On Equality, Social Choice Theory, and Normative Economics

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Institutions in Context: Inequality University of Tampere, 3-9 June 2013 On Equality, Social Choice Theory, and Normative Economics Maurice Salles Université de Caen CPNSS, LSE Murat Sertel Center, Bilgi University, Istanbul

1. Equality in equilibrium theory 1.1. Exchange economies 1.2. Economies with production 2. Equality in social choice theory, political science 2.1. Individuals 2.1.1. Anonymity 2.1.2. Power 2.2. Alternatives (neutrality)

3. Equality in normative economics/social ethics 3.1. Resources 3.2. Opportunities 3.3. Welfare 3.4. Capabilities 4. Equality and the incidence of formal methods 4.1. Measure theory 4.2. Commodity spacers

What is Equality? Equality of What? (Amartya Sen, Tanner Lectures 1979) Equality/Inequality Robert Badinter Amartya Sen

Equality in microeconomic theory (general equilibrium theory: initial endowments, preferences, shares of profits) Lionel McKenzie Gérard Debreu Kenneth Arrow Robert Aumann Lionel McKenzie Gérard Debreu Kenneth Arrow Robert Aumann

Equality in social choice theory, political science: individuals (power, influence, anonymity), alternatives/social states/candidates (neutrality) Lloyd Shapley Martin Shubik John Banzhaf III Lionel Penrose

Equality in normative economics, social ethics: incomes, opportunities, well-beings Philosophers John Rawls Ronald Dworkin G. A. Cohen

Economists John Harsanyi Serge Kolm John Roemer

and Marc Fleurbaey François Maniquet

1. Equality in equilibrium theory 1.1. Exchange economies commodities. commodity space individuals (consumers) Parameters : i preferences of individual i e i initial endowments of individual i +) price vector

1.2. Economies with production Consumers as share holders m production units ij share of consumer i in production unit j wealth of consumer i pe i j ij py j ij 1/n

2. Equality in social choice theory, political science 2.1. Individuals 2.1.1 Anonymity Anonymity highlighted by Donald Saari in his 2008 book (when he considers conditions to be selected) Majority rule Borda rule and other voting rules (Dummett, Saari) But Arrovian framework Non-dictatorship No veto Extensions (Bordes and Salles, Duggan)

2.1.2 Power Equal power Political institutions (EU, UN ) Power measures A priori (treaties, constitutions ) In practice (bargaining ) Representative democracy (fair representation, proportional rule ) Influence Equal power or no power

2.2. Alternatives: Neutrality Voting rules (among the four conditions selected by Donald Saari) Constitutions Ties Power and neutrality in the Arrovian framework (with independence of irrelevant alternatives) Power, neutrality, welfarism: Sen s impossibility theorem Individual rights

3. Equality in normative economics/social ethics 3.1. Resources Primary goods (Rawls) Resources à la Dworkin Incomes (resources as generally considered in economics) Basic incomes (Van Parijs) ELIE: Equal-Labor Income Equalisation (Kolm) Equalisation labor is k y i = w i i t i t i w i )

3.2. Opportunities (Roemer) Discrimination Handicap Skills (Fleurbaey, Maniquet) 3.3. Welfare (Dworkin and others) 3.4. Capabilities (Sen)

4. Equality and the incidence of formal methods 4.1. Measure theory 4.2 Commodity spaces