Latino'Influence'in'the'2014'Elections*' DavidF.Damore, AssociateProfessor DepartmentofPoliticalScience UniversityofNevada,LasVegas LasVegas,NV89154 david.damore@unlv.edu Abstract' ThispaperexaminestheimpactofimmigrationpoliticsandLatinovotersinthe2014U.S.House andsenateelections.incontrastto2012,latinosinfluencewasmutedlargelybecauseofthe inabilityofdemocratstorecruitandfundqualitycandidatescapableofchallengingvulnerable Republicans,aswellasdeclinesinparticipationinresponsetothefailureofcomprehensive immigrationreformandpresidentobama'sdecisiontodelayexecutiveactiontoalleviate deportationsofsomeunauthorizedimmigrants.assuch,theanalysispresentedheresuggests thatevenwhenimmigrationisasalientissuelatinopoliticalparticipationisconditionedupon geographic,political,andcontextualfactors.thefailureofthesevariablestoalignin2014 resultedinfew,ifany,republicansbeingpunishedelectorallyfortheirparty'shandlingof immigrationandamissedopportunityforthedemocratstofurtherconsolidatelatinosvoters. *PaperpreparedforpresentationattheAnnualMeetingoftheWesternPoliticalScience Association,LasVegas,NV,April2 4,2015.Earlierversionsofpartsofthispaperappearedas Damore2015a,2015b,2015c,and2015d.
Intheaftermathofthe2012presidentialelection,theconventionalwisdomsuggested thatmittromney'sdismalperformanceamonglatinovotersnotonlydoomedhiscandidacy,but alsothreatenedthegop'slongytermelectoralprospects.inresponse,therepublicannational Committee(RNC)releasedthe"GrowthandOpportunityProject"report.WithrespecttoLatino voters,thereportednoted,"hispanicvoterstellusourparty spositiononimmigrationhas becomealitmustest,measuringwhetherwearemeetingthemwithawelcomematoraclosed door."thefollowingjune,theu.s.senate withthesupportof14republicansenators passed comprehensiveimmigrationreform(s.744)thatincludedapathwaytocitizenshipfor unauthorizedimmigrants.anymomentumfortherepublicanpartytodeliveronimmigration reform,however,collapsedintherepublicancontrolledhouseofrepresentatives. Assessingwhatoccurrednextisthefocusofthiseffort.Specifically,Iseektoexamine howimmigrationpoliticsandbyextension,latinopoliticalparticipationaffectedthe2014house andu.s.senateelections.myanalysishighlightstheimportanceofgeographic,contextual,and politicalfactorsonlatinopoliticalbehavior.whenthesefactorsdonotalign,aswasthecasein 2014,theinfluenceofLatinovotersismuted. IbeginbyreviewingscholarshipexaminingtheimportanceofimmigrationtoLatino politicalparticipationandtoplacethe2014electionsincontext,iconsiderthestateof immigrationandlatinopoliticsleadinginto2014.next,electionsfortheu.s.houseof Representativesareexaminedtoassesshowtheparties'responsestothemacropolitical environmentconditionedcandidateemergenceandresourceallocationinamannerthatlimited Latinoelectoralinfluence.Ialsoconsiderhowthe2014U.S.Senatemapandtheunwillingnessof somedemocraticcandidatestoembraceimmigrationreformprovidedfewopportunitiesfor 1
Latinovoterstoaffecttheseraces.Insodoing,Icombinedatatraditionallyusedinstudiesof congressionalelectionswithdatafrom"the2014latinodecisionselectionevepoll"andl2voter MappingdetailingLatinopoliticalparticipation.Thepaperconcludesbyassessingwhatthe2014 electionsrevealaboutthecontoursoflatinopoliticalparticipation. The'Context'of'Latino'Political'Participation'' AsBarretoetal.(2014,173)suggest,"Attemptingtoseparate'Latino'politicsfrom 'immigration'politicsisafool'serrand."tobesure,latinovoterscareaboutissuesbesides immigrationsuchaseconomicopportunity,education,andhealthcare.however,formany Latinos,immigrationandbyextension,howpartiesandcandidateshandletheissue,shapesnot onlyhowtheyvote,butalsowhethertheyvote. Anextensiveliteraturehasemergeddocumentingtheprimacyofimmigrationpoliticsasa keyexplanatoryvariableaffectingboththemobilizationandpartisanpreferencesoflatino voters.mostobviously,theshiftamonglatinovotersawayfromrepublicanpresidential candidatesandtowardsdemocraticpresidentialcandidatesbetween2004(whengeorgew. Bushreceived40percentoftheLatinovote)and2012(whenMittRomneyreceived25percent ofthelatinovote)representsthebiggestpartisanshiftamongaracialorethnicvotingbloc (Barretoet.al2014).Themagnitudeofthiseffecttakesonevengreaterimportgiventhegrowth inthelatinoelectorateduringthatperiod,particularlyinkeyswingstatessuchascolorado, Florida,NewMexico,andNevadathatBarackObamacarriedinboth2008and2012.Indeed, whilepresidentobama'svotesharedecreasedbytwopercentagepointsbetween2008and 2012,hissupportamongLatinosincreasedbyfourpoints(Barretoet.al2014). 2
