Security Council The question of Somalia and the spread of terrorism into Africa. Sarp Çelikel Overview Since the downfall of the Federal Republic of Somalia s dictatorial regime under president Siad Barre in 1991, the country has been ravaged by the civil war, anarchy and insurgencies caused mainly by the clash between radical Islamist terrorist groups, provincial separatists and clan based rebel groups. The authority of the central government is almost totally disregarded, and thus no effective actions can be taken by it. Chaos has the rule over Somalian people, and the situation is mostly unpredictable. The strengthening of the newly established Somalian federal government, whose president failed a confidence vote in the parliament in December 2013, has only been a trivial success, for it is yet to solve the crucial issues of the nation and suffers from lack of infrastructure the rebels and insurgent groups control most of the government facilities such as energy power plants. A vast majority of the Somalian people don t have access to their basic needs including electric energy, sanitized water and food. The federal government is largely dependent on foreign support, particularly from Ethiopia. Due to the lack of a strong government control, Somalia is considered as a free operational space for many militant Islamic terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. Major terrorist acts are being committed against the government and the Somalian people that infringe human rights. Somalia has also become an ideal land for training camps and recruitments of such groups. The spread of violence isn t only limited with Somalia; the terrorist groups and their actians pose a great threat to member states like Nigeria, Chad, Kenya and Mauretania. The most recent, large-scale attack linked to the Somalian Al- Shabaab took place in a shopping mall in Nairobi, the capital of Somalia, on September 2013. With a death toll of 72, it was a massacre. Urgent Security Council actions have to be taken to prevent any more deaths, human tragedies and the pervasion of terrorist groups. UN involvement The international community is deeply alarmed by the dreadful situation in the Somalia region. Many previous attempts were made, yet they weren t enough to solve the issue holistically. Beginning from 1991, the Security Council has passed numerous resolutions taking a variety of different positions. The latest one being the resolution 2124 adopted on 12 November 2012, most of these failed to conclude the conflict in a peaceful way. UN Peacekeeper forces under the name of UNISOM are giving a fight against the rising terrorist activities with the African Union operating under the name of AMISOM. The UN is also collaborating with federal government in the struggle. However, it is important to note again that the government does not have the resources in order to be efficient. The U.S. have organized multiple attacks and launched numerous drone strikes in order to
eliminate the terrorist groups. It is clear that violence has not been an effective solution on the matter, and efficient, specific diplomatic guidelines have to be set in order to solve the issue. Al-Shabaab Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings in Mogadishu and in central and Somaliland. For example, the group carried out a series of five coordinated explosions that struck government offices, the Ethiopian consulate, and the United Nations Development Programme compound. Al-Shabab had used a combination of small arms attacks and suicide bombings, at least, 95 deadly attack since 2006. It had managed to strike the TFG ministers of Interior, Health, Education and Sports, at least, six members of the Somali Parliament and had caused serious damage to Mogadishu airport, port and presidential palace. Al Shabaab also attempt to radicalise Somali youth who are unemployed due lack of opportunity within the region. For example the story of Shirwa Ahmed, an ethnic Somali graduate from a high school in Minneapolis, USA in 2003, who was radicalised, travelled to Somalia in 2007 and in the October 2008 attacks drove a truck loaded with explosives toward a government compound in Somaliland killing himself and 20 other people, including UN office in Somaliland and Ethiopian Ambassador to Somaliland s and humanitarian assistance workers. This terrorist activity arose out of Al-Shabab s increased involvement with Al-Qaeda More foreign fighters have become more involved in Al-Shabab s terror activities as a result of its tactics to spread terror domestically and internationally. Another tactic employed by Al- Shabab is in its use of information and technology communication (ICT) for propaganda purposes and communicating its ideology. Al-Shabab uses the internet as a key tool in recruiting and interacting with its recruits all over the world. Since 2008, the organisation s media arm, Kata ib Foundation, has released media productions like Ambush at Bardale, At Your Service, Oh Osama and No Peace Without Islam all released online.these productions have targeted a foreign audience and potential recruits communicating its link with Al-Qaeda playing up its influence and effectiveness in fighting its ideological enemies. In recruiting members from Western countries the group has used English speaking leader, Oman Hammami, in the production of these videos who, speaking in English, encourages more people in the West to join the organisation. The use of ICT is a key a part of its reframing of the organisation as being part of an international fight against the West. It enables it to recruit members who otherwise may not have been interested in its nationalist aims and also raise funds from a broad audience. Without its ICT tactics it will not be able to benefit from its alliance with Al-Qaeda whose global recognition allows it to raise funds for its activities.
