Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 1 of 25 ROBERT B. SYKES (#3180 bob@sykesinjurylaw.com ALYSON E. CARTER (#9886 alyson@sykesinjurylaw.com ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 311 South State Street, Suite 240 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Telephone (801 533-0222 Facsimile (801 533-8081 Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION NATASHA CHILD, vs. Plaintiff, KENNETH HAMMOND, an Ogden City Police Officer, JON GREINER, Ogden City Chief of Police, OGDEN CITY, and JOHN and JANE DOES 1-15, Defendants. COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND Case No. 1:08-cv-147 Judge Tena Campbell Plaintiff Natasha Child complains and alleges for a cause of action against Defendants as follows:
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 2 of 25 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This is a civil rights action in which the Plaintiff seeks relief for the Defendants violations of her rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, specifically the Fourth Amendment, which right is further secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, and by the laws and the Constitution of the State of Utah. Plaintiff seeks damages, both compensatory and punitive damages; affirmative and equitable relief; an award of attorney s fees, costs, and interest; and other and further relief as this Court deems just and equitable. This is further an action at law to redress a deprivation under color of statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of a right, privilege, and immunity secured to the Plaintiff by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and under the law and statutes of the State of Utah. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 1. This action arises under the United States Constitution and federal law, particularly under the provisions of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988. The Fourth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, -2-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 3 of 25 supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Original spelling; emphasis added. 2. This action also arises under the Constitution of the State of Utah Article I, Section 14 which provides, under the Declaration of Rights, the following: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. (Emphasis added. 3. This action seeks redress for violations of the civil rights laws of both the United States in the State of Utah. Jurisdiction is therefore invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1343 and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil action for a deprivation of rights, in pertinent part, as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,... (Emphasis added. -3-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 4 of 25 4. The claims made in this Complaint occurred and arose in the State of Utah, in this District, and in the Central Division. Venue is therefore proper under 28 U.S.C. 1391. 5. Plaintiff is seeking damages pursuant to the claims for relief specified below in amounts to be proved at trial. PARTIES 6. Plaintiff Natasha Child ( Natasha is a citizen of the United States of America and is a resident of Clinton, County of Davis, State of Utah. 7. Defendant Kenneth Hammond ( Hammond, at all times relevant herein, was a law enforcement officer employed by the Ogden City Police Department ( OCPD, City of Ogden, State of Utah. 8. Defendant Jon Greiner ( Greiner, at all times relevant herein, was the Chief of Police of the OCPD, and Hammond s supervisor, and had knowledge of his activities and history for several years prior to the events described herein, including his tendencies to abuse female suspects. 9. John or Jane Doe No. 1, at all times relevant herein, was an indirect or a direct supervisor of Hammond and had knowledge of his activities and history for several years prior to the events described herein, including his tendencies to abuse female suspects. -4-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 5 of 25 10. John or Jane Doe No. 2, at all times relevant herein, was an indirect or a direct supervisor of Hammond and had knowledge of his activities and history for several years prior to the events described herein, including his tendencies to abuse female suspects. 11. John or Jane Doe No. 3, and several other John or Jane Does, at all times relevant herein, was or were an indirect or a direct supervisor[s] of Hammond and had knowledge of his activities and history for several years prior to the events described herein, including his tendencies to abuse female suspects. 12. Defendant Ogden City ( Ogden is a municipal corporation and is a political subdivision of Weber County and the State of Utah. As part of its corporate powers, and at all times relevant herein, Ogden maintained a Police Department as a Division of Ogden. Hammond was an officer and employee of Ogden and the OCPD. 13. This action is brought against Hammond and the other Defendants in his/their individual and official capacities. Their authority to act was derived from Utah State law and/or the commands and directives of his/their superiors. All of the acts of the individuals and entities listed in the preceding paragraphs were performed under color of the laws, statutes, ordinances, -5-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 6 of 25 regulations, policies, customs, and usages of the State of Utah and the City of Ogden. 14. This action is also brought against the Ogden City as a person liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 15. Plaintiff will serve notice of her pendent state claims, if any, against the Defendants pursuant to Utah law. These claims will be amended into this Complaint at a later time. However, Plaintiff denies that notice is required of any of the current claims in this Complaint since all current claims deal with constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and other statutes and constitutional provisions, and state law notice of civil rights claims is not required. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 16. On or about May 18, 2008, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Hammond was assisting Utah Highway Patrol (UHP officers in Ogden, Utah, in a search for Corey Child, who had shortly before escaped custody even though he had been handcuffed. 17. Corey had been pulled over by the Highway Patrol for an alleged DUI. Before he was taken into custody, he called his wife Natasha on his cell phone and told her he was being pulled over. Natasha then began to drive to -6-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 7 of 25 the location where Corey said he would be. She arrived moments after he was recaptured and was in custody. 18. Hammond and the UHP officers found Corey in the back yard of a residence still in handcuffs. They regained custody of him without incident, as Corey did not resist being recaptured. Natasha had arrived about the time of Corey s recapture, and witnessed Hammond escorting Corey from the backyard. After the recapture, Hammond walked Corey between two houses toward the street, followed a few feet behind by two other officers and Natasha. It was quite dark or dimly lit at the time. 19. Unbeknownst to Hammond, Natasha was observing her husband s recapture from the yard of the residence, just a few feet away. 20. As Hammond was walking Corey, still in handcuffs, toward the street, Natasha joined the other officers as they followed Hammond and Corey up the driveway. Corey was not resisting or causing trouble for Hammond or the other officers at that moment. 21. Before reaching the street, without provocation, Hammond kicked the legs out from underneath the unresisting and handcuffed Corey, and knocked him to the ground. Hammond then elbowed Corey in the head, and kneed him in the back. -7-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 8 of 25 22. Natasha cried out, I m a witness to that! Hammond appeared surprised by her presence, saying, Where the hell did you come from? Who are you? 23. Natasha told Hammond that she was Corey s wife. For no apparent reason, Hammond told the other officers to arrest her. The officers did so, and she was placed into handcuffs. 24. Hammond and Corey continued up the driveway and approached the sidewalk in front of the house. Hammond then kicked the legs out from the handcuffed and unresisting Corey again, knocking him to the ground. Hammond then forcefully stomped on Corey s exposed ankle, while on the ground, handcuffed and incapacitated, saying, Try to run now! 25. The pain was almost unbearable, and Corey thought Hammond had broken his ankle and asked for an ambulance. 26. The other officers took custody of Corey, and Hammond took custody of Natasha, putting his own handcuffs on her and taking her out of another patrol car where she had initially been placed. 27. Natasha was scared to be alone with Hammond because she had seen the unprovoked violence Hammond had visited on Corey just a few minutes -8-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 9 of 25 before. She begged the other officers to take her instead of letting her go alone with Hammond down a dark street. The other officers refused to help. 28. Hammond s vehicle was about a block and a half away, so he compelled Natasha to walk down the dark street with him to his vehicle. 29. From the moment he took custody of Natasha, Hammond was extremely aggressive and threatening. Among other things, even though she was initially compliant and non-resisting, he threatened to punch her, and thereafter he pushed her, jabbed her in the back, and lifted the handcuffs up as she was walking, in order to make it extremely painful and difficult. Natasha was fearful that Hammond s actions would break her wrists or arms. 30. These threats and physical abuse constituted an independent Fourth Amendment violation and constituted an unconstitutional provocation of an otherwise compliant prisoner. 31. Natasha was very frightened. Having seen what Hammond did to Corey, and experiencing what he was doing to her, Natasha was justifiably afraid for her physical safety, especially as Hammond directed her away from the other officers and into the darkness of a dimly lit street, where there were no witnesses. As Hammond continued down the dark street, threatening and abusing -9-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 10 of 25 her as he went, Natasha became more resistant, and tried to fight off Hammond s violence, as she yelled and cried out for help. 32. As the handcuffed Natasha struggled, her pants began to fall down. She pleaded for Hammond to let her pull them up, but he refused and raised her handcuffed hands nearly up to the back of her neck, preventing her from attending to her needs for modesty. She pleaded with him to please stop, but Hammond continued to apply force to the handcuffs behind Natasha s back, causing even more pain. 33. Natasha was finally able to get her pants pulled up a little bit. However, as she did this, Hammond seemed to get more aggressive and angry. 34. At one point, on the dark street, Hammond slammed Natasha down on the ground and fell on top of her with all his weight. She was badly hurt. Natasha became extremely frightened. After Hammond raised her up, he forced her to continue walking toward his patrol car, and Natasha s pants started to fall down again. Natasha struggled to keep them pulled up. 35. At that point, the two of them were almost to Hammond s patrol car when Natasha felt a tug on her left side as Hammond pulled Natasha s pants down to her ankles. Hammond then stated now you don t have to worry about them. -10-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 11 of 25 36. Natasha feared for her life and began to cry as she was being assaulted by Hammond. 37. Natasha was embarrassed, humiliated and scared when they arrived at the patrol car, as her pants were still down. Natasha was wearing only G String underwear. 