Themostobviousexplanationforthisshiftishowthepartieshavehandledimmigration. SincethefailureofPresidentBush'sattemptstooverhaulimmigrationduringhissecondterm, theimmigrationrhetoricandpolicyprescriptionsofferedbythegophavetackedsignificantlyto theright.this,inturn,hascreatedapolicyspacethatthedemocratshaveusedstrategicallyto mobilizelatinovotersinspecificcontexts.forinstance,priortohis2010reelection,u.s.senate MajorityLeaderHarryReidsoughtunsuccessfullytoattachtheDREAMActtospending legislationtosendasignaltothelatinocommunitythatthedemocratscaredaboutthislatino policypriority.similarly,injuneof2012,presidentobamausedhisexecutiveauthorityto implementthedacaprogram.priortothatpollingconductedbylatinodecisionsfoundwaning enthusiasmamonglatinovotesforthepresidentowningtohisinabilitytopursue comprehensiveimmigrationreforminhisfirstterm,aswellastherecordnumberofdeportations carriedoutbyhisadministration.inbothinstances,latinovotersrespondedbyturningoutat highlevelsandoverwhelminglycastingtheirvotesforreidin2010andobamain2012. Californiaoffersthebestcontexttoexaminehowimmigrationpoliticscanreshapethe politicallandscape.priortothemidy1990s,californiawaslargelyarepublicanstate,particularly instatewideelections,andlongitudinalanalysisofthecaliforniafieldpollbybowler,nicholson, andsegura(2006)foundthatbetween1980and1994latinoswerebecominglessdemocratic. AnyhopestheRepublicanshadofbriningLatinovotersintotheircoalition,however,ended abruptly.theturningpointwasthequalificationandpassageofseriesofballotinitiatives Proposition187(1994),Proposition209(1996),andProposition227(1998) thatrespectively prohibitedunauthorizedimmigrantsfromaccessinggovernmentservices(includingeducation); bannedaffirmativeaction;andlimitedbilingualeducation. 3
FortheGOP,thetimingoftheinitiativescouldnothavebeenworse.Notonlydidthey coincidewithexplosivegrowthinthelatinoelectorate,buttheinitiativecampaigns,championed byrepublicangovernorpeterwilson,wereraciallychargedandscapegoatedlatinosforthe state'seconomicillsandexpandingsocialwelfarespending.theresponsefromthelatino communitywasimmediateandcompelling.barretoandwoods(2002)foundthatbetween1992 and1998just10percentofnewlyregisteredlatinovotersinlosangelescountyidentifiedas Republicans.Pantoja,Ramírez,andSegura(2001)foundhigherratesofturnoutamong naturalizedlatinosduringthe1990sandbarreto,ramírez,andwood(2005)reportthatthebest predictorofturnoutamonglatinovotersincaliforniawaswhethertheyregisteredafter Proposition187. NotonlydidLatinovotersincreasinglymovetowardstheDemocratswitheachsuccessive ballotmeasure,buttheassociationoftheseinitiativeswiththerepublicanpartyledtobacklash againstthegopamongwhitevoters.priortoproposition187whitevotersfavoredthegopby eightpercentagepoints.however,afterthepassageofthethreeinitiatives,thedemocrats enjoyedasixypointadvantageovertherepublicanpartyamonganglocalifornians(bowler, Nicholson,andSegura2006). Insum,extantresearchdemonstrateshowimmigrationpoliticscanaffectLatino mobilizationandturnout,withtheprimarybeneficiariesofincreasedlatinopoliticalparticipation beingdemocraticcandidates.atthesametime,mostoftheseeffectshavebeendocumentedin eitherpresidentialelectionsoru.s.senateracesinstateswithlargeandgrowinglatino populationsandwherethedemocratshavemadestrategicinvestmentsinlatinooutreach(i.e., California,Colorado,Florida,andNevada).Moreover,thesesamepatternsarenoticeablyabsent 4
inotherstateswithlargelatinopopulationsandsalientimmigrationpoliticssuchasarizonaand Texas.ThissuggeststhattheabilityofLatinostoinfluenceelectionsmaybeconditionaleven whenimmigrationisasalientissues.thus,the2014electionsofferausefulcontexttoexplore howtheconfluenceofgeographic,contextual,andpoliticalfactorsshapelatinopolitical participation.beforedoingso,iofferanoverviewoflatinoandimmigrationpoliticsleadinginto the2014elections. Latino'Politics'and'Immigration'Leading'into'2014' Asnotedattheoutset,oneofthekeytakeawaysfromthe2012presidentialelectionwas Latinovoterswerepivotal,andinsomestatesdecisive,toPresidentObama'sreelection(see Sanchez2015). 1 Inresponse,theRNCissuedits"GrowthandOpportunityProject"report suggestingthatlittletonolatinooutreachandtheparty'shardlineviewsonimmigrationwould continuetohinderthegop'sabilitytoattractlatinovoters.inajune2013appearanceonnbc's Meet'the'Press,SouthCarolinaRepublicanSenatorLindseyGrahamwasevenmorebluntashe declaredthattherepublicanpartyis"inademographicdeathspiralasapartyandtheonlyway wecangetbackingoodgraceswiththehispaniccommunityinmyviewispasscomprehensive immigrationreform.ifyoudon tdothat,itreallydoesn tmatterwhowerun[in2016]." ThemostobviousindicatoroftheGOP'sinterestin"gettingingoodgraceswiththe Hispaniccommunity"wastheconstructiverolethatsomeRepublicans,includingGraham,played inpassingcomprehensiveimmigrationreformincludingapathwaytocitizenshipoutoftheu.s. SenateinJuneof2013.Yet,despitestrongadvocacyfromthefaithandbusinesscommunities, 1 "The2012ImpreMedia/LatinoDecisionsElectionEvePoll"foundathreetooneadvantageforPresidentObama amonglatinovotersandthatlatinovotersaccountedfornearlysixpercentofpresidentobama spopularvote 5
