PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS FROM AMONG THE HIGHEST PAID WORKERS TO AMONG THE LOWEST PAID WORKERS

PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS FROM AMONG THE HIGHEST PAID WORKERS TO AMONG THE LOWEST PAID WORKERS Throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, packinghouse workers were among the best paid industrial workers in America. The following is an average hourly earnings comparison chart arrived at from data prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. YEAR Meat Packing Meat Packing U.S. Manufacturing Slaughter Processing 1960 $2.60 $2.40 $2.26 1961 $2.69 $2.46 $2.32 1962 $2.77 $2.55 $2.39 1963 $2.83 $2.64 $2.45 1964 $2.91 $2.72 $2.53 1965 $2.99 $2.78 $2.61 1966 $3.09 $2.89 $2.71 1967 $3.24 $3.04 $2.82 1968 $3.45 $3.24 $3.01 1969 $3.67 $3.46 $3.19 1970 $3.98 $3.64 $3.35 1971 $4.20 $3.86 $3.57 1972 $4.46 $4.12 $3.82 1973 $4.76 $4.43 $4.09 1974 $5.20 $4.81 $4.42 1975 $5.67 $5.36 $4.83 1976 $6.06 $5.87 $5.22 1977 $6.57 $6.28 $5.68 1978 $7.09 $6.73 $6.17 1979 $7.73 $7.40 $6.70 1980 $8.49 $8.06 $7.27 1981 $8.97 $8.73 $7.99 1982 $9.00 $9.08 $8.49 1983 $8.58 $8.83 $8.83 1984 $8.17 $8.89 $9.19 1985 $8.10 $8.74 $9.54 1986 $8.24 $8.76 $9.73 1987 $8.41 $8.85 $9.91 1988 $8.48 $9.04 $10.19 1989 $8.64 $9.22 $10.48 1990 $8.74 $9.37 $10.83 1991 $8.92 $9.43 $11.18 1992 $9.16 $9.62 $11.46 1993 $9.26 $9.89 $11.74 1994 $9.44 $10.06 $12.07 1995 $9.61 $10.41 $12.37 1996 $9.82 $10.47 $12.77 1997 $10.03 $10.74 $13.17 1998 $10.34 $11.03 $13.49 1999 $10.81 $11.17 $13.91 2000 $10.94 $11.80 $14.38 2001 $11.38 $12.27 $14.84 2002 1/ $11.48 $12.40 $15.16

- 2 - An Entire Industry s Wages Decimated In less than two decades, the nation s packinghouse workers went from being among the bestpaid industrial workers in America to among the lowest paid. Consider the following stark statistics. At the time of the 1979 merger between the Meat Cutter and Clerk International Unions which created UFCW, the average hourly earnings of packinghouse slaughter workers were $1.03 an hour more than that for all U.S. manufacturing workers. As of February of this year, the average hourly earnings of packinghouse workers were $3.74 an hour less than that of U.S. manufacturing workers. In 1979, the average hourly earnings for meatpacking processing workers were 70 cents an hour more than that for U.S. manufacturing workers. By February of 2002, they were $2.76 an hour less than that of U.S. manufacturing workers. There are few, if any industries in the nation where wages plummeted to such depths during this period of time. What Caused the Plunge in Industry Wages? How and why did this happen? There are those who will say that old line Master Agreement meat companies such Armour, Swift, Wilson, Morrell, Hygrade, Rath, and Cudahy, companies that as a result of the Master Agreement contracts paid excellent wages and benefits, were replaced by low-wage companies such as IBP, American Beef, Excel, Monfort and later ConAgra. While structural changes especially in the beef sector did take place in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, there are a couple of facts to keep in mind. First, the measurement used to compare wages in the meat packing industry to other U.S. industries is the average hourly earnings of each industry which is compiled on a monthly basis by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. When such earnings are compiled the study includes all workers in the meat packing industry such as Master Agreement workers and those who did not work under Master Agreement Contracts. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, those packinghouse workers who labored under Master Agreement contracts did not comprise even 50 percent of all the workers in the industry. It is therefore safe to assume that the wages and benefits paid under non-master agreement contracts were substantial and indeed they were. Many of the non-master Agreement contracts called for the same wages as those in the Master Agreements, i.e., Hormel, Oscar Mayer, Bluebird, Dubuque Pack, American Stores, and many others. Many of the non-master Agreements in the industry lagged no more than 10 to 15 percent behind the wages of Master Agreement contracts. This placed their average hourly earnings well above most other earnings in U.S. manufacturing. Therefore, to say the disappearance of the old Master Agreement meat packers was the cause of the steep industry plunge in wages does not square with the facts. Second, the low wage operations of IBP and American Beef bursting onto the scene in the late 1960s and becoming the world s largest beef slaughterers in the 1970s hardly caused the