Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force

Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force September November 2007 Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force activities were assisted financially by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State. The Maras: The Implications for Security and Development in Central America Federico Brevé-Travieso FUNDEMOS, Honduras This paper expands upon remarks delivered at the first session of the Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force July 31, 2008 Overview Central America faces a crime problem that, if allowed to persist, will hamper further investment and growth in the region, despite the potential benefits that the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) represents in terms of more job opportunities for Central Americans. Persistent poverty might be the underlying factor of Central America s crime problem, but it is not the only one. Underemployment, a deficient educational system, declining moral values, deportations of illegal immigrants from the United States, and, to some extent, the abolition of compulsory military service, all have contributed to the crime surge. Nor can the region s publicly criticized justice systems be ignored, when its police, prosecutors and judges seem unable or unwilling to control criminal activity. 1

Altogether, it is not hard to see why Central America has a crime problem. But what needs to be understood is the role played by the maras and their predominance in crime-related activities. The region s rate of death by homicide was 19.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2006, as compared to 55.3 per 100,000 inhabitants for El Salvador, 45.2 for Guatemala and 42.91 for Honduras, according to the Observatorio Centroamericano sobre la Violencia (OCAVI). Also, a recent study done by the British magazine The Economist to determine the levels of violence in Latin America, showed Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador appearing high up on the scale of the most violent countries. These three countries have the highest rates of violence in the Central American region and, concurrently, they also have the highest presence of maras. This correlation of homicides with the presence of maras, if not conclusive, implies that the maras are becoming a highly significant threat to the countries of the northern triangle of Central America. In terms of membership, maras have grown significantly since their appearance during the late eighties and early nineties. Police reports estimate membership between 45,000 and 60,000 in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. In addition, their crime-related activities have also increased, not only in number, but in the kind of activities in which they participate, extending their radius of operations to organized crime, such as narcotics distribution, car theft, extortion and kidnappings. In Guatemala alone, the police reported that the maras had an income of US$50 million in 2007 from extortion, which shows they have the financial potential to escalate their threats and achieve new levels of influence, such as the ability to affect the behavior of government institutions. The Role of the Maras The maras are in many ways a symptom as well as a cause of the climate of insecurity that is present in Central America, although they have followed a peculiar developmental path. Comprised of violent, often vicious, young people, these gangs are terrorizing whole sectors of society. The maras origin is a good place to start when seeking to understand their evolution. In Los Angeles, California, the M-18 was an existing gang made up primarily of Mexican youths, while immigrants who had fled the fighting in El Salvador formed the Mara Salvatrucha or MS-13. These nationalities gave the gangs their identities, although both gangs later added immigrants from Honduras and Guatemala, and some Mexican youths also joined the MS-13. Their participation in thuggish acts and encounters with the law resulted in a great number of members being imprisoned and later deported to their countries of origin. This process saw an upswing starting in 1997, due mainly to the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act that included two provisions related to the Central American maras. The following table clearly shows the trend that ensued after the passing of the act. 2

Table 1. Trends in Total Formal and Expedited Removals from the United States to Countries of Origin: Fiscal Years 1995 to 2005 Year Total removals 2005...... 208,521 2004...... 204,290 2003...... 189,856 2002...... 150,788 2001...... 178,207 2000...... 186,391 1999...... 181,194 1998...... 173,146 1997...... 114,432 1996...... 69,680 1995...... 50,924 Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics The deportees rapidly became gang leaders in their home countries, using the know-how they had acquired in the streets and prisons of Los Angeles to recruit members who had similar habits of behavior and economic limitations. The data on the following table shows Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador as the principal countries, apart from Mexico, of origin of deportees, including those with criminal records. 3