thehouseneverconsideredthelegislationeventhoughthesenatebilloraclosealternative likelywouldhavepassedwithdemocraticvotesandsupportfromsomerepublicans. PerhapsinhopesofinoculatingtheGOPfrombeingblamedforkillingimmigration reform,thehouserepublicanleadershipsignaledthroughoutthe113 th Congressthatthe chambermightproceedinapiecemealmanner.however,formanyintherankyandyfilethere waslittleincentivetoallowanyimmigrationlegislationtopassthehouseasdoingsocouldlead toaconferencereportcombiningthesenatebillwithhouselegislation.sinceconferencereports mustbebroughtupforavote,comprehensiveimmigrationreformcouldbecomelawthrougha simplemajorityvote. Beyondthenuancesofthelegislativeprocess,HouseRepublicanoppositionreflectsa basicpoliticalcalculation.implementingimmigrationreformincludingapathwaytocitizenship wouldcreatemoredemocraticvotersandfurtherexpeditechangestothecountry spolitical demographythatwasalreadyundercuttingtheparty'selectoralprospectsinanumberof localities.moreover,withfewrepublicanheldhousedistrictscontainingsignificantsharesof Latinovoters,therewaslittlechancethatRepublicanswouldbepunishedelectorallyforfailingto act.rather,forhouserepublicansrepresentingsafe,homogenousdistrictsanymovementon immigrationreformmightengenderaprimarychallengewheretheywouldbeforcedtocompete inalowyturnout,intraypartyelectioncomposedofmoreideologicalvoters.asaconsequence, theonlyvotesthehousetookonimmigrationrelatedlegislationduring2014reinforcedthe GOP'shardlineapproach(i.e.,HR5230andHR5272)andhadnoprospectsofbeingconsideredin thedemocraticcontrolledsenate. 6
TheHouseRepublicans'aversiontoimmigrationreformhighlightstheconflictbetween theparty'scollectivegoalsandthoseofindividualpoliticians.forindividualhouserepublicans, whatmightbegoodfortherepublicanpartynationallymightnotbegoodfortheirreelection prospects.thedatainfigure1,whichsummarizesthe2012democraticandrepublicanvote sharesforallcontestedhouseseats,aswellastheethnicandracialcompositionofdemocratic andrepublicanheldhouseseatsinthe113 th Congress,tellmuchofthestory.Theaverage Republicanhelddistricthadavotingagepopulationthatisoverthreequarterswhite.In contrast,theaveragedemocratichouseseathad30percentfewervotingagewhites,overtwice asmanyvotingageafricanamericansandasians,andnearlytwiceasmanyvotingagelatinosas thoseheldbyrepublicans. 2 [Figure1AboutHere] InresponsetoHouseRepublicans inaction,presidentobamaindicatedthroughoutthe springandsummerthathewoulduseexecutiveauthoritytostemthetideofdeportations.this toofellbythewaysideoutofconcernsthatexecutiveactioncomingsoclosetotheelections couldharmthereelectionbidsofsomedemocraticsenators.instead,presidentobamadelayed doingsountillatenovember.forbothparties,shortytermpoliticalconsiderationstrumpedthe policypreferencesofthelatinocommunityandgavegristforamerica'svoicefounderfrank Sharry sobservationthat"it sneverconvenienttohelpoutlatinos"(o'keefe2014). 2 TheGOP ssuccessesinthe2010electionpositionedthepartytosignificantlyinfluencethedecennialredrawingof districtsboundariesforthehouseofrepresentativesinanumberofstates.theendresultwasstrongpartisan sortingsuchthatin2012winningdemocratsreceivedovertwoythirdsofthevote,whilewinninggophouse membersaveraged62percentofthevote.thelargeraveragevotesharefordemocratsisakeyreasonwhythe partyonlygainedeightseatsin2012despitewinningroughly1.4millionmorevotesnationallythanthegop.in 2014,theRepublicansreceived51percentoftheaggregateHousevote,butwon57percentoftheseats. 7
Data'and'Methods' Toexaminehowtheparties'handlingofimmigrationreformaffectedLatinopolitical influencein2014necessitatesunderstandingthegeographyofpoliticalcompetitionandhowthis interactedwiththeparties'responsestothemacropoliticalenvironment.thiscombinationof factorsdeterminedthecompetitivenessofindividualracesforthehouseofrepresentativesand thedegreetowhichimmigrationwasfeaturedinu.s.senateraces;allofwhichshapedthe degreetowhichlatinovoterswerepositionedtobeinfluential(measuredintermsofturnout andpartisansupport).inunpackingthesedynamics,icombinedatafromtheu.s.censuswith indicatorsofelectoralcompetitiveness(e.g.,marginality,candidatequality,andfundraising)and dataassessinglatinopoliticalparticipation(e.g.,"the2014latinodecisionselectionevepoll" andl2votermapping)todescriptivelyanalyzethecontoursoflatinoelectoralinfluencein2014. 2014'Elections'for'the'House'of'Representatives' ThedatapresentedinFigure1illustratewhyincumbentsofbothpartiesoftenclaimtobe moreconcernedaboutprimarychallengersasopposedtoastronggeneralelectionopponent fromtheoppositionparty.forrepublicanswhofearachallengefromtheright,political expediencedictatesoppositiontolegislationthatcanbedepictedasbeingeitherweakon securityorproviding"amnesty"toundocumentedimmigrants.yet,developingexpectations aboutmembers behaviorintermsofaveragedistrictcharacteristicsobscuresindividualcontexts whereimmigrationpoliticsmayplaydifferently. Earlyinthe2014electioncycle,LatinoDecisionsidentified44Republicanand58 DemocraticheldLatinoInfluenceHousedistricts(seeDamore2013).Districtswereincludedif the2010latinovotingagepopulationeitherexceedsorapproachesthe2012housemarginof 8
