Soviet/Russian American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT Special Advisor, PIR Center (Moscow) Director, Centre russe d etudes politiques (Geneva) Head, Center for Global Trends and International Organizations, the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation @Orlov_PIRCenter orlov@pircenter.org
1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (1) 1963, July. John Kennedy s secret message to Nikita Khruschev on a possible joint actions, including military ones, by US and USSR, to limit or prevent nuclear capability of China. Declined by USSR 1964, January 28. Soviet Memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Committe on Disarmament (ENCD) Committee of 18 on measures aimed at reducing of arms race and softening of international tensions (item 6: achieving of international agreement on nonproliferation. US reaction: skeptical (because of NATO Nuclear Forces issue) 1965, June 15. India proposes integrated approach towards nonproliferation, including disarmament and security assurances at UN Disarmament Commission. Resolution adopted. US, USSR: against any linkages, packages, or pre-conditions to the Treaty on Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (2) 1965, January 21. The Roswell Gilpatric Committee (Committee on Nuclear Proliferation) secret Report to President Johnson. Main conclusions: (1) US should recognize importance of working jointly with the USSR on proliferation prevention (2) It is unlikely that it would be possible to persuade other nations to abstain from developing nuclear weapons unless US, USSR stop their arms race (3) US should work together with the USSR cooperatively on regional nonproliferation issues, particularly in the Middle East (to keep Israel-Egypt confrontation on non-nuclear level We must acknowledge the importance of participation by the Soviet Union in efforts to stop proliferation. Furthermore, it is unlikely that others can be induced to abstain indefinitely from acquiring nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union and the United States continue in a nuclear arms race. Therefore, lessened emphasis by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons, and agreements on broader arms control measures must be recognized as important components in the overall program to prevent nuclear proliferation.
1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (3) 1965, September 24. Soviet Union introduces agenda item On nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to the 20 th UNGA session and its own draft of the future Treaty 1966, January 11. Soviet PM Kosygin sends a confidential message to President Johnson fully devoted to nuclear nonproliferation and invites United States on practical [деловые] talks to prepare the treaty. 1966, January 27. Johnson s address to the ENCD supporting work on the treaty. No concessions to the Soviet Union on NATO nuclear forces.
1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (4) 1966, September. Confidential US-Soviet talks on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty start in New York. Issues of transfer of nuclear weapons and groups of states key. Gromyko and Rusk generally come to an agreement on the issue of transfer of nuclear weapons and on groups/blocks of states. Also agreed that existing measures on nuclear arms within the military blocks, including nuclear planning, will not be banned by the treaty. 1966, September. FM Gromyko is under instructions to speed-up talks with Americans to prevent further proliferation. Soviet MFA s memo to the CPSU Central Committee warns that, in the absence of such a treaty India, Canada, Italy, Japan, Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands, Israel, Czechoslovakia, and the FRG would launch production of nuclear weapons soon
1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (5) 1966, September -1968, June. Consensus on major principles of the future nuclear nonproliferation regime among Soviet key players: 1) CPSU Central Committee 2) MFA 3) MOD 4) Minsredmash 5) VPK (Military-Industrial Commission under the Council of Ministers) 6) KGB Prevention of further nuclear proliferation in the world is considered as central task to address vital national interests of the USSR 1966, September 1968, June. Soviet Union is successful in convincing all its allies (except Romania) to support its position and the future Treaty. US convinces its allies, too (having difficulty with FRG)
1. Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1968) and Signing (1968) the NPT (6) 1967, October 10. Gromyko meets Johnson in the White House. The Roshin-Rusk working group intensifies its efforts to find compromise on Art.1. 1967, November 10. Soviet leadership approves Gromyko s position to accept US formula on to any recipient whatsoever as it prevents any case of potential transfers, to third countries or blocks; comes to a conclusion that issue of a Federation of Europe with independent nuclear arsenal is no more than a utopia 1968, July 1. NPT opened for signature. In the situation of arms races NPT has been highly important. It has demonstrated that we are able to resolve an important problem with US and UK, two NATO pillars. Brezhnev, all Politburo was so happy (Andrey Gromyko)
ARTICLE X 2. NPT Indefinite Extension (1995) (1) Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (1995) (2) 1994, Winter US and Russian diplomats began to prepare for the Conference and were eager to achieve maximal results: indefinite extension of the treaty with minimal concessions to the NAM. The preparation was carried out in Geneva (CD), in Vienna (IAEA HQ), and in New York. First, Russia, the U.S. and the UK were conducting trilateral meetings and then, all three parties discussed their plan with the French diplomats. China did not take part in these consultations and, as one of the participants put it, pretended to be "a non-nuclear weapon developing state, which has acquired some nuclear weapons by chance.
