EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY

EMPIRES IN WORLD HISTORY

PIR IN WORLD HISTORY POWERAND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE JANE BURBANK AND FREDERICK COOPER PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton and Oxfo rd

Copy right 2010 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 4r William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire ox20 ltw All Rights Reserved Paperback ISBN 978-0-691-15236-3 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Burbank, Jane. Empires in world history : power and the politics of difference I Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-691-12708-8 (hardcover : alk. pap er) r. World history. 2. World politics. 3. Imperialism-History. 4. Colonization-History. 5. Colonies-History. 6. Power (Social sciences)-history. 7. Difference (Philosophy)-Political aspects History. I. Cooper, Frederick, 1947- II. Title. D32.B94 2010 British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Bembo Printed on acid-free paper. oo press. princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America IO 9 8

CONTENTS List of Illustrations Preface xi vii l Imperial Trajectories 1 2 Imperial Rule in Rome and China 23 3 After Rome: Empire, Christianity, and Islam 61 4 Eurasian Connections: The Mongol Empires 93 5 Beyond the Mediterranean: Ottoman and Spanish Empires 117 6 Oceanic Economies and Colonial Societies: Europe, Asia, and the Americas 149 7 Beyond the Steppe: Empire-Building in Russia and China 185 8 Empire, Nation, and Citizenship in a Revolutionary Age 219 9 Empires across Continents:The United States and Russia 251 IO Imperial Repertoires and Myths of Modern Colonialism 287 II Sovereignty and Empire: Nineteenth-Century Europe and Its Near Abroad 331 12 War and Revolution in a World of Empires: 1914 to 1945 369 13 End of Empire? 413 14 Empires, States, and Political Imagination 443 Suggested Reading and Citations 461 Index 481

EMPIRE, NATION, AN D CITIZENSHIP IN A REVO LUTIONARY AG E We argued in chapter 6 that there was no revolution in sovereignty in seventeenth-century Europe: the relationship of ruler, people, and territory remained ambiguous and fluctuating. In the eighteenth century, there was a revolution in ideas of sovereignty. Thinking about the relationship of revolution and empire is difficult because we like our revolutions to be very revolutionary. Our textbooks tell us that an "epoch" of kings and emperors gave way to an "epoch" of nation-states and popular sovereignty. But the new ideas of sovereignty were important precisely because they differed from actually existing institutions and practices, within Europe as much as in its overseas empires. They were arguments; they fostered debate. Within Europe itself, monarchical and aristocratic privileges remained in tension with "the people's" claim to rights and voice for the entire nineteenth century. During the century after France's revolution of 1789 announced the principle of republican government, the state was republican for about a third of the time; for most of it, France was governed by men who called themselves king or emperor. The question of which people were sovereign remained unresolved into the mid-twentieth century. The eighteenth century's new arsenal of political ideas made it possible to imagine a non-empire: a single people sovereign over a single territory. From the start, the working out of such an imaginary took place not in nationally defined polities within Europe but in a much bigger and uncertain space. Empire was the stage, not the victim, of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century revolutions. But the nature of political alternatives within-and against-empires shifted in fundamental ways. In cities like London and Paris, flush with wealth-derived in part from overseas trade and lucrative sugar coloniesmerchants, artisans, and elements of the lesser nobility developed a new interactive politics that broke the pattern of vertical relationships cultivated by monarchical regimes and challenged the idea that "rights" came from 8 219

