Is This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia?

Similar documents
DECLARATION ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS *

Image: NATO. Report NATO and Russia: managing the relationship Wednesday 21 Friday 23 October 2015 WP1437. In association with:

Democracy, Sovereignty and Security in Europe

Ukraine s Integration in the Euro-Atlantic Community Way Ahead

WORKING DOCUMENT. EN United in diversity EN

The Eastern Question: Recommendations for Western Policy

Preparing for NATO s 2014 Summit Under the Spell of the Ukraine Crisis

Managing the Cold Peace between Russia and the West

Report Rethinking deterrence and assurance Western deterrence strategies: at an inflection point? Wednesday 14 Saturday 17 June 2017 WP1545

CONTRIBUTION OF THE LI COSAC. Athens, June 2014

Madam Chairperson, Distinguished participants,

RUSI Missile Defence Conference. 12 April Jakub Cimoradsky NATO BMD. as part of integrated approach to Air and Missile Defence

The European Union Global Strategy: How Best to Adapt to New Challenges? By Helga Kalm with Anna Bulakh, Jüri Luik, Piret Pernik, Henrik Praks

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION. SACT s remarks to National University of Public Service

POLITICAL EVOLUTION AT NATO LEVEL IN POST COLD WAR ERA

epp european people s party

LITHUANIA S NEW FOREIGN POLICY *

May ELN Issue Brief: Deterrence. NATO s Evolving Modern Deterrence Posture: Challenges and Risks. Łukasz Kulesa Thomas Frear

THE HOMELAND UNION-LITHUANIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS DECLARATION WE BELIEVE IN EUROPE. 12 May 2018 Vilnius

Prohlášení Statement Déclaration

Draft Conclusions. Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy

Statement by the Delegation of Ukraine at the 759-th FSC Plenary Meeting (2 July 2014 at 10.00, Hofburg)

U.S. foreign policy towards Russia after the Republican midterm victory in Congress

UK DELEGATION PROPOSED AMENDMENTS IN RED (paragraphs 31, 32 and 42)

Presidency Summary. Session I: Why Europe matters? Europe in the global context

SACT s lecture at. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. New York City, 16 Apr 2018,

The 'Hybrid War in Ukraine': Sampling of a 'Frontline State's Future? Discussant. Derek Fraser

Reviewing and enhancing NATO Partnerships in the Black Sea and Eastern Europe

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY CHAPTER I GENERAL PROVISIONS

Emerging threats and challenges to security and stability in the OSCE area: politico-military dimension

Back to Basics? NATO s Summit in Warsaw. Report

DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN 2015/2001(INI) on the state of EU-Russia relations (2015/2001(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs

CBA Middle School Model UN

What is NATO? Rob de Wijk

LITHUANIAN FOREIGN POLICY: CONCEPTS, ACHIEVEMENTS AND PREDICAMENTS

The War in Ukraine - a catastrophe for the people in Ukraine and for peace in Europe

Meeting of ambassadors and permanent representatives of Ru...

Policy Recommendations and Observations KONRAD-ADENAUER-STIFTUNG REGIONAL PROGRAM POLITICAL DIALOGUE SOUTH CAUCASUS

TIME FOR A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR NATO AND EASTERN NEIGHBOURS

Draft Position Paper. On the situation in Ukraine tabled by the EGP Committee. 1. The Current Situation. 2. The Immediate Consequences

THREE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP NEIGHBOURS: UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND BELARUS

TEXTS ADOPTED Provisional edition. European Parliament resolution of 10 June 2015 on the state of EU-Russia relations (2015/2001(INI))

The Political Adaptation of the Alliance

12 November 2014 Roger E. Kanet Department of Political Science University of Miami

Crimea referendum our experts react

NATO s tactical nuclear headache

Mr Speaker, Mr Deputy Prime Minister, Madam Special Representative, dear Miroslav, Members of Parliament, General, Ladies and Gentlemen;

Current Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic Region with a Special Focus on Hybrid Aspects

The Alliance's Strategic Concept

MEDVEDEV S. Yury E. Fedorov BRIEFING PAPER 47, 27 November 2009

Revising NATO s nuclear deterrence posture: prospects for change

ENGLISH only. Speech by. Mr Didier Burkhalter Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept

Warm ups *What is a key cultural difference between Ireland and Northern Ireland? *What is a key political difference between the two?