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (3) Four key and most probably controversial issues identified: 1) the term of extension 2) Article IV (the right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to access peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination); 3) Article VI; 4) Security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon states Russia proposed initially to discuss the problem of extension and to put it to a vote immediately, on the first day of the Conference, before the actual review of the treaty's implementation (the five-year review is an integral part of the Conference). Russia believed that the issue of extension should be solved deliberately by all participants, without arms-twisting and fuss; hence, it ought not to be put at the bottom of the agenda. However, this position was not endorsed, since the U.S. did not predict that indefinite extension or even longterm extension would be agreed upon easily. They preferred to obtain a clear vision of the positions at the beginning of the Conference and to use this forum to influence the heads of hesitating delegations.
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (4) 1994, December, Geneva. Russia set forth a two-fold initiative. The resolution on the term of the treaty would have been a short document, without preamble (which would have inevitably lead to long debate) and stating only the indefinite extension. Only UK backed the Russian initiative. The U.S. was concerned that the NAM might issue a collective resolution in response and put it to a vote first. Canada was against the proposal, naming the Russian draft a "high quality, high risk" idea. Canada stood for cautious and gradual actions before and during the Conference, to increase step by step the number of states supporting indefinite extension. Russia strongly opposed this approach: (1) it feared a low turnout at such meetings, which might look like the NWS policy was failing. (2) it believed that there was a split in the ranks of the NAM and, hence, did not expect a single unified resolution from all the opponents of indefinite extension. Russian diplomats advocated the benefits of lobbying, although they admitted that the U.S. had more capabilities in this area.
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (5) 1995, January. The most probable candidate to preside over the Conference, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), visited Moscow. In the course of his meeting with the Russian FM Kozyrev he expressed the opinion that the most favorable outcome of the Conference would be to take the decision without voting. He proposed his wording for the resolution: "As a majority exists among States Parties to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely." Russian diplomats appreciated this formula, calling it elegant but doubting at that time that the Conference would be able to avoid voting. 1995, Spring Russia and U.S. attached special importance to the intentions of the South African leadership to set forth its own initiative at the Conference. To assure South Africa of their intentions, Russian FM Andrei Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent letters to South African FM Alfred Nzo on the eve of the Conference.
