Du rma ssues April 2002 VOLUME 12 NUMBER 4 INFORMATION FOR ACTION CAMPAIGNS FOR PEACE GRASSROOTS EDUCATION AND ORGANIZING
H v M A N U I Ci II T S In 1974 the Burmese military instigated the "Four Cuts" operation into Karen National Union (KNU) controlled areas. A result of this campiagn was the division of the area in to three zones, an attempt to separate the villagers from the resistance group. They defined the areas completely controlled by the Burmese military as the white zones and the KNU controlled areas as the black zones (freefire zones). The areas where the Burmese military and the KNU did not have complete control were defined as gray zones. The Burmese military controlled all the villages which are close to the major cities. The KNU controlled the mountainous region in the eastern part of Tenasserim division toward the Thai-Burmese border. 1 The region between the black and white zones were mostly made up of Karen villages. People in the white zones have to follow only the rules of the Burmese military because the KNU cannot reach their activities, and the villagers cannot support the KNU. The villagers in the black zones have to follow only the KNU rules because the KNU can give them security and the Burmese military could not extend their control in to this area. But people in the gray areas have to follow the orders of both the KNU and Burmese military. People in the gray areas face more difficulties than the black and white areas. They have to pay tax both to the KNU and the Burmese military government. They have to pay land tax, crop tax, cattle tax, farm tax and other taxes for the produce they make. Moreover, they have to work for road construction and go to serve as porters for the Burmese military in their offensives on the KNU areas. For people who refuse or do not want to go they have to give money instead. Sometimes, even when they had paid the money for porter fees they still had to go because the people from the white zone were choosing to pay the money and the offensive from the black zone was strong and dangerous, meaning there was a manpower Burma Issues is a publication of the Peace Way Foundation and is distributed on afree-subscriptionbasis to individuals and groups concerned with the state of affairs in Burma. P.O. Box 1076 Silom Post Office Bangkok 10504, Thailand durham@mozart.inet. co. th LIVING WITH TWO FATHERS life in the gray zones of tenasserim 2 Bl (1998) shortage. Some villagers who did not want to face these problems escaped to the black zones. The Burmese military also formed a people's militia in every village in the gray zone. The villagers had to pay the salary for the people's militias. The aim of forming people's militias was to give security to the villagers. But in fact, it was a strategy to create conflict between the Karen people and make them not trust each other. Another reason they formed the people's militias was to find information in the villages who supported the KNU. In reality, no Karen villagers want to serve or be a part of a people's militia. However the Burmese military give some privileges to the villagers that serve in the people's militia. The people's militias do not have to go to be porters or pay the porter fees. The villages in the grey zone have to face more hardship as the village farmers have to sell their paddy to the military government at half the normal price than if they sold it on the market. The villagers have to prepare food for the Burmese military whenever they come to the village and sometimes also for the KNU. The women are raped and killed, properties destroyed and looted by the Burmese military. The villagers have to spend more time and money on the Burmese military than they do for themselves.many of the villages were forcibly relocated closer to the Burmese military base or to the centre of the village. The villagers had no permission to go outside of the relocation site. However, the villagers secretly went back to their original villages to tend to their gardens and to work for their survival.
