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Environmental Politics Vol. 20, No. 1, February 2011, 78 96 Political divisions over climate change and environmental issues in Australia Bruce Tranter* School of Sociology and Social Work, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia Willingness to pay to address environmental problems is influenced by partisanship in Australia. Ceteris paribus, the support base of environmental concerns is generally much stronger among Labor and Green supporters, postmaterialists, those who engage in eastern spiritual practices and professionals. Women are more likely than men to favour environmental protection over economic growth, to pay extra tax to protect the environment and to believe global warming will pose a serious threat during their lifetime. Support for renewable energy is stronger among younger Australians, suggesting demand may increase with generational replacement. Political leaders influence public concerns over global warming and other environmental issues across the partisan divide, yet while political elites remain divided over the implications of climatic change, the shift in public opinion and behaviour necessary to avert such problems is unlikely to occur. Keywords: Green; environmental movement; political leaders; climate change; global warming Introduction Global warming has attracted considerable international attention in recent years, with governments in many countries beginning to at least engage in dialogue over the consequences of anthropocentric climate change. Australia gained the reputation of a climate change laggard under Prime Minister John Howard s (1996 2007) lengthy conservative reign (Rootes 2008). Immediately following the election of the Rudd Labor Government in November 2007, Australia announced its ratification of the Kyoto protocol at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali and supported a 2050 target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 60% of 2000 levels. The years that *Email: bruce.tranter@utas.edu.au ISSN 0964-4016 print/issn 1743-8934 online Ó 2011 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09644016.2011.538167 http://www.informaworld.com
Environmental Politics 79 followed saw a shift towards action on climate change. A Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme White Paper was produced in December 2008 1 outlining the government s carbon emission targets for 2020, and an emissions trading scheme (ETS) bill was introduced to federal parliament in 2009, but subsequently rejected by the Senate. 2 The Howard government, placing highest priority on economic growth, was moving only slowly and cautiously towards action to inhibit carbon emissions. While the Rudd government s proposed ETS does not go as far as many environmental movement organisations and groups would like, the government has taken positive steps towards addressing climate change, including the addition of a new Minister for Climate Change. Confronted by former opposition leaders Brendan Nelson (2007 2008) and Turnbull (2008 2009), Prime Minster Rudd enjoyed a very high approval rating as preferred Prime Minister and a healthy lead in the polls. While Turnbull, a supporter of action on climate change and former environment minister in the Howard government, was opposition leader, partisan differences were muted, with the two major party leaders in agreement over the need to act, if not on the precise means of action. However, 2010 saw the elevation of Tony Abbott to the leadership of the opposition Liberal party. Like Howard before him, Abbott is openly sceptical of the implications of climate change. Abbott recently advanced his own climate change policy that encourages industry to reduce emissions but does not cap them (Curtis 2010). While welcomed by big business, it has received heavy criticism from other sources, including former Liberal leader, Malcolm Turnbull, who claims Abbott s policy merely represents a political stratagem rather than a serious attempt to combat climate change. 3 As in the United States (see Dunlap and McCright 2008, Hamilton 2008), so in Australia a serious partisan divide now exists over commitment to action on climate change, with the coalition partners broadly against and Labor and the Greens in favour. Following Abbott s election to the Liberal leadership, a shift appeared in public opinion, with the coalition clawing back Labor s electoral advantage. 4 Employing nationally representative data from the 2007 Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) and 2007 Australian Election Study (AES), I examine several questions related to the issue of climate change. Relevant to the domestic Australian context, this also has broader implications regarding the influence of political leaders and partisanship upon environmental issue support. Of major concern here is the importance of global warming and climate change vis-a`-vis other environmental issues in Australia. In addition, I consider how environmental issue support is socially and politically circumscribed, how willing Australians are to act to address environmental problems as opposed to merely expressing their concern, and the extent to which political leaders influence their partisan followers in relation to environmental issues such as global warming.