on high and were passed down to particular individuals or collectivities. Instead, political thinkers in England and France and elsewhere argued that sovereignty was vested in a "people," that the ruler's authority stemmed from these people, and that he had to respond to their will through institutions designed to express it. People had rights stemming from their belonging to a polity; and those rights constrained a ruler's choices. In the context of empire, ideas of natural rights and social contract opened up a new question: who constituted the people? Would citizenship be "national"-focused on a people who represented themselves as a single linguistic, cultural, and territorial community-or would it be "imperial," embracing diverse peoples who constituted the population of a state? Or could participation in state institutions create a national community, at least in parts of the empire? Would people who had emigrated to dependent territories overseas have their own representative institutions or participate in central ones? Neither extreme position-total assimilation of all people in the empire to the status of citizen nor complete reduction of colonized populations to rightless, exploitable objects serving a nation to which they did not belong-gained unqualified acceptance. Just what rights and what degree of belonging adhered to people of different origins and living in different parts of an empire remained a burning question. In this chapter, we look at a series of interconnected revolutions.the revolutionary spiral began in interempire conflict: the Seven Years' War of 1156-63, considered by some to be the first world war. With Hanover and Great Britain allying with Prussia and Austria, Russia (initially), Sweden, Saxony, Portugal, and Spain allying with France, the war was fought in the Americas and India, over the seas, and in Europe. The war's cost forced its winner, Britain, to tighten control and extract more resources from its overseas components, leading to rising anger and mobilization among elites in the thirteen colonies of North America as well as to tighter territorial control in India. Loss of colonies and war debt pushed France to tighten the screws at home and enhanced French dependence on its most lucrative remaining colony, Saint Domingue; these were both significant steps toward a revolutionary situation. Spain, like Britain, saw the need for "reform" to regularize and deepen its control over American colonies, and it, too, upset its relationship with imperial intermediaries on whom it depended. The revolutionary dynamic in France ended in another vigorous form of empire-building, by Napoleon, whose conquest of Spain precipitated a struggle between elites located in Europe and Spanish America that in turn fostered other revolutionary mobilizations. Had diplomats in 1756 been more cautious about getting into an interempire war, the revolutions in the British, French, and Spanish empires might well not have taken place, at least not at the time and in the form they did. 220 Chapter 8

In France, revolution resulted in the death of the monarch, but not of the empire. The question of whether the rights of man and of the citizen would extend to different categories of people in the empire became inescapable. In British North America, the revolution took thirteen colonies out of the monarchy and out of the British empire, but it did not take away empire's power to shape politics. American patriots proclaimed an "Empire of Liberty"-although they did not mean for all people in the empire to enjoy its liberty (chapter 9). If" national" visions of the state were the consequence more than the cause of revolutions in Spanish America, such ideas did not discourage some ambitious leaders from proclaiming their own empires or erase the acute tensions over hierarchy and cultural difference produced in the imperial past. Brazil's road out of the Portuguese empire was to declare itself an empire in its own right-under a branch of the same royal family that ruled in Lisbon. It was a process, not a given outcome, that made the age revolutionary. New ideas, new possibilities, and new struggles came to the fore, and empires still faced the old problems of acting in relation to other empires and recruiting elites to do the daily work of government throughout their diverse spaces. Once we get away from a nation-centered view of history and the assumption that history moves inexorably toward correspondence of one "people" with one state, we can focus on longstanding debates over what democracy, citizenship, and nationality actually meant and when, where, and to whom these notions applied-within empires, in interempire rivalries, in mobilizations against empires. We need to consider other forms of revolution, not just those celebrated on Independence or Bastille Day, not the purposeful creations of their makers: the industrial and agricultural revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the explosive development of capitalism. To some political thinkers and activists, imperialism grew out of capitalism, but as we have seen, empire as a political form was not new in a capitalist age. The questions of how empire shaped capitalism and how capitalism shaped empire inspire another look at the interactions between economic and political processes. Our story up to the eighteenth century has shown European states both expanding and trying to constrain long-distance connections; profiting from the productive and commercial initiatives of other people, especially in Asia; working around empires, notably the Ottoman and Chinese, that were too powerful for them to assault directly; and failing to penetrate inland in most of Africa and southeast Asia. Did capitalist development in Europe, especially in Great Britain, and the wealth and technological improvements it produced provoke a parting of the ways between Europe and the rest of world, including the Chinese, Russian, and Ottoman empires? Did this economic transformation take the story of interempire influence and competition in a new direction? Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 221