Table 2. Leading Country of Origin of Aliens Formally Removed in 2005 Country Number Number of removed criminals Total.......... 208,521 89,406 Mexico......... 144,840 68,840 Honduras....... 14,556 2,467 Guatemala....... 12,529 1,840 El Salvador...... 7,235 2,665 Brazil........... 5,938 1,416 Dominican Republic 2,929 2,301 Colombia........ 1,879 1,343 Jamaica......... 1,777 1,480 Other........... 16,838 7,054 Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Immigration Statistics Presence in Central America The maras have only been present in Central America for a relatively short time, since the late 1980s or early 1990s. Mara activities, especially those of the Mara Salvatrucha and M-18 gangs, first began in El Salvador and Honduras, and a little later in Guatemala. Gangs in these countries, known as barrio cliques, already existed before the massive influx of deportees from the United States. Their activities, however, were limited to scribbling graffiti on barrio walls and occasionally, robbing stores or assaulting passersby. Because of the influence of Mexican gang culture from Los Angeles, the Central American gangs applied practices, structures and integration processes similar to those 4

used in the United States. This generated inter-gang warfare, which led to the absorption of smaller groups by the MS-13 and the M-18 and to the formation of a predominant competing gang system. Tactics and Growth It did not take long before the gangs realized they could operate with relative impunity due to the state s lack of presence in the poorest sections of the larger cities. A surge in gang growth and its activities ensued. Gang members built homemade firearms, known as hechizas or chimbas, to victimize people and businesses within the poor areas. Soon after, the gangs devised a war tax, a form of extortion in which they demanded payment from vendors and taxi and bus drivers for the right to move freely through their territories. They also grew in size because many youths believed that joining the maras was the means to overcome their economic woes. Becoming gang members gave them a special standing in their community, as well as respect albeit respect born out of fear. Gang numbers also grew by forced induction, pressuring other youths by means of verbal and physical abuse even rape and murder in some cases to join them. There have been reports of cases in which the maras took to the streets, allegedly in support of unions on strike or protest marches of other organizations, and contributed to social unrest and chaos. The motive behind their support of events of this nature, which is not their usual modus operandi, has been to obtain an economic foothold and notoriety. Alliances and Operational Strategies The growth of mara membership and reach seems to rely on careful planning that could include some form of support from other organizations, such as organized crime syndicates or rogue elements of the state security apparatuses. 3 The level of organization achieved, especially by the MS-13, has facilitated stronger links with narco-trafficking cartels, leading to the establishment of a distribution network in major cities. This is due in part to an increase in the quantity of drugs that remains in possession of Central American cartels as a result of payments made by Colombian cartels, instead of cash, for the handling of drug shipments between Colombia and the United States. U.S. authorities estimate 100 tons of cocaine shipments pass through the region each year. Local drug-enforcement agencies estimate that from these shipments, 20% remains in the region, which would account for 20,000 kilos. With a local market value of US$6,000/ kilo, this generates an annual gross income of one hundred twenty million dollars. This excess of cocaine is merchandised through the regional maras network. This networking between narco-traffickers and the maras, which has arisen in the last four to six years, is a dangerous development. This is not mainly because of the ill effects of increased drug use, but mainly because of the increased risk of affecting the states levels of institutionalization and governance, and by having the means of corrupting public officials. In addition, drug money has allowed the maras to become better armed and thus more lethal and difficult to control. The presence of caches of arms, especially AK-47s, 5