steep plunge in the industry wages. In the late 1960s and into the mid-1970s, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen Union specifically, its Packinghouse Department fought it out with IBP, American Beef, Monfort, and Illini Beef, etc. and drove the wages at those companies to within 25 cents an hour of the Master Agreement wages. It is of interest to point out that the Packinghouse Department with moderate support from the rest of the International Union drove the wages of these large low wage packers up to their highest level in the late 1960s and early 1970s. On the other hand in the 1980s, the large UFCW International Union provided mere token support to its Packinghouse Division when it squared off against

- 3 - an entire industry assault on packinghouse workers. The outcome, of course, was a free fall of wages because the UFCW Packinghouse Division could not carry the fight by itself. Equally important, in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the International Union leadership helped entrench low wages in the meat packing industry with its disastrous bargaining and strategies. Therefore, the proposition that wages throughout the industry plummeted because of structural changes in the industry simply in and of itself does not hold water. Certainly those structural changes may have caused a retreat from the highest level of wages to a somewhat lower wage, but it would have never caused industry-wide wages to plunge as low as they did. There are those who would suggest that the defeat of the Hormel Austin workers was the cause of industry wages tumbling to their lowest point. Anyone who cares to examine the facts of this argument will find that by the time the Austin, Minnesota struggle commenced, the wages in the industry had been smashed and the Hormel Austin affair was an industry clean up operation at the end of a five year fight -- had already been won. In fact, as the courageous struggle in Austin took place (against one of the highest wage employers in the industry -- even with the cuts that had been made) the UFCW International Union leadership headed up by Wynn, Olwell, Dority and Hansen was agreeing to highly substandard contracts or sweetheart deals with large employers such IBP, Excel, and ultimately even Hormel s subcontractor at the Austin plant. All these employers in the 1980s were low-wage giants in the industry. Taking nothing away from the Hormel Austin workers ultimate reaction to the plunge in industry wages that had occurred in the previous five years, the struggle in Austin, Minnesota never was the beachhead for advancement or retreat of wages and benefits for workers in the meat packing industry. There are those who will advance the argument that the industry has always been a low-wage industry or that U.S. workers do not want to work in the meat packing plants so workers from other countries must be placed in the nation s meat packing plants. You will even hear some people say that the employers need low-wage foreign workers in order to make a slim profit. Such arguments are nonsense and, again, do not square with the facts. When the industry was a high paying industry, workforce turnover in the plants was practically nonexistent. Parents would work 25 or 30 years in a meat packing plant, raise their children and put them through college. When many of the children graduated they went to work in the meat packing plants because they could get more money working there than with their college degree at other places. When there was a lay-off at a meat packing plant, sometimes workers with as much as fifteen years seniority would be laid-off. When the wages and benefits were decent, employment in meat packing was highly prized. Only when the wages and benefits were driven to their lowest point did workforce turnover become a major problem for the meat packing employers and it was then that it became necessary to import workers from Third World countries to exploit with low wages and benefits. Clearly, if you track the profits of meat packing companies over the past fifty years, you will find that such companies have made very good profits and with the advent of modern day slave wages in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s meat packing profits have been huge. So as we can see the various arguments advanced not only do not square with the facts but they are designed to mask the real causes of why the wages in an entire industry crashed so fast and so low. If the factors just cited were not the major reasons for the free fall of wages in the meat industry throughout the 1980s and 1990s what then were the main contributing factors?

