MODERNIZE TO COOPERATE? TRANSITIONS OF RUSSIAN BORDER SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. Anna-Liisa Heusala 1

MODERNIZE TO COOPERATE? TRANSITIONS OF RUSSIAN BORDER SECURITY ADMINISTRATION Anna-Liisa Heusala 1 A Paper to be presented at the Nispacee Conference in Budva, Montenegro, 14.-16.5.2009. 1 Ph.D., Research Fellow at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki, Finland. 1

Abstract The article examines the main transitional processes in border security governance in Russia and the impact which international cooperation can have on the transition. The focus of the paper is Russian border security administration reform in the context of cross-border cooperation between Finland and Russia, two neighbouring countries sharing similar interests in border security. The paper will use gained empirical knowledge to outline transition in this context as a process which is closely related to practical needs in international cooperation. Obstacles found in operative cooperation may also form more general obstacles for internal reforms in Russian border security administration. The article argues that Russian administrative reforms in security governance are affected both by internal operative and economical needs, as well as by international cooperation, but face challenges characterized as risk administration elements. The paper will outline transition in Russian border security administration and obstacles faced in it. Implementation and policy making in transitional environments are discussed. The paper states that cross-border cooperation can help administrative reforms in these circumstances. Russian security administration reform covers both economically and operationally motivated legislative and organizational changes, including personnel policy reforms aiming to modernize present systems of border security. Requirements for economical and operational modernization can serve as venues of change in international cooperation. The article will pay specific attention to changes which are taking place in the Border Guard Service and the Customs. Both of these organizations have undergone major legislative and structural changes aiming to change their administrative cultures. Examination of these case organizations is developed on the basis a study conducted between 2004-2007 by the Police College of Finland and the Border Guard Academy (Finland). This study focused on the local and regional cross-border cooperation in crime prevention between Finnish and Russian internal security administrations. Key words: transition, Russia, security administration, cooperation, policy, implementation 2

1. Introduction This paper discusses factors affecting the success of administrative reform in the field of border security. The subject of security administration has general been approached from the perspectives of politics or international relations. The state has in many cases been but one subject or actor in the formation of security governance 2.The primary focus is Russian internal security administration and its growing needs of international cooperation. Border security administration generally speaking refers to internal security administration organizations which are involved in border crossing crime prevention work. In Europe these typically mean the police, customs and border guards. In different countries, police and border guards have different roles and jurisdictions. In Russia, border security is most urgently the responsibility of FSB, the Federal Border Guard Service and the Customs. However, also the Ministry of Interior (Militia), the Federal Narcotics Control Agency and the Head Prosecutor s Office play a significant supportive role. Finland became a member of the European Union in 1994. Since then, the border has become a wider concept connected with internal security. The control of border crossing has gained new importance. Finland and the Russian Federation share a 1340 km long border together which has nine international border crossing points. The Finnish-Russian border is both a European Union and Schengen area border. Travelling and trade across the border has grown rapidly since the early 1990 s. Finland serves as one of the main logistical routes to Russia, and the obvious one to the city of St. Petersburg. Tourism from Russian Federation has been growing rapidly and offers important business opportunities in Finland. Official joint programs and development work are regular between ministries and regional governments. Thus, the border has a special meaning to Finnish and Russian people which has undergone a major transformation. Security sector governance 3 is particularly important for European external relations. Crossborder cooperation between Russia and its neighbours includes both crime prevention and immigration control which extends across state borders. Proactive and preventive work, which takes place long before a person or a vehicle crosses the border, is becoming more important. Ideally, risks should be prevented or left behind the border. Thus, the geographical area of border control is being extended, and the concept of the border becomes more difficult to sketch 4. As borders have become easier to cross, new areas of control have been created. Borders in Europe are still controlled by different hierarchical systems and policies affecting them may have wide consequences. 5 Thus the developments in the administrations responsible for border security in Russian Federation have a significant practical as well as political meaning, also outside of Russian borders. This paper seeks to examine the meaning of cooperation for internal reform in the Russian border administration and to form a realistic viewpoint on policies and implementation of reforms in transitional administrations. The paper will outline theoretical ways to grasp transition at an institutional level in the Russian context. 2. Transition in Border Security Administration 2.1. A Case Study on Border Security Between Finland and Russia The Police College of Finland and the Border and Coast Guard Academy conducted a study in 2004-2007 on the bilateral border security cooperation between Finland and the Russian Federation 6. The study examined both national multi-agency internal security cooperation in 2 Mabee, 2003 3 Hänggi and Tanner, 2005, Krahmann,2003. 4 Walters 2006, Andreas 2000. 5 Newman 2006, Berg and Ehin 2006. 6 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. Samalla puolella eri puolilla rajaa. Rajaturvallisuuden edistäminen Suomen ja Venäjän viranomaisyhteistyönä. Poliisiammattikorkeakoulun tutkimuksia 30/2008 ja Raja- ja merivartiokoulun julkaisuja 1. Tutkimuksia 2. [Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. On the Same Side On Different Sides of the Border. Developing Border Security through the Cooperation of Finnish and Russian Authorities. The 3