80 B. Tranter Social background of environmental issues in Australia Concern over environmental issues has been explained in terms of value priorities, age and generational differences, gender, education, place and social class (e.g. Inglehart 1990, Tranter 1996, McAllister and Studlar 1999). For Inglehart (1997), citizens of advanced industrialised countries born after World War II are more likely to hold postmaterial values, prioritise free speech and seek greater say in political decision making. Materialists on the other hand, give precedence to economic and security issues. 5 Postmaterialists are more likely than materialists to be concerned about environmental issues (Pakulski and Tranter 2004), join environmental groups (Tranter 1996), participate in protest actions and vote for Green political parties (Inglehart 1990, 1997, Mu ller-rommel 1990, Papadakis 1993, Crook and Pakulski 1995, Tranter 1999, 2010, Tranter and Western 2003). In Australia, however, as a predictor of environmental concern, postmaterial values may be attenuated as different generations vary only minimally in their value orientations (Tranter and Western 2003). Women have significantly more general environmental concern than men (Zelezny et al. 2000, pp. 444 445) and play more prominent roles in grassroots mobilisations (Rootes 2004, p. 617). In Australia, women are more likely to participate in environmental demonstrations, although they are not more likely than men to join environmental groups (Tranter 1996). The new class and new middle class allegedly exhibit pro-environmental behaviours (Kriesi 1989), although for Rootes (1995, p. 227), the key factor underlying environmental support is tertiary education (Tranter 1997). In Australia, associations between new class location and environmental activism are weak, although there is a strong effect for tertiary education (Tranter 1996, p. 73). In fact, Inglehart (1990) claims the educated, articulate and politically skilled, or as he labels them, the cognitively mobilised, are most likely to participate in the environmental movement. Those on the left of the political spectrum are also more supportive of environmental issues than those on the right (Tranter 1996). Finally, viewing nature as spiritual or sacred in itself is associated with environmental activism (Tranter 1996, p. 76), as is support from those who engage in eastern spiritualist practices, such as Buddhism (e.g. Kaza and Kraft 2000, Queen 2000). Environmental issues in Australia Pakulski et al. (1998), drawing upon Weber, argue that environmental issues become routinised as radical new issues and unconventional forms of political participation enter the political mainstream. Routinisation in this context involves the absorption of social innovations into the established, and typically institutionalised, ways of doing and experiencing things through repetition and habituation (Pakulski et al. 1998, p. 239). Routinisation is associated with declining levels of environmental group membership and reduced levels of public support for such groups (Pakulski et al. 1998, p. 241), a
Environmental Politics 81 shift from new, unusual and unique (e.g. the environment as a new political issue) to old, expected and familiar (i.e. environmental issues tend to be absorbed into political party platforms and are increasingly absorbed by conventional political institutions) (Pakulski et al. 1998, p. 239). These changes are accompanied by a shift from protest-based charismatic activist leaders to lobbyists, green party politicians and bureaucrats (Pakulski et al. 1998, pp. 239 240). Similar trends occurred in Western Europe, a process Rootes (1999, p. 155) refers to as the institutionalisation of environmental movement organisations, as they are accorded at least some measure of institutionalised access to decision-making arena enabling new institutional arrangements and opportunities for communication and debate with policymakers and established economic actors and interest groups. Crook and Pakulski (1995) and Pakulski et al. (1998) divide environmental issues into green (i.e. logging of forests and wildlife preservation) and brown clusters (i.e. pollution and waste disposal). Mass media tend to concentrate upon brown issues, while environmental groups focus their campaigns around green issues. Concern over green issues tends to be stronger among younger, tertiary educated, secular, left of centre, urban-based Australians (Pakulski and Tranter 2004, p. 225). Political leaders and partisans Drawing upon opinion poll data, Pietsch and McAllister (2010, p. 232) show that a significant minority of Australians claim to understand the concept of an ETS, and while there is majority support for its implementation, a large minority remains to be convinced of the merits of an ETS. This large minority is of particular interest here. However, Pietsch and McAllister s analyses were based mainly upon the results of a short opinion poll and did not report on political partisanship or evaluations of political leaders, factors that I consider to be crucial determinants of support (or otherwise) for action to address climate change. Inglehart s (1990) claims that cognitively skilled citizens tend to be politically active, likely to participate in new social movements and to support new politics or left-libertarian parties are also relevant here (also see Kitschelt 1990, Mu ller-rommel 1990). Political party identification has been shown to influence attitudes and voting behaviour (Campbell et al. 1960, Miller 1976). Party identification is claimed to act as a simplifying function that helps voters sift through complex political issues, while political leaders provide cues that guide the political thought and action of the party identifier (Miller 1976, p. 23). As Campbell et al. (1960, p. 133) put it, party identification acts as a perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable to his partisan orientation. While the partisan dealignment thesis emphasises weakening partisan loyalties (Dalton et al. 1984, Dalton 1996), partisanship remains a powerful predictor of voting behaviour in many countries, including Australia (Bean 1996, 1997, Bartels 1996).
