MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA

MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA Wylie Spicer, Q.C. IIclKns COOPER An Atlantic Canadian Law Finn April 28, 2000

lielllrbe COOPER 2 MULTI-MODAL TRANSPORT AND THE JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA WYLIE SPICER, Q.C.I INTRODUCTION A manufactures widgets in Sydney, Australia. B sells widgets in Aulae, New Brunswick. B decides to purchase its widgets from A to sell in New Brunswick. B says to A: "I will pay you for the widgets when they are delivered to me in Aulac". A then contracts with C to have the widgets shipped from Sydney to Aulae, New Brunswick. C then makes arrangements for shipment,,including truck transportation, ship transportation and rail transportation. To begin the shipment, C picks up the widgets and loads them into C-truck. As a result of the unexpected volume of widgets, the C-truck collides with an overpass, but is able to continue and delivers the widgets to D who loads them onto D-ship in Sydney and begins the voyage from Australia to the Port in Halifax, Nova Scotia. A leak in the hold of D-ship allows water to enter the containers ofwidgets, but that water has drained out and dried up when D-ship reaches the Port in Halifax. E-terminal operator then unloads D-ship, but inadvertently drops one of the containers of widgets. The widgets are stored in E-shed until F arrives to load them onto its railcar. During the voyage, F-train goes off its track, but is eventually able to continue its voyage to Aulac, New Brunswick. B arrives at the station in Aulac to pick up the widgets, but discovers upon examination that all of the widgets are damaged and unsaleable. B does not pay A for the widgets. Does the Federal Court of Canada have jurisdiction over A's claims resulting from this scenario or are those claims outside Federal Court jurisdiction? Following the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in ITO-International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc. et a1 2, ("ITO"), the Federal Court of Canada has had to re- Wylie Spicer, Q.C. practices Maritime Law as a partner in the Halifax office of Mcinnes Cooper, an Atlantic Canadian law firm. 2 (1986),28 D.L.R. 4th 641.

11101 8 COOPER 3 examine its jur isdiction in relation to claims arising out of multi-modal transportation. The above scenario, while not likely to occur, illustrates the problems created by these issues. In particular, to resolve this issue the Court must consider federal legislation, specifically the Federal Court Act, in light ofthe division ofpowers between Parliament and provincial legislatures as defined in the Constitution Act, 1867. ITOv.MIIDA The ITO case is the standard against which the Federal Court determines whether it may exercise jqrisdiction in claims arising out ofmulti-modal transportation. Unlike the example used above, the facts in ITO were not unusual. A bill of lading evidenced a contract between the defendant Mitsui and the plaintiff Miida for the shipment of 250 cartons of electronic calculators from Japan to Montreal. Mitsui was a marine carrier and made arrangements with ITO, a cargo-handling company, to unload and store the calculators in its warehouse at the Montreal docks until delivery could be made to Miida. While the goods were being stored by ITO, 169 of the cartons were stolen. Miida sued both ITO and Mitsui. At trial, Marceau J. held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the claim against ITO as a result of the close link between that contract and the contract for the carriage of goods by sea between Miida and Mitsui. In particular Justice Marceau held that Miida knew that a stevedore would be involved to unload the cargo and Miida expected to receive that benefit under its contract with Mitsui. The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed. Justice Le Dain, for the majority, held that the close relationship between the work performed by ITO and the contract for the carriage of goods by sea was enough to bring the claim within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court pursuant to its power to adjudicate matters of maritime law as defmed in s. 2 ofthe Federal Court Act. In dissent, Justice Pratte stated that earlier decisions of the Court required a finding of no jurisdiction. Pratte, J. held that this claim was solely a claim in delict or tort and thus was not within the jurisdiction ofthe Federal Court. The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the lower court decisions, holding that the Federal Court did have jurisdiction over Miida's claim against ITO. Speaking for the majority, Justice McIntyre referred to earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada for the test to be