Finland and cross-border cooperation at the regional and local levels between Finland and Russia. The studied geographic area was South-Eastern Finland and the St. Petersburg/Leningrad region in Russia. The study had three goals. First, it sought to describe the official roles and tasks of border security administrations in Finland and Russia in a comparative manner. Second, it looked at the multi-level and multi-agency cooperation of internal security administration in progress in Finland. Third, it described analyzed the cooperation in crime prevention work between Finland and Russia. The analysis was based on an extensive collection of written material which included national legislation and administrative regulations as well as bilateral agreements and programs between Finland and Russian Federation. These were used to describe the roles and tasks of the studied organizations. Theme interviews (altogether 47 persons in Finland and Russia) were conducted by the researchers to look at the practical experiences of Police, Border Guard, Customs and Militia at the local and regional levels. Interviewing did not include personnel from the Customs or the Border Guard in the Russian Federation. Therefore the viewpoints presented in the final report on these administrations, were a collection of experiences of partner organizations mainly from the Finnish side. The interview structure and analysis was based on examining the legality of action (e.g. action according to agreements), the ability of authorities to anticipate the results of cooperation (predictability) and the effectiveness of cooperation for fieldwork. Four main categories were constructed for the interviews which also served as tools for qualitative categorization in the analysis of the interviews. These were the following: 1) Structures of cooperation (i.e. the legal tasks of each organization, bilateral agreement between Finland and Russia, permanent joint action groups, organizational arrangement according to agreements); 2) Mutual assistance (i.e. domestic operative assistance, operative assistance abroad, direct domestic and cross-border contacts at home and abroad, official assistance from abroad, role of liaison officers); 3) Flow of information (i.e. access to information in the registers of another authority, sharing of registers, general notification practices, flow of criminal intelligence information, training); 4) Functional effectiveness (i.e. the coordination of cooperation, familiarity with contracts, effectiveness of contracts, knowledge of another country, effectiveness of cooperation, hierarchies and their meaning). Interviewed officials were asked about their personal experiences in national and cross-border cooperation. From the answers, material was collected for each of the above mentioned categories. On the basis of this categorized material, a generalized picture of typical experiences and viewpoints was drawn for each interviewed organization. These pictures included evaluations of both national partnerships and counterparts across the border. The following section outlines the main forms of present cooperation and its practical obstacles based on our results. 2.2. Obstacles of Finnish-Russian Security Cooperation Finnish-Russian border security cooperation takes place at different administrative levels which all face challenges in transitional environments. At the national central administration level, cooperation takes the form of contract making and national legal changes supporting this effort. At this level international cooperation and national policies merge and international work is meant to enhance efficiency. In Europe, an administrative ideology of change in security is in development which promotes a harmonized security administration culture. It stresses cross-border and interagency cooperation 7. Cooperation is based on the assumption that institutional trust needs legal instruments (legal-rationality) which integrate Russian administration into European cooperation Police College of Finland Studies 30/2008 and the Border and Coast Guard Academy Publications 1. Studies 2.] 7 An example is the Treaty of Prum (27.5.2005) 4

(resource-rationality) 8. At the moment, European security relations with Russia are governed by European security strategy (2003), European Neighbourhood Policy (2004) and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA in 1997) and strategic partnership which is documented in EU Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Besides EU-Russia relations, Russian Federation and Finland have a bilateral Treaty on crime prevention between the governments of Finland and Russian Federation (1993) which complements European convention of legal assistance in criminal matters (1959). This European convention gives powers of authority to different organization than the bilateral treaty. The convention covers legal aid in such forms as questioning of witnesses, acquiring expert statements, informing of documents, accumulation of evidence, use of coercive measures, giving of information from an official register, and other forms of cooperation. The Finnish central authority is the Ministry of Justice. In Russia, the central authorities in this convention include the Supreme Court of Russian Federation, the Ministry of Interior, FSB, the Federal Narcotics Control Agency and the Head Prosecutor s Office. The bilateral treaty guarantees direct contacts among local and regional law enforcement officials at the moment. The treaty on border (1960) is the foundation of Finnish-Russian border guard cooperation. 