SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS -------------------------------------------------------------------X MIRIAM E. AGURTO, Index No.: 713230-15 Plaintiff, -against- REPLY AFFIRMATION PARVIZ YOUSEFF ZADEFF, Defendant. -------------------------------------------------------------------X JANET NINA ESAGOFF, an attorney admitted to practice in the Courts of New York affirms: 1. I am a member of the Esagoff Law Group, P.C. attorneys for the defendant PARVIZ YOUSEFZADEH, (the Defendant ), in the above matter. As such, I am fully familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this case as set forth herein. 2. This affirmation is respectfully submitted in further support of Defendants instant Motion dated March 26, 2017, (the Motion ) 1 and in opposition to the Plaintiff s Cross-Motion dated April 7, 2017 (the Cross-Motion ), which is baseless. DEFENDANT HAS REASONABLE EXCUSE AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES TO OPEN HIS DEFAULT 3. In ruling on the Motion, and the Cross-Motion, the Court need address only the following issues, all else being peripheral: a. Reasonable Excuse for Default: Defendant s default in answering the complaint is excusable, and Defendant beseeches this Court to grant such request to have the subject default vacated 2. Defendant still maintains, as does his wife, Parry Yousefzadeh (the only two people living at the subject premises), that neither were served in this action in accordance with CPLR 308. Defendant moved to dismiss the action in lieu of a complaint rather than move to vacate his default and such actions meet the reasonable excuse prong to vacate his default. See infra. 1 This Court is respectfully referred to the Motion, which is incorporated herein by reference. 2 Defendant regrets not moving the court to vacate his default earlier, as he verily believed he had a basis to dismiss the action for non-service. Defendant also believed that submitting additional affidavits, were in strict compliance of prior court orders requesting his wife s testimony. 1 of 7
b. Meritorious Defenses: Defendant has meritorious defenses to the action, including but not limited to the well documented and indisputable fact that Defendant is not the owner of the subject premises which is at the crux of this personal injury action. Thus, Defendant s defenses meet the meritorious defenses prong to vacate his default. See infra. 4. In light of the foregoing, and in the interests of justice, Defendant s Motion should be granted in its entirety, and Plaintiff s Cross-Motion should be denied so that this case may proceed to trial on the merits. LEGAL STANDARD 5. As aforesaid, Defendant has affirmative, meritorious defenses to this action. Pursuant to CPLR 317, a default judgment can be vacated when a defendant has a meritorious defense and did not receive actual notice of the action in time to defend, as here. 6. Under CPLR 317, four requirements must be met to have a default opened: (1) service must have been made in a manner other than personal delivery or delivery to an agent designated under CPLR 318; (2) the defendant must show that he or she did not receive actual notice of the process in time to defend the action; (3) the showing of a meritorious defense; and (4) the motion must be made within one year of knowledge of entry of the default judgment with an outside time limit of five years from such entry. It has been held in the Appellate Division that this Court may consider such relief, sua sponte. Ultimate One Distrib. Corp. v. 2900 Stillwell Ave., LLC, 140 A.D.3d 1054, 36 N.Y.S.3d 142 (2 nd Dept. 2016). 7. Under CPLR 5015(a)(1), a defendant need only show excusable delay and a meritorious defense to vacate a default, when such motion is brought within one year of the filing of the judgment. A motion to vacate a judgment on the grounds of excusable default" is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. MacMarty, Inc. v. Sheller, 201 A.D.2d 706, 608 N.Y.S.2d 294 (2nd Dept. 1994). This Court also has the discretion to treat a CPLR 5015(a) motion as 2 of 7
having been made as well as pursuant to CPLR 317. Eugene DiLorenzo, Inc. v. Dutton Lumber Co., Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 138, 142-143 (1986). Defendant has so moved and demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief. ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS IS PREFERRED IN NEW YORK COURTS 8. In any event, it is well established that New York courts prefer to have cases decided on the merits rather than by default. Smith v. Daca Taxi, 222 A.D.2d 209, 634 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1st Dep't 1995). Plaintiff fails to rebut this argument which was raised in the Motion, however the same must be held here. These proceedings are at a critical juncture, and should the Cross- Motion be granted, there will be great prejudice and imminent harm to Defendant. 9. Thus, in accordance with Smith, this Defendant, is properly moving to vacate his default, as he has numerous meritorious defenses to prevail at trial. 10. To that end, adjudication of this case on the merits is warranted, also taking into account the liberal policy toward opening defaults in the Second Department. Pabone v. Jon-Bar Enterprises Corp., 140 A.D.2d 872, 528 N.Y.S.2d 912, (3rd Dep't 1988). The Appellate Division has repeatedly held that "it is the general policy of the courts to permit actions to be determined by a trial on the merits wherever possible and for that purpose a liberal policy is adopted with respect to opening default judgments in furtherance of justice to the end that the parties may have their day in court to litigate the issues." 38 Holding Corp. v. City of New York, 179 A.D.2d 486, 578 N.Y.S.2d 174 (1st Dep t 1992) (citations omitted). In the case at bar, Defendant in this matter deserves his day in court, too. 3 of 7