4 JIIcl...BS COOPBR applied in detennining whether the Court had jurisdiction. According to Justice McIntyre, earlier decisions from the Supreme Court ofcanada 3 established three essential requirements for a fmding ofjurisdiction. Justice McIntyre lists those requirements as follows: 1. There must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament. 2. There must be an existing body of federal law which is essential to the disposition of the case and which nourishes the statutory grant ofjurisdiction. 3. The law on which the case is based must be "a law of Canada" as the phrase is used in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. 4 1. Statutory Grant ofjurisdiction by Parliament: In this case, Justice McIntyre held that s. 22(1) of the Federal Court Act met the first requirement. Section 22(1) then stated: 22(1) The Trial Division has concurrent original jurisdiction as well between subject and subject as otherwise, in all cases in which a claim for relief is made or a remedy is sought under or by virtue of Canadian Maritime law or any other law of Canada relating to any other matter coming within the class of subject of navigation and shipping, except to the extent that jurisdiction has been otherwise specially assigned. 2. Existing body offederal Law essential to the disposition: To meet the second requirement, it was necessary to consider whether there was a law of Canada in relation to navigation and shipping which was essential to the disposition of this case. In that regard, McIntyre J. held that the defmition of maritime law in s. 2 of the Federal Court Act encompassed 2 categories 5 : 3 Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd (1976), 71 D.L.R. (3d) 111 and McNamara Construction (Western) Ltd. v. The Queen (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 273. 4 p.650. 5 See p.652.

McINNES COOPER 5 (1) The law administered by the Exchequer Court of Canada by virtue ofthe Admiralty Act or any other statute; and (2) Law that would have been administered by the Exchequer Court of Canada if it had exercised unlimited jurisdiction in relation to maritime and admiralty matters. McIntyre J. concluded that the first category includes law administered by the High Court of England on its Admiralty side in 1934 as that law has developed and been amended by both cases and Parliament. In considering whether the claim against ITO fell within the law in category 1, McIntyre J. stated that the claim did "not arise from the contract of carriage between Miida and Mitsui, since ITO was not bound to perform any obligations under that bill of lading"6. The decision also points out that s. 22(2) ofthe Federal Court Act could not assist the Court since the claim against ITO could not fall within any of the specific categories listed in that subsection. As a result, the first category of Maritime Law in s. 2 did not encompass Miida's claim against ITO. With respect to the second category ofmaritime law, McIntyre J. stated: In my view the second part of the s. 2 definition of Canadian maritime law was adopted for the purpose of assuring that Canadian maritime law would include an unlimited jurisdiction in relation to maritime and admiralty matters.... The words "maritime" and "admiralty" should be interpreted within the modern context ofcommerce and shipping. In reality, the ambit of Canadian maritime law is limited only by the constitutional division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867. I am aware in arriving at this conclusion that a court, in determining whether or not any particular case involves a maritime or admiralty matter, must avoid encroachment on what is in "pith and substance" a matter of local concern involving property and civil rights or any other matter which is in essence within exclusive provincial jurisdiction under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. It is important, therefore, to establish that a subject matter under consideration in any case is so integrally connected to maritime matters as to be legitimate maritime law within federal legislative competence. 7 6 p.654. 7 pp. 656-657.

IIcl...ES COOPER. 6 Justice McIntyre then refers to an earlier decision of the Supreme Court ofcanada 8, which held that stevedoring was an integral part ofshipping. On this issue, the majority ofthe Court in ITO concluded as follows:... cargo handling and incidental storage before delivery... within the port area is sufficiently linked to the contract ofcarriage by sea to constitute a maritime matter within the ambit of Canadian maritime law. 9 According to McIntyre J., there were three key factors dictating this result: (1) the terminal was within the port of Montreal; (2) the connection between the terminal operator's activities within the port and the contract of carriage; and (3) the storage in this case was short term pending ftnal delivery to Miida. 10 Since common law principles ofnegligence and contract law had been employed in earlier admiralty cases, there was a sufficient body of federal law essential to the disposition ofthe case. 3. The law in 2. is a "law of Canada" as defined in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867: Canadian maritime law comes within federal powers over navigation and shipping as set out in s. 91(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867, thus the third requirement for a ftnding of jurisdiction was met in ITO. In a short dissenting judgment, Chouinard J. held simply that a claim for negligence arising from the storage ofgoods in a warehouse fell only within the jurisdiction of the province and thus was outside the jurisdiction ofthe Federal Court. The majority decision in ITO overruled earlier case law on those issues. I I 8 Reference re Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act, etc., [1955] 3 D.L.R. 721. 9 p.657. 10 See p. 657. II See, e.g., Robert Simpson Montreal Ltd v. Hamburg Amerika Linie Norddeutscher, [1973] F.C. 304 (T.D.) where Walsh J. dismissed a third party claim against a warehouseman unloading cargo for lack ofjurisdiction although the main action involved a claim for damaged cargo; Sumitomo Shoji Canada Ltd v. The Juzan Maru (1974) 49 D.L.R. (3d) 277 (T.D.) Where Dollier J. dismissed the plaintiffs claim against the terminal operators following receipt of damaged cargo; Domestic Converters Corp. v. Arctic Steamship Line, [1984] 1 F.e. 211 where