9. It regulates the border line, border signs, use of railroads and roads crossing the border and economic activity in the border crossing areas. Acting authorities have a permanent national level Finnish-Russian border guard working group which was founded in 1997. Its members include highest officials from both sides. The working group plans practical cooperation at the border zones and its work program is confirmed on a arly basis. 10 The Customs cooperation has a similar type of a structure. The Customs authorities of Finland and Russia have a government level Agreement on assistance in customs matters (1994). The agreement covers cooperation in facilitation of transport of goods, observance of customs legislation, crime prevention and investigations. Assistance is given according to the laws and resources of both countries. Forms of giving information, substance of documents, costs and implementation at regional and local levels are also included in the agreement. 11 Resource-rationality has had a significant role in the formation of process- and action-rationality goals in both Finnish and Russian internal security reforms 12. The transition of internal security administration is based on needs to cut down costs, minimize bureaucratic waste, develop quantitative efficiency and delegate public services to private and third sector actors. These factors go hand in hand with task goals in both Finnish and Russian organizational evolution. Resource-rationality has contributed to legislative developments, institution building and ways of work in both Finland and Russia 13. In Finland, structural and functional harmonization has taken place between the Police, Customs and Border Guard. Multi-agency cooperation has become an important tool for saving resources and enhancing efficiency in internal security. In Russia, a more varied development has been going on, which has used administrative mergers, re-divisions and creations of new administrative organizations (examples being the Border Guard Service and the Narcotics Control Agency). Strategic plans of modernization are also used (an example being the Customs). All these structural changes have a great significance for the roles and tasks of internal security administrations, which also affects cross-border cooperation and intergovernmental relations. A significant effect of reforms is the need for more international practical cooperation. 8 Weick, 2001. 9 Poutiainen, 2004. 10 A protocol on the establishment of a permanent working group between the Border Guard of the republic of Finland and the Border Guard Service of the Russian Federation 12.7.1997. 11 An agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance between the governments of the republic of Finland and the Russian Federation on customs matters 8.12.1994. 12 Comp. Weick, 2001. 13 Comp. Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008, and Ari Lahti, 2007. 5

Table 1 Ongoing structural developments in the border security administration in the Russian Federation Restructuring of internal security administration State multi-agency cooperation Privatepublic/third sector relations Government level policies Legal changes institutionalizing policies Diversification of border security State wide institutional reforms Geographical jurisdictions, tasks and relative roles of authorities New organizations, and actors and meanings for internal security Policies for multiagency cooperation in public order and crime-prevention Institutionalization of multi-agency cooperation development Evolution of cooperation both formally and informally Policies for privatepublic task divisions and cooperation at different levels Formalization of the role of private and third sector security Evolution of privatepublic cooperation both formally and informally State wide institutional reforms and legal changes have been going on in the Border Guard Service and in the Customs. The Border Guard Service has altered its personnel structure and thus its focus of work in the last years. It has shifted its strategy from being primarily a military organization using conscripts to a more policing and service type of an organization employing personnel on three year contracts. The focus of work has become proactive surveillance, information gathering and analysis, all requiring more attention to network connections with other law enforcement organizations. The geographical areas of jurisdiction inside the Border Guard Service have also altered. Today this organization has seven administrative districts. The geographical borders of these coincide with the seven administrative areas instituted by the President and with the administrative areas of the Russian armed forces 14. The Customs have gone through several changes of institutional settings since the beginning of the 1990 s. Finding the right institutional background for customs affairs has fluctuated with political emphasis on either border control or taxation. Depending on the general transition in the society and subsequent government policies, the multi-task profile of the Customs has made it an organization which has suffered from uncertain time the most. Presently the Customs is an independent governmental body which is responsible for the creation of customs policy and legal basis for its implementation. The Customs Service has used strategic development plans in its modernization efforts. The last of such documents was for years 2007-2009. It concentrated on three different areas of development which aim is to modernize technology and guidance of work processes. Better cooperation with other authorities is central in this process. 15 Private and third sector cooperation in the field of border security has interesting historical background in the case of the Federal Border Guard Service. It has always used civilian persons living near the border for assistance in its control work. This tradition is legally mandated in the present law. However, this cooperation serves as a secondary tool for local finding local temporary resources. For the customs, modernization efforts mean most of all developing forms of cooperation with the main body of their customers, the exporters and importers depending on smooth crossing over the borders. In this challenge, systems of information sharing with ports are key elements. The case of the Customs Service, particularly, is one which demonstrates the effect of transition on a single administration. Transition began a period of time where reactions by the Customs itself only aggravated transitional risks. An example is the attempt to bring order to local 14 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 15 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 6