remnants from the Cold War, throughout Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua, facilitates their acquisition by maras, drug cartels and organized crime in general. For example, an AK-47 rifle goes for US$500 to $600 on the black market, which last year brought around 2,500 units into Honduras alone, according to reports from Honduran authorities. Operations in the illicit trafficking of persons, especially immigrants seeking entry into the United States, have become a very lucrative market for the gangs. One needs only to consider the price of US$5,000 per person that traditional intermediaries (coyotes) charge, multiplied by approximately 5,000 illegal Central American immigrants a month, to understand the US$25,000,000 generated monthly by this business. 4 As if this were not enough, some of the maras are engaging in new behavioral strategies. To avoid capture, they no longer require new inductees to display tattoos as part of their trademark symbols of being part of the gang. Regular members are now allowed to remove their tattoos to avoid being identified by the police as gang members. They also obtain credentials from rehabilitation centers to prove they have left the maras, in case of detention by the police. Other tactics involve changing their dress codes and avoiding the use their old hand signals to communicate. This is all part of a process designed to hide their gang membership and confuse the authorities. These covert individuals are known as the natural gang members, those who do not express their philosophy in external symbols, but in mind and spirit only. 5 Concerns Derived from Mara Activities At this stage of the process, the maras have the necessary financial resources for continued growth and the potential to infiltrate governments, putting at risk the governance of the Central American states. This again is related to their increased participation in organized crime activities, which generate cash. Although it is very difficult to quantify amounts, since their tactics do not leave a money trail, the reported increase in crime-related activities, such as the retail distribution of narcotics, car theft, extortion and express kidnappings in the northern triangle of Central America, reflect their growing financial independence. Also, it would not be farfetched to think that the maras could become involved in illegal practices such as moving terrorists through Central America into the United States. One of the major concerns of U.S. authorities is the lax control of immigration procedures in most Central American countries, which allows illegal aliens to easily obtain documents and then continue their journey up north, aided by maras in Mexico. Mara infiltration of the police, armed forces and judicial systems confers immunity and provides a larger radius of coverage for gang activities. Already there are reported cases of actual gang members joining the military and the police, following normal procedures of enlistment, where they acquire skill in use of arms. Normally, they then desert the army, taking the weapons with them, and also bribe or intimidate judges and prosecutors in order to walk free of charges and avoid imprisonment. In addition, the hard-core elements of the maras kill simply to satisfy an urge no moral or legal inhibition governs their behavior. Power within the organization is usually related to the number and types of crimes committed, and the higher the number and the atrocity of the crime, the greater the power achieved by the individual. 6

Obviously, such viciousness threatens decent and hard-working societies that already feel unprotected by ineffective justice systems. Countering the Threat Some analysts think that the gangs capabilities will continue to grow unless governments create well-defined strategies to prevent youths from joining, as well as to control, rehabilitate and reinsert gang members back into society. A well-devised national and regional inter-agency plan is needed to counter this threat, considering its magnitude and nature. The presidential summits held by the heads of state of the Central American Integration System (SICA) are the top tier of this plan. 6 In July 2007, in Guatemala City, the Security Commission of Central America, which includes all of the participating countries of SICA and the United States, agreed to work jointly in this area. Pertaining to the maras, they resolved to: 1) Improve the effectiveness and integrity of law enforcement; 2) Carry out judicial and legislative reforms; 3) Improve rehabilitation and prevent mara growth. The signatories committed to meet regularly and share information, with the intention of following up on the implementation of the resolutions and to reach a more effective level of cooperation Although the essence of the resolutions taken by the Security Commission of Central America is in agreement with what needs to be done in order to meet this threat, it is disappointing that the participants did not make a financial pledge in support of these objectives. Nonetheless, the political will behind these efforts is strong and decisive, as reflected by the recent steps taken in that direction. In October 2007, resulting from common goals between Mexico and the Central American countries, the President of the United States announced his request to fund the Mérida Initiative, a security cooperation effort to combat drug trafficking, transnational crime and terrorism in the Western Hemisphere. The objectives, as stated in this initiative, are to produce a safer and more secure environment where criminal organizations no longer threaten governments and to prevent the entry and spread of illicit drugs and transnational threats. This opens a window of opportunity to devise a strategy that designates the maras as one of the threats. Central American countries should lobby to earmark the funds that were recently approved by Congress under this initiative, which amount to $450 million out of the $550 million requested, of which $100 million would go to Central America and the rest to Mexico. In terms of what has to done, and assuming that through the Mérida Initiative the access to funding would be viable, it is important to concentrate on certain issues that have the potential to counter the threat of maras in Central America. Improving Law Enforcement In each of the relevant countries, those who work in the judicial system, including prosecutors, judges, and the internal security forces (police and military), should have the responsibility for carrying out the summits resolutions. This, in turn, should lead to the 7