victoryorifthedistrictwaswonin2012bytheoppositionparty spresidentialcandidate. Dependinguponthesefactors,eachdistrictwasplacedintooneofthreetierswiththetiers capturingtheelectoralvulnerabilityoftheincumbentandthedegreetowhichthepoliticsof immigrationandthelatinoelectoratecouldbeinfluentialin2014.becausefewifanyofthe thirdtierdistrictswerecompetitive,theyareexcludedfromtheanalysispresentedhere. Intotal,thereweresufficientdistrictswhereLatinovoterswerepositionedtoaffect majoritycontrolofthehouseofrepresentativesdependentupontheabilityofthechallenging partytorecruitandfundqualitycandidatescapableofengagingandmobilizinglatinovoters. However,poorrecruitingbytheDemocratsinmanyLatinoInfluencedistrictssubstantially decreasedthenumberofcontextswherelatinosandproyimmigrationinterestscouldrewardor punishmembersofcongressfortheirhandlingofimmigration. Forinstance,inCalifornia s25thdistrictdemocratleerogersfailedtofinishinthetop twointheeightycandidatejungleprimary.instead,tworepublicanswereontheballot competingtorepresentadistrictthatnarrowlywentforromneyin2012andwithalatinovoting agepopulationof32percent.floridabestillustratesthedemocrats recruitmentwoes.the partyhadnocandidateinthe13thdistricttoopposerepublicandavidjollywhonarrowlywona specialelectionthepriorwinter.inflorida s10th,threecandidatescompetedinthedemocratic primarytofacedanielwebsterandthedemocratsstruggledtorecruitaqualitychallengerin Florida s16thbeforefirstytimecandidateandformerprofessionalfootballplayerhenrylawrence filedtorunagainstvernbuchanan.allthreedistrictswerehighlycompetitivein2012,bothat thepresidentialandcongressionallevels(seetable1),andhavelatinovoteagepopulations rangingfromseven(fly13)to14percent(fly10). 9
TheDemocratsalsofailedtofieldacandidateinNorthCarolina s9 th districttocompete againstincumbentrobertpittenger.pittengerransevenpointsbehindromneyin2012ina districtwithasmallbutgrowinglatinovotingagepopulation.indistrictswithretiringdemocrats (NCY7andUTY4),theDemocratsfieldedlacklustercandidates,allbutguaranteeingRepublican pickyups. Democraticchallengerswhowerehighlytoutedatthestartofthe2014cyclefaded.For instance,inearlyspringthedemocraticcongressionalcampaigncommittee(dccc)reserved advertisingbuysforthefall.onlyninedemocratchallengersrunninginrepublicanheldtierone ortiertwolatinoinfluencedistrictswereincluded.omittedwereeightcandidatesinthedccc s "RedtoBlue"programincludingthreecandidatesrunninginLatinoInfluencedistricts:Erin Bilbray(NVY3),SeanEldridge(NYY19),andRockyLara(NMY2). Ingeneral,theDemocrats decisionymakingandpatternsofresourceallocationwere consistentwithhowpartiesbehaveinanunfavorableelectoralenvironment.insteadoftryingto expandtheplayingfield,thepartyprotectsitsincumbents.asaconsequence,whatoccurson ElectionDayislargelydeterminedbydecisionsmademonthsbefore(JacobsonandKernell1983). Ifdonorsandpartyleadersperceiveitwillbeadownyear,theydevotefewerresourcesto challengingvulnerableincumbentsoftheoppositionpartyandmoreresourcesprotectingtheir incumbents.theoppositeholdsforthepartythatthemacroenvironmentfavorssuchthattheir party sleadersanddonorsseektoexpandthenumberofdistrictsinplaythroughaggressive recruitment.thepartyisalsoabletoprovidethesechallengerswithaccesstomoreresources sincemanyoftheirmostvulnerableincumbentsarenotbeingseriouslychallenged.thespending bysuperpacsandotheroutsidegroupsenhancesthesepatterns. 10
ThedatapresentedinTables1and2areconsistentwiththeseexpectations.Specifically, thesetablessummarizethe25democratic(table1)and24republican(table2)heldtierone andtiertwolatinoinfluencedistricts demography(latinovapandlatinoshareofregistered voters)andcompetitiveness(2012houseandpresidentialmarginofvictory);2014candidate fundraisingandoutsidespendingtotals;andthe2014marginofvictory. 3 [Tables1and2andFigure2AboutHere] LookingfirstattheDemocraticheldseats(Table1),excludingthethreeopenseats(NCY7, NYY21,andUTY4,allofwhichwerewonbyRepublicans),exceptforAZY2,allDemocratic incumbentsoutraisedtheirrepublicanchallengers,asdidsethmoultoninmay6,whodefeated incumbentjohntierneyintheprimary.collectively,thedemocratsrunninginthesedistricts raised$72.2millionascomparedto$47.8millionfortherepublicancandidates(a1.5to1ratio). However,spendingbyoutsidegroupseitherbolsteringRepublicansorattackingDemocratsoffset someofthisadvantageastherepublicanreceived$3.3millionmoreinoutsidespending. ThepatternsfortheRepublicanheldtieroneandtiertwodistrictsareverydifferent(see Table2).BecausemanyoftheRepublicancandidateswerenotseriouslychallenged,their fundraisingtotalsweresignificantlylessthanthoseoftheirdemocraticcounterparts. Traditionally,incumbentsraiseandspendinresponsetotheelectoralchallengestheyface.Doing soensuresthataparty sresourcesareusedefficientlysuchthatmoneyflowstotheraceswhere itisneededinsteadofbeinghoardedbysafeincumbents. 3 Dataforthefundraisingratios,"DemocraticOutside,"and"RepublicanOutside"columnsofTables1and2arefrom OpenSecrets.org.The"LatinoVAP"columnuses2010U.S.CensusdatasummarizingtheLatinoshareofthevoting agepopulationineachhousedistrict,whilethe"latinoregistrationshare"columnusesdatafroml2votermapping capturingthelatinoshareofregisteredvotersineachdistrict.dataforthe"2012margin"and"2014margin" columnsarefromtheassociatedpressanddataforthe"obama Romney"columnarefromDailyKos. 11