38. When they arrived at Hammond s patrol car, Hammond pushed the handcuffed Natasha, whose pants were still pulled down, up against his car. Hammond then pushed his body against Natasha s, and Natasha could feel his pants and belt against her almost naked body. 39. After that, another officer finally pulled up and could see that Natasha was extremely upset and crying and could see that her pants were down. She yelled to that officer for help. That officer got out of his car, came over and pulled up Natasha s pants, and took her from Officer Hammond. He told her to sit in the car for a minute to calm down. 40. Natasha was injured in that the handcuff abuse caused severe pain and strain. Additionally, she was bruised over much of her body, including calf, thigh, arm and head. She still, to this day, has left arm and should pain and reduced mobility. -11-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 12 of 25 41. Natasha was charged with public intoxication, interfering with an arrest, resisting an officer and a disorderly conduct. All the charges were later dismissed by the court. 42. Natasha was further damaged because when Hammond knocked Natasha down on the first occasion, and placed his body on top of hers, the keys to her truck slipped out of her pants pocket. Apparently, somebody in the neighborhood found the keys, stripped the new tires off of the truck, and stole all the property out of it, and did approximately $10,000 worth of damage to it. Natasha is thus entitled a judgment against Defendants for this sum. 43. Based on information and belief, Greiner and John and Jane Does 1-3 knew, or should have known, for years that Hammond abused female suspects, and did inappropriate things to them during the course of arrests. Despite this knowledge, these Defendants took no action to discipline him or prevent these matters from happening. As a result, Plaintiff suffered the abuse set forth herein. -12-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 13 of 25 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION Excessive Force On Natasha Child Against Officer Hammond... In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment Cognizable Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 44. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above allegations. 45. The security of one s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment is basic to a free society. 46. The proper focus in determining the reasonableness of force used is on the events immediately confronting officers when they decide to use force. Force is not reasonable when a suspect is non-violent and poses no threat. Furthermore, force is not permitted at all when there is no need to use force. Force is excessive when greater than reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also on how it is carried out. 47. An arrest accompanied by excessive force violates the Fourth Amendment. Even when some force is justified, the amount of force actually used may be excessive. Thus, when a police officer uses excessive force, a plaintiff may recover damages against that police officer under the Civil Rights Act. -13-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 14 of 25 48. The test to determine if the force used in this case was excessive includes: a. the severity, or lack of severity, of the alleged crime in issue; b. whether the person against whom the force was used posed an immediate threat to the safety of the police or others; and c. whether the person against whom the force was used was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight (trying to get away. When these factors are considered in context, it is clear that the force used here was excessive because Plaintiff had not committed nor was accused of a severe crime, and did not constitute an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or to others, and was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight at the time of the excessive force. 49. A police officer may not reasonably use greater levels of force when alternative courses of action involving uses of lesser levels of force are open to him. The standards of decency in modern society do not permit the imposition of needless harm. Thus, Officer Hammond violated Natasha s Fourth Amendment rights when he repeatedly threatened her with violent harm, placed his body -14-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 15 of 25 violently on top of hers, repeatedly pushed her and shoved her, violently lifted up the handcuffs so as to cause unnecessary pain, and pulled her pants down. 50. The use of any force by officers simply because a suspect is argumentative, contentious, or vituperative is illegal. Force can only be used to overcome physical resistance or threatened force, and a lack of provocation or need to use force would make any use of force excessive. The use of more force than is necessary, or of force for an improper purpose, is illegal. In this case, Hammond s actions violated all of these principles in that, inter alia, he forcefully and unnecessarily used the aforementioned force against Plaintiff. 51. Handcuffing someone inappropriately, or with unnecessary pressure or violence so as to cause pain or discomfort, is excessive force and violates the Fourth Amendment. Hammond thus violated Natasha s rights as he walked her to his patrol car. 52. A police officer is liable for a use of excessive force when he causes an escalation of events that lead to the plaintiff s injury. In this case, Officer Hammond is liable for excessive force because he caused, by means of unconstitutional threats, intimidation and physical violence, an escalation of events that led to Natasha s injury as well as a deprivation of her rights. -15-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 16 of 25 53. When a police officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, where the provocation is an independent Fourth Amendment violation as it was here, the officer then may be held liable for an otherwise defensive use of force. Thus, even if Officer Hammond might reasonably have used force in the arrest of Natasha if she had been resisting without provocation, Hammond is still liable for using excessive force because his reckless and unconstitutional provocation created the need to use force. The basis of liability for Officer Hammond s subsequent use of force is the initial constitutional violation. 