Speech on the 41th Munich Conference on Security Policy 02/12/2005

DRAFT REPORT. EN United in diversity EN. European Parliament 2018/2158(INI) on the state of EU-Russia political relations (2018/2158(INI))

cyber warfare, climate change, resource conflicts and how to strengthen human security;

II. The application of European confidence-building measures and confidence- and security-building measures in Ukraine

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Defence 13 December Developments at the Foreign Affairs Council

The President of the House of Representatives of the States General Binnenhof 4 The Hague. Date 27 July 2014 Re Repatriation mission in Ukraine

OSCE Permanent Council No Vienna, 30 August 2018

The Goals and Tactics of the Lesser Allies Introduction

Statement on Russia s on-going aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea

The EU and the Black Sea: peace and stability beyond the boundaries?

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA

854th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT TEXTS ADOPTED. European Parliament resolution of 15 January 2015 on the situation in Ukraine (2014/2965(RSP))

Analysis of the draft of Security Strategy of Slovak Republic 2017: Comparison with strategic documents of Czech Republic and Poland.

Athens Security Forum 2016: Searching for a Modus Vivendi in Relations between the West and Russia. Report

Position Paper. On the situation in Ukraine. 1. The Current Situation

WHY THE CONFLICT IN UKRAINE IS A REAL WAR, AND HOW IT RELATES TO INTERNATIONAL LAW.

Remarks by High Representative/Vice- President Federica Mogherini at the press briefing during her visit to Washington D.C.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Chair: Manuela Kurkaa

Re-Establishing Deterrence with Moscow Through Energy Sanctions

1173rd PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL

THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE AND CANADA S RESPONSE. Briefing Note to Canada s Members of Parliament

Note: The following OSE material is being ed to you based on a subscription. UNCLASSIFIED

Address given by Indulis Berzins on Latvia and Europe (London, 24 January 2000)

THE CHALLENGE OF THE GRAY ZONE. Presentation to the Strategic Multilayer Assessment

NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.30

JOINT DECLARATION. 1. With regard to the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the CSP members:

Security Forum: Experience Sharing between Baltic and Black Sea Regions

D. Medvedev European Security Treaty: arguments for and against

The Astana Summit: A Triumph of Common Sense

EUROPEAN UNION. 7 December EU Closing Statement

Return to Cold War in Europe? Is this Ukraine crisis the end of a Russia EU Partnership? PAUL FLENLEY UNIVERSITY OF PORTSMOUTH

ROMANIA - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

It is my utmost pleasure to welcome you all to the first session of Model United Nations Conference of Besiktas Anatolian High School.

Contents. Preface... iii. List of Abbreviations...xi. Executive Summary...1. Introduction East Asia in

NATO Solidarity? Trump s Criticisms. POLICY BRIEF NO. 32 May

Russia. Dealing with an awkward partner PERSPECTIVE WASHINGTON, DC. NIELS ANNEN July 2015

General Assembly, First Committee: Disarmament and International Security

National Security Policy and Defence Structures Development Programme of Armenia

Unknown Citizen? Michel Barnier

CHINA IN THE WORLD PODCAST. Host: Paul Haenle Guest: Su Hao

For a Balanced Peace. First Steps out of the Security Deadlock in (Eastern) Europe PERSPECTIVE

NDC Conference Report

Democracy Promotion in Eurasia: A Dialogue

Conference RUSSIA S INFLUENCE STRATEGY IN EUROPE: MOSCOW AND EUROPEAN POPULIST PARTIES OF THE FAR-RIGHT AND FAR-LEFT

AMENDMENTS EN United in diversity EN. PE v Draft motion for a resolution Libor Rouček (PE445.