Map 8.1 Empire and independence in the Americas, 1783 to 1839. Capitalism cannot be understood simply as market exchange or even as a system of production based on wage labor. Capitalism was also a work of the imagination. Just as a complex and conflict-ridden history lay beneath the surface of representations of the "nation" as the natural unit of politics, capitalist development was both a historical process that gave rise to new markets in goods and labor and an ideological process that made such markets appear "natural." As empires collided and competed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, questions about which forms of political and eco- 222 Chapter 8

nomic behavior were normal and legitimate became acute. We will argue in chapter 16 that making wage labor into a norm of British society depended on marking it off from other forms oflabor-notably slavery-. and that this process of distinguishing one kind of work from the other took place in the space of British empire. We argue in this chapter that the concept of a French "citizen" who had rights and obligations toward a state was worked out in the space of French empire. The political ideas that acquired such apparent force in the American and French revolutions provided tools for different sides in long-running struggles over who had what rights and in what place. The age of revolution provided no definitive answer to these questions. In the pages that follow, we look at the ambiguous but ongoing place of empire in revolutions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and at political movements that defined themselves both within and against imperial regimes. The Franco-Haitian Revolution Almost all of the immense body of scholarship on the French revolution is so focused on a national France that the revolution in the colonies all but disappears.yet when the revolution began in 1789, Saint Domingueproducer of half the western world's sugar and coffee-was of enormous importance to the French economy and its propertied elite. Revolution rapidly became a question of empire. Nation and Revolution in Imperial Europe Scholars today regard the French revolution not as the work of a collective actor-be it the "bourgeoisie" or the "popular classes"-but as a dynamic process, pushed on by the interaction of multiple actors with different interests and desires. A strong monarchy had developed state institutions and patrimonial ties to elites across France, more intensively than in much of eighteenth-century Europe. But aristocrats chafed at royal power, non-noble property owners at the privileges of the aristocracy, and peasants at the dues and services they owed to landowners. The older, hierarchical, patriarchal conception of French society and the sponsorship of royal and aristocratic patrons corresponded less and less with the increasing self-confidence of urban professionals or of elite women who saw themselves as consumers and active participants in spaces of sociability (such as cafes, salons, and political meetings). Magazines, newspapers, books, and scandal sheets proliferated and spread ideas of Enlightenment thinkers among the literate population Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 223

and those to whom these texts were read aloud. As the context for political debate widened, the concept of" citizen" came to the fore. The French old regime had gone further than other European states to distinguish a body of citizens from "foreigners," but its administrators conceived of the citizen as a subject of state sovereignty, not its source. The political activists of the late eighteenth century developed a different vision. They drew on older ideas of the politically engaged citizen, citing precedents from Greek cities, the Roman republic, and Renaissance city-states. As in the past, the politicized ideal of citizenship was not all-inclusive, for it implied the ability and the will to be active in civic affairs. At certain moments, the Parisian "crowd" propelled political leaders in radical directions; at others it was elite reformers who pushed ideas to their limits. The revolutionary moment in France was precipitated not only by internal changes in political consciousness and organization but also by the stresses of interempire conflict. France lost the war of 1756-63 and with it its Canadian colonies and all but a few outposts of its south Asian ones, but kept the horrifically lucrative sugar islands, notably Saint Domingue. Winners and losers were left with enormous debts, and if Britain could try to extract more from its colonies-with consequences its leaders did not predict-france had to turn inward. As demands for more taxes went down the French hierarchy, resistance pushed upward. Vulnerable and needing cooperation, Louis XVI in 1789 called a consultative meeting of the Estates General, something that increasingly powerful kings had dispensed with since 1614. The representatives of the three "estates" into which French society was organized-clergy, nobility, and commoners-refused the old terms under which the Estates General had met and turned the meeting into a National Constituent Assembly. Here the claim was heard that the people, not the king, were sovereign. On July 14, 1789, a crowd stormed and destroyed the Bastille, while in rural areas many peasants refused to pay dues to landowners and sacked manors. The assembly was becoming the de facto government; it abolished the nobility and reformed the system of rural dues. In August, it passed the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which declared, "The principle of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation. No body or individual may exercise any authority which does not proceed directly from the nation." It stressed equality before law and representative government. But what was the French nation? The revolution soon ran into the non-national nature of European politics. Austria (where Queen Marie Antoinette was from) and Prussia threatened to invade France in 179L This threat galvanized people's sense of "la patrie en danger" and led to efforts to assemble a voluntary army of citizens. But the national idea was not sufficiently strong. By 1793, compulsion was 224 Chapter 8