11. Finally, in situations where a default is not willful, and the defaulting party establishes a clear meritorious defense, it is preferable to vacate the default to allow for a disposition of the case on its merits. Price v. Polisner, 172 A.D.2d 422, 568 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1st Dep t 1991). The same must be held here, where Defendant s default was not willful. Rather, Defendant in trying to dismiss the case for non-service, verily believed he was complying with court orders which were so-ordered, without prejudice, by submitting additional affidavits to demonstrate nonservice. Accordingly, any contentions that Defendant engaged in frivolous motion practice are unfounded and baseless where Defendant was simply trying to satisfy the Court, even while maintain that this Court has no jurisdiction over him. CROSS MOTION IS BASELESS 12. In the Cross-Motion, Plaintiff, by counsel, broadly and in conclusory fashion states that Defendant has not set forth any basis for renewal or reargument of this Court s prior orders, even as Plaintiff is requesting to amend the complaint based on new information not yet deliberated by this Court. Namely, the true status of ownership of the subject premises is now at issue and it is incontrovertible that Defendant is not the owner of the subject premises. Plaintiff alleges by counsel that a search was performed to establish the ownership of the premises, but his assertions are implausible. Regardless, Plaintiff failed to name the proper party in this action. 13. Plaintiff by counsel also asserts that Defendant has not met his burden to vacate his default. Critically, however, this Court should note that Defendant is elderly and in poor health. He inadvertently failed to recall and advise this Court, or his counsel, that title was held in a corporate entity, and that said entity was a necessary party defendant. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate why Defendant would intentionally withhold such information from the Court, or that Defendant refrained from doing so in a willful and deliberate manner. 4 of 7
14. It is well settled that a movant must set forth a reasonable justification for the failure to submit information in the first instance. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v Ghaness, 100 AD3d 585, 585-586 (2012). In this case, Defendant is elderly and infirm, and he did not recall the ownership status of the subject premises. If he had, Defendant would have advised the Court, accordingly. 15. Self-servingly, Plaintiff, having failed in ascertaining the true ownership of the subject premises, now moves to amend the complaint while refusing to allow Defendant the opportunity to defend himself in this baseless personal injury action, given the new facts introduced to the Court. 16. As to sanctions or monetary award, counsel s request is baseless, and moreover, Plaintiff fails to provide even a single applicable case to support such an award or sanction. Your affirmant asserts that all the filings made by Defendant have not been frivolous, in any respect. 17. To the contrary, should Defendant s Motion be granted and the default judgment vacated, the real facts of the case will be revealed in discovery. Defendant is confident that he will debunk Plaintiff s claims, on the merits and it is her allegations that will be proven to be frivolous, as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. W H E R E F O R E, by reason of all the foregoing, Defendant respectfully requests that his Motion be granted, and this Court enter an Order as follows: (a) Vacating Defendant s default due to his reasonable excuse and meritorious defenses; (b) Granting leave for Defendant to interpose his answer so that the case can proceed on the merits; and, 5 of 7
(c) any other relief in favor of Defendant deemed just and proper by this Honorable Court. Dated: April 25, 2017 Great Neck, New York ESAGOFF LAW GROUP, P.C. Attorney for Defendant Janet Nina Esagoff By: Janet Nina Esagoff, Esq. 10 Bond Street- Suite 118 Great Neck, NY 11021 Janet@esagoff.com (516) 417-7737 6 of 7
Index No. 713230-15 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS MIRIAM E. AGURTO, Plaintiff, - against - PARVIZ YOUSEFZADEH, Defendant. REPLY AFFIRMATION CERTIFICATION: THE UNDERSIGNED ATTORNEY CERTIFIES THAT, TO THE BEST OF HER KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION AND BELIEF, FORMED AFTER AN INQUIRY REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRESENTATION OF THIS PAPER OR THE CONTENTIONS THEREIN ARE NOT FRIVOLOUS AS DEFINED IN SECTION 130-1.1(C). JANET NINA ESAGOFF BY: JANET NINA ESAGOFF, ESQ. ESAGOFF LAW FIRM, P.C. Attorney for Defendant 10 BOND STREET- SUITE 118 GREAT NECK, NY 11021 janet@esagoff.com (516) 417-7737 7 of 7