creation of rapid-response units for situations that require bilateral or multilateral action. The police forces of El Salvador and Guatemala already cooperate and coordinate actions along their shared border and have been able to neutralize criminal groups that operate in the border zone. Similar results have been achieved between the police of Nicaragua and Costa Rica. On a larger scale, all the members of SICA approved an arrest warrant recognized by all countries that permits apprehending criminals, including maras, in countries other than the ones in which they committed the crimes. Sharing of information through intelligence agencies is another example of successful cooperation, which has led to the arrests of criminals that regularly move from one country to another with relative ease, thereby avoiding capture. In support of the national police forces, member countries of the Central American Armed Forces Conference (CFAC) have developed plans to counter organized crime. These include inter-agency action and pooling of resources, which is absolutely necessary to compensate for the region s limited number of policemen, vehicles, helicopters and communications equipment, as well as reduced capabilities of the intelligence systems. Among all of these elements, intelligence systems and real-time sharing of information are essential, as has been proven with the capture of criminals that have operations in more than one country in the region. National security forces are aware that without accurate information, it is extremely difficult to achieve desired results. This has led to more communication among them, resulting in positive outcomes. There are, however, still some shortcomings, such as in the case of the pooling of equipment, which has not been achieved, mainly due to an archaic legal system that is in dire need of reform. Even a cooperative, coordinated regional effort is insufficient to thwart the menace of the maras. Central American countries require international support to be effective in their actions. Countries with interests in the region, especially the United States, Mexico and Colombia, must consider backing a permanent Central American security plan, similar to Plan Colombia, where the United States has a strong commitment in supporting it. This Plan Centro America should be, in the first place, endorsed by the governments of all the Central American countries and must have the commitment of the United States, Mexico and Colombia supporting it logistically and financially in complementary ways. This means that if the Central American cosignatories of the plan cannot meet their own needs, they would be supplied by these three other countries. The Mérida Initiative has the right ingredients to become the basis for a specific plan for the Central American countries. If the concept is packaged and sold adequately, both the cosignatories and the backers have much to gain, considering that drug trafficking and its consequences are a common denominator to all three countries. It is assumed that individual actions by every Central American government are underway in order to move to the next level of regional cooperation and integration. For instance, the CFAC-country members have responded to the formation of the rapid response units in their own jurisdictions. Also, programs have been put into place to improve intelligence and communication systems. Practically all countries have progressed in setting up inter-agency commissions to discuss, plan and execute actions to confront these emerging threats. But even if the individual countries are successful in fulfilling these goals, it would have a small effect at a regional level. Crime-related organizations, including 8

maras, operate regionally and borders have not been able to stop or thwart their actions. Therefore, to ensure that regional and extra-regional efforts succeed, a regulatory and legal framework is needed to allow fluid, dynamic interaction among the authorities of the affected countries. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed by most Central American nations and the United States, is a model of the kind of instrument necessary for such interaction. Reform the Legal System To complement the treaty, the laws related to gang acts have to undergo even more drastic reform in order for the actions taken by law enforcement institutions to be more effective. Until recently, most of the penal codes in the region had not been reformed for many years. Consequently they failed to address new types of crimes that were not as frequent and, therefore, the sentences handed out were not appropriately severe. These outdated codes have become obstacles to adequately punishing criminals carrying out such crimes, especially those perpetrated by the maras, like territorial war taxes, illicit association and retail drug trafficking. These inadequate codes have affected the rate of obtaining a sentence against maras apprehended by the police, since once they are turned over to prosecutors there is a lack of legal structure to support the accusation. As a result they are released back into the streets. The number of maras that are in prison at this time, according to information from Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, is close to 11,000 members, an average of 20% of the mara population in those same countries. Another area that requires legislative and administrative reform is the prison system. Prisons have become schools for higher learning, as well as operational headquarters for the gangs and organized crime. 7 Mara leaders continue to exercise control within prison walls through the use of cell phones, which are readily available. Infrequent inspections conducted by prison authorities have turned up arms and significant stashes of cash as well. Prevent Mara Growth Preventing mara crime is not only the state s responsibility, but also pertains to society as a whole. All sectors of society should participate in the prevention process. This requires well-planned and organized support that includes, among other things, preparing communities to confront the mara problem and orienting youths toward noncriminal activities. Organizing communities participation is essential, such as the action taken by the administration of Ricardo Maduro (2002-2006) in Honduras, where a new group, Citizens Safety, had the sole purpose of creating working relationships between community leaders and specially-trained police units. Citizen assemblies were held weekly to address crime-related and safety issues and actions were taken to analyze or resolve them. Sport facilities were built to provide youths with safe and healthy activities. Additionally, the appropriate authorities must place greater emphasis on improving the quality of the educational system. They should demand that students be supervised more closely, by teachers and parents, to ensure that they complete a minimum education level. In Honduras, the dropout rate has diminished from 3.38 % in 9