decision making at single customs points by issuing legal orders at the central level. It is easy to see how a transition which includes structural harmonization, restructuring of organizations, merges and closing of organizations, creates so called risk administrations. Risk administration features include structural, legal, political, personnel and client relation elements. 16 In many cases, risk administration features might be the reason behind reforms. However, transitions typically produce cycles of dysfunctions 17, instead of wanted goals. Risk in an administration refers to problems which stand in the way of good government, defined here as corresponding with legality (rule of law), transparency and effectiveness. Factors affecting the use of discretion and general professional ethics are particularly important. 18 A risk administration is characterized by hectic structural changes, legitimate levels of bad things as a part of life, diffuse administrative authority, incoherent latent and manifest functions, formalistic laws, rules and norms, corruption, weak guidance and internal opposition, separate official and unofficial powers, difficult choice making and calculation, politics inside administration, complicated client relations, important cliques, competing new and old elites, and personnel which is trapped in a weak or distorted system of rewards. 19 The study indicated that main challenges in at the national levels included hectic structural changes, weak guidance, formalism and corruption. Cooperation at the national levels is based on an idea, that Russia needs to be integrated to the work of European security administration structures. Its strength - and weakness is the reliance on treaties and laws. Politically this might be a strength if it corresponds with the rhetoric of the environment. Contracts, however, are most successful when the leaderships of partner organizations find each other at the level of colonization of the future 20. Shared views on modernization and functionality 21 have importance here. The operative level in cooperation consists of both contract based fixed systems of assistance and personally built, often unofficial channels. Interestingly enough, one of the main challenges at this level of cooperation was found to be intensified policy rules which disrupt personal ties. Legitimate levels of bad things 22 were also seen as normal in Finnish-Russian relations. The study showed that, for instance, the request for official assistance was seen as a burdensome process by both the Finnish and Russian counterparts. At the local level unfamiliarity with the process was typical on both sides. But more importantly, the process was seen suffering from formalism, and slowness a legitimate bad thing. Formalism of laws and contracts were brought up. Corruption presented itself as an inevitable background for the building of personal trusted liaisons. For the Border Guard organizations on both sides of the border, the main instrument for regional and local cooperation is the regional border delegate system. It was created to solve local problems, coordinate information giving and to avoid negotiations at higher levels between the two countries about practical matters. The essence of this system is that it serves as a fixed venue of local contacts in strictly regulated matters. The Border Guard cooperation has been limited to cases involving border crossing situations, and cross-border criminal investigation has been organized through the Police in Finland and Head Prosecutor s Office in Russia. Since the new law on Border Guard (1.9.2005) in Finland, this situation has been changing and a need for cross-border investigation contacts has risen, which includes joint investigation teams. Fears of information leaks and breaches of authority stiffened the desire to develop cooperation further. Diffuse authority at the Russian side and differences of discretional power of Finnish and Russian Border Guard line workers, was seen as slowing down cooperation by the Finnish respondents. 16 For a full list of writers contributing to this concepts and description of the qualities see Heusala, 2005, pp. 45-48. 17 Comp. Heusala, 2005. 18 Heusala, 2005. 19 For a full description of the qualities see Heusala 2005, pp. 45-48. 20 Beck,1996. 21 For instance Parsons, 1964 and 1969. 22 Beck,1996. 7

At the present, Border Guard cooperation is based on post cold war working methods which underline limited and fixed information sharing in issues directly concerning a particular border crossing inspection or illegal border crossing case. Policy development is slowed down by rearrangements on the Russian side, where the partner organization is going through a major transformation. The Russian Border Guard Service is presently transforming itself to a more investigative organization which uses contract based border guards and more preventive border surveillance methods. The Finnish and Russian Customs have a bilateral treaty obliging them to cooperate over information sharing for a criminal investigation. The nucleus of the Customs agreement is exchange of information and active assistance across the border which includes joint covert operations. Information exchanges are meant to ensure that Customs authorities across the border perform their duties as much as possible together. 