- 4 - The Success Of Packinghouse Workers And Their Union Before UFCW Under the United Packinghouse Workers of America Union (UPWA) workers in the meat packing industry entered the second half of the century with effective union leadership, widespread support, a bold tradition of rank and file activism and a strong sense of purpose. When the UPWA merged with the Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America Union (AMC&BW of NA) in 1968, these factors were carried over to AMC&BW. Union leaders, especially those who staffed the union s Packinghouse Department were experts on the structure and operations of the meat packing industry and on each company in the industry. They were expert negotiators on bargaining on a national basis in a national industry and they were superior strategists and tacticians. The Packinghouse Department was the national center of operations that coordinated all bargaining with national operators. The Packinghouse Department was the vehicle that monitored contract settlements and rallied forces to defend the national standard of negotiated wages and benefits. The Department created, maintained, educated and frequently met with chains a combination of rankand-filers and full-time local union officers from a local union that represented workers of a company at a certain plant. At times, there were as many as 20 to 25 local unions from across the country that would represent workers at a given company s plants across the country. For example, Armour & Co. would constitute a chain. When a chain meeting was called by the Packinghouse Department as many as 50 people from around the country from that given chain would attend the meeting, again such a chain would be comprised of a combination of rank-and-filers and full-time local union officers from a local unions. There were 12 to 15 such chains that met with the Packinghouse Department three or four times a year in working meetings and they were a power to reckon with. The Packinghouse Department created the National Packing Committee, which was two to three leaders from each chain, again rank-and-filers and full-time officers. This committee met with the Packinghouse Department six or more times a year. They participated in all negotiations with national operators and took to their respective chains what was going on in bargaining with all national operators. The Packinghouse Department fought for and established a national pattern of bargaining and settlements. Using this approach, they advanced wages to their highest level and encouraged all the chains to strive for such pattern settlements. In effect, through vehicles of unity (chains, the national packing committee, national and pattern bargaining and protecting on a national basis those gains won at the bargaining table) they avoided their weakest position which was local by local bargaining in isolation and forced wages and benefits to their highest level. Decade after decade, the Packinghouse Department in conjunction with the chains and national packing committee negotiated national pattern contracts. They built on those agreements improving them each time they expired. They strongly encouraged every local union to strive for the industry pattern of wages and benefits and not to undermine it in contract negotiations or elsewhere. The Packinghouse Department served as a watchdog to sound the alarm when the level of wages and benefits were threatened internally or by the employers. This approach ultimately resulted in establishing one of the best standards of living in industrial America, indeed the world. It did not happen because a local union was big or the International Union was big. It was the result of hundreds of meetings with the chains and the National Packing Committee. It was the result of bargaining on a national basis and establishing a national bargaining pattern to follow. It was the result of the Packinghouse Department, the chains and National Packing Committee working together on a national basis for common objectives and mutual protection. It was a program that most of the rank-and-file supported. It was the result of the

- 5 - Packinghouse Department conducting an ongoing educational program of the local union leadership and rank-and-file activists. It was the Packinghouse Department servicing the local unions in a number of different ways and encouraging them to constantly strive to be better trade unionists. Teaching that an injury to one is an injury to all and that the best interest of the majority of packinghouse workers is achieved in unity. UFCW Brand Of Unionism: the Kiss of Death for Packinghouse Workers As cited earlier in this report, the Meat Cutter and Clerk International Unions merged to create UFCW in 1979. Structurally, politically and constitutionally the former Clerk union was the absorbing union and its leadership became the power in the new union. The leadership in control of the newly created UFCW had no background or interest in industrial unionism or national bargaining in a national industry. In fact all their experience was local by local union bargaining and, at best, in some places of the country, regional bargaining. Because they bargained on a local by local basis, they saw no need or necessity to protect the