Evenstill,theratiobetweenRepublicanandDemocraticfundraisingwaslarger(1.56to1) inthesedistrictsascomparedtointhedemocraticdistricts.moreover,whileonlyone RepublicancandidateintheDemocratichelddistrictsraisedlessthan$300,000,thiswasthecase ineightofthe22republicanheldseatscontestedin2014.withfewvulnerablerepublicansin LatinoInfluencedistrictsfacingstrongopposition,outsidegroupslargelystayedoutofthese races.asaconsequence,thetotaloutsidespendingintherepublicanhelddistrictswas$36.5 million(ascomparedto$98.3millioninthedemocraticdistricts)andnearlyhalfofthistotalwas concentratedincoy6andfly2;thelatterofwhichwasoneofthethreeseatsthedemocrats flippedin2014. Inshort,thepatternsinthetieroneandtiertwoLatinoInfluencedistrictsin2014are consistentwiththe"selfyfulfilling"prophecyhypothesislinkingexpectationsaboutthemacroy politicalenvironmenttodecisionsinindividualdistricts.fearingabadelectoralenvironment,the Democratsattemptedtoprotecttheirincumbents,whiletheRepublicansdidjusttheopposite. Thecombinationofstrongerandbetterfinancedchallengersandspendingbyoutsidegroup undercutthefundraisingadvantagesofthedemocraticcandidatesinthesedistricts. Meanwhile,becausemostDemocraticcandidatescompetingintheRepublicanheld districtsfailedtomountseriouscampaignsandwereunabletoattractthesupportofoutside groups,republicansinthesedistrictsneededfewerresourcestowinthesedistrictsbylarger marginsthanin2012.exceptforthetwoseatswheredemocratsprevailed(fly2andcay31)the 2014marginofvictoryforeveryotherRepublicanincreasedascomparedto2012andina handfulofdistrictstheseincreasesweresevenfoldorgreater. 12
ThesamecannotbesaidfortheDemocratictieroneandtiertwoLatinoInfluence districts.democraticlossesinthesedistrictsaccountfor10ofthe16seatsthegoppickedupin 2014andinjustnineofthesedistrictsdidtheDemocratsincreasetheirmarginofvictoryas comparedto2012(intheothersixseatsthemargindecreased).although"the2014latino DecisionsElectionEvePoll"doesnotdisaggregateresultsforspecificHousedistricts(duetosmall districtsamples),nationallylatinosupportfordemocratichousecandidatesdecreasedfrom77 percentin2012to69percentin2014(seefigure2),whiletherepublicanshareincreasedfrom 23percentto27percent. Certainly,someofthisdropYoffinDemocraticsupportstemsfromdifferencesinthe compositionofthe2012and2014latinoelectorates.typically,themidtermelectorateisolder anddrawsmoreheavilyfromhighersocioyeconomicvoters;factorsthatcorrelatewithgreater Republicansupport.Equallyimportanttoconsiderthougharethedifferencesbetweenthe "LatinoVAP"and"LatinoRegistrationShare"columnsinTables1and2.Inonlythreeofthe49 districtsdidthelatinoregistrationshareexceedthelatinovotingagepopulationandnoneby morethan.3percent(miy1andohy6,twodistrictsheldbyrepublicanmembersofthehouse thathavesmalllatinopopulationsbutwhichwerecarriedbyobamain2012).moreover,innine ofthe10seatsthatswitchedfromdemocratictorepublicanrepresentation(theonlyexception istheheavilylatinofly26)thedifferencebetween"latinovap"and"latinoregistrationshare" exceedsthe2014margin. 2014'Elections'for'the'U.S.'Senate' Asisdetailedabove,Latinoelectoralinfluencehaslargelybeenanalyzedinpresidential electionsandtoalesserextent,inu.s.senateelectionsoccurringinswingstatessuchasflorida, 13
Colorado,andNevada.However,withnopresidentialelectionontheballotin2014,the potentialinfluenceoflatinovoterswaslimitedtou.s.senateelections.in2014,thedemocrats held20ofthe36u.s.senateseatsupforelectionandtherepublicansheldtheother16. However,manyoftheseelectionsoccurredinstateswhereonepartyholdstheoverwhelming advantage(e.g.,idaho,mississippi,andnebraskaforthegopandhawaii,oregon,androhde IslandfortheDemocrats)andasaconsequence,justtenraceswereconsideredcompetitiveby mostprominenthandicappers(seetable3). [Table3andFigure3AboutHere] Moreover,ascanbeseenfromTable3,whichreportstheRealClearPolitics(RCP)preY electionforecast,thelatinovap,latinoregistrationratesandtheirincreasessince2000,andthe 2014marginofvictory(forsomestatesthetotalandLatinoturnoutisalsoreported),besides Colorado,noneofthecompetitiveU.S.SenateelectionsoccurredinstateswithaLatinovoting agepopulationgreaterthan10percent. 4 Asaconsequence,thegeographyofthe2014U.S. SenateelectionsprovidedlittleopportunityforLatinovoterstoinfluenceoutcomes.Indeed,in justthreestateswithcompetitiveelections(alaska,colorado,andnorthcarolina)didthe"latino VAP"and"LatinoRegistrationShare"exceedtheeventualmarginandinallthreecases,the Democraticcandidateslost,aswasthecaseinsixoftheothersevencompetitiveU.S.Senate racesin2014. StillandasFigure3summarizingthepartisanvoteshareamongLatinosforselective statesandnationallyasreportedby"the2014latinodecisionselectionevepoll"indicates, 4 Dataforthe"LatinoVAP"andthe"RegistrationIncreaseSince2000"comefromtheU.S.Census.The"Latino RegistrationShare,""TotalTurnout,"andLatinoTurnout"columnsusedatafromL2VoterMapping.The"RCP Margin"columnreportstheRealClearPoliticsOctober26,2014pollingaverage,whilethe"2014Margin"column usesdatareportedbytheassociatedpress. 14