23 Both the Border Guard and the Customs have built a system of exchanging workers for educational purposes at the border with their Russian partner organizations. The purpose of this practice is to build better working relations through joint training. In terms of voluntary operative assistance at the Customs check points, the Finnish respondents felt that the Finnish side had so far been more active than the Russian Customs. The study indicated that images and bad experiences related to risk administration elements affect cooperation strongly. This view was shared by both the Finnish and Russian respondents. Finnish and Russian Customs operative level has some permanent concrete problems at the border which are affected and caused by both the Russian transition and Finnish economic interests. The main case here is the problem of double invoicing, which contributes to Russian economy losing a considerable amount of tax revenue each year. The Finnish policy towards this problem is in practice ambiguous. Even as the situation is recognised, little has been done in the previous decade, because the crime is taking place on the Russian side and it does not affect the Finnish economy directly. Politics, in this way, are inside the Customs cooperation on a daily basis. The continuing Customs battle makes negative images stronger and has an effect on the general development in trans-national relations. 24 One of the main findings in the study was the reaffirmation of the meaning of informal in crossborder contacts. Yet, these same qualities indicate that institutional trust is not well developed. The viewpoint from the Finnish side was that this was largely due to the nature of hierarchy in the Russian administration and lack of cooperation between Russian security authorities. Both the Finnish and Russian respondents acknowledged that without reliable and preferably long lasting personal contacts, it is hard to make things happen fast enough in cross-border assistance. The meaning of networks of this kind is underlined by the fear of leaks and sometimes blurry lines of what is a proper amount of trust in international contacts. The studied Finnish authorities felt that decision making about such contacts has been difficult on the basis of present agreements and regulations. The study showed that a major reason for lack of creativity and trust-building is limited experience and lack of knowledge about partners, both closely related to images of the other. 25 Images and risk administration experiences guide policy development, which differs between organizations, to a large extent at the moment. There is also a gap between national level decision making and local and regional work, which would benefit from more flexible security regimes 26. 3. Transition in Russian Security Administration: Implications for Policies and Implementation The meaning of policies and implementation in transitional environments is often downplayed as having only secondary meaning. Transition itself is seen as the extreme of turbulent environments, because it is so dependent on political whims and possible setbacks taking place in difficult economic situations. Because calculation in transitions is difficult, researchers may 23 An agreement on cooperation and mutual assistance between the governments of the republic of Finland and the Russian Federation on customs matters 8.12.1994. 24 Heusala, 2008. 25 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 26 Comp. Krahman, 2003, p. 8. 8

have the view that efforts connected with planning are easily wasted time and intellectual capacity. Therefore, it is not surprising, that in studies related to Russian security administration, complaints about corruption and other transitional effects have been the main contribution to academic discussion. Security administration has been at the centre of attention mostly in connection to criminology and defence-oriented security studies, or general studies of Russian politics. However important contributions these fields offer, particularly concerning the environment of the security administrations, they leave us wanting better understanding of internal developments in Russian security administration. Scholars of administrative sciences have produced decades of literature on strategy formation, policy making and its implementation in different organizational context. Examination of administrative uncertainties, irregularities, less than desirable leadership and unmet goals are the stuff of our field. Therefore, Russian and Eastern European transitional difficulties, even in particularly demanding surroundings, such as the security administration, are not exceptional to us. Historically, the main practical obstacle in sketching a comprehensive transition strategy for a country like Russia is the sheer geographical size of it. Although the collapse of the Soviet state system happened fast, and presumably to an extent according to a strategic plan 27, the building of new administrative system was incremental and in the first stage delegated to the regional level 28. According to Salminen and Temmes, fast privatization was strategically meant to fight change resistance and prismatic decline. In the first, threat images were related to nomenklatura and centrally led economic system which included the permanence of communist structures in government. In the other, the threat came in the form of cliques, corruption, lack of consensus and nepotism. 29 Administrative routines which uphold legality and predictability, however, collided with the entrepreneurial revolutions from above leaving civil servants unsure about their place in the state. This, in fact, intensified the unwanted side-effects of the transition. Security administration is no exception to the general Russian experience which has been clouded by a disappointment of losing control over planning. Even as the Russian reality in the Soviet times in many situations resembled that of an administrative market 30, the disappearance of channels for information feedback and fixed standards for expectations, left the administration in a type of a shock for years. Strategically, administrative reforms of sector ministries have evolved in an incremental and even conflicting manner. For Russian security administration, planning has been a mixture of attempted comprehensive and incremental planning. As the worst turmoil of the 1990 s is behind, an evolution of toward a more comprehensive policy making is on the way although not without challenges. Policies are presently formulated as a result of overall analysis of the situation, but incremental steps are used to reach targets. 