54. Unjustified striking, beating, or infliction of bodily harm gives rise to liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Thus, when Hammond inappropriately struck, dragged, pulled and roughly handled Natasha, he violated her Fourth Amendment constitutional rights. 55. Beating and kicking restrained suspects who are in the control of the police is plainly excessive force. The need for force is nonexistent when a suspect is handcuffed and not trying to resist or escape. There is no occasion for the use of any force against a prisoner who quietly submits, and no matter how difficult it is to apprehend a prisoner, the law does not permit officers to beat him/her once he/she is securely in custody. Officer Hammond thus violated -16-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 17 of 25 Natasha s Fourth Amendment rights when he treated her roughly, as described above, when she was handcuffed and not trying to escape. 56. Non-consensual, inappropriate touching may violate the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Hammond violated Natasha s Fourth Amendment constitutional rights when he inappropriately fell or placed his body on top of Natasha s, when he pulled her pants down to her ankles, and when he placed his body forcefully against the semi-naked Natasha and pushed her against his car. 57. A classic Fourth Amendment violation occurs when an officer uses excessive force in creating a situation which causes a plaintiff to use force which results in police using additional, responsive force. A claim of excessive force may be based on a showing that an officer used excessive force in creating the situation which caused a plaintiff to take the actions she did. In this case, Officer Hammond violated Natasha s civil rights when, among other things set forth in the facts above, he was unnecessarily rough with her, as herein described, which caused her to be frightened and to justifiably resist his advances and violence. 58. The violation of Natasha Child s rights are actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Natasha is entitled to judgment against Hammond, as well -17-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 18 of 25 as Ogden City, in an amount to be proved at trial, plus costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. 59. Natasha is entitled to punitive damages against Hammond, as allowed by law, since Hammond s actions were intentional, reckless, wanton, malicious, and/or oppressive. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION Unconstitutional Custom, Policy or Practice and Failure to Supervise and Train Against Ogden, Jon Greiner, Chief of Police, and Does 1-15 as to Natasha Child... In Violation Of The Fourth Amendment Cognizable Under 42 U.S.C. 1983 60. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the above allegations. 61. The Defendant Ogden City ( Ogden is a person for purposes of a 1983 action. Ogden may therefore be sued directly for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief for its policies, customs, or practices that violate Natasha s constitutionally protected rights. 62. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Hammond, as a police officer in the OCPD, was acting under the direction and control of Ogden City, which acted through its agents and employees who were responsible to supervise -18-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 19 of 25 its officers and operations, and for making the policies of the Police Department. One of Ogden s agents, under which Hammond operated, was Jon Greiner, chief of police of Ogden City. 63. John or Jane DOES 1-3 were direct or indirect supervisors of Hammond, who acted under their direction, knowledge and control. These Does were also agents of OCPD and Ogden City, and were under Greiner s supervision. 64. A 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim may be asserted against a city and/or its supervisors based on allegations of negligence in hiring, training, and supervising employees. Additionally, failure to have a written or other policy in place, or having a policy in place that is customarily not followed, may make the city or a supervisor liable for the deprivation of a person s civil rights that results because of the failure of policy. 65. Greiner and Does 1-3 essentially adopted a policy of allowing their subordinate, Hammond, to abuse and assault female suspects. This constituted a knowing failure to act or supervise wrongful actions of a subordinate, which became so consistent that they have become a custom. The failure of the government to respond to a supervisory need in such a manner shows deliberate indifference by the Defendants to the risks of constitutional violations against women, and is a basis for liability. In this case, the custom or policy to allow -19-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 20 of 25 Hammond to continue to operate and be employed by Ogden City, after it knew or should have known that he was abusing female suspects, directly caused the abuse sustained by Natasha Child in the early morning hours of May 18, 2008. In essence, the failure of Ogden City and its police chief and supervisors to supervise Hammond, and to allow him to be employed and to be on patrol by himself at night, enabled Hammond to abuse Child as he did in the early morning hours of May 18, 2008. 66. Deliberate indifference is determined by analyzing whether the government knew or should have known of the risk of constitutional violations. Either actual notice or constructive notice is sufficient to show deliberate indifference. Here, Hammond s long history of abusing female suspects, which was known or should have been known to Greiner and Does 1-3, provides actual or constructive notice of the risk of constitutional violations on women suspects and demonstrates deliberate indifference. 