well as the issues most important to the nation. It will set the stage for more detailed analysis of her administration in subsequent reports. Park Assumes Office Throughout February President Park s approval rating has been remarkably steady, with approximately 57% approving of her performance as president-elect (Figure 1). Of course, the media has focused heavily on the fact that this is a much lower approval rating than previous presidents received before taking office others often topped 70% before taking office. However, it was widely expected that her approval would be lower than previous presidents given the truly divisive nature of the December 2012 presidential election. 3
Figure 1 Park Approval 70 56.7 Approve Disapprove 61.1 30 20 29.2 27.8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 February The Generational Divide One of the major features of the outgoing Lee administration was a persistent generational divide. Quite simply, Koreans or older were much more likely to approve of President Lee s job performance than were younger Koreans. This same generational divide is already becoming visible in the nascent Park presidency (Figure 2). Figure 2 80 Park Approval: By Age 20s 30s s s s 70 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 February 4
This division in society was on full display following President Park s victory in the presidential election. In one story from Yonhap following the election, the newswire service reported some young Koreans calling for older Koreans to be stripped of their right to vote, and for the subsidized transportation program senior citizens can ride the buses and subway for free to be ended. While this was not widespread it does illustrate the frustration felt by Korea s youth with the outcome of the election. It also serves to depict the challenge President Park will face in mending the generational divide, although it will likely prove to be an impossible task. With youth unemployment at 7.5% in January 4.1pp higher than the total unemployment rate for the same month there will be additional pressure on President Park to address the concerns of young Koreans. While a second miracle on the Han is unlikely but could happen in the longer run, the real danger for President Park lies in the immediate future. An uncertain global economy will constrain export growth and mounting household debt will constrain domestic consumption. These are not the conditions conducive to job creation and moving young Koreans into the secure jobs they seek. If their needs are perceived as not being met, it could prove troublesome before the first year of her presidency is out. President Park and Gender Even though President Park is the first female elected to lead South Korea, there was nearly no gender gap in her support rates throughout the campaign. But following her election a persistent gender gap has emerged on her job approval rating. In general, women are 5-7pp more likely to approve of her job performance than are men (Figure 3). Figure 3 80 Park Approval: By Gender Male Female 70 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 February 5
Even though President Park ran her campaign with the slogan, A prepared female leader, there was little hope among those working on gender equality issues that she would be a strong advocate of women s rights. They consistently pointed to the fact that she has never been married, never had children, and throughout her career had not strongly voiced support for women s rights. Thus, there was little expectation that President Park would strongly push for great equality for women in Korea. Regardless, there has been high expectation that President Park, simply by being Korea s first female president, will have a broad impact on how women are perceived in Korean society. This is especially relevant considering that the OECD s most recent report states that in Korea just.1% of college educated females are employed dead last among OECD countries included in the survey. (The OECD average is 78.7%.) Thus, the general thought is that her leadership will begin to open doors and lead to greater opportunities for women in general. But that might not be the case immediately. While pressure has been building on Korea to make its work force more inclusive, leaders who are responsible for putting this into action may very well point to the election of President Park as evidence that Korea does not have a problem with the role of women in society, allowing them to delay increased female roles in the workplace. After all, they will argue, how many other OECD nations have elected a female president? All the President s Men In making nominations for ministerial posts and Blue House staff, women were largely left out of the process. However, the more pressing issue for President Park is to get her government reorganized and staffed. While Chung Hong-Won was confirmed as prime minister on February 26, minister nominees will take more time especially considering that President Park s proposal for government reorganization has yet to be approved by the National Assembly. Thus, President Park s first meetings will be held with staff put in place by President Lee. But this is not without precedent. President Lee went through a similar experience, holding his first meetings with members of President Roh s administration. Part of the delay has been due to the controversy created by some of her ministerial nominations. After the withdrawal of her initial pick for prime minister, there has been increased scrutiny on each of the picks. In all, progressive politicians are calling for the withdrawal of five nominees with the most controversial being the nominee for Minister of Defense and the pick to head the proposed Ministry of Future, Creation and Science. General Kim Byung-Kwan, President Park s nominee for Minister of Defense, has had several issues raised in question to his nomination. First among them is his work for an arms brokerage firm associated with a German arms producer. However, it is important to note that 6