82 B. Tranter In a broader sense, when individuals are either interested in or detached from issues, cue taking is likely to be a more common means of evaluating political issues than substantive assessment of competing evidence and arguments (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, p. 21). In the present context, the cues provided by party leaders on climate change may therefore, at least partly, structure attitudes and behavioural intentions. In relation to elite cues, the greater a person s level of habitual political awareness, the more likely she is to receive these messages. Also, the greater a person s level of awareness, the more likely she is able, under certain circumstances, to resist information that is inconsistent with her basic values or partisanship (Zaller 1992, p. 266). Drawing upon referendum data from Switzerland, Sciarini et al. (2007) demonstrated the polarising effect a divided elite can have. Where political leaders are at odds over issues, including environmental issues, there is a high likelihood that their divisions will be reflected among partisans. In the United States, Dunlap and McCright (2008) found a substantial and widening gap between major party supporters over global warming. They trace this divide to skepticism among Republican and conservative elites and leading conservative media figures (Dunlap and McCright 2008, p. 28). The partisan divide over climate change in the United States is complicated by education, with Hamilton and Keim (2009) finding interaction effects between partisanship and education, such that concern over global warming increased with education among Democrats, and decreased with education among Republicans. 6 The extent of the partisan divide over global warming in the United States is even greater among those who claim to have a good understanding of the process of global warming (Dunlap and McCright 2008, p. 33). In Australia, Tranter (2007) has shown higher levels of political knowledge to be associated with a tendency to vote split between the upper and lower houses of parliament. Knowledgeable voters tend to favour Labor for the House of Representatives but vote Green for the Senate, even after holding social background factors constant. Given the demonstrated importance of political knowledge structuring Green voting and cognitive skills for support of green causes, a political knowledge scale is included in analyses of AES data below. 7 Employing data from the 2007 AES, I consider the influence of political partisanship and evaluations of political leaders upon environmental attitudes, including beliefs in the reality of climate change. While the environmental influence of political leaders and partisanship is a major focus here, I also draw upon new questions designed for the 2007 AuSSA to explicate the social and political bases of environmental issue support, willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental protection and WTP extra for energy generated from renewable sources in order to reduce the impact of global warming. Responses to these questions are analysed below with multivariate statistical methods.
Environmental Politics 83 Data and method In order to gauge the level of environmental concern and the social and political bases of environmentalism on a national basis, two main sources of data are analysed. The 2007 AuSSA and the 2007 AES. The AuSSA is a systematic sample of 2583 cases with a response rate of 39% (Phillips et al. 2008). The 2007 AES is also a nationally representative survey with a sample size of 1873, and a response rate of 40% (Bean et al. 2008). Both surveys employed separate systematic samples drawn from the 2007 federal electoral roll. AES data from 1990 to 2004 are also presented to allow comparisons of environmental issue support over time (see Bean et al. 2005) using the question: How urgent are each of the following environmental concerns in this country? Slightly different versions of these questions appear in the AES and AuSSA. The AES also asked respondents to prioritise issues: Which two of the above environmental issues has worried you personally the most in the last 12 months? Which is the most urgent and which is the second most urgent? In an examination of survey data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), Ivanova and Tranter (2008) found public WTP higher taxes or higher prices for environmental protection actually decreased in several countries over time. Here, I consider how willing Australians are to act rather than merely express concern over environmental issues. In addition, questions previously included in the ISSP that asked about WTP extra taxes or prices to protect the environment were modified by the author for the 2007 AuSSA to differentiate between the local, national and global environment: How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the quality of the.... Local environment (i.e. your neighborhood).... National environment (i.e. countrywide).... Global environment (i.e. worldwide)? When considering the determinants of WTP for environmental protection, an obvious suspect is income. Other things being equal, those on higher incomes should be able, if not necessarily more willing, to pay more than lower-income respondents. Several previous studies have shown WTP for environmental quality and services varies according to household income (Witzke and Urfei 2001, Hokby and Soderqvist 2003, Israel 2004), although Stumborg et al. (2001) found positive although only weak correlations for income, and Israel and Levinson (2004) positive, but weak and statistically non-significant associations between per capita gross national product and WTP higher taxes for environmental protection. Results What were the most important environmental issues for Australian adults over the last two decades? Data from the AES and AuSSA in Figure 1 provide a