negotiated national pattern of wages and benefits during negotiations, during the term of the agreements and in what was newly organized. The former Clerk leadership was not noted for working closely with the rank-and-file or even including local unions in on negotiations in a meaningful way. The leadership was noted for not having the intestinal fortitude to confront the employers when necessary. Chains, the National Packing Committee and working closely with the rank and file were foreign to the leadership and viewed as outdated and unneeded. In essence, the Packinghouse Department and the packinghouse workers were swooped up in a merger that would ultimately be the kiss of death for them. Almost from the very beginning of the merger, the former Clerk leadership over the strenuous objections of its own Packinghouse Division granted mid-term contract concessions in meat packing that ultimately lead to an industry wave of mid-term contract concession. When the Packinghouse Division struck employers in the mid-1980s to drive wages back up that had been lost in the first half of the decade through mid-term contract concessions, the leadership gave only token support to its division while behind the scenes it worked to undermine the Division and the strikes in a number of different ways. From the mid to late 1980s, the leadership bypassed the Packinghouse Division and entered into numerous substandard contract settlements, sweetheart deals with the employers and more mid-term contract concessions. Some observers stated that the treachery displayed against the Packinghouse Division by the leadership was some of the worst in the history of the trade union movement. During this period, the Clerk leadership firmed up local by local union bargaining which the employers had wanted for decades. Often these deals were made while the Packinghouse Division was carrying on strikes to advance wages. By January of 1989, the leadership had completely undermined its own Packinghouse Division, the chains and National Packing Committee s five year fight to bring wages back up. Also at this time, the leadership purged its Packinghouse Division of the leadership that had come with the merger and replaced it with a series of puppet staff members that did the bidding of the leadership for a high salary. Throughout January 1989, and throughout the decade of the 1990s, the leadership of the UFCW International Union systemically destroyed the National Packing Committee and the chains. National bargaining was replaced with local union bargaining. All efforts were abandoned to protect wages and benefits at their highest level on a national basis. Through the vehicle of local union bargaining the employers grabbed the initiative and established a national wage structure at it lowest level. The Packinghouse Division became nothing more than a name on a piece of paper and the cohesion and unity

- 6 - of the Packinghouse Division and packinghouse workers completely disappeared. The end result of local by local union bargaining, the destruction of solidarity building vehicles and rank-and-file involvement is clear. A high paying industry turned into a low paying industry. The union has been taken to its weakest position in the meat packing industry. With the exception of a small handful of local unions, the employers assault the workers and union at the bargaining table and at the work place at will. Under the present structure of UFCW and its disastrous approach to representing workers in the meat packing industry, there is little hope that meaningful advancements on behalf of the workers can be made. Today, decertification attempts led by the workers and not the employers have been made at several large meat packing plants. The International Union leadership is now alarmed at the fact that in a number of local unions, that have been under contract for several decades, they are losing membership. Clearly wages continue to lag far behind those paid to U.S. manufacturing workers where once the opposite was true. It is generally recognized that on a national basis the meat packing industry is a low wage, dangerous industry to work in where a weak union has allowed the employers to return the workers back to the days of the jungle. To a very large degree, the UFCW International Union leadership is responsible for this tragedy. There are a small few rays of hope within the union in the meat packing industry. Namely, those local unions that have resisted the destructive agenda and operation advanced over the past couple of decades in the meat packing industry. In a hostile environment displayed by both the employers and UFCW International Union leadership, these local unions function like old packinghouse local unions used to function. It is of interest to note that they do better at the bargaining table and at representing the workers daily at the work station than do those who sold out to the UFCW leadership approach to representing workers in the meat packing industry. Just think what could be accomplished if all the local unions and the International leadership operated in the meat packing industry like those few local unions do. We can only hope. RESEARCH-EDUCATION-ADVOCACY-PEOPLE E-MAIL: REAPINC@AOL.COM WEBSITE: REAPINC.ORG JUNE 3, 2002