Mel SS coopsa 7 LeDain. J., speaking for the majority ofthe Court of Appeal, stated that a finding ofjurisdiction over a tort committed on land would be against tradition.

8 McIlIlIBS COOPBR OTHER CASE LAW In determining jurisdictional issues today, the Federal Court also has the benefit of Iacobucci J.'s interpretation ofito in Monk Corp. v. Island Fertilizers Ltd)2. The claims in the Monk case arose out of a contract for the sale offertilizer to be supplied by ship. Monk had three separate claims for damages: 1) a claim related to excess product delivered; 2) a demurrage claim due to problems in unloading; and 3) a claim for the cost of renting shore cranes to unload the fertilizer. Iacobucci J., speaking for the majority, explained the findings in ITO as follows: Reduced to their essentials for purposes of this appeal, the reasoning and conclusions ofmcintyre, J. were as follows: (1) The second part of the s.2 definition of Canadian maritime law provides an unlimited jurisdiction in relation to maritime and admiralty matters which should not be historically confined or frozen, and "maritime" and "admiralty" should be interpreted within the modem context ofcommerce and shipping. (2) Canadian maritime law is limited only by the constitutional division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867, such that, in determining whether or not any particular case involves a maritime or admiralty matter, encroachment on what is in pith and substance a matter falling within Section 92 of the Constitution Act is to be avoided. (3) The test for determining whether the subject matter under consideration is within maritime law requires a finding that the subject matter is so integrally connected to maritime matters as to be legitimate Canadian maritime law within federal competence. (4) The "connecting factors" with maritime law were the proximity ofthe terminal operation to the Port ofmontreal, the connection between the terminal operator in activities within the port area and the contract of carriage by sea, and the fact that the storage in issue in the case was short term pending final delivery to the consignee, Miida. I3 12 (1991), 80 D.L.R. (4th) 58 (S.C.C.). I3 p.91.

McINNES COOPER 9 Applying these standards, Justice Iacobucci held that all three claims against Island Fertilizers fell within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. In particular, Iacobucci J. noted that the claim for excess product delivered related directly to Island Fertilizers' obligation to discharge cargo from the ship. Similarly, the claim for demurrage was directly related to the discharge of cargo. Finally, the use of shore cranes was closely connected with maritime matters because it resulted from the lack of equipment on the ship to discharge the cargo without aid. Since the discharge of cargo is clearly a maritime matter, a failure to discharge cargo is also a maritime matter. In conclusion, Justice Iacobucci states simply: "What is important for purposes of maritime law jurisdiction is that their claim be integrally connected with maritime matters"14. For comparison purposes, the decisions in SIO Export Trading Co. v. The Dart Europe 15 and United Tires & Rubber Co. v. Transco Shipping Inc. 16 illustrate the difference between cases decided prior to ITO and those decided after that decision. In the SIO Export case, the goods had been transported inland from the ship for repacking and were damaged in a traffic accident occurring on the way back to the ship. Justice Dube held that transportation within the province was not a traditional maritime activity. The fact that the truck was returning cargo to a ship could not bring the matter within the subject of navigation and.shipping thus the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the claim. In the United Tires case, Richard J. considered a similar action. The plaintiff contracted for the shipment oftwo containers of tires from Ontario to Cuba, but the tires were stolen from a storage area in Montreal before they could be placed on the ship. The plaintiff sued, inter alia, the owner of the yard from which the tires had been stolen. Contrary to the decision in the Sio Export case, Justice Richard held that the Federal Court had jurisdiction over the claims against both defendants because the contract entered into by the plaintiff was essentially a contract for the carriage of goods by sea. Without reference to ITO, Richard J. held that the Court could exercise jurisdiction because of a through bill of lading evidencing the plaintiffs contract. The fact that the other party to the bill of lading arranged for transport to Montreal by truck for the 14 p.95. 15 (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 182 (F.e. T.D.). 16 (1994), 88 F.T.R. 12.