84 B. Tranter Figure 1. Environmental issues in Australia 1990 2007. Question: How urgent are each of the following environmental concerns in this country? The Greenhouse question referred to climate change in the 2007 AuSSA and the greenhouse effect in the AES (1990 2004). Sources: Australian Election Studies 1990 2004 and Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2007. temporal comparison on six environmental issues that have appeared in national surveys since 1990. Some qualifications are necessary. The 2007 AuSSA refers to climate change which is a related, but clearly different, concept from the greenhouse effect referred to in the question in the AES surveys. Although different surveys are compared here, both employ the same mail out/mail back administration and similar follow-up strategies to maximise response rates, and both were administered by a team of researchers at the Australian National University. The results should, therefore, be comparable. In 1990, pollution was the most important issue for Australians, with 58% claiming it to be very urgent, followed by soil degradation (52%) and the greenhouse effect (51%). However, these cross-sectional survey results indicate that the proportion of respondents claiming wildlife preservation, pollution, soil erosion and waste disposal to be very urgent has actually declined over time, quite substantially for the latter three issues. Alternatively, concern over logging of forests, an issue championed by environmental movement organisations such as The Wilderness Society, remains relatively consistent, after rising somewhat in 2001 and 2004, while greenhouse/climate change appears to have increased in urgency in 2007. After declining from 1996/2004
Environmental Politics 85 levels, concern over greenhouse/climate change now approaches the high levels of the green election of 1990 (Bean et al. 1990). The most important environmental issue? While several environmental issues are shown in Figure 1, in recent years, other issues have emerged as particularly noteworthy. What were the most important environmental issues in 2007? Respondents were asked how urgent are each of the following environmental concerns in this country? and then asked to rank their first and second most important choices from the 10 issues listed. The items include issues that have an impact locally, nationally or globally. Some questions appeared in earlier AES (Figure 1), while some such as the drought, renewable energy and climate change are recent additions only administered in the 2007 AuSSA (Table 1). Perhaps in contrast to expectations driven by the media coverage climate change receives, the prolonged drought in many parts of the country was identified as by far the most important issue, with 42% identifying it as the most important issue and a further 19% as their second choice. In addition, 72% claim the drought to be a very urgent issue, with renewable energy and climate change the next most urgent issues, both on 49%, although climate change (26%) ranked much higher than renewable energy (6%) as an issue of most concern. Another way of establishing issue importance is by considering the prioritisation of pairs of issue concerns. A cross-tabulation of the first and second most important issues (not shown) suggests that people who selected the drought and climate change combination (as either first or second choice) accounted for 27% of the sample, drought and renewable energy 10%, drought and pollution 8% and climate change and renewable energy 6.5%. Clearly, climate change is seen as important, but not as important as the drought. Table 1. Most important and urgency of environmental issues (%). First Second Very urgent Drought 42.1 18.7 71.9 Climate change 26.1 22.1 48.5 Pollution 11.2 10.6 34.7 Renewable energy 5.7 17.3 49.3 Logging of forests 3.6 6.2 33.6 Nuclear power 3.3 5.2 23.7 Destruction of wildlife 3.2 7.3 39.0 Waste disposal 1.9 4.2 24.9 Loss of biodiversity 1.8 4.0 28.7 Soil degradation 1.1 4.5 31.1 N 2447 2426 Questions: How urgent are each of the following environmental concerns in this country? ; Which two of the above environmental issues has worried you personally the most in the last 12 months?; Which is the most urgent? And which is the second most urgent? Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2007.
86 B. Tranter Support bases of issue concerns In order to examine the social and political background of support for environmental issues more rigorously, several regression models were developed (Tables 2 6). The first uses a broad question that contrasts support for environmental and economic values: Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own point of view?... Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs. Economic growth and creating jobs should be given top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent. Although middle-aged people were more pro-environmental in the bivariate case (results not shown), age is not an important factor when other background effects are controlled for, at least on this measure of environmental concern. Men are about 1.4 times less likely than women to support protection for the environment over economic growth (i.e. 1 7 0.70 ¼ 1.43), professionals are around 50% more environmentally supportive than other occupations and Table 2. Protect the environment versus economic growth? (odds ratios). Men 0.70** Age (years) 0.999 Degree 1.13 Professionals 1.49* Income 5$36,400 (referent) 1 $36,400 77,999 1.10 $78,000þ 1.26 No religious denomination 1.44** Spiritual 1.73** Middle class (vs. other classes) 1.14 Capital city 1.08 Values scale (1 3) 1.62*** Labor ID 2.03*** Green ID 21.26** No ID 1.42* Coalition ID 1 Nagelkerke R 2 0.14 N 1981 % Who would protect the environment 77.5 Dependent variable: protect the environment ¼ 1, economic growth ¼ 0. *p 50.05; **p 50.01; ***p 50.001. Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2007.
