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Irrational Exuberance vs. Afro-Pessimism : Lessons from an empirical perspective on governance in Africa Daniel Kaufmann www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance www.govindicators.org Background for Presentation at the GAC Workshop April 23, 2008 Inputs and collaboration from Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi and staff from the World Bank s Africa region is acknowledged. Errors 1 and views are the author s.

Issues: Empirics inform on Fallacies vs. Realities? Moving Away from Fallacies: Unmeasurability of Governance & only rely on objective or official data Afro-pessimism lack of governance changes, and poor perfomers, or Irrational Exuberance by focusing on growth in very recent short term, declaring victory prematurely Generalizations about the whole African continent excessive averaging Governance a Luxury Good Towards a new Reality: Governance is measured Governance Matters for development Understanding the variety and contrasts across countries in the continent Learning from good performers: some leaders, countries, and institutions showing the art of the possible Role of the Demand Side of Governance, & of the International Community 2 & Private Sector

The Long View Sobering but some hope While Africa Stagnated, East Asia Soared GDP per capita: Africa & East Asia, 1960-2006 GDP per capita 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 East Asia & Pacific Low income Sub-Saharan Africa 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 1473 509 605 -- Chart depicts income per capita in 2000 constant terms. In 1960, actual per capita income of East Asia region was $141, while Sub-Saharan Africa average was $432; in 1974 it was $202 and $595, respectively, in 1994 it was $677 and $486, and in 2006 it was $1473 for East Asia and $583 for Africa. -- Source: WDI, Low-income economies are those in which 2006 GNI per capita was $905 or less (533 countries of which 33 from Sub-Saharan Africa).

AFRICA S FIVE FASTEST GROWING ECONOMIES STACK UP WELL WITH ASIA 10% 9% Africa Average Africa top performers Asia top performers China Annual GDP per capita growth, simple average 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% -1% 1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's 2000~2005 Source: WDI, 1960-2005 4

Macroeconomic Management has improved Inflation Rates, 2000-06 (in %) 26 22 18 Oil Exporting Oil- Countries 14 10 Oilimporting countries Africa Average 6 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Source: IMF, SSA Regional Economic Outlook. 5

Growth has recently picked up in a number of countries in Africa, yet very diverse Eq. Guinea Angola Chad Sudan Nigeria Congo Gabon Mozambique Botswana Sao Tome Mauritius Cape Verde Ethiopia Mali Tanzania Uganda Ghana Lesotho Sierra Leone Rwanda Namibia Cameroon Burkina Faso Zambia Senegal South Africa Guinea Benin Malawi Seychelles Gambia Mauritania Kenya Swaziland Madagascar Togo Niger Comoros Cote d'ivoire Central African Burundi Eritrea Congo, Dem. Rep. Guinea-Bissau Zimbabwe % of total African Population 14% 28% 13% 22% 13% 10% Per Capita Growth: 1-2% Negative Per Capita Growth Growth in Oil Rich Countries Countries with per Capita Growth Rate >3% Per Capita Growth: 2-3% Per Capita Growth 0-1% -4-2 0 2 4 6 8 10 GDP per capita growth, 1996-2006 Source: Africa s Silk Road (2007). Authors calculations based on 2007 ADI Report. 6

Governance in Africa: work in progress Governance defined and measured The WGI, margins of error, and caution Africa s governance performance: diversity in levels and in trends variance galore Complementing aggregate WGI with other data sources Some preliminary implications 7

What Is Governance?: the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes: The process by which governments are selected and replaced: 1.Voice and Accountability 2. Political Stability & No Violence/Terrorism Capacity of state to formulate and carry out good policies and deliver services 3. Government Effectiveness 4. Regulatory Quality Respect of citizens and state for rules of the game 5. Rule of Law 6. Control of Corruption 8