The Burmese army kill the villagers who are found outside the relocation sites, without asking any questions. Many of the villages were burned down and destroyed by the Burmese army. Some villagers who could not face the hardship escaped to the black zone. Many of the villagers do not want to leave their land where they were born and they believe that there is no way to make their living in the relocation sites. Some believe that if they escape to the black areas they would be recognized by the Burmese military as the KNU's collaborator and could never return to their villages. The people who leave their villages and escape to the black area do so because they feel they have no other choice, because their lives are in danger. After the 1997 offensives, the KNU in Mergui/Tavoy district lost nearly all their controlled areas to the Burmese military operations. Since then, the Karen people in the gray zones have had to relocate and their difficulties have increased. They have lost confidence in the KNU and believe that it will not stand for the Karen people as actively as before. Almost all of the villagers in the gray zone were relocated by the Burmese army closer to their military bases and the villagers in the black areas fled to Thailand or became displaced people in the jungle. Fewer villagers are able to support the KNU because these displaced people have their own troubles, struggling for security and food. In Mergui/Tavoy district, after the 1997 offensives to 2000, more than one hundred villages were deserted and about one hundred villages were relocated. About seven thousand people became displaced people, sixty thousand people live in the relocation sites and about ten thousand people entered Thailand as refugees and illegal migrant labourers. 2 The problems of the gray zones will not change until tripartite political dialogue between the ethnic groups, the NLD and the Burmese military occurs. The individual cease-fire agreement between each ethnic group and the bilaterial talks between the Burmese military and the NLD will not terminate the conflicts. It will create misunderstanding between each ethnic group and the political parties. The conflicts must be solved in a non-violent way because the armed conflict has been going on for more than five decades and brings no improvement. The civilians want to be free from slavery and they are hungry for peace. Boe Boe (Footnotes) 1 The 1997 Offensives (Moe Kyaw Tun) 2 Karen population registration (KNU, Mergui-Tavoy district) 3 Interview (CIDKP Mergui-Tavoy district) The experience of a Karen woman from a relocation site to the east of Mergui city, Tanesserim Division. Before we came here we lived in our village where we have our own farm and fruit tree gardens. We can make our living better than here even though we had to serve both the KNU and the SPDC in our village. One day in the cold season in 1997 the Burmese military troop IB 17(Infantry Battalion) ordered us to leave our village and move to another place which was close to their military base so that the KNU could not join with the villagers so easily. When we lived in the relocation site we had to pay 200 kyat a month for the salary of the people's militia, 1200 kyat and one basket of rice for a teacher and 400 kyat for the teacher's trainee. We cannot pay this easily because we have no farm or other workspace here in the relocation site and they didn't allow us to go back to our villages to work to earn some money for the payments and food. If we failed to make the payment they punished us. One night, March 27, 1999 a group of KNU soldiers came to our relocation site to buy and to ask for some food. That night they spent the night in our relocation site and some stayed at my home and others stayed at homes nearby. Early the next morning when they left the relocation site they met Burmese troops and fighting broke out between them. After the fighting, the Burmese troops came to our relocation site and asked the headman to organize all the villagers. That day, all of the villagers had no time to work or to eat. The villagers had to prepare food for them and we were interrogated. They beat many of the villagers including some women and me. The women had to cut down all the plants along the river. At midday they ordered the villagers who they suspected were letting the Karen soldiers to stay in their home to burn down their own houses. The commander of the troops said, "we do not burn your houses. You burnt your houses by yourselves because you broke the law. You punish yourselves". In the evening, they asked all the villagers to move completely to another place that was closer to their military base. It was to be finished by the next day. 3 3
c v L VV A U The Southern divisional command based in Toungoo and the Western Divisional military headquarters (Sittway) control military operations within Toungoo and Nyaunglebin Districts in Karen State. Within each division there exists three strategic commands that conduct military operations in each region. Under each Divisional Command there are at least 14 battalions conducting their military operations. Of the 3 strategic units active in Toungoo and Nyaunglebin districts, two of these units are on duty at any given time. Each of these strategic units has 4 or 5 battalions under its command. In each battalion there are two army columns and in each column there are two companies of soldiers. Each strategic unit is on duty for four months after which they are replaced by the off-duty unit. The operational objective of each strategic unit is to make incursions against the insurgents within their area of operation and conduct scorched-earth