2005 to 1.61% in 2007 for elementary school, but in grades 7 to 11, the rate is still high at 8.83 % in 2007 versus 9.31% in 2005. Communities should build sports and cultural facilities and programs that encourage youth participation. The more organized these efforts are, the higher the probability of success. 8 Based on rapprochement between the authorities and communities, these programs build and strengthen teamwork, which can lead to initiatives such as reporting irregular or illicit activities, taking measures to prevent those activities, improving the level of community coexistence, reinforcing the family unit, and, in the long term, offering a better environment for youths in the community. Technical schools provide excellent opportunities to teach at-risk youths a trade that can provide a decent, honest living. A current shortage of qualified technical personnel in the private sector, especially in assembly plants, would allow for quick job placement. Concerned about the growth of the maras, the police have designed a series of programs aimed at 5 th and 6 th graders, parents, teenagers and also officials in the justice system, emphasizing prevention. For example, a course aimed at 5 th and 6 th graders, EREM (Education to Resist and Avoid Maras), emphasizes what the maras destructive way of life represents and how to avoid being enlisted. Another program, DESAFIOS (Challenges), teaches youths how to recognize mara behavior, by their music, dress codes, sexual habits and drug use. DESPERTAD (Wake Up) is designed to educate parents on how to handle the mara threat in relation to their children, and COBAMA (Basic Knowledge of the Maras) instructs judges, prosecutors and police about mara behavior. 9 One must not lose sight of the fact that poverty, unemployment and other social ills have prompted many youths to join the maras. If these young people are presented with opportunities to improve their lives, there is a higher probability of their becoming law-abiding citizens. Rehabilitation Due to the inefficiency that characterizes bureaucracy, governments typically do not manage programs well. Rehabilitation programs are not an exception. Additionally, rehabilitation programs require considerable resources, but budget priorities are often elsewhere, and it is difficult to ascertain the availability of funds. Therefore it might be better if programs were in the hands of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and religious groups. Governments should play only a supervisory role to ensure that the groups are using the funds within established parameters and rehabilitating the number of persons mandated in each country s annual goals. Currently, there are NGOs and religious groups in almost every country in the region that offer rehabilitation programs for mara youths. 10 Although highly successful in terms of the rehabilitation process per se, these programs face three main obstacles: 1) lack of resources; 2) limited facilities; and 3) insufficient opportunities for reinsertion of mara youths into society. To cope with these limitations, other sectors of society will have to get involved in this effort by contributing money, food, equipment, facilities, land, or other pertinent support. 10