Worldwide Governance Indicators Data on six dimensions of governance covering 212 countries over 1996-2006 Based on hundreds of underlying indicators taken from 33 different data sources Aggregate and individual indicators available interactively at www.govindicators.org, largest governance database Full transparency on degree of imprecision: taking margins of error seriously Unobserved Component Model (UMC) used to aggregate individual sources 9

Why Measure Governance? Governance matters for: Development outcomes Effectiveness of foreign aid WGI are not a scorecard or a horserace entry point for serious empirical analysis Data on governance empowers reformers and advocates for change enables evidence-based policymaking If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it Lord Kelvin 10

Whose Views Do the WGI Reflect? WGI capture views of tens of thousands of stakeholders worldwide household and firm survey respondents sharing their successful and failed interactions with governments experts in NGOs, private and public sectors sharing their international perspective on governance successes and failures WGI do not reflect views of World Bank almost all data sources from outside WB WB allocation of IDA resources based on CPIA 11

Sources of Governance Data Cross-Country Surveys of Firms: Global Competitiveness Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals: Gallup World Poll, Global Corruption Barometer, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating Agencies: Global Insight, Political Risk Services, BERI, Economist Intelligence Unit, Merchant International Group, IJET Travel Consultancy, Asia Risk Consultancy Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks: Reporters Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Bertelsmann Foundation, Amnesty International, IREX, Global Integrity, Binghamton University, International Budget Project Expert Assessments from Governments, Multilaterals: World Bank CPIA, EBRD, AFDB, ADB, State Department, 12 OECD, IFAD

Why Aggregate Indicators? Basic Premise: individual data sources provide a noisy signal of broader concept of governance, e.g.: trust in police RULE OF LAW freedom of press VOICE & ACCOUNTABILITY bureaucratic quality GOV T EFFECTIVENESS Benefits of Aggregation aggregate indicators are more informative about broad concepts of governance simple intuition of averaging less likely to generate extreme outliers generate explicit margins of error for country scores 13

Three Principles for Using Governance Indicators 1. All indicators have measurement error rely on variety of data sources reduce noise by aggregation 2. There are no silver bullets subjective/perceptions vs. objective/statutory aggregate vs. individual indicators regular cross-national monitoring/research vs. detailed country diagnostics/country policy advice complements vs. substitutes 3. Links from policy actions to outcomes are complex actionable versus action-worthy indicators 14

Governance Indicators 2006, Selected Regions Voice & Accountability Government Effectiveness 100 Regulatory Quality Control of Corruption 90 Percentile Rank (0-100) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 East Asia NICs ('Tigers') East Asia developing Sub-saharan Africa Former Soviet Union Eastern Europe Latin America 15 Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org.

Sub-Saharan Africa Resource-Rich vs. Non Resource Rich Countries, 2006 100 OIL RICH COUNTRIES Percentile Rank (0-100) 80 60 40 20 OTHER (NON-OIL RICH) STRONG GROWTH PERFORMER (NON-OIL RICH) 0 Voice & Accountability Political Stability / Lack of Violence Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality Rule of Law Control of Corruption Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org. Oil Rich countries included Gabon, Congo, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Angola and Equatorial Guinea 16

1.8 Control of Corruption, African countries, 2006 Good Control of Corruption Governance Level Margins of Error 0-1.8 SOMALIA EQ. G UINEA Congo, Dem. Rep. ZIMBABWE NIGERIA SIERRA LEONE CHAD COTE D'IVOIRE ANGOLA SUDAN BURUNDI CENTRAL AFR. REP. CONGO TOGO KENYA NIGER GUINEA CAMEROON LIBERIA GABON BENIN ZAMBIA MALAWI UGANDA GAMBIA MAURITANIA MOZAMBIQUE MALI ETHIOPIA SWAZILAND BURKINA FASO SENEGAL TANZANIA MADAGASCAR ERITREA GHANA RWANDA NAMIBIA MAURITIUS SOUTH AFRICA CAPE VERDE BOTSWANA High Corruption Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, by Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi, June 2007,www.govindicators.org. Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red: country is in the bottom 10 th percentile rank ( governance crisis ); Light 17 Red: between 10 th and 25 th percentile rank; Orange: between 25 th and 50 th percentile rank; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th percentile rank; and Dark Green: between 90 th and 100 th percentile (exemplary governance). Estimates subject to margins of error.