Environmental Politics 87 Table 3. Willingness to pay extra tax to protect the local, national and global environment (odds ratios). Local National Global Men 0.82* 0.82* 0.74*** Age (years) 1.006* 1.005 1.000 Degree 1.42** 1.57*** 1.37** Professional 1.36** 1.34** 1.26* Income 5$36,400 (referent) 1 1 1 $36,400 77,999 1.08 1.07 1.02 $78,000þ 1.38* 1.45** 1.21 No religious denomination 1.04 1.20* 1.17 Spiritual 1.37** 1.48*** 1.45*** Middle class 1.28** 1.36** 1.28** Capital city 0.92 1.11 1.09 Values scale (1 3) 1.13* 1.27*** 1.20** Labor ID 1.26* 1.42*** 1.72*** Green ID 2.75*** 3.81*** 3.54*** No ID 1.04 1.10 1.25 Coalition ID 1 1 1 Nagelkerke R 2 0.08 0.13 0.11 N 1943 1951 1941 % Who were very willing to pay 17.6 20.1 14.4 Dependent variable: How willing would you be to pay higher taxes in order to protect the quality of the... local environment (i.e. your neighbourhood)... national environment (i.e. countrywide)... global environment (i.e. worldwide)? *p 50.05; **p 50.01; ***p 50.001. Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2007. the non-religious are pro-environment to a greater extent than those with religious affiliations. Engaging in eastern spiritual practices such as yoga or Buddhism also tends to be associated with environmental protection, with spiritualists almost twice as likely to say they would protect the environment over economic growth. 8 Not surprisingly, postmaterialists exhibit proenvironmental sentiments, as do those who identify as Labor or Green. In fact, party identification exhibits the strongest effects in this model. Three questions are examined to assess the social background of support for local, national and global environmental issues (Table 3). Using ordered logistic regression to analyse these Likert-type dependent variables, the odds ratios for Labor identifiers increase in magnitude from local to national and global issues. This may reflect the strong partisan divide over global issues such as climate change, as shown below. Social background effects are generally strongest for national and global issues (see R 2 ), compared to local concerns, although the differences in the magnitude of the estimates across the dependent variables are quite modest. Income also plays a lesser role and was not a significant predictor at the 95% level on the global dependent variable, while women tend to be more concerned than men about all three types of environmental issues, particularly global issues.
88 B. Tranter Alternatively, effects for tertiary education, income, class, values and Green party identification tend to be somewhat stronger for national compared to local or global issues. Leader influences on attitudes towards climate change Two questions from the 2007 AES are particularly relevant for illustrating the strong political divide over climate change in Australia. In Table 4, AES respondents were asked if they thought Australia should participate in the Kyoto process 9 ; approximately 66% responded affirmatively, 8% were against, and the remaining quarter suggested it depends. When asked if they believed Table 4. Global warming and Kyoto agreement (odds ratios). Global warming Kyoto Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Men 0.67** 0.72* 0.68 0.66 Age (years) 0.978*** 0.978*** 1.001 1.005 Degree 1.26 1.17 1.33 1.38 Professional occupation 1.14 1.06 1.85* 1.72 City 1.07 0.95 1.02 0.87 Income 5$35,000 1 1 1 1 $35,000 80,000 1.44 1.35 1.72 1.43 $80,000þ 1.08 1.01 1.00 0.76 No religious denomination 0.93 0.87 0.85 0.87 No self-assessed class 0.97 0.88 0.88 0.70 location (vs. other classes) NSW 0.57** 0.58** 0.39*** 0.40** QLD 0.70 0.76 0.58 0.66 Other states and 1 1 1 1 territories (referent) Values scale (1 3) 1.45** 1.40* 0.84 0.64* Trust in government 1.08 1.23 1.31 1.35 Government performing 0.48** 0.65 0.17*** 0.35* well in last 3 years? Labor ID 2.78*** 1.44 6.25*** 1.23 Green ID 2.72*** 1.17 2.94 0.51 No ID 1.62* 1.19 1.81 0.71 Coalition ID (referent) 1 1 1 1 Coalition leader (Howard) 0.95 0.86* Labor leader (Rudd) 1.09* 1.25*** Greens leader (Brown) 1.18*** 1.31*** Political knowledge (0 5 scale) 0.93 0.94 0.83** 0.88 Nagelkerke R 2 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.38 N 1075 1019 1080 1033 *p 50.05; **p 50.01; ***p 50.001. Source: Australian Election Study 2007.
