Letter from the Frontline: Back from the brink!

Wouter Bos, leader of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), shares with Policy Network his personal views on why the party recovered so quickly from its electoral defeat in May last year. Anyone wondering just how the Dutch Labour Party managed to almost double the number of seats they held in parliament during the 2003 elections should not forget that we had first managed to lose almost half of them during the 2002 elections. It is, of course, a lot easier to win 19 seats if you have already lost 22 of them. This spectacular recovery carries with it some inherent dangers. For example, we may come to regard the 2002 elections as an accident of history, a defeat that did not really challenge in any fundamental way our approach to politics, one that could easily be repaired with a clever campaign, and Letter from the Frontline: Back from the brink! Wouter Bos one after which social democratic politics could be conducted like business as usual as if nothing had changed. This would be a big mistake. We won the 2003 elections because there were fundamental lessons to be learnt with regard to leadership, style, culture and the political agenda. In 2003 the electorate gave us the benefit of the doubt. They believed that we had indeed learned those lessons. If we now revert to the old way of doing things they will leave us again, only this time in even greater numbers. How, then, did we convince voters in 2003 that we had already learned our lesson from the defeat only a year earlier? One could mention a whole host of factors that contributed to this perception and our subsequent success but, in what follows, I will choose to concentrate on those that specifically helped to make us look new: Mea culpa, leadership elections, a new campaign strategy and a new political agenda. Mea culpa Perhaps one of the most important decisions following the 2002 elections was the decision by the party to produce two evaluation reports, one on party culture and organisation, and another on where we stand or rather where we should stand politically. In the process, we gave party members the opportunity to speak their minds, to share their views about the state they thought we were in, and where we were going wrong. This clearly helped establish in people s minds the idea that the PvdA was now making a fresh start. Of course, this strategy could have left us vulnerable. We could have been portrayed or seen as a party that was always too busy talking about our problems rather than doing something about them. Our political opponents could have used this process as evidence of the fact that it would be a long time before we were really ready to take on the responsibility of government again. There is probably one simple reason why we survived all attempts to characterise our efforts in this light: we put our money where our mouth was. We took the reports seriously from the start, and began initiating some very clear changes from 96 progressive politics vol 2.2

the past, starting with the direct election of the new party leader. Leadership elections It was the direct election of the party leader, on the basis of one-memberone-vote, that in my view gave the clearest signal that the PvdA was undergoing a process of political renewal. This also bestowed upon myself, the new leader, a mandate that none of my predecessors had ever really had. In previous years, the party leaders were always arranged, and then formally blessed by the party congress. This time it was a real contest between four candidates, a real election campaign, and one that ended with a clear result: a 60 per cent majority in the first round. With the benefit of hindsight, I assume that the political implications of broadening the group of people who had a say in the leadership of the party actually helped to establish a stronger degree of support for a political strategy focused on the mainstream of pragmatic progressive politics. Indeed, it could also very well be that this way of electing a leader (that included a real campaign where the competing candidates toured the country etc.) encouraged a greater appreciation of the manner and style in which we communicated with the electorate. In our traditional Calvinistic approach to politics, we tend to overestimate the impact of content and underestimate the impact of style in convincing and inspiring voters. During this year s election the capacity to effectively communicate became an issue in itself in various guises: language, humour, dress-sense, media appearance, age and enthusiasm. Campaigning On reflection, the mandate that I was given enabled me to make the election campaign a very personal one, sometimes through strategic preparation, sometimes because that just seemed to be the way it worked. Personal campaigning characteristics then became party characteristics: suddenly the party became young, modest, enthusiastic, modern and cool. There was no fear of the dominant media and entertainment culture, we always showed up where the debate was and PvdA politicians could always be found on the streets and market-places, among ordinary people, debating with those who disagreed rather than seeking confirmation from those who already agreed. In a way, the direct leadership election also enabled me to act, if I so wished, with a relative degree of independence from the internal party apparatus, and thus we could maintain our focus on voters rather than on party bosses. The final touch in all of this was that we got away with labelling ourselves as The new PvdA of Wouter Bos which was, in the Dutch context, an extraordinary personalised way of conducting an election campaign. The political agenda It was the nature of this campaign, one that proved surprisingly effective, that helped us to move the political agenda away from the issues and concerns that had dominated the 2002 election immigration, social integration and crime and bring the ball back into our court. In 2003, the main issues were work, income, housing, and the costs of health care. The campaign worked, but it was hard work! Firstly, we had to ensure that people were convinced that we weren t moving the agenda away from immigration, integration and crime because we had no answers to their concerns and worries. Ignoring the problems, running away from the debate and disrespecting the right wing populist leaders would, in this respect, be considered counterproductive, and therefore did not fit our strategy. The balancing act we had to perform in order to beat the right wing populists on these issues Giving party members an opportunity to speak their minds helped show that we had made a fresh start. was that of convincing people we took their problems seriously but that we did not necessarily agree with them and the right wing populists on the solutions. Our message on crime was stolen or rather borrowed from New Labour: Tough on crime; tough on the causes of crime. On immigration and social integration we developed a similar message: Tough on the responsibilities of immigrants; tough on the responsibilities of society towards them. Indeed, in our own electoral programme published in January 2003, these issues had a higher and sharper profile than they did in 2002. However, this was done without ever losing the balance that we needed in order to remain credible to our more leftish voters. The second aspect of our strategy with regard to these issues was to continuously look for the debate, to go and meet the people in the vol 2.2 progressive politics 97