style operations against insurgent strongholds. To these ends, they establish foot holds at strategic points and key positions in the hills by which they can communicate well with their troops. Within the Hteet Sah or "grey areas" that aren't controlled decisively by either side and in the internal black zones (those controlled primarily by the insurgent groups), they have resorted to guerrilla techniques. Additionally, they construct car roads all along the frontline areas and use them to send in large amounts of food supplies to support the military operations. THE ANATOMY OF AN ARMY The troops have to act strictly according to instructions set down by the higher command. When the Infantry Defense command gives an order, the order has to be relayed to the frontline troops in a complex several step process. If the order relayed is not in accordance with the original order sent down to them, actions are taken against the responsible units to the lowest level. If orders are not enacted, effective actions are carried out against the responsible persons. Within one army column, the intelligence officers have to supervise the operations. During the duration of an operation no more than 15 soldiers can be wounded by landmines. If more than that are wounded then blame falls upon the strategic commanders and the column commanders. They are reprimanded for their alleged weaknesses. When a solider steps on a landmine and sustains an injury, the responsible officer has to give a sound explanation for that happening. Should there be insufficient evidence to support him, then the commander will be dealt with. So the Burma Army uses cattle, buffalo and porters as mine sweepers to clear landmines in these areas. Should a solider step on a landmine the section commander, company commander or Burmese solider platoon commander BI (1996) stand responsible and actions will be taken against them. No land mine explosions must occur within an area of two miles surrounding an army camp or base or the camp commander will have to bear responsibility. Additionally, if a mine is detonated in a populated area, the people in that area will be relocated. In order to discourage populations seen as supporting the enemy from living in demarcated free-fire zones, the Burma Army must burn down all the farms and fruit gardens within that area. There is an ongoing order that all paddy barns and other rice storage should be destroyed. Anyone seen within the operational area is assumed to be an insurgent and killed 4
on sight. The troop commanders are ordered to see that the people around the area are not able to supply food, medicines and batteries to the insurgents. The Divisional Army Command constantly orders the villagers to organize themselves and do the army's bidding. Villagers face a long list of hardships and demands on the part of the military units. During military operations 10 civilian laborers must always go along with the troop. Those people who are selected as porters but cannot go, must pay a fine of K 3000 (about $3.50). If villagers, who were previously relocated want to return to their villages or farms they must first obtain written permission. There is also an order in effect that no one must carry more than two days worth of food supplies. The Burma Army only want male villagers for forced labor and only in emergency cases are female villagers taken for service. Each village must also always have two messengers ready at all times. When there isn't a good map of the area of operations, a local village committee secretary or ordinary villager must serve as a guide. Forced labourers have to provide their own food while serving the Burma Army. Only when it is greatly needed are these workers given food to eat. The villagers must prevent the insurgents from dwelling or camping in their areas. Due to the differentiation of ranks and powers and due to the exploitation of the subordinate soldiers by the officers, some dissent has arisen and some troops have defected with their weapons to the insurgent groups. in these circumstances. ceed in deserting are fined and punished. If there is any indication that villagers have helped deserters, the villagers are punished and required to return the arms lost or compensate the army for the loss.those unable to return or compensate the army for the lost weapons are harassed, their property is destroyed and some people have even been killed. In some cases whole villagers were relocated I discussed the situation with one insurgent military commander, I learned from him that land mine warfare is very dangerous and it can mean casualties for both sides. He said that despite their reluctance of being involved with this k'ind of warfare, they nevertheless had to obey orders. He asked me to consider the situation. He said that when he employed landmines in the warfare against the Burma Army he was very conscious that it would hurt the innocent villagers. There were villagers in the area who were hurt due to the use of landmines. However, he could do nothing else because he had to prevent the Burma Army from making attacks into the area, which could cause villagers to starve. This commander then asked me what I would do if I were in his place. Caught between two warring factions the people are bound to suffer. So the commander said that the most important thing is to end the war. To scrutinize the present condition of the Burmese Military, one can see that there exists no enthusiasm in the morale of the troops.they carry out their instructions only casually and just for appearance. They only strive for some sort of understanding with the higher strata of command units. The frontline troops stay silent and do not take up any military activity. There is also an increase in deserters each passing day. However, should any deserter be recaptured with their arms and ammunition they would have to stand trial at a military court and suffer sever consequences. It is known that some deserters were executed after giving weak excuses for deserting. Additionally, the families of soldiers who suc- Phar Haw Hsuh Military training BI (1990) 5
