Geraci-Yee v Freeport Union Free School Dist. 2010 NY Slip Op 33340(U) November 22, 2010 Supreme Court, Nassau County Docket Number: 10503/06 Judge: Denise L. Sher Republished from New York State Unified Court System's E-Courts Service. Search E-Courts (http://www.nycourts.gov/ecourts) for any additional information on this case. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.
[* 1] SHORT FORM ORDER SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK PRESENT: HON. DENISE L. SHER Acting Supreme Cour Justice SABRIA GERACI-YEE, an infant by her father and mother and natural guardians, JIMMY YEE and LORI GERACI, individually, TRIAL/IAS PART 32 NASSAU COUNTY - against - Plaintiffs Index No. : 10503/06 Motion Seq. No. : 06 Motion Date: 08/03/10 FREEPORT UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendant. The followine papers have been read on this motion: Notice of Motion for Summ Jud men Affirmation and Exhibits Affirmation in O osition and Exhibits Reply Affirmation and Exhibits Papers Numbered Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for an order granting summar judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs oppose defendant's motion. Plaintiffs commenced this action for damages due to an alleged assault to plaintiff Sabrina Geraci- Y ee (the "infant plaintiff') by another high school student, Stephania Pena ("Ms. Pena ) while on the grounds of defendant's Freeport High School. Plaintiff alleges that on March 29, 2006, at the end of a play rehearsal at approximately 8:40 p., the infant plaintiff got into a physical confrontation wherein the infant plaintiff allegedly suffered injuries. Defendant contends it had no evidence that Ms. Pena was a disciplinar problem (see
[* 2] Defendant' s Affirmation in Support Exhibit 0) and it has no prior complaints from the infant plaintiff or her parents as to Ms. Pena. See Defendant's Affirmation in Support Exhibit C, p. 19. The infant plaintiff stated Ms. Pena did not make any physical threats toward the infant plaintiff prior to the March 29, 2006 incident. See Defendant's Affirmation in Support Exhibit J, pp. 19-20 and Exhibit Q. The infant plaintiff never requested a security detail for protection against anyone. See Defendant' s Affirmation in Support Exhibit C, p. 127. As to the specific incident of March 29 2006, Ms. Pena had been attending softball practice when Ms. Pena approached the infant plaintiff in the hallway as the infant plaintiff sought to enter play practice. Ms. Pena accused the infant plaintiff of having a sexual encounter with Ms. Pena s boyfriend. While it is alleged Ms. Pena did not touch the infant plaintiff, it is alleged Ms. Pena spat on the infant plaintiff. The infant plaintiff continued to play practice. The infant plaintiff did not inform the teacher in charge of the play rehearsal. When play practice was over, Ms. Pena again approached the infant plaintiff and the infant plaintiff began to scuffle. School security broke up the incident within a minute of the star of the altercation. Prior to the March 29 2006 incident, the infant plaintiff did have problems with a few other female students (not Ms. Pena). The infant plaintiff reported the problems to the infant plaintiff s softball coach, Ms. Christina Bivona, and the problems ended. Ms. Bivona stated she had not heard of physical threats against the infant plaintiff. See Defendant's Affirmation in Support Exhibit O. Plaintiffs allege defendant owed the infant plaintiff a " special duty. As to a "special duty" to establish a special duty of protection, a par must show the assumption by the public entity through promises or action, of an affirmative duty to act on
[* 3] behalf of the injured part, knowledge on the par ofthe defendant that inaction could lead to har of the plaintiff, some form of direct contact between the defendant and the injured plaintiff and the injured plaintiffs justifiable reliance on the defendant' s affrmative action. See Basher v. City of New York 268 A.D.2d 546, 702 N. Y.S.2d 371 (2d Dept. 2000) Iv to app den. 95 Y.2d 759, 704 N.Y.S.2d 709 (2000). The mere implementation of security measures at a high school does not give rise to a special duty. See Dickerson v. City of New York 258 A.D.2d 433 684 N.Y.S.2d 584 (2d Dept. 1999). Here, defendant's act of having security guards did not create a special duty to protect the infant plaintiff. There is no indication that the security guards were hired specifically to protect the infant plaintiff or a limited class of which the infant plaintiff was a member. See Blanc v. City of New York 223 A.D.2d 522 636 N. Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dept. 1996); Salmond by Salmondv. Board of Education of City of New York 131 A.D. 2d 829 517 N. Y.S.2d 90 (2d Dept. 1987). A "special duty" involves a promise of protection to a paricular citizen as opposed to the population at large. See Cuff v. City of New York 69 N. Y.2d 255 513 N. Y.S. 2d 372 (1987). Plaintiffs have not set forth or shown a " special relationship" existed between the infant plaintiff and defendant. See Shinder v. State of New York 62 N.Y.2d 945, 479 N.Y.S.2d 189 (1984); Dickerson v. City of New York, supra. Here, the record is devoid of defendant assuming an affirmative duty that generated justifiable reliance by the infant plaintiff of a special duty. See Cuff v. City of New York, supra. There is no evidence on the record that the infant plaintiff relied on school personnel or school security to protect her. See France v. New York City Board of Education 40 A.DJd 268