neighbourhoods where the problems were the most acute. This proved successful, as those people who were experiencing the greatest problems viewed this as an honest attempt to try and understand the day-to-day issues they were facing. In this manner we managed to neutralise the issue of immigration, and could actually build Having been directly elected by party members I benefited from a mandate that previous leaders lacked. up a credible new agenda on work, income, housing and health care. These issues were of great concern to exactly the same people in the same neighbourhoods, the very same people who in 2002 abandoned us because of our stance on immigration, social integration and crime. Indeed, it would be naive to think that issues related to work, income, housing and health would not address, in a similar manner, the concerns and fears these people held about their own future. (not) Getting into government Despite the election victory, we did not manage to get into the government coalition. There is an unwritten law of Dutch politics that states that a centreleft government will only come to be if there is no alternative. This time around the clear majority was there for the centre-left majority but the Christian democrats chose, after two and a half months of negotiation, to go for a smaller majority with the conservative liberals (the VVD) and the progressive liberals (the D66). The main reason for trying to get into government was of course that we believed we could do most for our voters and for the country whilst in the driving seat. But I also had another reason for wanting to take up governmental responsibility: I was convinced the process of party modernisation and renewal would stand a better chance if at the same time we were forced to assess whether or not our ideas could actually be carried out. Party modernisation in opposition always runs the risk of floating away into radicalisation, without the ideas ever having to be tested. On the other hand, opposition also offers an opportunity for modernisation and renewal. The very fact that we had been in government for 12 years certainly contributed to our electoral defeat in 2002. Our party leader, Wim Kok, very often had to play the role of government leader, rather than that of party leader. This contributed to a party culture which tended to focus far to heavily on staying in power and avoiding risks: a focus which slowed its intellectual renewal and modernisation. It also created an image of us as a party whose main concern was to defend daily compromises rather than one that had a clear vision and ideals. Towards the end of the Kok government, the party tended to debate with those who agreed with us, not those who disagreed. All of this we can rectify and do better now. And we will. However, even as we seek to rectify the failings of the past, we must also face the new challenges that are ahead of us. As an illustration of the challenges ahead let me just mention those related to renewing our ideas about 98 progressive politics vol 2.2

