EU accession conditionality and the impact on the Greek-Turkish border conflict

EU accession conditionality and the impact on the Greek-Turkish border conflict Name: Ioannis Moraitis ID Number: i6018297 Name of Workshop Group Tutor: Dr. Karolina Pomorksa 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction 2. A short overview about the Greek-Turkish border conflict 3. Theoretical Framework 4. EU accession conditionality, Conditions 5. Applying Theory to Practice 6. Conclusion 7. References/Bibliography Name: Ioannis Moraitis ID Number: i6018297 Name of Workshop Group Tutor: Dr. Karolina Pomorksa 2

Introduction The literature about the European Union as an international player has been vast and has covered a lot of aspects regarding the tools that the EU might posses in order to influence states or states behaviors and their policies beyond its borders. However the question in this paper is not whether such influence or impact exists in general, but if such an impact can be traced in a more specific field and case and whether this impact can be causally be linked to a certain European incentive or impulse. Since the European Union was mainly created after the Second World War in order to bring stability and Peace and was further enlarged among other reasons because of security concerns it is obvious that the resolution of conflicts should be at the core of the EU s interests in order to achieve a stable and peaceful Union. As Atsuko Higashino writes the need to achieve stability and security in Europe has been a core motivation for European Union actors in their decision in favor of Enlargement (Higashino, 2004) and never has EU enlargement been so frequently connected with security debates (Ibid). What seems to be challenging is, if, and if, how and to what extend the European Union can positively influence the resolution of conflicts between two parties. Since the European Union faces an increasing number of border conflicts (Diez, Stetter, Albert, 2004) and territorial borders are connected to a state s sovereignty, it seems even more difficult for the EU to influence or even resolve such disputes. There are have been developed different models, which try to explain or to trace back an impact of the EU on conflicts, however this paper will focus on the EU s accession conditionality as a model to influence border conflicts because the EU s political accession conditionality has been the cornerstone of [the EU s] success [in contributing] to democratic consolidation, respect for human rights, minority protection, conflict resolution in Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig, 2008). Since the EU s political accession conditionality works by making a highly attractive external incentive the benefits coming with membership conditional on peaceful conflict management (Ibid), at least one of the conflict parties has to be a potential member state or candidate country or interested in becoming one, in order for this model to work. Due to this fact and to better illustrate the impact of the EU s accession conditionality on border conflicts, this paper will use the Greek-Turkish border conflict as a case study because this particular conflict can be divided into three periods regarding potential membership. During the first period none of the two parties were members of the EU and only Greece was a candidate 3

country, during the second period Greece had become a member and Turkey was not an official candidate country yet and during the third period Turkey became officially a candidate country. Moreover this conflict has the characteristic that during the second and third period the Greek border had become an external border of the European Union making the resolution of this conflict even more important and even more difficult. The division into time periods may turn out to be very helpful since it facilitates the tracing of the EU s impact on this conflict by providing three different stages that can be examined separately. A short overview about the Greek-Turkish border conflict Despite the well-known Cyprus Dispute, Greece and Turkey have several differences regarding their borders, which remain unresolved matters. The invasion of Cyprus in 1974 created a climate of mistrust and tension (Rumelili 2008) and intensified the already existing disputes over, the delimitation of the Continental shelf, the delimitation of the territorial waters and the delimitation of the national airspace and the different interpretations about Flight Information Regions (FIR) (Rumelili, 2008). Since 1996 another highly disputed matter is the status over some islets, where the most contested is the islet of Imia/Kardak, which are uninhabited and brought Greece and Turkey nearly to the brink of war (Rumelili, 2004, p. 3). Moreover the militarization of the Greek islands also pose a contested factor since Greece spends between 4.5 and 5 percent of its GDP on military expenditures-the highest such percentage in Europe (Anastasakis, 2007). The dispute over the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea involves Turkey s objection to Greece s Reference to international law that islands are entitled to territorial waters and possibly to continental shelves (Rumilili, 2008,p.98). These different views brought Greece and Turkey in 1976 (Sismik I) and in 1987 (Simsik II) nearly to a military contention (Anastasakis, 2007). Regarding the territorial waters, Greece and Turkey have delineated them at 6 nautical miles. However Greece insists on expanding these 6 miles to twelve, according to the International Law of Sea. Although Turkey has expanded its territorial waters to 12 miles on their other coasts as well, they regard such an expansion from Greece s side in the Aegean Sea as a casus belli (Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, 2003, p.305). The dispute over the Greek national airspace lies in the fact that it was defined at a distance of 10 nm from its coast in 1931, while maintaining a 6 nm territorial sea (Rumelili, 2008, p.98). Although this fact is somehow controversial regarding international law, Greece argues 4