Transcription:

Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review vol. 34 (2015) DOI: 10.1515/lfpr-2016-0006 Is This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia? Renatas Norkus* Currently we face Russia s regime fighting a war in Ukraine. At the same time, Russia is intimidating its other neighbours, exerting its power upon Moldova and Georgia, disguising its military activities in Eastern Ukraine, violating its major international obligations. It is recruiting, training and commanding so-called separatists in the East in order to destabilise the rest of Ukraine. Russia aims by all possible means to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influence by reverting/discouraging Ukraine s European direction. This is not only a war against Ukraine, but against the European order itself, that we have worked so hard to build. The order based on principles of territorial integrity, national sovereignty, non-violability of national borders and the right of countries to choose their own future. Russia s belligerent behaviour violates those principles and undermines European security. It is deliberately violating its obligations under UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, Budapest Memorandum, the NATO Russia Founding Act as well as the Minsk Agreements. Russia s bellicose behaviour can be attributed to different cause effect rationales, and assessed with a variety of possible outcomes, but what is obvious its breaking bad mode goes together with its military saber-rattling, more aggressive nuclear and conventional messaging and increased military activities close to Alliance borders. Russia returns to a language of power and block-to-block approach and is singling out the zones of its privileged interest. In this way, Russia is creating and maintaining the spheres of instability around its borders. At the same time, the cynical and aggressive propaganda campaign by the Putin s regime continues and aims at confusing its own people by portraying an aggressive block of NATO led by the United States, and some neighbouring EU countries as looking for ways and means to destabilise and undermine Russia. * Renatas Norkus is a career diplomat currently working in the capacity of the Director of Transatlantic Cooperation and Security Policy Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania. Before assuming the present post, he held the position of the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Lithuanian to the Russian Federation. All views expressed in this article are the opinion of the author and hold no affiliation with any government or other institution. Email: renatas.norkus@urm.lt 2015 Renatas Norkus. This is an open access article licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).

136 Renatas Norkus It claims NATO for an expansion and at the same time annexes Crimea. This hypocritical behaviour can be illustrated by the most recent Putin s quote: It is NATO, which is coming closer to our borders, not us moving somewhere. The recent Russia s military activities, messaging and some doctrinal intentions are exceptionally worrisome. For example, Russia s strategic intentions to use nuclear weapons early in conventional regional conflicts for the purpose of deescalation; currently observed over-flights of Russian strategic aviation in a close vicinity of NATO borders; Russia s proclaimed intentions to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea, and to deploy Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, also Putin s most recently announced intention to obtain 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of piercing any missile defences. Before the aggression against Ukraine, Moscow sat together in the NATO- Russia Council and within the G-8, among many other diplomatic forums. It has been offered numerous ways by NATO and the European Union to cooperate it has only chosen in many cases, such as with the EU Neighbourhood Policy, to decline. It was on Russia s demand that the infamous Corfu Process had been initiated and conducted in the OSCE for a good couple of years to discover that the very demandeur was not interested in joining the consensus among participating states. NATO has been reaching out to Russia in a transparent and constructive spirit over the last 25 years, including through the Partnership for Peace Programme, NATO Russia Council, based upon NATO Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. However, Russian aggressive military activities in Georgia and Ukraine clearly demonstrated that Russia was not interested anymore in the implementation of international commitments and principles, including the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. By agreeing to the Founding Act of relationship with NATO, Russia committed to reduce its conventional and nuclear forces and to withhold from using force to settle disputes among states. Instead, it has violated these and other provisions in Georgia and now in Ukraine, thus rejecting its own pledges and assuming confrontational posture with Alliance. Unfortunately, the future is less clear now than it was two years ago. Russia has undermined the predictable, rules-based European security order, the fundamental principles of which are enshrined in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Russia is deliberately undermining those principles. The principles cannot be renegotiated on the basis of Russia s hypocritical actions, to attain its foreign policy goals.