what social democracy can mean in today s society. In particular I wish to concentrate on those related to populism, political representation (or the crisis thereof), public service renewal, and equality and solidarity. The challenges ahead: populism Foremost, we need to come to terms with the attractiveness of populism and the concerns, fears and psychological insecurities that the Die Modernisierungsverlierer ( those who lose out in the process of modernisation ) have. Where we find ourselves, during and at the end of, the modernisation process directly impacts on our opinions about migration, science, security, terrorism, European unification and globalization. Social democrats tend to believe in progress and in the capacity to control events and developments. This is a fundamentally rational message, which does not always convince in times of quick and massive change, change that produces huge uncertainties. Populists are more successful in that respect. Third Way social democrats more specifically seem to have a problem. They often define their answers to societal problems in terms of this and that. The unique selling point then seems to be the balance we always seek: economy and environment, individual and collective, market and state, the nation state and the international community, rights and responsibilities. This eternal quest for a balance between what appear at first sight to be competing demands seems to be less and less compatible with the increased superficialisation of society, the increased impact of the mass media, and the increased floating of voters from election to election. This is where one of the great dangers of the Third Way lies: it has so many nuances that populists will find it an easy victim. One way out is to have our own populists and maybe that is something we shouldn t be so afraid of. The other way out is to redevelop our message in a way that shows genuine interest in people s worries, fears and concerns. In the Netherlands with the 2003 election campaign in our pocket we have made a first modest step in that direction. The challenges ahead: the crisis of representation Voter turn-out during the 2002 election was high and in 2003 it was even higher. It seems to show, probably also at least partially due to the events in May 2002 most notably the murder of Pim Fortuyn that there was a certain hope that, at last, politics could deliver; While we are in opposition we must ensure that our modernisation does not drift towards radicalisation. that politics mattered again. The expectations were and are high, probably too high. This may also mean that there is a huge potential for disappointment and scepticism with politics to reach even higher levels than it did before the 2002 elections. Such a crisis would not only affect the trust people have placed in the parties who participate in the current government, but will in the end impact on the confidence people have in politics as a whole. vol 2.2 progressive politics 99

The answer to this crisis must be threefold. Firstly, political parties need to re-invest in how they communicate with their members and voters. The direct election of the party leader by the one-memberone-vote system is only one way of doing this. More extensive use of the Internet and direct communication between parliamentarians and ordinary citizens may also work, and should be tried. Second, we need to make people more responsible for the public sector by putting forward proposals for the radical democratisation of this sector. Making publics services more responsible may have a healthy impact on thoughts about what may rightly, and perhaps more importantly what may not, be expected of politics and government. Third, we need to find new ways of making the public sector deliver more and better quality services. The challenges ahead: making the public sector deliver The traditional roles that Left and Right play in discussions about efficiency and effectiveness of the public sector are easy and well-known: the Left is supposed to want more money and the Right wants to spend less money. It should be our goal to escape this lessthan-inspiring debate, and I believe there to be two main reasons for this. Firstly, I don t believe that more money always means better services. Second, in those instances where I do believe that there is a need for more money to be invested in the public sector, I need to make my case by convincing others that the money is well spent: that requires a different logic. We should, then, no longer talk about investment levels but about how we organise power, how we measure output, how we motivate professionals, how we create choice and how we attract finances. These We need to find new ways of improving public services. Localisation may mean accepting differences in the levels of service provided in different communities. should be the main characteristics of the new debate we hold on public service renewal. The challenges ahead: new notions on equality and solidarity It is in the heart of this debate, the (re) organisation of the public sector, that we will be challenged on our traditional notions of equality and solidarity. One crucial question will be how we deal with the fact that more decentralisation and localisation of public services may mean that we have to accept greater differences in the levels of service provided in different communities. Added to this, we may have to accept that in order to keep the public sector attractive for the (upper) middle classes we must allow them to enjoy and pay for higher service levels. Maintaining solidarity, paradoxically, may therefore require greater inequality. However we resolve these dilemmas, one thing is sure: politicians who believe they can guarantee equality of outcome for all, a high level of quality for all, and a tax level that does not slow down economic growth to unacceptable levels, either lie or just simply do not understand economics. Wouter Bos is leader of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA). These remarks are based on his keynote speech at the Progressive Governance Preparatory Conference held on 25th and 26th April 2003. Wouter would like to thank Dick Benschop and Rene Cuperus for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. 100 progressive politics vol 2.2