that Turkey had not disputed the limits of Greek airspace until 1975 (Ibid, p.98) and insists on the above mentioned expansion. The dispute over the uninhabited islet Imia/Kardak however is one of the most explosive disputes between the two countries. The legal status of the islets is controversial because the Dodecanese islands, which include the islands neighboring Imia/Kardak were handed to Italy after the Peace Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. After the Treaty of Paris in 1947 Italy returned these islands to Greece. The problem is that the treaty of Lausanne does not name every island belonging to the Dodecanese separately, but names them with the overarching name Dodecanese islands (Moraitis, 2008). These islets or rocks in the Aegean close to the Turkish coast whose ownership has not been determined by previous international agreements (Rumilili, 2008), brought the two sides to the brink of war. Lastly, while Greece maintains, that militarization [of the island in the Aegean] is necessary for self defense, Turkey contends that [it] constitutes a violation of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty (Ibid, p.99). After having outlined the main contested disputes between the two countries, the theoretical framework in order to analyze this dispute will be mentioned and explained. Theoretical Framework For the purpose of this analysis the theoretical framework of Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006) will be applied. Their work will be used in this paper firstly to define and classify conflicts, and secondly to categorize the different pathways that the EU can follow in order to influence border conflicts. In their work The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration (Diez et al. 2006) conflicts are defined as when an actor constructs his or her identity or interests in such a way that these cannot be made compatible with the identity or interests of another actor (Diez et al., 2006, p.565). This discursive definition (Ibid) links conflict to securitization 1 as a tool to capture conflict communication within societies and classifies the intensification of securitization within these societies into four stages (Ibid, pp. 566-567). According to this framework the increasing intensity of securitization moves a conflict from a Conflict Episode, which stands for the weakest expression of securitization, to an Issue Conflict, to an Identity Conflict and 1 Securitization is defined following Buzan and Waever, as the representation of the other as an existential threat justifying extraordinary measures (Diez et al., 2006, p. 566) 5

lastly to a Subordination Conflict, which is regarded to be the stage where securitization is at its peek (Ibid, p.568). The EU s impact on a border conflict can be verified and traced back if a certain incentive can move the conflict from a higher to a lower stage. In the context of this paper this incentive would be the EU s accession conditionality and a movement from a higher to a lower stage of conflict would prove that this particular impulse had a positive impact on the border conflict between Greece and Turkey. Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006) distinguished four pathways of EU impact (p.570). Through these four pathways the EU is able to influence border conflicts. Since this paper is concerned with whether the EU s accession conditionality has actually an impact on such conflicts, only the first pathway will be mentioned here. The first pathway has a compulsory impact (ibid, p.572) and can influence border conflicts directly since it works through carrots and sticks [and] the main carrot that the EU has at its disposal is membership (Ibid). As F. Schimmelfennig and U. Sedelmeier (2004) agree, according to the external incentives model the EU s main tool to achieve a change on the domestic level in a third country relies on conditionality. Conditionality mainly follows a strategy of reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004, p.663). It means that a country has to comply with certain conditions in order to get the reward. After the above mentioned several key components of the analysis have been made clear. First, it has been pointed out how conflicts are being defined and how an impact on border conflicts can be measured through the mentioned framework by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2006), second, EU accession conditionality has been defined and made clear that potential membership is essential for this model to work and finally third, the particular case study and its division into time periods has been picked since it is regarded to be helpful in order to verify an impact of the EU in the context of accession conditionality due to the separate time periods, that can be examined separately. EU accession conditionality, Conditions to Success As it was mentioned above the EU s accession conditionality (compulsory impact) as a tool to influence border conflicts depends strongly on the eagerness of at least one part of the conflict to enter the European Union and if such desire is lacking, the conflicting party will not regard membership as an incentive to change its policies (Diez et al., p.572). Moreover, once one of the conflict parties enters the Union and becomes a full member Diez, Stetter and 6