10 MelllllBS COOPBR goods to be loaded on the vessel was not enough oust the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Richard 1. particularly considered s. 22(2)(f) ofthe Federal Court Act. Section 22(2)(f) states: 22(2)(f) any claim arising out of an agreement relating to the carriage of goods on a ship under a through bill of lading, or in respect of which a through bill of lading is intended to be issued, for loss or damage to goods occurring at any time or place during transit; The Court held that this subsection was enough for the exercise ofjurisdiction over the claim against the defendant trucking company. Another case addressing s. 22 (2)(f) is Watt & Scott Inc. v. Chantry Shipping S.A.17. In that case, the plaintiff purchased nuts to be shipped from Brazil to Manitoba. The cargo left Brazil on a ship, but was loaded onto a train owned by the defendant in Alabama. When the nuts arrived in Manitoba, they had become infected and had to be sold at a discount. Joyal J. held that the Court had jurisdiction over both the claim against the shipowner and the claim against the railway company. ITO was considered, but the case was decided on other grounds. Initially, the Court focussed on whether there was a "through bill of lading" as described in Section 22(2)(f) of the Federal Court Act. Justice Joyal, however, held that the facts before the Court were insufficient to make that determination. As a result, Joyal, J. turned to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in ITO, stating: The Supreme Court's reasoning, nevertheless did extend the field of maritime law to stevedoring duties and responsibilities on the indicia oftheir proximity, oftheir close relationship to the contract of carriage and oftheir short duration. Quaere whether these tests may be applied with respect to Burlington Northern's carriage of the goods from Mobile to Winnipeg.I8 Joyal J. again refuses to decide the case on that ground, leaving the issue open and focussing instead on s. 23 ofthe Federal Court Act which reads: 23. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, Aeronautics and Inter- Provincial Works and Undertakings - except to the extent that jurisdiction has been otherwise specially assigned, the Trial Division has concurrent original jurisdiction, between subject and subject as well as otherwise, in all cases for which a claim for 17 [1988] 1 F.C. 537 (T.D.). 18 p.546.

11 MclRRES COOPER relief is made or a remedy is sought under an act of parliament or otherwise in relation to any matter coming within any of the following classes of subjects, namely, (a) (b) (c) bills ofexchange and promissory notes, where the Crown is a party to the proceedings; aeronautics; and works and undertakings connecting a province with any other province or extending beyond the limits of a province. Joyal J. applied the ITO test requiring 3 pre-requisites to a finding ofjurisdiction. To meet the first requirement ofa statutory grant ofjurisdiction, Joyal J. focussed not on the s. 22 jurisdiction over maritime matters generally, but on whether the business of the railway company brought it within the language of s. 23. Joyal J. held that the railway company was an undertaking extending beyond the limits of Manitoba into Alabama, bringing it within s. 23( c). In meeting the final two requirements (an existing body of federal law, a law as defined in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867), s. 262 of the Railway Act, imposing a duty of due diligence on railway companies, was sufficient to meet both the second and third pre-requisite and was held to apply in this case. Not limiting his analysis to ITO, Joyal J. went back to the basics offederal legislation. In this manner, the decision looks at the roots of jurisdictional issues to see whether specific legislation enacted by Parliament existed to deal with the issue. This analysis avoided any consideration of whether the claim against the railway was "integrally connected" to maritime matters. While this situation will not arise in all cases, certainly many trucking and railway companies extend "beyond the limits ofa province" and may fall within s. 23. Perhaps Joyal J. got it right by attempting to focus on federal legislation for a finding ofjurisdiction instead of relying solely on the "integral connection" standard from ITO. Marley Co. v. Cast North America (J 983) Inc. 19 involved a similar action against a defendant railroad. The plaintiff contracted for the carriage of goods from Illinois to Holland. The carriers under that contract contracted with the defendant railway company to carry the goods to Montreal for shipment by sea. The railway company attempted to produce evidence showing that it would not have carried the container to Montreal by itself, but would have 19 (1995),94 F.T.R. 45.