added to the spirit of citizenship in recruiting soldiers; systematic conscription followed. Threats from abroad and radicalization of the revolutionary regime at home (including the execution of the king and queen) were part of a volatile mix that gave rise to waves of terror and counterterror and then to a more conservative turn. Meanwhile, France had been declared a nation and a republic, and the constitution and a plethora of revolutionary writings enshrined an ideology of republicanism that has been both invoked and violated ever since. Power resided in the people through their elected representatives; the state was one and indivisible; liberty, equality, and fraternity were its core principles. This was a bold assertion of a new kind of sovereignty, but the boundaries of equal citizenry were contested from the start. Women were considered citizens, but not "active" ones-they did not get the vote until 1944 Whether the republican ideal implied social and economic, as well as political, equivalence was debated. Many property owners feared that too much political participation by the propertyless would threaten not only their own interests but social order. Fear of chaos was the cover behind which a more authoritarian government crept into post-revolutionary politics; in 1797 the new executive authority, the Directory, refused to accept defeat in an election. Tension escalated until a palace coup in 1799 brought in General Napoleon Bonaparte. In a startling reversal of revolutionary vocabulary, he declared himself emperor in 1804. Citizenship and the Politics ef Diff erence in the French Empire Let us now look at what is usually left out of the story. One cannot draw a sharp line around European France. Neither Enlightenment philosophy nor revolutionary practice provided a clear idea of who constituted the French people or what the relationship of European France to France overseas should be. Some political thinkers, insisting that they were applying reason to society, developed classifications of human populations that explained why African and Asian peoples could not participate in civic life. Others refused to recognize particularity among people and assumed that their own ideas of the universal should apply to all. Still others used their enlightened reason to provide a more nuanced view of human difference. For Denis Diderot, espousing universal values implied recognizing the integrity of different cultures. From his perspective, European assertions of the right to colonize others were illegitimate-a sign of the moral bankruptcy of European states. The Abbe Gregoire opposed colonization as currently practiced. He detested slavery, but not converting and "civilizing" other people. In 1788, leading Enlightenment figures founded the Societe des Amis des N oirs to plead the cause of slaves in the French empire. While Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 225

they did not agree on the significance of cultural difference, these theorists and activists embraced the fundamental equality of all humans and denied that people in the colonies could be enslaved or exploited at will. Most abolitionists favored gradual emancipation, weaning the imperial economy from its degrading practices without entailing social upheaval. But the metropole's intellectuals were not the only parties interested in the relationship of colonies to the revolution. White planters in Saint Domingue translated citizenship doctrine into claims for a measure of selfrule. Their delegations to Paris lobbied for colonial assemblies to have the power to regulate matters of property and social status within the colony, insisting that colonies that mixed slaves and free, African and European, could not be ruled by the same principles that governed European France. But the revolutionary assemblies in Paris also heard from gens de couleur, propertyowning, slave-owning inhabitants of Caribbean islands, usually born of French fathers and enslaved or ex-slave mothers. In Saint Domingue, they were a substantial group, owning one-third of the colony's plantations and a quarter of the slaves-and many of them did not lack for money, education, or connections to Paris. Citizenship, they insisted, should not be restricted by color. The Paris assemblies temporized. Everyone involved, including the Paris revolutionaries, had to rethink positions when slaves entered the fray in August 179!. Two-thirds of the slaves of Saint Domingue were African born, and the revolt emerged from networks shaped by African religious affinities as well as knowledge of events in Paris. Rebels burned plantations and assassinated planters across an entire region of the island. The Saint Domingue revolution soon turned into multiple, simultaneous struggles: between royalists and patriots, between whites and gens de couleur, between slaves and slave owners. Subsets of each category sometimes allied with others, often switching allegiances. Political action was not defined by membership in a social category. The revolutionary state fe ared losing a valuable colony to royalist counterrevolution or to the rival empires of England or Spain. The gens de couleur now seemed to leaders of the French Republic to be a necessary ally. In March 1792, the government in Paris agreed to declare all free people to be French citizens with equal political rights. In 1794, one of their number,jean-baptiste Beiley, took a seat in the French National Constituent Assembly as a delegate from Saint Domingue. The door to imperial citizenship was now aj ar. It opened further as the French government found it could not control the multisided conflict without enlisting slave support. In 1793, the republican commissioner in Saint Domingue decided to free the slaves and declare them citizens. Paris-where the revolutionary dynamic had also entered a more radical phase-ratified his edict and the next year extended it to other 226 Chapter 8