Environmental Politics 89 global warming will pose a serious threat to their way of life in their lifetime? (my emphasis), 52% agreed, 22% disagreed and about one quarter claimed it depends. 10 While these data were collected in 2007 and Australia is now participating in the Kyoto process, they inform the current debate over climate change by illustrating the impact of political party identification and party leaders on environmental issue concern, in addition to social location effects. In order to control statistically for differing views regarding the performance of the previous conservative government and trust in government more broadly, two additional control variables were added to the regression equation. 11 The introduction of these variables into the regression model reduces the impact of party identification upon the dependent variables, but strong effects remain. As shown in Model 1, both global warming and the Kyoto protocol divided support along partisan lines in 2007, with Labor supporters pro-kyoto and coalition supporters against. These effects hold even after controlling for social and political background and knowledge of politics. 12 Labor and Green identifiers were almost three times as likely as coalition supporters to believe that global warming will pose a serious threat in their own lifetime. Partisan differences for the Kyoto variable were even stronger for Labor supporters. These results hold after controlling for a range of social background effects and evaluations of the performance of the incumbent government, suggesting they are robust findings. In Model 2, leader evaluation scales are introduced to the regression equation. 13 Interestingly, partisan differences are rendered nonsignificant at the 95% level, suggesting they are mediated through the leader variables. These results indicate that political leaders have a powerful influence on environmental attitudes, and, at least in relation to climate change, an influence more powerful than party identification itself. While party leaders are expected to exert influence upon their own supporters, how do leader effects manifest across party lines? Did John Howard or Kevin Rudd, or indeed, the Greens leader, Senator Bob Brown, also influence supporters of other parties over global warming? To examine these effects, the sample was split by party identification. Given the reduced sub-samples, the models were simplified to consist of the three leader scales, with estimates controlling for age and sex (Table 5). 14 It seems leaders not only influence their own partisans; their influence is much broader. For example, viewing former Prime Minister John Howard in a positive light is associated negatively on the issue of global warming and engagement in the Kyoto process for both coalition and Labor supporters. The scale for Labor leader Kevin Rudd shows a weaker effect, however; it is associated with support for the Kyoto process among coalition identifiers and those not affiliated with any political party. The Greens leader scale is the most consistent predictor for both dependent variables. Controlling for age and sex, positive evaluations of Bob Brown increase the odds ratios on the global warming-dependent variable across all parties and the non-aligned, and, for all but Labor supporters, on the Kyoto variable.
90 B. Tranter Table 5. Interactions on global warming and Kyoto (OR). Coalition Greens Labor No ID Global warming Coalition leader (Howard) 0.901* 0.848 0.912* 1.018 Labor leader (Rudd) 1.073 1.056 1.134 1.104 Greens leader (Brown) 1.149** 1.813** 1.252*** 1.220* R 2 0.12 0.36 0.17 0.19 N 460 87 485 189 Kyoto Coalition leader (Howard) 0.812** 1.337 0.756** 0.812* Labor leader (Rudd) 1.187** 0.770 1.141 1.326* Greens leader (Brown) 1.303*** 4.893* 1.216 1.346* R 2 0.24 0.66 0.16 0.24 N 409 93 529 199 Estimates control for age and sex. *p 50.05; **p 50.01; ***p 50.001. Source: Australian Election Study 2007. These are important findings, as they suggest that political leaders exert an influence across the political spectrum. Partisans may well follow the cues offered by their respective leaders, particularly if they feel positively towards them, but also react to the leaders of other parties when the political elite is divided, as is the case in Australia over global warming and engagement in the Kyoto agreement. These results nuance the findings of Sciarini et al. (2007, p. 32) who noted that if the elite is divided and the campaign is moderately intense... environmental support increases as a function of political awareness among left voters and decreases among moderate right voters. In Australia, this polarising effect is mediated by the way partisans evaluate not only their own party leader, but leaders of other parties who adopt a strong stance, for or against, environmental issues. Addressing climate change: support for renewable energy While a majority of Australians agree that global warming will have an impact upon their lives, how willing are they to act to address these concerns? The final dependent variable comprises an attempt to measure environmental behaviour by examining specific intentions to act to reduce the impact of global warming: Energy generated through renewable sources such as wind or solar power is claimed to reduce global warming, compared to non-renewable power sources such as coal. How much extra would you be prepared to pay on top of your existing energy bill for power generated from renewable sources? The frequency responses indicate that 30% of Australians would not be willing to pay any more for renewable energy, but 70% would. Almost a quarter (23.5%) would pay between 1% and 5% extra, and slightly more (26.5%) would pay 6 10% extra, with the remained indicating they would pay more
Environmental Politics 91 Table 6. (OR). Would you pay more tax for energy produced through renewable sources? Men 1.14 Age (years) 0.987*** Degree 1.27* Professionals 1.47*** Income 5$36,400 (referent) 1 $36,400 77,999 1.04 $78,000þ 1.25 No religious denomination 1.18 Spiritualist 1.21 Middle class 1.66*** Capital city 1.08 Values scale (1 3) 1.27*** Labor ID 1.28* Green ID 3.32*** No ID 0.99 Coalition ID 1 Nagelkerke R 2 0.13 N 1905 % Who would pay more for renewable energy 70.2 Dependent variable coding: 1 ¼ 0%, 2 ¼ 1 5%, 3 ¼ 6 10%, 4 ¼ 11 15%, 5 ¼ 16 20%, 6 ¼ 20þ%. *p 50.05; ***p 50.001. Source: Australian Survey of Social Attitudes 2007. than 10% extra. In fact over 9% of the sample would pay 20% or more on top of their existing bill for energy produced through renewable sources. To explore the social and political background of responses to this question, ordered logistic regression analysis was employed in Table 6. Support for renewable energy is stronger among the tertiary educated, professionals, the middle class and those holding postmaterial values. The important difference with this dependent variable is that age is also a factor, with younger Australians much more likely to claim they would pay more tax for renewable energy, regardless of their income level or other social and political background factors. Partisanship was again an important indicator, with Green identifiers exhibiting by far the strongest effects. In the absence of appropriate leader variables for the AuSSA, we can only speculate that leader effects may also be at work. Discussion Environmental issues receive a high degree of support in Australia, although they vary considerably in terms of their relative urgency. Climate change is clearly an important issue for many, although it is not the most important issue according to the 2007 AuSSA. 15 The results presented here suggest that Australians view national issues as more important than local or global issues.