12 1101111188 COOP8R retained another carrier. This fact, of course, would not allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction under s. 23 of the Federal Court Act. In determining whether the Court had jurisdiction, Nadon J. examined s. 22 of the Federal Court Act. Nadon, J. distinguished this case from others by stating that the defendant railway company had not been a party to any contract of carriage with the plaintiffs. Instead, the railway company had contracted with another defendant only for shipment by rail. The plaintiffs goods here would have eventually been carried by rail, ship, and truck. Justice Nadon concluded: I am certainly not prepared to accept that a contract to carry goods by rail or by truck in the United States, Canada or Europe is within the maritime jurisdiction ofthis Court simply because they are part ofthe on-going movement ofa container.20 According to the decision, the claim against this railway company did not fall within the jurisdiction of s. 22 of the Federal Court Act, however, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the company fell within the language used in s. 23 ofthe Act. As a result, the motion for a dismissal of the claim was dismissed. The Court refused once again to look solely at the ITO standard and referred only to federal legislation. In Matsuura Machiner Corp. v. Hapag Lloyd A. G. 21, NYK., an ocean carrier agreed to carry cargo under a through bill of lading from Japan to Toronto. NYK. then contracted with Melburn for carriage of the cargo by truck to Mississauga where it would be loaded onto a vessel. Upon arrival by truck, the goods were found to be damaged. The plaintiffs sued both NYK. and Melburn. The appellants agreed that the circumstances in ITO were not present in this case, but argued that jurisdiction should be found in s. 22(2)(f) and s. 23 of the Federal Court Act. Justice Pratte, speaking for the Court, held that s. 22(2)(f) did not apply as the claims against Melburn did not arise "out of an agreement relating to the carriage of goods on a ship under a through bill oflading" as required in that subsection. Further, s. 23 could not apply since there was no federal law to support the claims made against Melburn. The Supreme Court of Canada almost had a third opportunity to review these issues in the recent case of Pakistan National Shipping Corp. v. Canada 22 Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was eventually discontinued 23. The disputed claim in this case involved a third 20 pp. 49-50. 21 (1997),211 N.R. 156 (C.A.). 22 [1997] 3 F.C. 601. 23 [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 375 (QL).

McINNES COOPER 13 party claim for negligent misrepresentation in relation to containers used to ship oil by sea. The canola oil in the containers leaked while being carried on the plaintiffs ship causing damage. The defendant shipper claimed indemnification from the container supplier. Attempting to apply ITO, the Court of Appeal held that the claim was integrally connected to the maritime jurisdiction of the Federal Court. Stone J.A. referred to the decisions in both ITO and Monk, then stated: It would thus appear that the root of the claims in the main action for losses incurred by reason of the collapse of the plastic drums in stow during the voyage to Pakistan was the sufficiency of the drums themselves to withstand the conditions experienced by the ship... In my view, the third party claim is integrally connected to the Court's admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 24 The main contract was for the carriage of goods by sea, thus the Court's jurisdiction extended to the alleged tort committed by the supplier ofthe oil drums. A recent decision on the topic of multi-modal transport is the Court ofappeal decision in Garfield Container Transport Inc. v. Uniroyal Goodrich Canada 25. In that case, the plaintiff sued when it was not paid for its services in trucking cargo from Kitchener, Ontario to a Port in New Jersey. The defendant had sold the goods in question to a company who then contracted with a third company for the transportation of the goods. The third company did not pay the plaintiff for its services in relation to that transportation. Denault J., speaking for the Court, stated that this case was similar to that in Matsuura Machiner. The Federal Court had no jurisdiction over a claim relating only to road transportation ofgoods. ANALYSIS Under the law established in ITO, there are three pre-requisites to finding jurisdiction over cases involving multi-modal transportation: 1) a statutory grant ofjurisdiction by the federal Parliament; 2) an existing body of federal law essential to the disposition of the case; and 3) an existing body of law which is a "law of Canada" as defined in s. 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Many of the decisions after ITO have ignored the three-pronged test mandated by ITO, focussing instead on the words "integrally connected to maritime law". Justice McIntyre's 24 p.625. 25 (1998),229 N.R. 201.