Albert (2006) argue that accession conditionality is loosing its effectiveness. It is interesting to find out whether the impact on Greece regarding its border issues with Turkey was high before it became a member (1 st period) and if it became static after its accession (2 nd period). Despite the desire of a conflict party wanting to join the Union, other factors regarding the EU s accession conditionality play an important rule as well. As Simmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004, p.665) state, credibility is essential because of the fact that besides the superior bargaining power of the external agency certainty about the conditional payments [are required] in order for the target countries to comply. If the potential member state does not regard membership as an achievable option it will most certainly not agree to the conditions posed. It is understandable that size and speed of rewards (Ibid) is crucial to accession conditionality as well, because possible membership is the biggest reward in size a country can achieve and when accession negotiations have advanced (speed), the power of the compulsory impact is higher since the target country has been very close to becoming a member, making a failure of the negotiation process more costly for the government. Regarding the Greek-Turkish border conflict, it is interesting to examine whether Turkey s candidate status (3 rd period), after France and Germany s objections and the uncertain date for its accession, really is credible. Another important factor in the context of accession conditionality are the adaption costs of the target country (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004, p.666; Tocci, 2005, p.75; Diez, Stetter and Albert, 2006, p.575). When domestic decision makers consider the costs of compliance higher than the rewards, then the latter are likely to default on the conditions (Tocci, 2005, pp.75-76). According to Tocci (2005) the domestic costs are high when the conditions posed, are connected to a country s national security (p.76). In this regard it is most obvious that the Greek-Turkish dispute, as being a border conflict is closely related to first, as already mentioned, sovereignty and second, national security. Applying Theory to Practice As already mentioned, the first period that we will focus on finds Greece being a candidate country from 1975 to its accession in 1981. After the 1976 continental shelf crisis the two countries were involved in a subordination conflict, having shifted away from an identity conflict and moved close to a potential violent expression of the conflict. As Rumelili (2004) states until 1999, Greek-Turkish conflicts have fluctuated between identity conflicts and conflicts of subordination (p.3). 7

What is essential in this regard is that the two countries were constantly moving between conflict stages, which were characterized by great securitization measures regarding the aspect of conflict communication. The lack of the Copenhagen Criteria during Greece s application, and the rather underdeveloped EU incentives for conflict resolution, meant, that influence was directed to Greece in a weak disorganized and non-institutionalized fashion (Rumelili, 2008,p.106). Never the less, following the first Continental Shelf Crisis in 1976 a few months after Greece had applied for the EU, the Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis preferred avoiding a military conflict and to turn to the UN Security Council and to the International Court of Justice in order to settle the crisis (Rumelili, 2004, p.6). The following Declaration of Berne, which stated that both countries would restrain themselves from unilateral actions on the Continental Shelf of the Aegean Sea, was made possible due to the Greek Prime Minister s desire to secure Greek membership of the EEC (Ibid). As we have seen Greece s pending membership drove Greece to avoid a military solution of the first Continental Shelf Crisis and shifted the conflict of subordination to the lower stage of identity conflict. During the second period of our analysis Greece had become a member and Turkey was no official candidate country. After the application of Turkey in 1987 we can observe a similar effect as in the first period. The second Continental Shelf Crisis in 1987 took place right before Turkey applied for the EC. Again, one can see that this time Turkey s policy towards the crisis was influenced by the application for the EC since Turkey was aware [,] that improved relations with Greece were necessary to prevent a Greek veto and to strengthen Turkey s membership prospects in the EC (Rumelili, 2008,p.107). That is why Prime Minister Ozal adroitly defused the crisis and actively pursued dialogue with Greece (Ibid). We have no examined the second period and concluded that the application of Turkey, lead again to a shift from the conflict of subordination to an identity conflict. Although the shifts in the first and second period are not near to a resolution of the conflict one can clearly see, that the desire for both countries to join the EC/EU, restrained them from escalating the mentioned crisis in 1976 and 1987 respectively. Turkey s application in 1987 to join the Union was not followed by the accession, as it was the case with Greece s application. According to the size and speed of rewards, mentioned above, one can see, that since membership was at that time very difficult to achieve and the credibility of the EU s membership-reward was at a low point, Turkey s application did not lead to a further improvement of Greek-Turkish relations. In 1996 the Imia/Kardak crisis brought the two countries again close to war. 8