31 Many structural changes have indicated that some administrations, such as the Customs, have yet to find their true place in the Russian administrative system. Many academic fields have attempted to grasp the concept of transition and its effects on Russian government. Transitional processes of different kinds have been described and analyzed in literature. Attempts have been made to theorize Russian transition and its effects on institutions 32 but their applicability in understanding organizational change at a more concrete and yet general level, has left room for further work. One such inspiring attempt has been made by Hempel and Martinsons (2009) who have conducted eight case studies of a single type of organizational change in mainland China in order to develop international organizational change theory. Their results show that change context influences not only the process of change, but also the content and the objectives of the change. Important in their work is the idea that since specific practices carry implicit values, the congruence with existing values influences organizational implementation significantly. 33 27 Boycko, Vishny and Schleifer, 1991. 28 Heusala, 2005. 29 Salminen and Temmes, 2000, p. 69. 30 Kordonskii, 2000. 31 Comp. Etzioni, 1986. 32 In Finland, for instance, Larjavaara, 2007. 33 Hempel and Martinsons, 2009. 9

Hempel and Martinsons build their review around key elements of change which were change criteria, outcomes/objectives of change, change process, change content and change context which refers to internal and external factors that influence change initiative. This resembles Heusala s (2005) effort to build a transition model for Russian administration which used concepts of transitional goals, structural changes, mediation and institutionalization of new culture. Mediation in this case was based on Anthony Giddens concept of structuration in which social systems of organizations in essence change the meaning of structures in society. Success of transition was looked at in terms of how well a new institutionalized administrative culture reflected original goals. New administrative culture included practices and ways of thought, therefore underlining values and ethics of officials. 34 In Heusala s (2005) study on transitions of Russian local administration culture, a liberaldemocratic ideal type was constructed and used as a tool for comparison against which to assess changes in different Russian historical ruptures. A general view on changes in chosen administrative elements was constructed in this manner. It can serve as a background to more specific organization level studies. However, the relation between end results and goals remains to be specified. With regard to trans-national cooperation, goal setting is a particularly challenging topic for both practitioners and scholars alike. The study by Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi (2005) on Finnish-Russian cross-border crime prevention showed that at the moment goals are in fact being set at the ground level by officials. This is partially due to the lack of transparent national strategies and diffuse polices across organizations. Partially it can be contributed to the cultural sphere of limited contacts and lack of experience which leads to concentration on crime investigation results (quantitative goals) instead of more comprehensive ideas of what cooperation is aiming to achieve at the long run 35. In administrative transitions, value systems in organizations deserve particular attention because they have a long historical memory. Hempel and Martinsons point out that researchers attention has so far focused upon national values, but institutional forces are also critical. Yet there is no clear idea of the way in which national context influences change objectives, process or content in organizations. 36 The case of Russian security administration is no exception. As was said earlier, attempts to examine Russian security administration has typically been done in the context of political analysis in which administration is either a direct object of politics or a political actor itself. Lack of basic empirical knowledge on the internal structures and social systems of the Russian security administration contributes to this situation. Similarly, implementation of cooperation with Russia security administration is affected by lack of knowledge, limited experiences, vague political level strategies and apprehended risks involved. Images more than planning have guided implementation of cooperation. It is noteworthy here to stop and think about implementation in the Russian security administration context from a more general perspective. Findings from implementation studies done in the past in much more stable environments can serve as assets in understanding how to approach Russian challenges. Our study was based on the prevailing idea that policy making and implementation of laws, treaties and instructions is mainly top-down, has clear goals and common strategic viewpoints across the border. Elements of good government are to be present in street level work of individual officers, based on shared ideas of meanings. With regard to these ideas, the results of the study showed mixed results. Even when officials had good experiences of cooperation across the border, they attributed this more to personally good relations than on anything else. There seemed to be a gap between government level document production and diplomatic meetings and the actual daily barriers between Finnish and Russian officials. 37 The results indicated that a new type of multi-task, multi-agency, intergovernmental network across the borders is in demand. This network will first require efficient organization of national cooperation through legislation, structural changes and development of working methods. The questions here are: how to combine these requirements with the Russian security administration 34 Heusala, 2005. 35 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 36 Hempel and Martinsons, 2009. 37 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 10

