Major Theme: Origins of the Cold War Topic 5: The Cold War Kissinger Chapter 23: Khrushchev s Ultimatum: The Berlin Crisis 1958-63 Ideological Differences Mutual Suspicion and Fear From Wartime Allies to Post-War Enemies Historiography Llewellyn Thompson reported from Moscow that Khrushchev really wants and is almost forced to a détente in relations with the West. Khrushchev s conduct did not support such optimism (570). The Berlin crisis engendered much distrust between before very close allies, such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Adenauer viewed the creation of an Access Authority, in which communists and democracies would have equal representation, to be a breech in trust and a poor substitute for American commitment. As the years passed after Potsdam, the Soviets found the prosperity of nations involved involved in West Germany to be a thorn in their side. Major Theme: Nature of the Cold War Ideological Opposition Superpowers and Spheres of Influence Alliances and Diplomacy in the Cold War Adenauer, of the German Federal Republic, desired unification of Germany and viewed Khrushchev s ultimatum as a threat to that drive for unity with the West and would isolate the Federal Republic. He did not want to make concessions and instead preferred free elections, using diplomacy to show his wisdom in relying on the West. Great Britain valued an alliance with the United States more than with Germany and as such did not support the German reunification that Adenauer wanted. They did not want to risk nuclear war over the transfer of transportation control to the Democratic German Republic. Division of Berlin among the victors of WWII Russia controlled transportation and communication into Berlin, and as Khrushchev said, To put it crudely, the American foot in Europe had a sore blister on it. That was West Berlin. Anytime we wanted to step on the Americans foot and make them feel the pain, all we had to do was obstruct Western communications with the city across the territory of the German Democratic Republic (569). Khrushchev overestimated the superiority of the Sputnik launch and attempted to use it as a diplomatic strategy, though Eisenhower was not convinced. Khrushchev s ultimatum to the West was to make Berlin a free city, or be placed under the control of the German Democratic Republic.
Historiography De Gaulle sought to reunify Germany and concede military and economic power in order for recognition of France as the political leader of Europe. Dulles sought to find balance between negotiations and stated that there were more than one methods of reunification and that free elections were the natural method, but that Germany could function as a confederation as well. He sought to hold the Soviet Union to its obligations and to deal factually with other nations involved. Willy Brandt, Lord Mayor of the Federal Republic of Germany, felt that Dulles was undermining his political strategy by saying that Germany could perform as a confederation and that the Soviets would have too much power in such a case. He wanted free elections in connection with the West for reunification. Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of the U.S., made it clear that the United States would not be giving it s customary all-out support to west Germany in negotiations with Dittman, the German Undersecretary for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry. Macmillan, the British Prime Minister, tried to convince Khrushchev that peace could be made through the good relations of leaders and discussed what concessions might be offered in 1959. Khrushchev wasn t having it and felt that diplomacy only reflected the balance of forces. Dulles made a tactical retreat in foreign policy immediately after, such as in his call for a German confederation as a route to German unity. As the Berlin Wall was constructed, beginning August 31, 1961, the United States did not do much about it. They had little military options due to the fact that East Germany could move the wall back within their own territory and the United States was not willing to risk nuclear war over it. They did not define it as an act of aggression. Staking American credibility on the freedom of Berlin, Kennedy proceeded to send troops to Germany in 1961. Kennedy preferred to use a unilateral method of negotiating with the Soviet Union and broke from the veto power of NATO in so doing. Neither side could find concessions to the other that would not weaken themselves in the long run. As a devout communist, Khrushchev was practically required to seek to translate this presumed change in the balance of forces into diplomatic coin. Berlin was his first target (570). Khrushchev acted with great skill in forcing the democracies to either recognize the East German satellite nation or go to war over the technicality of control of transportation, though he used his bluster to mask the weakness of East Germany in that they were losing all of their workers to the West. The East German state was the most fragile link in the Soviet sphere of influence because it lacked legitimacy. America and Britain used the term new ideas in diplomacy as a euphemism for enhancing the status of East Germany s regime or making concessions to the Soviet