To improve the likelihood of successful rehabilitation, there is the need to enlist psychologists, sociologists, social workers and other professionals who can help mend the minds and spirits of these youths. In short, one cannot provide only education or a trade; the moral and psychological aspects in the mara reclamation process are equally as important. The armed forces could also join the effort by setting up special courses to reclaim mara youths. They have the capacity in terms of space and human resources. What they lack is the program framework and financial support to execute such an undertaking. In a structured environment, soldiers learn trades that later enable them to re-enter civilian society and engage in law-abiding, economically-productive activities. Why not increase the capacity of trade schools and use them for rehabilitating maras as well? They could be placed in strategic locations, so that graduates could obtain employment with relative ease. Training in a military environment could also enhance character and personality development, with emphasis on discipline and moral values. The Need to Act Now Although the mara problem in Central America mainly affects Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras, other countries in the region should not consider themselves immune. Already there are negative effects of it in Mexico and the United States. For the rest of the Central America, it is only a matter of time. Gangs are becoming stronger than what they were just a few years ago. The Mano Dura (Strong Hand) strategy applied by most of the countries of the region has not been very effective in diminishing their presence and growth. On the contrary, their radius of action has expanded into other criminal activities, such as extortion, kidnappings and, of more concern, through their nexus with drug cartels, into the retail distribution of cocaine. This calls for immediate action by authorities to thwart the maras expansion in the criminal realm. Otherwise, their ties to organized crime will become stronger. The result would be that the democratic viability of the region s countries would be at greater risk and opportunities to effectively combat the maras will be lost. Right now, Central America has a great window of opportunity to improve upon what it has accomplished thus far, in particular, sustained economic growth with levels above the median in Latin America. It can generate opportunities for thousands of its citizens to gain decent employment, enabling them to improve the conditions in which they now live. A great deal of valuable time has been invested in analyzing and planning with regard to the mara situation, but so far it has yielded few concrete results. Now is the time to make it a dynamic process and correct this growing problem. Failure to act now will set the region on a course leading to future regrets. 11

Notes 1. Ambassador of the U.S. in El Salvador, Douglas Barclay, censuring court actions taken in favor of accused criminals, El Diario de Hoy (San Salvador), 18 October 2006, 2-3. 2. Mara Prevention Unit of the General Directorate of Preventive Police of the Republic of Honduras; interview with sociologist Ramón Romero, advisor to ex-president Ricardo Maduro of Honduras. 3. Capturan dos Policías vinculados con Mama Tere, Diario La Tribuna de Honduras (Tegucigalpa), 20 October 2006, 111. 4. Miguel Pickard, In the Crossfire: Mesoamerican Migrants Journey North, 18 October 2005, General Directorate of Migration of the Secretariat of the Interior and Justice of Honduras. 5. Mara Prevention Unit of the General Directorate of Preventive Police of the Republic of Honduras. 6. Central American Presidential Summits held in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In attendance were the heads of state of all member countries of SICA, plus the presence of Colombia, Mexico and the United States in certain summits. 7. Privilegios se acabarán, Prensa Libre de Guatemala (Guatemala City), 19 October 2006, 10; and El Diario de Hoy (El Salvador), 18 October 2006, 31; Director del Sistema Penitenciario ; Alejandro Giammattei, Lucha contra la corrupción y el amedrentamiento and Adquisición de bloqueadores de teléfonos celulares. 8. The administrations of former president Ricardo Maduro and current president Manuel Zelaya Rosales, Republic of Honduras, conceived the Safer Community and Citizen Safety Assemblies programs. 9. Mara Prevention Unit of the General Directorate of Preventive Police of the Republic of Honduras. 10. Among the groups dedicated to the rehabilitation of former mara members are Reverend Mario Fumero s Project Victory and organizations run by Monsignor Rómulo Emiliani, San Pedro Sula Diocese, both operating in Honduras. Federico Brevé-Travieso served as Honduras s minister of national defense from 2002 to 2006. He is currently the director for security and political issues at FUNDEMOS, a think tank whose main objective is to strengthen democracy. Mr. Brevé also serves on the board of several private corporations, and holds a position on the political committee of Honduras Partido Nacional. A frequent speaker at conferences and seminars on defense and security issues, he holds a B.S. from McGill University (Montreal) and an M.B.A. from the Central American Institute for Business Administration (INCAE). All statements of fact or expression of opinion contained in this publication are the responsibility of the author. 12