Figure 8.1 Portrait of Jean-Baptiste Beiley, by Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy Tr ioson, 1797. A man of color, elected to represent Saint Domingue in the French legislature, Beiley leans on the bust of the Abbe Raynal, a leading (white) advocate of the rights of slaves, while looking toward a distant future. Musee National du Chateau de Versailles. Bridgeman Art Library, Getty Images. colonies. The 1795 constitution declared the colonies an "integral part" of France. France became, for a time, an empire of citizens. That slaves were needed to fortify the military was hardly new in the history of empires-islamic empires and others had used this tactic. And slave-fighters had been deployed earlier in imperial competitions in the Caribbean. But the practicalities now corresponded to a principle that was indeed new-citizenship. Unlike the personal dependence of the fighting slave upon the master, the participation of the ex-slaves of Saint Domingue in the French military was linked to their new status. The Saint Domingue revolution was thus a movement for freedom within empire before it was a movement against empire. The most revered leader of slaves, To ussaint L'Ouverture, embodied the ambiguities of the situation.a literate and skilled freed slave, he joined the slave revolt early on and rapidly rose to leadership. He contemplated for a time allying with the Spanish, but when France, not Spain, moved toward abolishing slavery, he went over to the French side, becoming an officer of the republic and by Empire, Na ti on, and Citizenship 227

r797 the de facto ruler of French Saint Domingue, fighting against royalists and rival empires and in defense of ex-slaves' newly claimed liberty. In r8or, still proclaiming his loyalty to France, Toussaint wrote a new constitution for Saint Domingue. Neither French leaders nor Toussaint wanted to see sugar production end and they did not have an alternative to the watchful eyes oflandowners and officials, at least, they thought, until ex-slaves had acquired the self discipline of the "free" worker. Not all ex-slaves agreed; there were revolts within the revolution over issues oflabor and of autonomy, as well as a daily struggle as ex-slaves sought control over their working lives and insisted that the state regard them-in officials' records of names, marriages, and deaths, for instance-in the same way as white citizens. If the actions of Saint Domingue's people forced the Paris revolutionaries to keep rethinking what they meant by citizenship, the dynamics of empire in Europe had an enormous effect on the colonies.when Napoleon came to power he reversed the stumbling moves toward inclusive, empirewide citizenship. In the overseas empire, Napoleon was a thoroughgoing restorationist, reflecting his personal connections to old regime settlers in the Caribbean (including but not limited to the slave-owning family of his first wife,josephine). He wanted not only to restore the pre-revolutionary special status of colonies but to reinstate slavery as well. In r802, he sent an army to Saint Domingue to do just that. He dissembled about his purpose enough to induce Toussaint, still acting within the framework of imperial citizenship, to surrender. Toussaint was sent off to prison in France, where he soon died. It was the Napoleonic version of empire-not a national or republican one-that ended Toussaint's vision of emancipation within France. Other generals of slave origin continued the fight. The ex-slave armies combined with the devastation of yellow fever on Napoleon's army proved too much for the great emperor. In 1803, he gave up. The next year, the victors proclaimed the Republic of Haiti. A struggle for freedom and citizenship within a revolutionary empire thus ended up with Haiti taking itself out of the empire. France's other sugar colonies, Guadeloupe and Martinique, where rebellions had been contained, had to endure forty-four more years of slavery until another revolutionary situation in European France, combined with another round of revolts in the plantation colonies, definitively turned the remaining slaves of the French empire into citizens. Haiti's independence posed a new problem to the world's empires. Was Haiti in the vanguard of emancipation and decolonization? Or was it a symbol of the dangers of losing control over African slaves? Not only France but other imperial states had strong reasons to keep Haiti a pariah and not 228 Chapter 8