Union s demands. It was ironic that Great Britain and the United States should be urging Germany onto a course that would almost certainly lead to greater German nationalism, while Adenauer, having far less confidence in his own countrymen, remained determined not to expose them to that temptation (578). Dulles understood and most likely shared much of Adenauer s point of view, but needed to reconcile his policies with Eisenhower s, which were slightly different, in order to get his points across. Eisenhower dropped many hints to Khrushchev that the United States planned on eventually vacating Berlin and that it was an awkward position. Khrushchev could have pressed the Soviet challenge or formulated a compromise, but instead, Khrushchev s limited attention span, his misassessment of his own relative strength, and perhaps divisions within the Soviet leadership all conspired to impart an oddly inconclusive quality to Soviet conduct Khrushchev s failure to stick to his objective spared the Atlantic Alliance what might have turned into its greatest crisis (580). Khrushchev s visit to America did little to sway the ideals of either leader, but did convince the American public, falsely, that Khrushchev could now see America s desire for peace. By invoking the Spirit of Camp David in 1959, Eisenhower was able to buy more time and gain a relaxation tensions without making any serious concessions to Khrushchev. The principle result of Camp David was another delay (582). The conference to take place in Paris was then canceled, and Khrushchev delayed his demands until Kennedy took office, when Khrushchev decided, after the Bay of Pigs and Laos, to demand a decision concerning Berlin within 6 months. Bundy gave reassurance that Germany could trust the U.S. but that they could not grant a German veto on western policy: In effect, these conciliatory phrases canceled each other out. Since the state American and German positions were irreconcilable, and since Germany was totally dependent on the United States for the defense of Berlin, denying Bonn a veto could produce only one of two outcomes: risking war for a cause in which the Kennedy Administration had said it did not believe, or imposing views on Bonn that had been rejected by the German leaders. The former course could not have been sustained in the American Congress or in public opinion; the latter would have wrecked Germany s commitment to the West and the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance (587). As much as I admired Acheson, I did not believe that a strategy of stonewalling could be sustained. Whenever Khrushchev chose, he could force a negotiation; no Western leader, not even de Gaulle, could confront his public with the need for a showdown unless he had first demonstrated that he had explored every means to avoid one (588). Khrushchev should have known that he held the key to a major crisis in the Atlantic Alliance, in that Adenauer would not accept the idea of an Access Authority.
Major Theme: Development and Impact of the Cold War Global Spread of the Cold War from its European Origins Cold War Policies of Containment, Brinkmanship, Peaceful Coexistence, Détente Role of the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement Role and Significance of Leaders Arms Race, Proliferation and Limitation Social, Cultural, and Economic Impact Ambassador Thompson felt that Russia was using brinksmanship to develop a pattern of domestic coexistence, though did not explain how the threat of war established this coexistence. While Eisenhower used containment to eliminate certain threats to the peace, Kennedy wanted to end the Soviet-American conflict once and for all and eliminate all Soviet threats to the peace. He, like Eisenhower, was not willing to engage in nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union, though he did know of their political and military inferiority as well. Military stakes had to be raised very high, such as in the Cuban Missile Crisis, in order to affect diplomacy. Khrushchev conceded that no peace treaty need be made due to the success of the Berlin Wall. Though the Cuban Missile Crisis would have greatly increased the Soviet Union s bargaining position in Berlin, due to Kennedy s excellent handling of it, the Soviet Union lost credibility in negotiations instead. Eisenhower read the needs of his people and made it clear in 1959 that America s willingness to risk war over Berlin was very limited (574). Eisenhower considered Khrushchev the West s greatest hope for peace, leading in part to his mild reaction to the issue of Berlin. Charles de Gaulle wanted France to play a greater role in West Germany. He denounced the exploratory talks between the U.S. and Soviet Union and ascribed Khrushchev s ultimatum to being due to an inferior political system. De Gaulle could well afford such clear-sighted intransigence because, unlike the American President, he did not bear the ultimate responsibility for initiating a nuclear war (576). De Gaulle created a new trend (trend-setter ;)) of French friendships with Germany, in order to avoid Soviet domination of Europe and in realization that France was not strong enough to contain Germany alone or with alliances as in the past. For the United States, the Berlin crisis brought home the realization that nuclear weapons, which throughout the decade of America s nuclear monopoly and nearmonopoly had seemed to provide a quick and relatively inexpensive path to security, would, in the age of approaching nuclear parity, increasingly circumscribe America s willingness to run risks and thereby constrain its freedom of diplomatic maneuver (573). Massive retaliation, a strategy devised by Dulles, in which the U.S. would use nuclear weapons to counteract Soviet Aggression failed as the Soviet Union gained nuclear power itself. The American public desired a calm, collected government that feared the possibility of
Historiography nuclear war, while the kind of diplomacy needed to make the threat of nuclear war credible was that of reckless, hair-trigger reaction to threats. The most elaborate formulation of an advantage often occurs at the moment that the advantage begins to disappear, just as the United States experienced in the nuclear arms race with the theory of massive retaliation. Soviet military power was therefore a façade designed to obscure the endless internal struggles inherent in the Soviet system (576). Major Theme: End of the Cold War Break-Up of Soviet Union: Internal Problems and External Pressures Breakdown of Soviet Control Over Central and Eastern Europe Historiography