67. A public entity and supervisory officials may be liable under Section 1983 when it is shown that a governmental policy or custom was the moving force that led to the deprivation of a constitutional right. Defendants could have prevented the abuse against Natasha had they exercised proper supervision and control over Hammond. Thus, the deliberate indifference of these -20-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 21 of 25 Defendants to Natasha s constitutional rights was the moving force behind the constitutional violation. 68. A government body may be liable if it has a policy of inaction and such inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights. In this case, deliberate inaction or acquiescence in a long-standing practice by these Defendants constituted a failure to protect Natasha Child s constitutional rights. 69. The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the government has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. Thus, these Defendants are liable to Natasha Child because their failure to act resulted in a substantial certainty that some female suspects, such as Natasha Child, would suffer abuse from Hammond. The notice to these Defendants is established by the existence of a pattern of wrongful conduct known to these Defendants. This pattern of knowing wrongful conduct meant that it was highly predictable or plainly obvious that, as a consequence, someone like Natasha Child would be abused or injured by Hammond s conduct. The OCPD s failure, through Greiner and supervisors, to adequately address recurring situations presented an obvious potential for -21-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 22 of 25 constitutional violations. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998(quoted in Carr v. Castle, 337 F.3d 1221, 1228 (10th Cir. 2003. 70. In this case, Greiner and other policymakers in the OCPD and Ogden City had long-established knowledge, either actual or constructive, of a potential serious problem with Hammond s treatment of women suspects, such that the need for corrective action or supervision was obvious, and the policymakers failure to investigate or rectify the situation thus evidenced a deliberate indifference. 71. Where the chief of police and/or senior government officials knew or should have known of a pattern of unconstitutional acts or omissions by members of its police force, then the chief, the senior officials, the government, or all of them, may be held liable for the consequences of such conduct. Personal participation in the deprivation is not required for imposition of liability, but setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause Hammond to inflict the constitutional injury imposes liability for that injury. Here, Greiner and Does 1-3, at a minimum, are liable to Natasha Child for their deliberate indifference to her rights and for their failure to act on information which they knew indicating that unconstitutional acts or omissions were occurring. They are also liable for their gross negligence in failing -22-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 23 of 25 to supervise subordinates and Hammond, who were committing wrongful acts against women suspects. Greiner and Does 1-3 thus exhibited gross negligence and deliberate indifference to a high risk that Plaintiff s civil rights would be violated, and this neglect caused and enabled Hammond to violate Natasha Child s civil rights. 72. When a police chief acquiesces in a department s practice, he is liable for constitutional violations that result. It may be inferred that a police chief was aware of a pervasive activity in his department. Refusing to seriously investigate an incident or to discipline an involved officer may constitute a pattern of ratification of bad conduct and of recklessly ignoring evidence that government employees had violated Plaintiff s constitutional rights. In this case, Natasha Child complained about her treatment by Hammond to police officials, who took no action, and conducted no investigation. This indicated ratification of the pattern of conduct and constituted deliberate and reckless indifference to the constitutional rights of Natasha. 73. When the complaint about Hammond s activity was made by Natasha Child to a female police officer at police headquarters, she was told that Hammond had a long history of abusing female suspects. However, the procedure for investigation of these complaints, and for reprimand, and/or for discipline, is -23-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 24 of 25 so inadequate or flawed as to constitute ratification of unconstitutional conduct. As a result, Greiner, as a chief of police, and Does 1-3, are all liable for the unconstitutional conduct of the police. 74. The violation of Natasha s rights are actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and Natasha is entitled to judgment against the City in an amount to be proved at trial, plus costs and attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988. JURY DEMAND Plaintiff requests a jury trial on all issues in this case. REQUEST FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows: 1. For general compensatory damages in an amount to be determined at trial; 2. For special damages as are shown at trial, including $10,000 for damage to her vehicle and loss of property; 3. For punitive damages against the named individuals as may be allowed by law; 4. For pre-judgment interest on the damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, as allowed by law; -24-
Case 1:08-cv-00147-TC Document 2 Filed 12/09/2008 Page 25 of 25 5. For Plaintiff s costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred herein, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988; and 6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. th DATED this 9 day of December, 2008. ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES, P.C. /s/ Robert B. Sykes ROBERT B. SYKES ALYSON E. CARTER Attorneys for Plaintiff Q:\CLIEN T\2017 Child\2. P\2.1 CASE\Complaint.120908.wpd -25-