S 0 <: 1 A L I S s o E s Few events have had as much impact on Burma's political landscape as the signing of cease-fire agreements by ethnic insurgent groups and the government of Burma in the late 1980's and throughout the 1990's. These cease-fires allowed the Burma military to shift its attention from many different fronts to focus on containing the few remaining active insurgencies and extending its economic control over increasing amounts of territory. Much attention has been paid to the benefits of the cease-fire agreements for the government and the effects on the cease-fire groups themselves. However, less has been said about the effects of cease-fires on the common people. While the cease-fires in Burma are generally talked about as a general phenomenon, one of the defining qualities of the various cease-fire negotiations is their vast diversity. From the almost complete economic and political autonomy of the United Wa State Army to the much more limiting cease-fire of the New Mon State Party, the agreements and their effects on the parties involved vary greatly from location to location and from group to group. This is no less true for the ordinary citizens living in the different cease-fire areas. CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS: burden or blessing A displaced family BI (1996) As cease-fire agreements are with armed groups and don't necessarily cover a set area, there are several areas in Burma which are primarily under the control of one cease-fire group but still have insurgent groups active in the area. This situation is typified by the conditions in certain parts of Karen State, Mon State and Tenasserim Division. Pa-an district of Karen State is one such area. The Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), which controls much of the district, has r signed a cease-fire with the government. However, they are only one of many armies operating in the district. The Karen National Union is still active in parts of Pa-an District as are Tatmadaw (government) troops, armed government intelligence units, and smaller village militias and pocket armies. a These cease-fires allowed the Burma military to shift its attention from many different fronts to focus on containing the few remaining active insurgencies and extending its economic control over increasing amounts of territory, y One example of a smaller armed group, the "Storm Unit", was formed by the head of the Karen State Peace and Development Council (the state-level equivalent of the central governing SPDC). Villagers find themselves caught between the various groups each making demands on the villagers, often extorting food, cigarettes and money from the village people and demanding labourers and conscripts from each village. The accumulative economic toll of these acquisitions by various armed groups can deeply effect villagers. During the harvest season in 2000 the "Storm Unit" extorted 27,700 baskets (692 metric tons) of "goodwill rice" from villages in the district (enough to feed 50,000 people for a month). 1 This was above and beyond the regular rice acquisition where villagers are required to sell a pre-determined amount of their rice to the government at below market prices. The DKBA cease-fire has only encouraged a proliferation of groups in this area, each looking to extend their power and influence often at the expense of the local people. In areas of greater security, ceasefire agreements are seen more positively by the people, but are still viewed as a mixed blessing. "Before the ceasefire, we were running and hiding in the forest and our villages and livestock were destroyed. Now people can think about their future again, they can J 6
settle in one village for a long time, and plan their farming activities for the future. People can also benefit from more healthcare facilities; that is very important/' said one person about the Kachin Independence Army's ceasefhe:hkadi±istate. 2 Likewise, sources living in Shan cease-fire areas stress the importance of being able to travel freely and work without the constant threat of attack. However, the ceasefire agreements have not done away with some of the problems faced during war times. Ceasefire areas generally see a sharp increase in Burma army soldiers, and the subsequent building of roads and army bases. Local villagers are required to provide materials and labor for such projects. "Villagers in Lashio Township (Northern Shan State) are subject to forced labour, both on 'development projects' and on military-owned farms, and forced potering. They also have their vehicles "borrowed" for military purposes. Like so many farming communities in Burma, these people carry the burden of rice procurement, by the military and, to a lesser extent, by some of the cease-fire groups. Farmers are required to give or to sell rice at prices far below market value to local government officials and other armed groups. All together these "lesser" types of human rights abuse, too, can become an unbearable weight on the shoulders of the country people". (From Lashio: A Township in Transition, Burma Issues, March 2001) However, unlike in Pa-an district, the cease-fire groups often serve as advocates for local