[* 4] 834 N. Y.S.2d 193 (IS! Dept. 2007). Here, defendant made out a prima facie case for sumar judgment that it established it owed no special duty to the infant plaintiff and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact. See Reynolds v. Central Islip Union Free School District 300 AD.2d 292, 751 N.Y.S.2d 850 (2d Dept. 2002). Furher, schools are obligated to exercise such care oftheir students as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances. See David v. County of Suffolk 1 N. Y.3d 525, 775 N. Y.S.2d 229 (2003). Schools are not insurers of safety as they canot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students. See Doe v. Orange- Ulster Board of Cooperative Educational Service 4 AD.3d 387, 771 N.Y.S.2d 389 (2d Dept. 2004). Although schools are not insurers of safety, they are obligated to exercise such care of their students as a parent of ordinar prudence would observe in comparable circumstances. See David v. County of Sufolk, supra; Shannea M v. City of New York 66 AD.3d 667, 886 Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dept. 2009). Schools canot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students. See Mirand v. City of New York 84 N. Y.2d 44 614 Y.S.2d 372 (1994); Doe v. Orange-Ulster Board of Cooperative Educational Service, supra and are not to be held liable for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another. See Johnsen v. Cold Spring Harbor Central School District 251 AD.2d 548, 674 Y.S.2d 740 (2d Dept. 1998). As schools are under a duty to adequately supervise students in their charge, they will be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.
[* 5] See Brandy B. v. Eden Cent. School Dist. 15 N.Y.3d 297 907 N. Y.S.2d 735 (2010); Mirand City of New York, supra. For a school to breach a duty to adequately supervise students in its charge so to be liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision, the school must have sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous condition which caused the injur in that the third-part acts could reasonably have been anticipated. See Whitfeld Board of Educ. of City of Mount Vernon 14 AD.3d 552, 789 N. Y. S.2d 188 (2d Dept. 2005); In- Ho Yu v. Korean Central Presbyterian Church of Queens; 303 A.D.2d 369, 756 N. S.2d 89 (2d Dept. 2003); Smith v. East Ramapo Central School District 293 A. 2d 521, 741 N. S.2d 251 (2d Dept. 2002); Velez v. Freeport Union Free School District 292 AD.2d 595, 740 Y.S.2d 364 (2d Dept. 2002). Actual or constructive notice to a school of prior similar conduct is generally required to find that a school has breached its duty to provide adequate supervision as a result of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students because school personnel canot reasonably be expected to guard against all of the sudden spontaneous acts that tae place among students on a daily basis. See Mirand v. City of New York, supra. An injur caused by the compulsive unanticipated act of a fellow student ordinarly will not give rise to a finding of negligence by a school, absent proof of prior conduct that could put a reasonable parent on notice to protect against the injur causing act. See Convey v. City of Rye School District 271 AD.2d 154, 710 N. Y.S. 2d 641 (2d Dept. 2000). To find that a school breached its duty to provide adequate supervision of students, in context of injuries caused by acts of fellow students, a plaintiff must show that the school had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury, that
[* 6], that the third-par acts could reasonably have been anticipated. See LaPage v. Evans AD. 3d 1019, 830 N. Y.S.2d 818 (3d Dept. 2007); Velez v. Freeport Union Free School District supra. Sufficiently specific knowledge or notice generally requires actual or constructive notice to the school of prior similar conduct, and an injur caused by the impulsive, unanticipated act of another student will ordinarily not give rise to a finding of negligence. See Calabrese v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist. 294 AD.2d 388, 741 N. 2d 569 (2d Dept. 2002). Here there was absolutely no history as to Ms. Pena and the infant plaintiff nor Ms. Pena as to other students. Also, constant supervision of students at the high school level is not required under the school' s duty to provide adequate supervision. See Rose ex rei. Rose v. Onteora Cent. School Dist. 52 AD.3d 1161 861 N. 2d 442 (3d Dept. 2008). As to school events that are intermural and other school approved extracuricular activities, the Cour of Appeals has held that the school exercise the less demanding ordinar reasonable care" standard as opposed to the " reasonable parent standard. See Benitez v. New York City Bd ofeduc. 73 N. Y.2d 650 543 N. S.2d 29 (1989). The infant plaintiff s prior history of " harassment" at the hands of other students was not sufficient to place defendant on notice that the infant plaintiff and Ms. Pena would be involved in a fight after play practice (emphasis added). See Siegel! v. Herricks Union Free School Dist. 7 AD. 3d 607, 777 N. Y.s. 2d 148 (2d Dept. 2004). Plaintiffs contend that security cameras or closed circuit TV would have prevented the alleged attack (allegedly fueled by an alleged affair of the hear) or serve as a deterrent. The Cour disagrees.