Democraticcandidates(andtheindependentcandidateinKansas)fortheU.S.Senateenjoyed strongsupportfromlatinovoters.atthesametimeandasweobservedinthecontextofthe HouseofRepresentatives,thenationalDemocraticshareoftheLatinovotedecreasedfrom72 percentin2012to67percentin2014,whiletherepublicanshareincreasedonepercent. [Figure4AboutHere] TheraceinColoradobetweenDemocraticincumbentMarkUdallandRepublican RepresentativeCoryGardnerprovidesausefulexample.Engagementandmobilizationof ColoradoLatinovoterswasakeyfactorintopoftheticketDemocraticvictoriesin2008,2010, and2012anditwasexpectedthatthispatternwouldcontinuein2014resultinginudallbeing reelected.despitethecandidates'verydifferentrecordsonimmigration(udallvotedfors.744 andgardnerreceivedazeroonthenationalimmigrationscorecard),thisdidnothappen. InsteadasthedatainFigure4indicate,thisdistinctionwaslostonmanyLatinovotersin Colorado.Indeed,while46percentofthesevotersknewthatUdallsupportedcomprehensive immigrationreform,48percentwereunawareofhisposition.similarly,38percentoflatino votersknewthatgardneropposedimmigrationreform.however,41percentdidnotknow Gardner simmigrationrecordeventhoughitwasantitheticaltothepositionsofmostlatino voters. PairingthesedatawiththosepresentedinTable3andFigure3suggestapartial explanationforudall sloss.clearly,udalldidwellwithlatinovoters,runningfourpointsbetter thandemocratsnationally.atthesametime,thedifferencebetweenthelatinovotingage populationandtheshareofcoloradolatinoswhoareregisteredtovotewasnearlytwiceas largeastheeventualmarginbywhichgardnerwon.moreover,turnoutamongregisteredlatino 15
votersincoloradowas55percentascomparedto71percentoverall.notonlydidtheudall campaignfailtodrawasharpcontrastontheimmigrationissueinthemindsofmanylatino voters,manypotentiallatinovoteswereleftonthetableowningtotheunderrepresentationof LatinovotersintheColoradoelectorate. TheU.S.SenateraceinNorthCarolinaoffersadifferentexampleofimmigrationpoliticsin statewideelections.democraticincumbentkayhagannotonlyurgedpresidentobamatodelay executiveactiononimmigration,butshe,alongwithothervulnerabledemocraticsenate incumbentsmarylandrieuoflouisiana,markpryorofarkansas,andjeanneshaheenofnew Hampshire,supportedaneffortbySenateRepublicanstolegislativelyblockthepresidentfrom takingaction.inresponse,presenteactionranspanishylanguageradioadsattackinghaganfor obstructingrelieffromdeportationforsomeunauthorizedimmigrants.inaracedecidedbyless thantwopoints,haganreceivedthelowestleveloflatinosupportamongalldemocraticu.s. Senatecandidates(seeFigure3)andLatinoturnoutlagged20pointsbehindthetotalelectorate (seetable3). Discussion'and'Conclusion' Astheanalysispresentedaboveindicates,despitethepotentialforLatinovoterstobe influentialin2014,muchofthispotentialwasunrealized.thiswasclearlythecaseinelectionsto thehouseofrepresentativesaspoorrecruitmentbythedemocratsresultedinuncompetitive racesandeasyreelectionsforrepublicanincumbents.indeed,thenumberofseatsthatthe DemocratswereabletopickYupin2014amongthetieroneandtiertwoRepublicanheldLatino Influencedistrictsequaledthenumberofdistrictswherethepartyfailedtofieldacandidate: two.thus,thecalculationbyhouserepublicansthatinactiononimmigrationreformwouldnot 16
hurttheir2014electoralprospectswasvalidatedinnosmallpartbythedemocratsemphasison incumbentprotection. TherealsoweremissedoutcomesintheDemocraticheldtieroneandtiertwodistricts. ByforegoingstrongchallengesintieroneandtiertwoRepublicanhelddistricts,theDemocrats notonlygavevulnerablerepublicanspasses,theyalsoensuredthatresources,particularitythose controlledbyrepublicanandconservativeoutsidegroups,wouldbeusedtotargetvulnerable Democraticincumbents.Thespendingbythesegroupsoffsetmostofthefundraisingadvantages ofthedemocraticincumbents,withtheendresultbeingtenrepublicanpickyupsamongthetier oneandtiertwodemocraticheldlatinoinfluencedistricts. Yet,eventhoughtheDemocratssoughttoprotecttheirincumbents,thereappearsto havebeenlittlemobilizationandoutreachtolatinovoters.innineofthetendistrictsthatthe GOPpickedYupin2014themarginofvictorywaslessthanthedifferencebetweentheLatino votingagepopulationandthelatinoshareofregisteredvoters.themostobviousexampleof thisisarizona s2 nd districtwheredemocraticincumbentronbarberlosttomarthamcsallyby 161votes.ThedistricthasaLatinovotingagepopulationofnearly22percent,butLatinos constitutelessthan16percentofregisteredvoters. InelectionstotheU.S.Senatethe2014mapworkedagainstLatinoinfluenceasthere werefewstatesfeaturingcompetitiveracesandsignificantnumbersoflatinovoters.yet,even incontextswherelatinovoterswerepositionedtobeinfluential,thedemocraticcandidates wereriskadversewithrespecttoimmigration.incolorado,markudallfailedtodifferentiate himselffromhisrepublicanopponentontheanimatingissueformostlatinovoters,whilein 17