villagers, buffering the people from the demands of the Burmese army. The largest burdens lie on those villages in areas under ceasefire agreements but lacking the presence and protection of cease-fire groups. People living under cease-fire agreements are understandably unwilling to return to fighting and the living-conditions of living in a war zone. However, the cease-fires only enforce the difficult conditions under which people in the ceasefire zones live. Politics and military might have been intimately partnered in Burma for decades. Residents of the cease-fire zones are no longer so concerned about the possibility of being shot; their concerns have turned now to economic survival. By tying cease-fires to economic incentives and promises of development the military government have also married military power to economics. In a March 2001 article for the Bl newsletter, a resident of Lashio Township in northern Shan State expressed that to be successful in his area you have to have connections with one of the many armed groups - the Burmese Army, the military intelligence or the cease-fire groups (see Burma Issues, "Lashio: A Township in Transition"). While in most areas the cease-fires have stopped the bullets from flying, they only reinforce the equation that in Burma guns equal power. The cease-fire agreements in Burma have changed the situation on the ground in the short-term. However, they do not address the issues at the root of so many years of civil war. The issues of ethnic identity and ethnic nationalism remain as pertinent today as ever. Indeed, the cease-fire agreements have aggravated these issues. However these issues are eventually addressed, the grassroots people will likely bear the greatest burden of the problems of Burma's fractured politics. E Miller (Footnotes) A villager moving his produce Bl (1999) \ 1 Bl Internal Report, March 2000 2 "The War on Kachin Forests," The Irrawaddy Vol 9 No 8, October-November 2001 7
news briefs shan state army want cease-fire deal, currency falls to all-time low. Burma's land confiscated in arakan state. The Burma's military government brushed aside currency, the kyat, fell to a record low in Burmese State Peace and Development an olive branch in April from the second April, sliding to 910 kyat to the U.S. dollar Council junta have been confiscating largest rebel force still fighting its grip on on the black market, which is the basis for privately owned land in the border the country, saying the Shan State Army - most transactions. A year ago, it was trading townships of Maungdaw, Rathedaung and South (SSA) would have to surrender if it at about 610 to the greenback. The official Buthidaung of Arakan State, in the western wanted peace. SSA commander Yod Suk, exchange rate is six kyat to the dollar. But part of Burma, according to a Narinjara said the SSA, which has battled Burma most business transactions and consumer correspondent. On 1st April 02, Mayaka troops in the volatile Golden Triangle re- sales are based on the black market rate, Township Peace and Development Council gion for years, would not agree to lay down set by underground dealers. The black Chairman of Maungdaw along with the its weapons before starting peace talks, market is tolerated by the government as leader of Payrung model village surveyed "There is no way we will have peace nego- necessary for business, because the kyat 135 acres of hilly area owned by local tiations with the (SSA) because they are a is not convertible outside the country, neighbouring villagers. Afterwards the splinter group of the MTA that has already Dealers had no explanation for the kyat's group confiscated the land and distributed surrendered unconditionally to the govern- latest dip and Burma's military authorities it among the residents of Payrung model ment," Lieutenant-Colonel San Pwint told reacted to the sharp fall by arresting several village. Narinjara reported there are now Reuters. 4 'But if they want to exchange their currency traders, witnesses told Reuters, more than thirty such model villages in the weapons for peace, they are welcome.'' The The government, which has often blamed three townships which are occupied mostly SSA wants similar conditions to those of- the currency's fall on "dealers and by released prisoners, those with fered to other cease-fire groups though. Yod speculators", has detained currency traders communicable diseases, and retired military Suk said neither side should set precondi- in the past, usually for a few days, in a bid personnel. The inhabitants of the tions for talks. He said the SSA wanted simi- to disrupt black market trade. Burma's ruling townships have expressed concern that lar privileges to those granted to the U WS A military junta claims the country' s economy they are now facing rises in crime rates and where they were allowed to maintain au- is growing at a reasonable rate, but outside spread of HIV among the local population, tonomy and their arms. analysts question their figures and suggest The wholesale settlement of Burman "Myanmar brushes aside olive branch from the country's economic health is shaky. population is also a threat to the ethnic Shan rebels ", April 17, Reuters "Myanmar's kyat currency hits record low ", balance of the area. "Shan rebels 'want talks with Myanmar juntaapril 22, AP Worldstream "Confiscation of landfor Burmese junta's model April 18, Reuters "Myanmar currency hits record low, dealers villages" April 16 Narinjara news \ arrested. April 24. Reuters Nnrinjnrn wwc y BURMA ISSUES PO BOX 1076 SILOM POST OFFICE BANGKOK 10504 THAILAND ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED PRINTED MATERIALS AIRMAIL