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (6) 1995, March. The NPT. Problems of Extension White Paper presented by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. 1995, March. The National Security Council of Russia met to make decision on NPT extension to provide instructions to the Russian delegation. Agreed that Russia should strive to achieve indefinite extension of the NPT, and to regard the option of 25-year rolling periods with conferences in between, as an alternative. "[...] If it is not possible to achieve indefinite extension, there will be a danger that [...] a group of states will oppose this. If these positions clash - either indefinite or nothing - we cannot agree to this. Responsible approach will be to prevent proliferation [...] on any fundamental principles. This is why it will be possible to offer 25- year extension with the possibility of further extension [...] Valery Manilov, then Deputy Secretary of the RF Security Council
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (7) 1995, January-May. Sticks-n-carrots combo used by Russia, US in building international support of indefinite extension of the NPT prior and during the conference Russia worked primarily with (1) CIS countries. Normally, meets with positive reaction and support. Exerts some pressure on the Moldavian and Azerbaijani delegations at different stages of the Conference. Surprised with presence of US advisor in delegation of at least one of the CIS states but chooses not to raise this issue. (2) Ukraine more specifically: until the last days of the Conference, the Ukrainian delegation was not ready to sign the final resolution on extension of the NPT. Kiyv demanded that some provisions concerning security assurances be included in the succinct text of the resolution. If these demands were accepted, other states would have immediately begun to propose new amendments. The Russian delegation worked closely with the Ukrainian diplomats and finally succeeded. (3) Iran. When President Clinton announced during the conference that sanctions against Iran would be tightened, the leadership of the Russian delegation had to make an extra effort in order to prevent the Iranian delegation from taking steps with uncontrollable consequences: The decision on sanctions deteriorated the situation [...] At first, Iran did not react, then its tone became more defiant [...] and the Russian delegation had to take some measures to mitigate Iranian concerns". In Russia s assessment, level of activities by the US was unprecedented, including substantial pressure on such states as Mexico and Egypt. US sent ambassadors at large to the majority of allied and friendly countries and counted every new vote for the resolution.
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (8) 1995, April-May. During the Conference, Russia and US worked jointly and cooperatively on preparation of the final package : "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament Resolution on the Middle East proved to be the only major irritator in US-Russian approaches during this Conference. However, Russia agreed to mostly US-drafted language of the Middle East resolution even though Israel was not even mentioned there. Russia looked at this resolution as a compromise that would allow to avoid the vote and/or walk-outs at the end of the conference. Russia and the US (together with the UK) agreed to co-sponsor the resolution
2. NPT Indefinite Extension (9) 1995, May 11. "We achieved a high level of honest and good interaction. I mean cooperation among those who wanted indefinite extension of the NPT and cooperation with other countries. The Conference was marked with high degree of cooperation. Sergei Kislyak, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation, in his interview to Vladimir Orlov. 1995, May 12. "This conference can be regarded as a certain referendum with respect to U.S.-Russian disarmament activities. The referendum yielded sound results, efforts of the recent years [...] were approved by the international community. [...] The United States played an important part in the adoption of the final decision on indefinite extension - it used all its power, all its influence in different regions of the world [...]. The cooperation between Russia and the United States, as far as the major goal was concerned, was very good." Gen. Gennady Evstafiev, member of the Russian delegation, to Vladimir Orlov 1995, May 12. "There are no differences here between US and Russia, our interests [on major NPT-related issues] coincide This result [NPT indefinite extension] would not have been achieved without the high level of coordination between Russian and U.S. diplomats A senior member of the Russian delegation to Vladimir Orlov, New York
3. Lessons Learned & Conclusions (1) The signing of the NPT became possible only thanks to close joint work and readiness to compromise between United States and the USSR. It has become their mutual grand success. (2) With concluding the NPT, United States and the Soviet Union established a condominium in nuclear nonproliferation (Amb. Roland Timerbaev), sharing privileges and special responsibilities (3) Since 1968, nuclear nonproliferation has always been an island in US-Soviet turbulent relations not affected by major storms and mostly immune from clashes. Information exchange and coordination in nuclear nonproliferation have been unprecedented. Even in the worst times of the Cold War, nuclear nonproliferation remained the only silk string connecting the two superpowers (Andrey Gromyko) (4) In 1995, both United States and Russia worked closely, cooperatively, and successfully on achieving indefinite extension of the NPT without a vote because it met their national interests and strategic visions. (5) Currently, both United States and Russia continue to share joint responsibility of strengthening nonproliferation regimes (Vladimir Putin, December 1, 2016) (6) Failure of the NPT RevCon in 2020 will be a joint failure of United States and Russia, regardless of specific circumstances. Blame game will not be an option. Failure will not be an option. We need to start building foundations for the 2020 RevCon success now and together.