92 B. Tranter In fact in 2007, far more Australians, including those living in urban locations, were concerned more about the drought than any other issue. These findings have potential policy implications. Given the level of public concern over the drought, there appears to be electoral support for changes to government drought support programs, such as the provision of income contingent loans and the form of welfare support delivered to farming families (see Chapman et al. 2006). In general terms, consistent predictors of environmental concern in Australia include holding postmaterial values, engaging in eastern spiritual practices (perhaps reflecting alternative lifestyles and consumption practices), professional occupation and, to an extent, tertiary education. Gender differences are also apparent, with men less likely than women to favour environmental protection over economic growth, to claim they would pay extra tax to protect the environment, or to believe global warming poses a serious threat to their way of life. In 2007, there were substantial partisan differences over environmental issues. Only 29% of National and 40% of Liberal identifiers agreed global warming was a serious threat to their way of life compared to 64% of Labor and 79% of Greens supporters. Importantly, to an even greater extent than party affiliation, the way Australians evaluate their party leaders also appears to influence their views about global warming. Positive evaluations of former coalition leader, John Howard, are associated with climate change scepticism, while those who evaluate Labor or Greens leaders favourably are far more likely to view global warming as a serious threat within their lifetime. Other researchers (e.g. Dunlap and McCright 2008; Hamilton, in press) have demonstrated the importance of political partisanship and how it is associated with divergent views on climate change. My research takes this a stage further, drawing upon electoral survey data to examine the influence of political leaders upon their constituency. Studies that consider the impact elites have upon mass opinion, particularly the manner in which political leaders influence their partisan followers, are insightful here (e.g. Campbell et al. 1960, Miller 1976, Zaller 1992). Leaders provide the cues for partisans to follow. They simplify the political process for those who may not have sufficient interest in politics to explore the issues for themselves. Australian political leaders are instrumental in shaping public views on environmental issues when divisions exist within the political elite. This research replicates findings from the United States and elsewhere (Sciarini et al. 2007, Dunlap and McCright 2008). However, the divided elite thesis is modelled here using items that examine directly the influence party leaders have upon environmental issue support. Importantly, this approach shows that party leaders structure environmental concern in a way that is not confined to their own supporters, but cross-cuts party affiliations. The way one evaluates other party leaders also appears to influence one s views on environmental issues, at least when party leaders disagree, as is the case over global warming. While the data were collected in 2007, these political divisions and leader effects
Environmental Politics 93 are relevant to more recent debates over climate change in Australia, but also in other countries where elite divisions persist. What of future actions to address climate change? Public support for renewable energy is strongest among younger Australians, even taking their social and political backgrounds into account, although more than a quarter say they would not pay extra for renewable energy. If these data are tapping strong age-based intentions that actually underpin demand for renewable energy rather than mere attitudes, there are potential long-term electoral and policy implications, as support for such schemes should increase with generational replacement. Nevertheless, generational replacement alone is unlikely to occur quickly enough to address the emerging environmental, socioeconomic and political problems associated with global warming. While divided political elites contribute to divisions in public opinion, united elites may hold the key to action on critical global issues such as climate change. Shifting public opinion on climatic change requires constructive and unified elite responses at the national level. In the absence of agreement among national political leaders, attempts to reach global consensus over climate change action are unlikely to succeed. Notes 1. The White Paper specified a minimum commitment to reduce carbon emissions to 5% below 2000 emission levels by 2020 (Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 2008). 2. Labor does not control the Senate and did not receive the support of the Green and independent senators who hold the balance of power. 3. Deposed coalition leader Turnbull (2010) claimed in response to Abbott s climate change scheme: It is not possible to criticise the new Coalition policy on climate change because it does not exist. Mr Abbott apparently knows what he is against, but not what he is for. 4. The 12 14 February (2010) Newspoll had the coalition on 40% and Labor on 39% of primary votes, although technically these estimates are indistinguishable due to the sampling error of 3% points. On two party preferred estimates, the coalition still lagged 47 53, because Greens preferences favour Labor. 