he joined the firm two years after his discharge, and he was not in violation of any of the guidelines on ethics for public officials. Regardless, his activities there have been largely classified as lobbying, and in his role he is said to have promoted imported systems rather than developing equivalent domestic capabilities. This, his critics say, should make him ineligible to lead the nation s military. Also under fire is Kim Jeong-Hoon, the nominee to lead the proposed Ministry of Future, Creation, and Science. The fact that the ministry does not yet exist aside, there is serious opposition from progressives on his nomination. While there is talk of his connection to the CIA a role Kim has described as advisory the real problem is that he was not until recently a Korean citizen. While non-koreans can hold ministerial posts, those posts cannot be related to national security or intelligence, clearly a problem for the minister responsible for overseeing key infrastructure and energy assets. Mr. Kim is now a dual citizen, and is in the process of giving up his U.S. citizenship. [Note: Just hours before this report was issued, Dr. Kim withdrew from consideration.] President Lee s Exit President Lee leaves office as a controversial figure. One-third (33.9%) of South Koreans cite his Four River Project as his biggest failure while in office. Of course, this is a major blow considering this was to be his signature project, and it now faces an uncertain future. Only 28.8% stated that he had performed well on economic growth, and 36.0% stated the same on South-North relations. Despite this, President Lee leaves office with an approval rating higher than 30%, a major feat considering approval in December 2012 was just 24.8% (Figure 4). Figure 4 70 63.5 61.0 63.6.6 62.7 Lee Approval Approve Disapprove 66.6.6.0 58.8 57.7 64.1 61.5 56.4 30 20 30.1 31.7 30.4 35.0 31.4 28.3 30.6 29.7 33.0 27.8 24.8 28.6 34.6 0 Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 2012 2013 7
Most Important Issues to the Country North Korea and its third nuclear test dominated the headlines in February, and the importance of South-North relations as perceived by the South Korean public did receive a significant bump after the test. While 7.8% cited it as the most important issue to the nation in January, 15.4% cited it as such in February following the test (Figure 5). However, recent history would suggest that in the absence of any further provocations this will decline quikcly. The failed missile launch in April also raised the importance of the issue only to see it decline to its original level in May. The successful missile launch in December failed to create any movement whatsoever in the relative importance of the issue. It is notable that the rise in relative importance of South-North relations did not come at the expense of job creation, and this will remain President Park s top priority. Instead, there was a corresponding decline in the relative importance of economic democratization. This, coupled with the continued low importance of the redistribution of wealth, may help to explain why the Park administration has already begun to back off some of its more ambitious plans. Figure 5 Most Salient Issues to the Korean Public Creating Jobs South-North Relations Redistribution of Wealth Economic Democratization 45 35 30 25 20 15 5 0 Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb 2012 2013 8
Party Support The Saenuri Party continued to be the most supported party, leading by 15-20pp throughout the month (Figure 6). The Democratic United Party (DUP) continues its ongoing overhaul, with no serious changes coming to light. While the prosecution seems to have indirectly confirmed that former president Roh Moo-Hyun did make comments that South Korea would not insist upon the Northern Limit Line, this did not have the anticipated effect of driving the party to dismantle and reform under a new name. Even so, the party continues to muddle through and will face an uphill battle in regaining its footing following a dismal 2012. Figure 6 Party Support Saenuri DUP Independent 45.3 48.1 30 27.7 26.4 20 20.9 18.8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 February Security Perceptions The media coverage following the North s third nuclear test made it clear that the South Korean public s reaction was, the reaction to the test from the South Korean public was largely a non-reaction. While this was the case, it should not be interpreted that the South Korean public did not feel threatened by the test. As Figure 7 shows, positive perceptions of both current and future national security were negatively affected. However, that affect was short-lived. By the end of February, positive perceptions for both current and future national security had surpassed their levels on the day of the test. Indeed, both were at or near highs for the entire month. 9
Figure 7 70 Positive Perception of National Security Current Future 59.4 64.2.8 30 20 26.1 18.0 29.1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 February Conclusion President Park s presidency will begin slowly as she continues to try to push her government reorganization plan through the National Assembly. However, the DUP has taken a strong position against such pressure, issuing statements saying that the National Assembly is not a rubber stamp, obviously attempting to create parallels between Park Geun-Hye s presidency and her father s. However the opposition cannot stall forever. By mid-march the Park administration should be fully staffed and pursuing its policy goals. However, the current delays are costly and may wear on the president s approval ratings through no fault of her own.