Control of Corruption, 2006: Africa Map Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 18 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th.

Government Effectiveness, 2006: Africa Map Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 19 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th.

Government Effectiveness, 2006: Selected Countries 20

Over-time Changes in WGI s Voice & Accountability, selected African Countries, 1998-06 1.5 1 Unit Change 0.5 0-0.5-1 COTE D'IVOIRE ZIMBABWE ERITREA GABON ETHIOPIA BENIN CAMEROON Congo, Dem. Rep. BURUNDI Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org. Dark and light Green reflect significant improvement at 90 and 75% confidence level, respectively, and likewise regarding light and dark Red for deteriorations. By contrast, changes in Yellow (only selected 21 countries shown) are not highly significant statistically (once margin of error taken into account). NIGERIA LIBERIA CONGO KENYA GUINEA-BISSAU GHANA SIERRA LEONE LESOTHO NIGER

Governance Indicators for Benin, 1998-2006 22

Governance Indicators for Burundi, 1998-2006 23

Governance Indicators for Cameroon, 1998-2006 24

Governance Indicators for Congo DRC, 1998-2006 25

Governance Indicators for Ghana, 1998-2006 Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 26 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th.

Governance Indicators for Mozambique, 1998-2006 Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 27 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th.

Governance Indicators for Liberia, 1998-2006 28

Governance Indicators for Mali, 1998-2006 29

Governance Indicators for Zimbabwe, 1998-2006 Source for data: : 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, July 2007 30 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/); Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10 th percentile rank; Light Red between 10 th and 25 th ; Orange, between 25 th and 50 th ; Yellow, between 50 th and 75 th ; Light Green between 75 th and 90 th ; Dark Green above 90 th.

Governance and Development Is governance better than expected given low income levels in Africa? 2/3 of countries in Africa fall above the line in a scatterplot of governance against per capita income doing relatively ok on governance? This scatterplot interpretation (implicitly) assumes a strong positive effect of income on governance but actually most if not all of the causation is in the other direction better governance raises per capita income Weak rationale for income discount for governance challenges in poor countries 31

Rule of Law and Per Capita Income 3 WGI Rule of Law 2006 2 y = 0.63Ln(x) - 5.45 R 2 = 0.58 1 CPVBWA MUS NAMZAF SEN MWI TZA ZMB UGA GHA 0 MDG GMB LSO BFA RWA STP MRT ETH BEN 100 1000 MOZ SWZ GAB NER DJI 10000 100000 ERI LBR TGO BDI KEN COM GNB SLE TCD SDN NGA COG CMR -1 GNQ CIV GIN ZAR CAF ZWE -2 SOM -3 GDP Per Capita in 2003, USD at PPP, log scale 32

Higher Income Does Not Cause Better Governance 3 WGI Rule of Law 2006 2 1 y = 0.63Ln(x) - 5.45 R 2 = 0.58 NAMZAF SEN MWI TZA ZMB UGA MLI GHA 0 MDG GMB LSO BFA RWA STP MRT ETH BEN MOZ SWZ GAB 100 1000 NER DJI 10000 100000 ERI TGO BDI KEN COM LBR GNB SLE TCD SDN NGA COG CMR GNQ -1 CIV GIN ZAR CAF ZWE -2 SOM CPVBWA MUS Causal Effect of Income on Governance -3 GDP Per Capita in 2003, USD at PPP, log scale 33

Governance Matters: The 300% Dividend Large Development Dividend of Good Governance: a one-standard-deviation improvement in governance (say, corruption control) raise incomes per capita in a country by about 300% in long-run But is such a decline in corruption unrealistically large?: NO -- One S.D. is the difference from: Somalia Togo or Guinea- Bissau Namibia or Rwanda Botswana or Portugal Netherlands or Sweden The impact is from governance to incomes, and not viceversa -- higher incomes alone will not automatically do 34