5. Value orientations were measured in the 2007 AuSSA using the following question: People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Listed below are some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Please indicate which one of these you consider the most important? And which would be the next most important? A. Maintain order in the nation; B. Give people more say in important government decisions; C. Protect freedom of speech; D. Maintain a high rate of economic growth. Those who chose options A and D were deemed materialists and options B and C as postmaterialists. All other combinations were classified as mixed. A scale was constructed for regression analyses scored 1 ¼ materialists; 2 ¼ mixed; 3 ¼ postmaterialists. 6. Controlling for age and sex, no significant interactions between education and party identification were found at the 95% level in these Australian data for either the global warming variable or Kyoto variable analysed in Tables 4 and 5. 7. An additive scale (0 6) combines the correct answers to six quiz questions on knowledge of political facts and process included in the 2007 AES. 8. The spiritual measure was constructed from the following category: How often do you personally do the following... Engage in Eastern spiritualities (e.g. Buddhism
94 B. Tranter or yoga)? Response categories: at least once a week; at least once a month; several times a year; at least once a year; never. Those engaged were coded 1 and never coded 0. 9. Based on what you know, do you think Australia should or should not participate in the Kyoto agreement to reduce global warming? (responses coded: 1 ¼ should participate; 0 ¼ should not participate, with depends category omitted). 10. Do you think that global warming will pose a serious threat to your way of life in your lifetime? (responses coded: yes, will pose a threat ¼ 1; no, will not pose a threat ¼ 0, with depends category omitted). 11. These questions were In general, do you feel that people in government are too often interested in looking after themselves or do you feel that they can be trusted to do the right thing nearly all of the time? (usually þ sometimes look after themselves ¼ 1; usually þ sometimes do the right thing ¼ 0). Now thinking about the performance of the government in Canberra in general, how good or bad a job do you think the government in Canberra has done over the past three years? (a very good þ a good job ¼ 1; a very bad þ a bad job ¼ 0). 12. When added to the models in Table 6, knowledge effects are negative and statistically significant at the 95% level among coalition supporters and positive but non-significant for Labor on both the global warming and Kyoto dependent variables. 13. The leadership scales are derived from the following questions: using a scale from 0 to 10, please show how much you like or dislike the party leaders. Again, if you don t know much about them, you should give them a rating of 5 (bold emphasis in original wording). 14. Estimates for Green partisans are based on small sub-samples and potentially unreliable, but are presented for illustrative purposes. 15. McAllister s (2008) ANU Poll conducted in October 2008 also found that 73% of Australians saw the drought as a very serious issue, compared to 69% for the degradation of lakes and 56% for global warming. References Bartels, L., 1996. Uninformed votes: information effects in presidential elections. American Journal of Political Science, 40, 194 230. Bean, C., 1996. Partisanship and electoral behaviour in comparative perspective. In: M. Sims, ed. The paradox of parties. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 135 155. Bean, C., 1997. Parties and elections. In: B. Galligan, I. McAllister, and J. Ravenhill, eds. New Developments in Australian Politics. South Melbourne: Macmillan, 102 124. Bean, C., McAllister, I., and Warhurst, J., 1990. The greening of Australian politics: the 1990 federal election. Melbourne: Longman Chesire. Bean, C., et al., 2005. Australian election study, 2004 user s guide for the machinereadable data file (ASSDA Study 1079). Canberra: Australian National University. Bean, C., et al., 2008. Australian election study, 2007 user s guide for the machinereadable data file (ASSDA Study 1120). Canberra: Australian National University. Campbell, A., et al., 1960. The American voter. New York: Wiley and Sons. Chapman, B., Botterill, L., and Egan, M., 2006. Income-contingent loans for drought relief. Farm Policy Journal, 3 (2), 59 67. Crook, S. and Pakulski J., 1995. Shades of green: public opinion on environmental issues in Australia. Australian Journal of Political Science, 30, 39 55. Curtis, L., 2010. Abbott selling climate change plan AM [online]. Available from: http:// www.abc.net.au/am/content/2010/s2808547.htm [Accessed 17 February 2010]. Dalton, R., 1996. Citizen politics: public opinion and political parties in advanced industrial democracies. 2nd ed. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.
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