features of strong, independent agencies and reliance on unofficial ties to broker results in daily life? Is there in reality any room for policy in all this complexity? What is the meaning of implementation in an administrative culture historically filled with latent functions 38 and the unofficial? Presently, in Finnish security studies, there is a need to connect different levels of administration together in order to bring about the best results in implementation, at the street level. In this attempt, leadership, management and strategic studies, are the dominant genre. Presently, both contingency and network theoretical views are being applied in order to find the best fit between the environment and organizational structure and to outline dependencies between agencies sharing the same task. As much as these theoretical approaches may help in grasping some of the complexities, they do not help understanding what implementation is like in crossborder networks or in transitional environments such as Russia. The normative assumption that clear goals and direct causal chains of command are good in security administration, will continue to face difficulties in any network studies. In comparative studies, however, normative perspective can serve as an asset if chosen research concepts are used as ideal types against which comparisons are made or as ways to find functional equivalence. However, as Hupe 39 has pointed out, it is the task of an implementation researcher to empirically investigate the working of different principles rather than presuppose them. The study by Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi suggested that hierarchy was seen as a key restrictive element at the implementation or street level. Russian officials had less room for personal discretion officially, yet in many cases substituted this fact with unofficial networks with trusted colleagues. At the same time, at the somewhat higher level of city and region, changes of leadership affected cooperation considerably at the strategic and policy making level. 40 Hierarchy in this manner was a major factor affecting both Russian reform and cooperation across the state border. Further studies on Russian administrative structures, decision making systems, values in operation and their institutional application in reality are needed. In addition, as Russian transition is not a permanent fixed state but a process, much more serious attention needs to be given to ways of building links between equal partners. This should be done in a manner which avoids continuing the prevailing situation of multitude of actors implementing their own regional and local interests. Development of cooperation should not result in a situation where it is difficult to coordinate actions of foreign partners and national Russian policy programs 41. 4. Cooperation as a Tool for Modernization in the Network Administration Studies of the Finnish-Russian cooperation network, and the Russian security administration at the moment can benefit from seeing implementation as an open system which includes bargaining 42 and deals with a thickness of hierarchy 43. In cooperation, local networks of Russian administrative culture and institutionally created cross-border networks become connected. Instead of having to implement just one trans-national contract or national law, a variety of policy programs need to be implemented at the same time. The implementation level is less the last stage of a policy process, than an arena where actors deal with many hierarchies at the same time. Goal attainment depends on their governance skills 44. The area of these skills and their content in transitions focuses our attention to areas of human interaction, cultural in the administration. Requirements for economical and operational modernization can serve as venues of change in international cooperation. They can also be forced changes which shift problems into new organizational settings. Application of the risk administration concept in an analysis of transnational cooperation is based on the assumption that cooperation needs to incorporate all levels 38 Heusala, 2005. 39 Hupe, 2008. 40 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 41 Comp. Salminen and Temmes, 2000. 42 Bowen, 1982. 43 Hupe, 2008. 44 Hupe, 2008. 11

of administration in strategically solid manner. Legality, transparency and effectiveness build institutional trust which is in essence the same as reliability of the formal side of administration. The informal shows the consequences of administrative action. In transitions such as the one in Russia, the informal is often the same as the side-effect of changes. People change their behaviour from the intended when side-effects of changes in structures become large and meaningful enough. Side-effects can assume a directive role in the execution of law. Furthermore, in transitions, new risk positions appear in fast changes and people need to find individual survival solutions. As a result, a more instrumental attitude can appear which means pursuit of organizational and personal interest regardless of consequences 45. In the study by Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, the operative level at the Finnish side commonly saw Russian administration as one which was characterized by a lack of transparency, was unpredictable and lacked real law. Dysfunctions were seen mostly as the result of national culture 46 which is a timeless quality of Russia 47. Practical problems of cooperation were considered as the results of the above mentioned qualities of general Russian administrative culture. If anything, transition was seen as requiring internal reforms which at the same time were considered unrealistic in the near future. 48 The study showed that Russian border security administration would benefit from closer practical cooperation with its border neighbours. This need is also connected with EU-Russia development work in crime prevention. Still, the challenge is to understand that cooperation itself needs to develop its own practices and ways of thinking, and that it forms a third reality between national administrative cultures. This type of a cooperation culture has three ways to cope with tasks at hand which can be found in Jasaitis (1996) work about organizational development in turbulent environments. Included in these ways are sensing of the environment and participatory ways of work. Organizational practices may allow a proactive relationship with the environment and thus make it possible to modify internal structures and practices. 