Governance Matters -- The Development Dividend Isolating Causality: From governance to income) Kaufmann-Kraay (2002) 3 log(real GDP Per Capita) Alcala-Ciccone (2004) 2 Rodrik-Subramanian-Trebbi (2004) Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson (2000) 1 0-3 -2.5-2 -1.5-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5-1 Rule of Law 2004-2 -3 35

Avg per capita growth rate 98-06 (%) Even in the Shorter Term African countries can benefit from improvements in Governance? Changes in Control of Corruption & Income per capita growth, 1998-06 2 1 0 r = 0.41 Corruption Control Deteriorating Governance Improving Countries Corruption Control Improving Source for data: 'Governance Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006, by D. Kaufmann, A.Kraay and M. Mastruzzi, June 2007 - www.govindicators.org, and World Bank database. The Africa sample excludes 7 oil-rich countries; the correlation is somewhat lower when included. 36

Complementing WGI & Learning from Disaggregated Data Firms Speak: Top Constraints to Business, EOS 2006 % firms reporting constraint among top 3: 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Financing Labor Market Foreign Currency Average for Sub-Saharan African Countries in EOS Infrastructure Bureaucracy Educated Workforce Work Ethics Policy Instability Government instability Crime Corruption Tax Regulations Tax rates Inflation Source: EOS 2006. The question posed to the firm was: Select among the above 14 constraints the five most problematic factors for doing business in your country. Note that the overall EOS sample covers 125 countries, and in some regions particularly in the Middle East, Africa and the FSU, many countries are not surveyed. Thus, regional averages need to be interpreted with caution, since typically countries not surveyed tend to rate lower in governance than those surveyed. 37

Frequency of Bribery Unbundling Different Manifestations of Bribery, EOS 2006 % Firm Report High Bribery (1-3) 100 High Bribery 80 60 40 20 Low Bribery 0 Bribery in: Trade Permits Procurement Connection to Utilities Judiciary Benin Botswana Burundi Cameroon Kenya Rwanda South Africa Source: EOS firm survey, WEF2006. Questions: In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with permits / utilities / taxation / awarding of public contracts / judiciary? (common never occurs). How commonly do firms like yours make undocumented extra payments to lower level public servants / high ranking politicians, political parties, and senior public servants to secure business? 38

60-70- Responsibility of the Private Sector & Multinationals on Anti-Corruption (% of Firms Reporting Procurement Bribery, 2006) 50-40- 30-20- 10- Location Multinational in Multinational Domestic Firms in NON OECD, HQ in operating outside OECD Countries (comparable) of Firm: another OECD OECD, HQ in OECD Source: EOS2006. Questions: When firms like yours do business with the government, how much of the contract value must they offer in additional payments to secure the contract?. Y-axis shows percentage of firms who admitted paying bribes. Last bar excludes small with less than 50 employees. 39

Complementing WGI: Country-specific, in-depth Governance & Anti-Corruption diagnostic surveys A demand-driven, participatory action-oriented process to improve governance Key features: Three surveys: households, firms, and public officials Questions focus both on experience and perceptions Questions are tested and adapted to local realities Rigorous technical requirements in implementation Local institution implements, with advise from outside Outcomes: enhanced local capacity, baseline governance data, and action plan for policy reform In Africa, examples of such diagnostics in Ghana, Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Guinea, Nigeria, Malawi, Benin, and Burundi. 40

The power of diagnostic data and key dimensions for analysis 1. Participatory and Transparency Tool, for all stakeholders within the country to be involved 2. Unpackage corruption administrative, state capture, bidding, theft of public resources, purchase of licenses 3. Identify weak and strong institutions 4. Assess the costs of corruption on different stakeholders 5. Identify key determinants of good governance 6. Input to develop concrete policy recommendations 41