After the1999 Helsinki European Council decision to grant Turkey official candidate status, membership became credible again. Due to this fact Turkey has accepted EU involvement in Greek-Turkish disputes in the form of linking the resolution of [these disputes] to Turkey s membership process (Rumelili, 2008, p.109). The fact that Greece lifted its veto, making it among others possible for Turkey to retrieve candidate status, made possible membership an achievable reward, thus leading to the improvement of Greek-Turkish relations and moving the identity conflict to the stage of an issue conflict showing the impact on the EU s accession conditionality on this conflict. Conclusion As we have shown, the EU s accession conditionality had an impact on the Greek-Turkish border conflict since it was able to decrease tension and to move the conflict from a higher to a lower stage of conflict. Although the EU s accession conditionality was not able to resolve the dispute and to provide a permanent solution, it was able to prevent the escalation of the above-mentioned crisis and after 1999 and its regained credibility to even make a new and more effective rapprochement possible. It is of course of importance to mention that EU accession conditionality is not the only factor that positively influenced the Greek-Turkish border conflict. Of course conditionality was essential for the improvement of the relations, however other factors influenced this improvement as well. In 1999 both countries suffered major earthquakes. One could ask what earthquakes could have to do with the improvement of relations between two countries. However as Ganapati, Kelman and Koukis (2010) point out disasters suffered by two countries, who are in conflict with each other, may lead to the so-called disaster-diplomacy making the two sides come together in order to help each others suffering. Other incentives like personal relations of leaders and often visits helped improving relations between the two countries as well. Moreover, other pathways, as outlined by Diez, Stetter and Albert (2008) have surely supported this process. Eventually the aim of this paper was to highlight the importance of accession conditionality and its impact on border conflicts. Furthermore the aim was not to show that the compulsory impact is able to resolve disputes, but to show that a clear influence leading to the improvement of a conflict can be sustained. The case study has shown that a credible pending membership can have an impact, even on such delicate conflicts as border conflicts, which are linked to sovereignty- and national 9

security- issues. It remains to be seen if the latest expressed skepticism from France and Germany regarding Turkish membership and the veto posed by Cyprus, similar to Greece s long lasting veto until 1999, will reduce the credibility of the membership-reward and with combination with the long time frame will make full membership not achievable. Since Greece and Turkey follow rational self-interest policies, Greece, due to the fact that they want to solve their disputes with Turkey in a European framework and Turkey, because the resolving of the disputes with Greece are preconditions for their accession, a non-credible membership perspective could lead to the intensification of the Greek-Turkish border conflict. References/Bibliography Anastasakis, O. (2007). Power and Interdependence. Uncertainties of Greek-Turkish Rapprochement, Harvard International Review 28(4), 14-17 Diez, T., Stetter, S., Albert, M. (2006). The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration, International Organization 60(3), 563-593 Diez, T., Stetter, S., Albert, M. (2008). The European Union and Border Conflict. The Power of Integration and Association. London/New York: Cambridge University Press Ganapati, N.E., Kelman, I., Koukis, T. (2010). Analyzing Greek-Turkish disaster-related cooperation: A disaster diplomacy perspective, Cooperation and Conflict 45(2), 162-185 Higashino, A. (2004). For the Sake of Peace and Security? : The Role of Security in the European Union Enlargement Eastwards, Cooperation and Conflict 39(4), 347-368 Interview with Lampros Moraitis, Former Diplomat for Greece (2010), [Live interview], Athens 30 th January 2011 10

Rumelili, B. (2008). Transforming the Greek-Turkish conflicts: The EU and what we make of it! In Diez, T., Stetter, S., Albert, M. (2008). The European Union and Border Conflict. The Power of Integration and Association. London/New York: Cambridge University Press Rumelili, B. (2004). The European Union's Impact on on the Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Review of the Literature. WorkingPaper 6. WorkingPaper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies. Birmingham: Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham Schimmelfennig, F. (2008). EU political accession conditionality after the 2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness, Journal of European Public Policy 15(6), 918-937 Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy 11(4), 661-679 Tocci, N. (2005). Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?, South European Society and Politics 10(1), 73-83 Tsakonas, P. and Tournikiotis, A. (2003). Greece s Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The Expectations-Reality Gap, Security Dialogue 34(3), 301-314 11