NorthCarolina,DemocratKayHagan soppositiontoexecutiveactionresultedinherbeing targetedbyproyimmigrationactivists.inbothinstancesthedemocraticcandidatesnarrowlylost. Still,eventhoughsomeDemocratsarehesitanttodiscussimmigrationorsupport immigrationreformeffortsduringtheircampaigns,oneofthekeytakeawaysfrom"the2014 LatinoDecisionsElectionEvePoll"isthatformostLatinovoters,immigrationcontinuestobea salientissue.specifically,67percentoflatinovotersrespondedthatimmigrationwaseitherthe mostimportantoroneofthemostimportantfactorsinshapingtheirvotechoice.moreover, howthepartiesaddresstheissuenotonlyaffectshowlatinosvote,butiftheyvote.among Latinosregisteredbutwhodidnotvote,60percentreportedthatthedecisionbyPresident Obamatodelayexecutiveactiononimmigrationmadethemlessenthusiasticaboutthe presidentandthedemocraticparty. 5 Yet,anevenlargershare(68percent)respondedthatthey wouldbemoreenthusiasticaboutthedemocraticpartyinthefutureifpresidentobamawereto enactanexecutiveorderlimitingdeportationsashedidinlatenovember. [Figure5and6AboutHere] TherealsoisdatasuggestingthatanylockthattheDemocratsmightthinktheyhaveon Latinovotersisfragile.NotonlyweretheredeclinesinLatinosupportforDemocraticHouseand Senatecandidatesin2014ascomparedto2012,buttherealsowasanincreaseintheshareof LatinovoterswhoseetheDemocratsasbeingnotoverlyconcernedwiththeircommunity. Figure5summarizestheresponsestoaquestionfromthe2014LatinoDecisionsElectionEvePoll assessingrespondents perceptionsofthedemocraticandrepublicanparties viewstowardthe Latinocommunity.AlthoughmorethantwiceasmanyrespondentsfeltthattheDemocratstruly 5 Includedin"The2014LatinoDecisionsElectionEvePoll"wasanationalsampleof200registeredLatinovoterswho didnotvotein2014. 18
careaboutthelatinocommunityascomparedtothegop,thisattitudeissharedbylessthan halfoflatinovoters. ThepollalsofindsgrowingsupportforLatinopoliticalparticipationdistinctfrom partisanship.figure6reportstheresponsesfromtheelectionevepollassessingwhy respondentsvotedin2014.nationally,morelatinosindicatedthattheywerevotingtosupport thelatinocommunityasopposedtosupportingthedemocraticparty;aresultthatholdsinallof thestatesexceptforgeorgiaandtexas.thisrepresentsaslightshiftascomparedto2012when 39percentofLatinovotersrespondedthattheywerevotingtosupporttheDemocraticPartyand 36percentstatedthattheirvotewasmotivatedtosupporttheLatinocommunity. Insum,theresultsofthe2014electionssuggesttwoimportantconclusionsaboutLatino politicalparticipation.first,theabilityoflatinovoterstoaffectoutcomesisshapedbyamixof political,contextual,andgeographicfactors.whenthesevariablesdonotalign,aswasthecase in2014,theimpactoflatinovotersismutedevenasthelatinoelectoratecontinuestogrowand immigrationisasalientissue.second,participationintheelectoralprocessformanylatinos requiresoutreach.yet,manylatinosfeelignoredbythedemocratsandunderattackbythe Republicans.Asaconsequence,whiletheDemocratscontinuetoreceivethebenefitofthedoubt amongmanylatinovoters,thepartydidlittletoconsolidatelatinosupportin2014. 19
References' Barreto,Matt,andGarySegura.2014.'Latino'America:''How'America s'most'dynamic'' ' Population'is'Poised'to'Transform'the'Politics'of'the'Nation.NewYork:PublicAffairs.' andnathanwoods.2002."theantiylatinopoliticalcontextanditsimpactofgop DetachmentandIncreasingLatinoVoterMobilizationinLosAngelesCounty."InDiversity' ' in'democracy:''minority'representation'in'the'united'states,ed.garym.seguraand ShaunBowler.Charlottesville:UniversityofVirginiaPress.,RicardoRamírez,andNathanD.Woods.2005."AreNaturalizedLatinoVoters DrivingtheCaliforniaElectorate?MeasuringtheEffectsofIRCACitizensonLatino Voting."Social'Studies'Quarterly86(4):792 811.,GarySegura,ElizabethBergman,DavidDamore,andAdrianPantoja.2014."The Prop187Effect:ThePoliticsofImmigrationandLessonsfromCalifornia.In'Latino' ' America:''How'America s'most'dynamic'population'is'poised'to'transform'the'politics'of' ' the'nation,eds.mattbarretoandgarym.segura.2014.newyork:publicaffairs,173y 188. Bowler,Shaun,StephenP.Nicholson,andGaryM.Segura.2006"EarthquakesandAftershocks: Race,DirectDemocracy,andPartisanChange."AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience 50(1):146 159. Damore,DavidF.2013."HowLatinoVotersMayDecideControloftheU.S.Houseof Representatives."Latino'Decisions,9July..2015a."AnOverviewofLatinoInfluenceinthe2014Elections"Latino'Decisions, 26January..2015b.LatinoInfluenceandthePoliticsofImmigrationinthe2014U.S.Senate Elections,Latino'Decisions,9February..2015c.LatinoInfluenceinthe2014HouseElections:PartI,Latino'Decisions,2/24/15.2015d.LatinoInfluenceinthe2014HouseElections:PartII,Latino'Decisions,3/09/15 Jacobson,GaryC.andSamuelKernell.1983.Strategy'and'Choice'in'Congressional'Elections.New Haven:YaleUniversity. O'Keefe,Ed.2014."ToSome,Obama'sImmigrationDelayProves'It'sNeverConvenienttoHelp OutLatinos'."Washington'Post,6September. 20
Pantoja,Adrian,RicardoA.Ramírez,andGaryM.Segura.2001."CitizensbyChoice,Votersby Necessity:PatternsinPoliticalMobilizationbyNaturalizedLatinos."Political'Research' ' Quarterly'25(2):256 286 Sanchez,Gabriel,ed.2015.Latinos'and'the'2012'Election:''The'New'Face'of'the'American'Voter. EastLansing,MI:MichiganStateUniversity. 21