Is This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia? 137 It was only right and obvious that in response to the Crimea annexation and Russia s illegal actions in Ukraine the Alliance had to discontinue practical cooperation of the NATO-Russia Council. As and until Russia s intent and policies are not changed, the resumption of the NRC cooperation activities has no reason; neither has it any pragmatic meaning. Before any eventual dialogue between NATO and Russia is relaunched, we will have to ensure that it is not at the cost of our security that it will not harm the Alliance s cohesion, and that it will not weaken the Euro-Atlantic stability itself. Any possible way ahead with Russia should not be at the cost of our principles, values and security of our neighbours and partners, such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. We all know Russia is serious when they come back to the table and respond to our strong and principled proposals. If we are going to resume the possible cooperation with Russia, it should definitely be based on principles, values and commitments, and naturally this re-engagement would be based on lower level of trust, expectation and without any wishful thinking. It must take into consideration a thorough and informed analysis of Russia s domestic and foreign policies, and its military and security doctrines, including its nuclear posture. The re-engagement must be tied with fundamental principles of international security and based on conditions agreed by Allies. We all know Russia is serious when they come back to the table and respond to our strong and principled proposals. Even in such a difficult and complex environment, contacts and communication lines with Russia are still possible, needed and available. Diplomatic dialogue with Russia can be maintained at NATO s 50-member Euro- Atlantic Partnership Council, which includes the other eastern partners such as Ukraine. When it comes to military contacts the so-called red-line emergency communication lines they are available through appropriate arrangements between the NATO SACEUR and the Chairman of the Military Committee, on the one end, and Russia s Chief of Armed Forces Staff, on the other. Similarly, all the NATO states that border with Russian Federation, have long ago established emergency communication lines on bilateral basis. These can and should be used to avoid misunderstandings and/or minimise escalations, especially when Russian military do engage in frequently unannounced snap exercises. The question remains - if the Russian counterparts will be picking up when rung.

138 Renatas Norkus The full implementation of the Minsk Agreements (however bleak the prospects of it in light of recent attacks by the Russian-led separatists may seem) remains the best way to end this tragedy. Certainly, full implementation of the Minsk commitments by Russia will be one important litmus test for the Alliance s future re-engagement with it. NATO has always been open about its exercises and capabilities in line with Vienna Document confidence and security building measures and its partnership commitments. Just recently, during the meeting between the NATO Secretary General and Russia s Foreign Minister, the former handed over the list of NATO s planned exercises to his Russian colleague. However, to be effective, confidence and security-building measures should be implemented in good faith, in reciprocal and predictable manner. Russia so far has not demonstrated such openness as it comes to its military activities, deployments and exercises. Russia has suspended implementation of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. It has restricted over-flights under the Open Skies Treaty (excluded Kaliningrad from the airports used for Open Skies Treaty). And it continues to use no-notice snap exercises to disguise major troop movements, including on the Ukrainian border. This neither increases transparency and predictability, nor does it reduce the risk of conflict and miscalculation. All those activities go together with hybrid tactics, when the line between war and peace, true and lie is blurred and in this way the ambiguity and possibility for miscalculation is exceptionally high. It is obvious that in this way the moral principles are being downgraded and the level of trust and predictability in the region is moribund. The Russia regime s behaviour has created a new strategic reality for NATO. After 25 years of focusing on out-of-area crisis management and on good-willed partnership with then strategic neighbour Russia, we now must re-emphasise our original mission of collective defence. Strengthening NATO response to this challenge is preventive, not escalatory measure. By demonstrating capability to defend its Allies, the Alliance has the best chance and obligation to deter and discourage today s Russia from intimidation, sabre-rattling, propaganda and provocation. NATO s principal/foremost mission is now to adequately deter Russia s escalatory behaviour as well as to adapt its defence and deterrence posture to changed security environment. While any resumption of meaningful dialogue with Russia, which obviously will not be the same as it was, much depends on Russia s behaviour. Allies should continue to call Russia to change course, and to end its selfimposed isolation, bearing in mind that the fundamental principles that underpin

Is This the Right Time for NATO to Resume Dialogue with Russia? 139 European security and shape international order are not negotiable, and any selective implementation, free improvisation on the theme is not acceptable. No one in international community should tolerate violations to fundamental principles of founding documents.