Corruption acts as a regressive tax, and small firms pay more in bribes, 2000-2005 (% of gross monthly revenue paid in bribes, as reported by firms) 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Guinea(2004) Ghana(2000) Small Medium Large 42

Governance Indicators, by agency (based on responses of public officials from 20 agencies, Guinea 2004) Audit Mechanisms Enforcement of Rules Quality of Rules Politicization Resources Transparency Citizen Voice Wage Satisfaction Service State Capture Overall Corruption Ministère de la justice 63 51 55 44 37 47 72 19 67 44 39 Ministère de la Sécurité 62 50 57 44 38 47 74 18 69 38 35 Ministère de l Administration et de la Décentralisation 61 53 54 42 39 49 75 29 70 45 45 Ministère des Finances 76 72 60 40 43 58 80 28 67 51 30 Ministère de l Enseignement Supérieurs et Recherche 62 50 56 44 35 46 74 20 69 47 42 Scientifique Ministère de l Urbanisme et Habitat 76 42 33 64 75 38 5 Ministère de la Santé Publique 70 63 57 43 35 60 70 30 58 40 44 Service Communal 62 51 34 40 52 64 13 49 49 Service Sous Préfectoral 58 43 55 45 32 43 72 13 64 52 37 Ministère de la Communication 52 61 44 38 46 75 42 65 69 Ministère de la Jeunesse et Sports 60 52 56 42 42 53 73 11 71 52 42 Ligue Islamique Nationale 62 60 59 41 41 49 75 28 64 43 33 Ministère de l Agriculture 61 58 57 42 38 45 77 30 65 36 36 Ministère de l enseignement Pré Universitaire 67 69 57 41 50 50 72 42 76 45 31 Ministère de la Fonction Publique 44 60 45 44 44 71 25 56 10 Organisation Non Gouvernementale (ONG) 59 53 41 48 44 82 8 70 54 Entreprise Micro Finance 32 73 8 80 13 Ministère de l Energie, Mines et Environnement 70 49 55 52 25 74 Whole Country 62 50 57 45 34 46 75 20 68 42 37 The indicators above take values between 0-100. To interpret them please keep in mind that: -The higher the value of the governance indicator the better the quality of that dimension. -The higher the value of the corruption index, the more severe the problem. 43

Concluding: Some Issues for Debate Governance Matters, and so does Measuring it Learning from considerable Country and Institutional Variation in Africa & other regions Candid & Realistic Role of Donors, Private Sector & Multinationals Away from focus on symptoms and on superficial reforms by fiat Towards deeper Incentive-driven reforms Back to basics?: Contestable Politics, Competition, Transparency, Voice & Free Press; Judiciary Reforms 44

Concretely: 10 Transparency Reform Components 1. Public Disclosure of Assets & Incomes of Candidates, Public Officials, Politicians, Legislators - & dependents 2. Public Disclosure of Political Campaign contributions by individuals and firms, and of campaign expenditures 3. Public Disclosure of Parliamentary Votes, w/out exceptions 4. Effective Implementation of Conflict of Interest Laws, separating business, politics, legislation, & government 5. Publicly blacklisting firms bribing in public procurement 6. Effective Implementation of Freedom of Information Law, with easy access to all to government information 7. Fiscal/Financial transparency: EITI, budgets, ROSCs 8. E*procurement: transparency (web) and competition 9. Media Freedoms & Media Development 10. Country Diagnostic (& Scorecard) on Governance & A-C 45

Data for Analysis and Informing Policy Advice, Not for Precise Rankings Any data on Governance, Institutions, and Investment Climate are subject to a margin of error. They are not intended for precise country rankings, but to highlight relative strengths and weaknesses and draw analytical and policy lessons. The data and indicators do not necessarily reflect official views on rankings by the World Bank or its Board of Directors. Errors are responsibility of the main authors. This presentation draws from collaboration and inputs from Massimo Mastruzzi as well as from staff from the Africa region. For access to the data and to bibliographical references, visit www.govindicators.org 46