Table1:DemocraticHeldTierOneandTierTwoLatinoInfluenceDistricts,2014 Tier District Dem:Rep Fundraising Ratio DemOutside Spending RepOutside Spending Latino VAP(%) 22 LatinoReg Share(%) ObamaJ Romney 2012 Margin 2014 Margin 1" AZ1" 2.45:1" $5,482,290"" $6,729,929"" 18.1" 13.1" 2.5" 3.7" 5" 1" AZ2".85:1" $5,259,913"" $4,921,801"" 21.7" 15.9" 1.5" 0.8" "161"votes" 1" AZ9" 2.68:1" $1,093,971"" $60,398"" 22.4" 14.2" 4.5" 4.1" 12.8" 1" CA7".85:1" $6,493,389"" $7,082,232"" 13.7" 12.1" 4" 3.4" 0.4" 1" CA26" 2.12:1" $2,184,358"" $1,366,859"" 38.5" 27.0" 10.3" 5.4" 1.6" 1" CA36" 2.63:1" $612,074"" $173,180"" 39.4" 28.8" 3.2" 5.8" 7.6" 1" CA52" 1.07:1" $4,298,236"" $3,656,501"" 11.5" 10.9" 6.4" 2.4" 3.2" 1" CT5" 1.68:1" $670,025"" $3,917"" 13.1" 10.5" 8.2" 2.6" 7" 1" FL18" 3.43:1" $1,422,149"" $6,479"" 12.1" 11.0" 4.1" 0.6" 19.6" 1" IL10" 1.39:1" $3,229,694"" $6,981,668"" 18.1" 11.0" 16.4" 1.2" 3.2" 1" MA6^" 1.63:1" $1,547,992"" $2,684,245"" 6" 6.1" 10.8" 1.2" 13.7" 1" NC7*".04:1" $401,762"" $30,272"" 7.3" 2.9" 19.3" 0.2" 22.3" 1" NY1" 1.68:1" $5,313,325"" $3,579,671"" 11.2" 7.2" 0.5" 4.8" 9.6" 1" NY18" 1.23:1" $2,273,909"" $1,221,050"" 13.1" 9.1" 4.3" 3.8" 1.6" 1" NY21*" 1.09:1" $799,262"" $1,712,059"" 2.4" 1.8" 6.1" 1.9" 21.7" 1" TX23" 1.83:1" $2,636,287"" $2,802,340"" 65.8" 61.4" 2.6" 4.7" 2.1" 1" UT4*".17:1" $82,497"" $180,858"" 14" 6.1" 37" 0.3" 3.2" 2" CA3" 1.76:1" $54,211"" $2,000"" 23.6" 18.0" 11.2" 8.4" 4.4" 2" CA9" 19.2:1" $12,063"" $63,704"" 32.7" 27.0" 17.7" 11" 4.4" 2" CA24" 4.75:1" $345,940"" $0"" 29" 18.5" 11" 10" 3.4" 2" FL22" 9.48:1" $0"" $0"" 17.7" 14.8" 9.5" 9.2" 16" 2" FL26" 1.63:1" $2,678,871"" $6,320,907"" 68.9" 67.1" 6.7" 11" 3" 2" IL8" 9.70:1" $7,709"" $223,582"" 22.1" 13.9" 16.5" 9.4" 10.8" 2" NV4" 4.71:1" $606,150"" $1,072,596"" 22.9" 15.9" 10.7" 8" 2.7" 2" WA1" 3.32:1" $0"" $0"" 6.7" 4.3" 10.8" 7.8" 10" *""Open"seat" " "
Table2:RepublicanHeldTierOneandTierTwoLatinoInfluenceDistricts,2014 Rep:Dem Dem RepOutside Latino LatinoReg Tier District Fundraising Outside Spending VAP(%) Share(%) Ratio Spending ObamaJ Romney 2012 Margin 2014Margin 1 CA'10 2.12:1 $67,112 $14,444 34.9 29.2 3.6 5.4 12.8 1 CA'31*.21:1 $136,187 $2,079,482 44.4 35.5 16.6 10 '2.8 1 CO'3 4.49:1 $2,000 $54,211 20.6 14.8 '6 12 22.4 1 CO'6.91:1 $5,322,977 $4,028,643 16.7 9.3 5.1 2 9.1 1 FL'2.8:1 $4,142,468 $4,382,061 4.8 3.8 '5.8 5.4 '0.8 1 FL'10 29.9:1 $0 $14,196 14.2 14.1 '7.7 3.4 23.2 1 FL'16 27.9:1 $0 $0 8.8 6.9 '9.3 7.2 23.2 1 IN'2 2.51:1 $5,878 $0 6.3 3.8 '14 1.4 20.6 1 NC'9 $0 6.6 4.3 '13.4 6.1 1 NV'3 2.14:1 $1,704,346 $163,753 13.5 13.0 0.8 7.5 24.1 1 NY'11.82:1 $125,133 $3,593,825 13.9 11.9 4.3 5.4 13.3 1 NY'19.49:1 $2,227,809 $8,896 5.4 4.1 6.2 5.8 30 1 NY'23 1.49:1 $715,490 $78,497 2.6 2.1 '1.2 3.8 25.2 1 TX'14 29.2:1 $154 $8,690 19.2 13.9 '19.8 8.9 25.7 2 CA'25 ' $0 31.5 23.3 '1.9 9.6 2 IL'13 1.8:1 $581,970 $926,696 2.6 1.8 '0.3 0.3 17.4 2 MI'1 1.11:1 $1,251,726 $651,699 1.1 1.4 '8.3 0.5 6.8 2 MN'6* 8.85:1 $5,750 $124 1.8 1.5 '15 1.2 17.9 2 NJ'3* 3.16:1 $1,960,014 $1,880,989 5.6 5.1 4.6 8.8 10.7 2 NY'2 223.1:1 $0 $0 18.6 11.8 4.4 17 38.6 2 NY'27 $0 $10,060 1.8 1.8 '12.4 1.6 43.4 2 OH'6 2.45:1 $32,164 $39,310 0.7 1.0 '12.5 6.6 19.6 2 OH'16 56.2:1 $3 $27,743 1.5 1.4 '8.2 4 27.6 2 VA'2 1.77:1 $208,394 $62,778 5.7 5.6 1.5 7.6 16.2 *Openseat 23
Table3:CompetitiveU.S.SenateRaces,2014 State RCP Margin * Latino VAP(%) Latino Reg(%) RegIncrease Since2000(%) Total Turnout(%) Latino 2014 Turnout(%) Margin Colorado R+2.8 15.4 11.1 43 71.3 54.8 R+2.5 Kansas I+0.6 6.1 4.5 575 58.9 35.9 R+10.8 Alaska R+4.2 5.9 4.5 67 ; ; R+2.2 Georgia D+0.3 4.0 3.3 438 ; ; R+7.9 North Carolina D+1.6 3.4 3.2 271 52.0 31.9 R+1.7 Louisiana R+4.4 3.1 3.8 50 55.4 48.8 D+1.1 Arkansas R+5.0 3.0 2.3 220 61.9 40.2 R+17 Iowa R+2.2 2.8 2.5 45 ; ; R+8.5 New Hampshire D+2.2 2.1 2.7 275 ; ; D+3.2 Kentucky R+4.4 1.5 1.5 5 ; ; R+15.5 * "RCPMargin"istheRealClearPoliticsOctober26,2014pollingaverage. DemocraticincumbentMaryLandrieuwasdefeatedintheDecember6,2014runoffelectionbyBillCassidy. 24
Figure1:CharacteristicsofDemocraticandRepublicanHeldU.S.HouseDistricts,2012 DatafromtheU.S.CensusandtheAssociatedPress 67% 62% 54% 77% Democra\cSeats(201) RepublicanSeats(234) 20% 11% 16% 7% 7% 3% 2012VoteShare WhiteVAP La\noVAP BlackVAP AsianVAP Figure2:LatinoVotefortheHouseofRepresentatives,2014 17% 21% 22% 23% 25% 24% 27% 31% 28% 28% 44% 82% 78% 76% 74% 72% 72% 69% 67% 65% 63% 53% IL AZ CA GA NV CO Na\onal NC TX KS FL DatafromLatinoDecisions2014ElectionEvePoll Democrats Republicans Other 25
Figure3:LatinoVoteforU.S.Senate,2014 16% 23% 28% 30% 28% 33% 64% 81% 71% 70% 69% 67% 63% 35% DatafromLatinoDecisions2014ElectionEvePoll Figure4:LatinoKnowledgeofColoradoSenateCandidatePositionsonImmigration,2014 IL CO GA TX Na\onal NC KS DatafromLatinoDecisions2014ElectionEvePoll Democrats Republicans Other DemocratMarkUdall RepublicanCoryGardner 26
Figure5:ViewsofDemocraticandRepublicanPartiesTowardtheLatinoCommunity 48% 42% 22% 24% 23% 12% 16% 14% Trulycares Don'tcaretoomuch Some\meshos\le Don'tKnow Don'know Democrats Republicans DatafromLatinoDecisions2014ElectionEvePoll Figure6:MotivationforVoting 11% 13% 11% 16% 12% 13% 14% 16% 10% 11% 17% 45% 43% 42% 40% 38% 37% 35% 35% 34% 31% 29% 11% 11% 16% 14% 14% 16% 18% 18% 16% 16% 25% 33% 33% 31% 30% 36% 34% 33% 31% 40% 42% 29% IL CA NV CO AZ National KS NC TX GA FL Democra\cParty RepublicanParty La\noCommunity Other DatafromLatinoDecisions2014ElectionEvePoll 27