a vanguard. Only in 1825 did France give Haiti conditional recognition as a sovereign state, and then only after Haiti agreed to pay compensation for France's supposed losses. Full recognition finally came in 1838. The United States recognized Haiti in 1862, in the midst of its own civil war. When in 1938, C.L.R. James, born in what had been the British slave colony oftrinidad, wrote his famous history of the Saint Domingue revolution, The Black ]acobins, he tried to put Haiti back in the vanguard of liberation and use its example to argue for the end of colonialism around the world. In 1946, an African political leader elected to serve in the French legislature in Paris, Leopold Senghor, invoked the moment 150 years earlier when France recognized the citizenship of black slaves. He was trying to persuade other deputies to return to the promise of revolutionary France and make all subjects in the colonies into citizens, with the same rights as those of European France. The Franco-Haitian revolution of 1789-1804 brought before the world questions about the relationship of citizenship and freedom-within and beyond empires-issues that are still debated today. Napoleon Napoleon now lies in his opulent tomb in Paris, a few kilometers from the Arc de Triomphe, his monument to himself and the glorious battles by which he conquered most of Europe. The French nation, as it has come to be, has appropriated the Napoleonic legend for itself. But Napoleon's history sits uneasily within a retrospective assertion of a French nationstate. Napoleon's conquests-at their peak embracing about 40 percent of Europe's population-are well-known, so let us concentrate on two questions: Did his empire represent a new, post-revolutionary notion of empire politics, less aristocratic and hierarchical, more centralized and bureaucratic? How French was the French empire under Napoleon? The case for a new kind of empire rests on Napoleon's apparent interest in turning the rationalism of the Enlightenment into a logically planned, integrated, centralized system of administration, staffed by people chosen for competence and allegiance to the state, irrespective of social status. Scienceincluding geography, cartography, statistics, and ethnography-would guide state officials and shape the population's conceptions of itself. The state's role in defining and superintending society through a single legal regime was embodied in the Napoleonic code.the code was more systematic than Justinian's compendium of the sixth century (chapter 3); it set out both public and private law, to be applied in a uniform and disinterested-and above all predictable-manner by judicial institutions. Taxation was high, but thanks Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 229

Map 8.2 Napoleonic empire in Europe. to the systematic registration of land, its basis was transparent. A direct relation of citizen to sovereign was to replace the entrenched privileges of nobles and clergy, the arbitrary corruption of pre-revolutionary monarchy, and deference to local elites and local traditions. Napoleon abolished the one symbolic rival-long since voided of power-to his claims to overarching imperial authority in Europe: the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon was of course a dictator and not a democrat, but in this argument, his imperial regime embodies the ideals of a French citizenry united behind its leader and rationalized bureaucracy-two products of revolution and Enlightenment, extended across Europe onto Russia's lands. The case for reversion to an older mode of empire, on the other hand, starts with the symbolism of state power that Napoleon invoked, none more striking than his taking the title of emperor, his public display of thrones and robes and crowns, and his prevailing upon the pope to conduct the coronationeven with the twist Napoleon gave the ceremony by taking the crown from the pope's hands and placing it on his own head. All of this deliberately and obviously echoed the coronation of Charlemagne one thousand years earlier, just as Napoleon's triumphal arches claimed the heritage of Rome. 23 0 Chapter 8

The revolution's break with aristocratic government was compromised in two more fundamental ways. First was Napoleon's allocation of noble titles and dotations (property given to people who served the regime, heritable in the male line) to many of his generals and leading supporters, including a considerable number of people who had held titles under the old regime as well as to elites in some conquered territories, creating (or re-creating) what one scholar calls an "imperial nobility." Second was his use in conquered areas of another classic strategy of emperors: ruling different places differently. If that meant in some contexts-northern Italy, for example-incorporating new territory into the basic administrative structure of France and imposing standardized laws and practices of bureaucracy, it meant in others-the Figure 8.2 Napoleon on his imperial throne, Jean-Auguste-Dominique Ingres, 1806. Musee de l'armee, Paris. Bridgeman Art Library, Getty Images. Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 23 1