Kenya As a neighbouring country and often times the victims of Al-Shabab s acts of terrorism. AMISON and Kenya plays a major role in the counter-terrorist measures against the organisation as it has millions of Somalians living in Kenya some of whom help raise funds for Al-Shabab. Kenya s need to intervene is precipitated by the absence of a strong central government in Somalia. In the last three years Kenya has adopted a more assertive and interventionist approach to combating the problem of Al-Shabab conducting a military campaign in its border town of Bulo Hawa. Kenya s measures in countering Al-Shabab s acts of terrorism goes beyond military assaults, it has since included the cultivation of alliances with Somali with groups of Somali fighters along its borders. Kenya, backed by the international community, supports these groups who fight Al-Shabab. Since 2012 Kenyan troops operating in Somalia have been incorporated into the larger AMISOM force of approximately 18,000 troops (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012). AMISOM is backed by Western countries like the US, the UK, UN and several other countries, and were mandated in recent conference to go on the offensive against Al-Shabab (Africa Research Bulletin, 2012). In essence, most of the measures rely on the use of force. War on Terrorism Official authorities have tried to stop Al-Shabab s terrorist activities with force. Occasionally, it is reported that a terrorist has been killed by official forces. The most prominent of these announcements was the death of Osama bin Laden. Apart from killing those identified as dangerous terrorists there are other measures aimed at combating terrorism perpetuated by Al- Shabab and similar organisations. Following the September 2001 terror attacks the maxim War on Terror was adopted characterising attempts at countering terrorist attacks perpetuated by groups like Al-Shabab. Although this term has now been dropped several of the measures adopted in countering terror remain in use. Some of these measures include the use of counter-terrorism legislations, military assaults on those identified as terrorists, detention and interrogation of suspects, raids, surveillance, diplomacy and so on. With the controversies brought about in the use of rendition, Guatanomo Bay and waterboarding, rightfully, questions have been asked to the legitimacy and effectiveness of various counter-terrism measures. In terms of effectiveness, the decision for the Kenyan army to directly intervene in the war against Al-Shabab has led to reprisal attacks in the form of threats, bombings and a greater feeling of insecurity in Kenya Still, the Al-Shabab organisation remains. Another effect of the counter terrorism measure on Al-Shabab is that it has acted as a means of rallying Somalis into joining the group and gaining sympathisers who might donate to the group as they are seen as fighters defending the country against foreign invaders. The invasion by Ethiopia was held to have has a similar impact and the present intervention Kenyan and other African troops may trigger the same response from Somalis. The announcement that Israel was supporting Kenya s counter terrorism activities played into Al-Shabab s propaganda. Whilst not many Somalis joined Al-Shabab as a consequence, it may yet have had a positive influence on its recruitment of foreign fighters. the governmental and institutions set to tackle perceived threat from terrorism.
The way in which the dangers posed of terrorism is often presented and the uniqueness of the threat posed often clouds what should be a broad debate on the legitimacy of the measures being taken in combating terrorism. Legitimate questions can be raised on key counter terrorism issues like extended periods of detention without trial, sanctioned under new antiterrorism laws; the use of torture to extract evidence; unfair trials and the abuse of anti-terror laws to detain and bring charges against democracy activists and opposition leaders; the application of counter-terrorist legislation and policies for unrelated domestic political purposes. Somaliland Somaliland is a self-declared de facto sovereign state that is internationally recognised as an autonomous region of Somalia. Since it gained its autonomy in 1991, it has suffered from the terrorist acts and insurgencies as well as Somalia. However, differences in thought and policies, with the lack of a powerful government in Somalia, impeded any efficient cooperation. Piracy in Somalian Coasts Even though no direct connection exists between al-shabaab and Somali pirates due to contradicting ideologies arising from different clans, the pirates contribute to the general disarray, instability and resource insufficiency of Somalia. For a sustainable infrastructure for the fight against terrorism, the pirates should be eliminated, or gradually reduced. Additionally, while the two groups are not directly affiliated, since 2009, the pirates have had to pay rent in order to operate out of southern ports controlled by al-shabaab. It is possible that more financial agreements have been made between the two illegal parties. Alternative Solutions: Since the beginning of the insurgencies and terrorist activities in 1991, the main solution perception was the use of force and international pressure. After 23 years of intense violence, a new approach is necessary. While UN and African Union Peacekeepers are important to secure the civilians safety, eliminating the terrorist groups and building an infrastructure to provide resources require innovated, non-violent, yet action-taking measures. Basic needs such as sanitized water and electric should be made accessible to the Somalian people. Al- Shabaab s new recruitments should be reduced as possible with actions against its communication web. International collaboration between suffering nations such as Kenya, Chad, Nigeria and Somaliland should be established. Above all, the war against terror and infringement of human rights must be fought without any other human rights infringements committed.
Useful links http://somalilandpress.com/somalia-counter-terrorism-in-horn-africa-and-al-shabab-43457 http://www.theafricareport.com/east-horn-africa/terrorism-a-case-for-somalilands-secession-fromsomalia-official.html http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/23/terrorism-out-of-somalia/wnc http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/156/html http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/content?wcm_global_context=/el cano/elcano_in/zonas_in/international+terrorism/ari96-2009 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14094632 http://www.cfr.org/somalia/terrorism-havens-somalia/p9366