Mell'fl'fB. COOPER 14 decision did centre on prong 2 ofthe test, but requirements 1 and 3 were easily met in that case. Where the case involves some aspect of maritime law, as in ITO, the Supreme Court of Canada has decided that s. 22 of the Federal Court Act meets the requirement for a statutory grant of jurisdiction. However, where maritime law is not directly involved in the claim (as may have been the case in both the Matsuura Machiner and the Garfield Container cases), the Court must look further for a statutory grant of jurisdiction. If there is no statutory law, there is no jurisdiction. Where the claim is related to maritime law, the Court must then consider whether the claim falls within either category ofmaritime law as defined in s. 2 of the Federal Court Act. If the defendant and the plaintiff were both parties to a contract of carriage, the claim will fall within the first category of law as exercised by the High Court of England in 1934 on its Admiralty side. Where, however, one party was not obliged to perfonn any obligation under the contract for carriage, the Court must then consider the second category ofmaritime law. The second category includes unlimited jurisdiction in relation to maritime and admiralty matters which jurisdiction is pennitted to evolve in the context of modern commerce and shipping - enter the limits imposed by the division of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867. It is here that the Court must consider whether the claim is "integrally connected" with maritime matters. While there is not yet an established rule to detennine which cases will be integrally connected and which will not, ITO and Monk provide helpful guidelines. In particular the Court must consider whether the essence ofthe claim is a matter that falls within provincial jurisdiction under s. 92 ofthe Constitution Act, 1867. The Court must also consider whether it is the type of claim traditionally connected with maritime matters (unloading and storage ofcargo at a Port, as in ITO), or another federal power. In Watt & Scott Inc. v. Chantry Shipping, for example, Joyal J. held that the matter was within federal jurisdiction as a result of both the Railway Act and the Federal Court Act. Considerations of whether a particular claim has an integral connection to maritime matters involves not only consideration of traditional and modern maritime law, but also consideration ofthe "pith and substance" of the matter to detennine whether it was a matter delegated to the provinces' exclusive jurisdiction or a matter over which the federal Parliament retained jurisdiction. Each case should be decided in light ofthe division ofpowers in s. 91 and s. 92 ofthe Constitution Act, 1867.

McINNBS COOPBR 15 The third requirement is that the law in requirement 2 be a "law of Canada" as defined in section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867. If the issue under requirement 2 is met, there will be no issue under requirement 3. Ifthe matter is essentially federal in nature, then the "essential" law will be a "law ofcanada" pursuant to s. 101. Coming back to the example used at the outset, we are now able to determine whether A's claims fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court. If A wished to sue B for non~ payment, the Federal Court would not have jurisdiction over that claim. The arrangement between B and A was, in essence, a contract for the sale of goods and thus falls properly within the jurisdiction ofprovincial courts and not the Federal Court. If, however, A wished to sue C for the loss, the claim would be within Federal Court jurisdiction. A had contracted with C for shipment of the widgets from Sydney to Aulac, New Brunswick. The essence of this arrangement was for the carriage of goods by sea - A needed to transport widgets across the world to B. Can C then claim indemnity from the various carriers involved? C could certainly sue D for any damage caused during the sea voyage, and E for damage occurring during unloading or storage since that is "integrally connected" to maritime matters under the ITO standard. Could C also bring an action for indemnity against F? F is a railway company "extending beyond the limits ofa province" within the meaning of s. 23 ofthe Federal Court Act. This brings C's claim against F also within the jurisdiction ofthe Federal Court not because of an integral connection with maritime matters, but because the Court has jurisdiction over the claim separate and apart from any connection to the contract for the carriage ofgoods by sea. JCllcc/ (239121.1)