Duchy ofwarsaw, for instance--co-opting rather than displacing the local aristocracy. Such strategies went against the notions of equality that the revolution had promoted. And the Napoleonic code was a patriarchal one, reinforcing male authority within the households of citizens. An imperial perspective lets us avoid the false dichotomy between continuity and change. Napoleon faced challenges common to all empires, balancing the need to co-opt defeated kings and princes against systematic top-down authority, finding a workable strategy somewhere between creating a homogenized elite and ruling each part of the empire separately. Other emperors across the world had tried to use officials distanced in one way or another from the society they were administering; the Chinese had pioneered a carefully recruited and educated bureaucracy long before the Enlightenment. Napoleon assimilated new ideas of government into classic imperial strategies. Michael Broers argues that Napoleon conceived of an "inner empire" present-day France except for the Ve ndee, the Netherlands, countries around the Rhine, Switzerland, much of northern Italy-in which a civilizing, centralizing, bureaucratizing model of rule was most strictly imposed. Then came an " outer empire" in which local aristocracies played a much stronger role and the Napoleonic reforms-particularly in regard to the privileges of nobles-were attenuated. Napoleon installed his relatives (brothers Joseph in Naples and Spain, Louis in the Netherlands, Jerome in We stphalia, brother-in-law Joachim Murat in Berg) as monarchs. In the Confe deration of the Rhine, sixteen princes were nominally in charge of specific territories, loosely consolidated and interlaced with Napoleon's own officials. He was in effect fe derating smaller kingdoms or duchies into larger units, all under the umbrella of the Napoleonic empire. The multiple channels of authority-of which prefects, on the Roman model, were the main but not the only means of passing information up and orders down-served a structure in which the emperor was, as in the past, the king of kings. Among Napoleon's potential allies, submonarchs, or enemies were the Habsburgs-with their own claims to empire. The Habsburg rulers sometimes fought Napoleon, sometimes-recognizing his superior power-allied with him.a Habsburg princess became Napoleon's empress after he divorced Josephine. Habsburg claims to imperial status became hollow with Napoleon's military dominance. But for the Austrian elite, Napoleon was an emperor one could live with or under, preferable to other empires on their flanks, Ottoman and Russian. The crux of the Napoleonic machine was the sustenance of the army. The revolutionary ideal-a citizen army serving the nation-had been compromised even before Napoleon assumed power. People fought for their country because they had to. Napoleon (like Peter I in Russia a cen- 232 Chapter 8

tury earlier) systematized conscription. Doing so entailed the penetration of state power-military and administrative-to the village level, for it was from rural areas that most conscripts had to come. In addition to an administration under a prefect in each territorial division, Napoleon posted his gendarmerie, a militarized police force. Conscription was applied not just to the pre-napoleonic boundaries of France but to conquered territories as well. Resistance to conscription was higher in the mountainous villages of central France than in non-frenchspeaking areas such as the Rhine, parts ofltaly, and Westphalia. By and large, the apparatus of state wore down defiance, producing an army that was more imperial than French. Only a third of the immense army that attacked Russia in 1812 was from "France." This brings us to the second question: how French was the empire? The language of administration was French, and many-but not all-of the prefe cts and military authorities installed in non-french-speaking areas were from France. Gradually local elites were recruited into the roles defined by French occupants of these positions. Some authors speak of a French "cultural imperialism" imposed on places like Italy, where Napoleonic officials thought people backward and in need of civilizing influences-the French law code, competent civil servants, and a scientific attitude-to be wielded against priests and reactionary aristocrats. Yet much of "France" was being "civilized" at the same time as regions that spoke Italian or German. Parts of western France, the Vendee, were ruled lightly because the region was considered obstreperous and dangerous, while Poland was also ruled lightly-in order to co-opt its nobility. Elites in some conquered territories found good reason to follow a course taken in many empires going back to Rome-contingent accommodation. The rationalizing side of Napoleonic administration appealed for a time at least to certain liberal, commercially minded people, who embraced its antiaristocratic, anticlerical side. But Napoleon strongly identified stable social order with landownership-although not with royalists and feudal lordsand landed elites had their reasons to prefer peace under Napoleon to war against him. Many liberals who had welcomed Napoleon became disillusioned with his system; some resisted French rule on national grounds. Spain comes perhaps the closest to widespread guerilla warfare against an invader, but even there, mobilization was directed in part against Spanish elites who were oppressing peasants. The fighters in different provinces of Spain could not act together in a sustained and coherent fashion, and parts of the "Spanish" campaign against Napoleon were led by British generals. Napoleon's empire is sometimes seen as continental rather than overseas-but only because his overseas ventures did not succeed. Napoleon's only major defeat by what became a national liberation movement oc- Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 233