[* 7] It would have provided a record of the event and helped defendant to identify the assailants. Here, the incident was quickly quelled by a security officer and the paries were apprehended. Also, plaintiffs canot create a liability on the par of defendant by attempting to boot strap prior alleged bad conduct toward the infant plaintiff by Ms. Pena s alleged "crowd group" or posse. See Siegel! v. Herricks Union Free School Dist., supra. Here, plaintiffs did not show or raise triable issues of fact that defendant had actual or constructive notice of prior similar incident on the par of Ms. Pena. See Whitfeld v. Bd of Educ. of the City of Mt. Vernon, supra. Plaintiffs seek a "20/20 hindsight" standard for defendant and attempt to raise defendant' s standards to those of co-plaintiffs, i., infant plaintiffs parents allegedly sought a prospective cocoon around the infant plaintiff. The Cour canot adopt plaintiffs ' highly subjective standard. The Cour, from an objective point of view, must utilize the reasonable person standard (of the after-school event). As previously stated, a school and/or school district is liable for injuries caused by the intentional act of another student only when the plaintiff(s) shows that the acts of the fellow student could have been reasonable anticipated due to notice or prior specific knowledge of the specific aggressor student's propensity to engage in such conduct. See Flanagan v. Canton Central School Dist. 58 A.D.3d 1047 871 N. Y.S.2d 775 (3d Dept. 2009); Strnadv. Floral Park-Bellerose Union Free School Dist. 50 AD.3d 774 855 N. Y.S. 2d 609 (2d Dept. 2008). The record clearly reflects that the defendant did not have actual or constrctive notice as required for finding of liability to an injured student on the theory of inadequate supervision of prior similar conduct on the part of Ms. Pena who allegedly injured the infant plaintiff with
[* 8] her alleged attack on plaintiff, and thus the defendant is not liable in negligence for injures allegedly sustained by the infant plaintiff. See Calabrese v. Baldwin Union Free School Dist. supra. As discussed, there is no indication that more intense supervision could have prevented the incident. See Navarra v. Lynbrook Public Schools 289 AD.2d 211, 733 N. Y.S.2d 730 (2d Dept. 2001); Ancewicz v. Western Suffolk BOCES 282 AD.2d 632, 730 N.Y.S.2d 113 (2d Dept. 2001). Short of prohibiting the infant plaintiff from engaging in play practice, and perhaps keeping the infant plaintiff home, there was no way to insure that incidents such as the one herein would not occur. Where an incident occurs in so short a span of time that even the most intense supervision could not have prevented it, lack of supervision is not the proximate cause of the injur and summar judgment in favor of the school district is waranted. See Mayer Mahopac Central School Dist. 29 AD. 3d 653 815 N. 2d 189 (2d Dept. 2006). That is the situation here. In conclusion, defendants have made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that they had no actual or constructive notice of prior similar conduct by the student, Ms. Pena, who allegedly pushed the infant plaintiff. See Anglero v. New York City Bd of Educ. 304 A.D.2d 596, 758 N.Y.S.2d 162 (2d Dept. 2003). Defendant also showed that the level of supervision it provided for the infant plaintiff was at least that which a prudent parent and reasonable person would have provided, and it showed that the incident happened so suddenly that no amount of supervision could have prevented it. See Cranston v. NyackPublic Schools 303 AD.2d 441 756 N. 2d 610 (2d Dept. 2003).
[* 9] "'- -- '/ ;' " /, / Accordingly, defendant's motion, pursuant to CPLR ~ 3212, for an order granting summar judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint is hereby granted. This constitutes the decision and order of this Cour. ENTER: ) J /1 1)( \ I DENISE L. 'SHER Dated: Mineola, New York November 22 2010 ENTE NOV 2 9 2010 NASSAU COUNTY COUNTY CLERK' S OFFICE