49 In cross-border cooperation these variations can be combined in the creation of a trans-national administrative culture. This does not necessarily require organizing special units inside existing structures, but sensitivity towards the needs of cross-cultural cooperation and investment on persons willing and able to concentrate on this work. Investment of work and resources in cross border cooperation varied in different security organizations in our study. Operative level cooperation was slowed down on both sides by lack of trust, lack of direct contacts, lack of language skills, lack of knowledge about the other organization, slowness of official routes, differences in the quality of official requests for assistance, and general uncertainty about what cooperation should be like. Both the experiences of Russian transition and general negative images can be blamed for this prevailing situation. A cycle of non-cooperation can be seen here. Inside the Russian border security administration, experiences of street level cooperation with foreign partners differ. In network situations, inside Russia and across the border, there can be imbalances across alliances in the ability to assert trust and reduce risk 50. Indeed, this factor was seen as major obstacle in cooperation by the Finnish side which saw its own system as representing modern system of high institutional trust 51. Russian situation, however, is not 45 Comp. Denhardt 1994, p. 173. 46 see for instance Salakka,1997, pp. 19-26. 47 Bäckman, 2006, has studied the attitudes of Finnish authorities about Russian crime in the creation of threat image politics and cultural meanings. He has found out that many attitudes were based on expectations about Russian crime and legal system instead of actual realities. These expectations were in turn based on the inheritance of the cold war views on Russian society. 48 Rinne, 2002, found examples of this type of an attitude which stem most of all from lack of knowledge. A resulting situation was inaction in the face of cross-border crime. 49 Jasaitis, 1996, p. 270. In Finland, Ari Lahti,2007, has made a study about the Finnish internal security cooperation in crime intelligence and analysis work which he looked at its development from this point of view. 50 Stephens, Fulk and Monge, 2009. 51 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 12

exceptional in international terms. United States provides a comparison in terms of multitude of agencies and different ways of cross-border and regional arrangements 52. Our study showed that building institutional trust through contract making and official channels of operations needs additional approaches, a more holistic understanding of what intercultural administrative operation is like. Trust needs to be built on the terms of the security administration culture. This culture has to an extent many similarities even in historically very different countries. Trust can be built on professional social capital 53, which extends politics and economics. Modernization means that technical tools and practices of work become similar. Therefore, trust evolves around experiences where a common ground, or what Nugent and Abolafia call consideration, appears. Consideration means contexts of exchanges in which granting of resources (e.g. information, protection and services) involves virtually no loss to the giver, yet a significant gain to the recipient. Essential to consideration is that both the recipient and the giver are aware that action is a product of a choice. Externally motivated (e.g. forced or legally obligated) actions do not serve the same purpose. 54 With regard to the unofficial networking of the Russian security administration, consideration in cross-border cooperation can serve as a means to create reciprocity and establish what Nugent and Abolafia call moral character in relationships. To overcome present challenges in the future, both comprehensive and incremental approaches to cooperation are needed. Cross-border cooperation with a different type of administrative system requires a long-term commitment that sees cooperation as a mutual process. Presently implementing Finnish-Russian cooperation suffers from concentration on dissimilarities 55, often based on rather random knowledge of the partner organization. As was pointed out earlier, there should be more neutral information on similarities and functional equivalence. Russian reformists need to find support for the idea that dissimilar administrative cultures benefit from their differences 56. 5. Conclusions The study by Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi (2008) indicated that images and bad experiences related to risk administration elements affect Finnish-Russian cooperation strongly. This view was shared by both the Finnish and Russian respondents. Cooperation at the national levels is based on an idea, that Russia needs to be integrated to the work of European security administration structures. Contracts, however, are most successful when the leaderships of partner organizations find each other at the level of colonization of the future 57. Shared views on modernization and functionality 58 have importance here. The results suggest that hierarchy was seen as a key restrictive element at the implementation or street level both in Russian internal modernization and in Finnish-Russian relations. Russian officials had less room for personal discretion officially, yet in many cases substituted this fact with unofficial networks with trusted colleagues. At the same time, at the somewhat higher level of city and region, changes of leadership affected cooperation considerably at the strategic and policy making level. 59 Hierarchy in this manner was a major factor affecting both Russian reform and cooperation across the state border. Further studies on Russian administrative structures, decision making systems, values in operation and their institutional application in reality are needed. In addition, as Russian transition is not a permanent fixed state but a process, much more serious attention needs to be given to ways of building links between equal partners. 52 Cottam and Marenin, 2005. Roberts, 2008. 53 Comp. Bouckaert, 2006, about modernizing government. 54 Nugent and Abolafia, 2006. 55 Comp. Yeganeh and Su, 2006. 56 See Yeganeh and Su, 2006, who analyze different ways organizational cultures have been studied. 57 Beck,1996. 58 For instance Parsons, 1964 and 1969. 59 Heusala, Lohiniva and Malmi, 2008. 13