curred at the hands of Saint Domingue's ragtag armies of slaves, ex-slaves, and free people of color, with help from France's imperial enemies, American merchants, and tropical microbes. Napoleon's other, earlier, overseas venture, the conquest of Egypt in 1798, proved short-lived. British intervention helped restore this territory to the Ottoman empire. In Egypt, Napoleon had sought both to push his imperial genealogy back to the pharaohs and to bring science and rational rule to a part of the "backward" Ottoman empire. He had also hoped to build on Saint Domingue and Louisiana to forge an imperial expanse across the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. In neither Egypt nor Saint Domingue was the outcome his to determine. In 1803 Napoleon was reputed to say, "Damn sugar, damn coffee, damn colonies!" as he sold off Louisiana to the United States for cash to finance his other imperial dreams. Overextension is a conventional and unsatisfying explanation for Napoleon's defeats; in the history of empires no clear line separates overextension from extension. Napoleon tried to harness the resources of central Europe-with considerable success-but Russia could bring to bear those of Siberia and Ukraine, while Britain had overseas territories, as well as the world's premier navy. Napoleon succumbed not to the welling up of national sentiment against the reactionary power of empire but to other empires, notably the British and the Russian. As Napoleon's army lost its grip after the debacle of his invasion of Russia in 1812, components of his conquest reconstituted themselves as politically viable entities-around monarchic and dynastic figures-in somewhat different forms than before. Polities like Baden and Bavaria had absorbed smaller units around them under Napoleonic overrule and emerged as stronger, more consolidated entities afterward. When the king of Prussia tried to organize the fight against Napoleon in 1813 he appealed not to "Germans" but to "Brandenburgers, Prussians, Silesians, Pomeranians, Lithuanians." The components of the empire that had come closest to integration into France (northern Italy, the Rhine, the low countries) experienced the most profound effects of Napoleon's empire, including increased professionalization of governing elites. Napoleon's defeat allowed for a degree of federation among polities he had subdued and that reconstituted themselves as allies against him. Elites across Europe who had for a time been swayed by Napoleon's project of regularized administration and legal codification would influence the later course of politics. Post-Napoleonic Europe remained dominated by a small number of strong players: Russia, Austria, Prussia, Great Britain, and-as before-france. The peace negotiated at Vienna in 1815 reinforced this monarchical consolidation. The major winners kept their emperors; France, some twenty-five years after its revolution, went back to having a king. 234 Chapter 8

Napoleon's conquests, his governments, and his defeats had profound effects on the building of states. But state and nation did not coincide in Napoleon's empire, and fighting Napoleon did not bring state and nation together among his enemies. Napoleon was not the last ruler who came close to incorporating the European continent into a vast empire, and al""'" though late nineteenth-century empire-builders looked overseas, their actions were still part of the competition between a small number of empirestates centered in Europe. France, after episodes of monarchy, revolution, and a new republic (1848-52), came under a regime that called itself the Second Empire and was headed by a man who called himself Napoleon III (nephew of the original). The Second Empire endured until 1870, and like the first its end came through the actions of another empire, in this case the newly unified German Reich. The rise and fall of both Napoleons left in place a Europe of empire-states, mixing variously the voice of citizens with the power of monarchs, combining contiguous and distant territories and culturally diverse populations (chapter II). Capitalism and Revolution in the British Empire We saw in chapter 6 that "Britain" emerged not as a coherent project of a single people but out of varied initiatives, state and private, that were gradually tied together: composite monarchy in the British isles, and piracy, chartered companies, trading enclaves, plantation colonies, and colonies of settlement overseas. A "fiscal-military" state, linked to strong banking institutions, provided the revenue for a navy that could protect settlements and trade routes and channel a major portion of the world's commerce through British ships and British ports. England had its share of internecine conflict, but the success of Parliament, representing largely landed gentry and aristocracy, in limiting royal power made it possible for the Crown's empire-building to complement rather than contradict the interests of magnates. With the consolidation of government by the "King in Parliament" after the civil war of 1688 and under the pressure of a long series of wars against France-to counter Louis XIV's efforts to dominate Europe and possibly impose Catholic kings on England-Britain developed a government capable of managing diverse ventures abroad and social and economic change at home. England, Empire, and the Development of a Capitalist Economy The eighteenth century was for the British empire revolutionary in more ways than one. The nexus of plantation slavery overseas and agricultural and industrial development at home was tightened up during the extraordinary Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 235

expansion of the sugar economy. Creeping colonization of India by a private company escalated into a process of territorial incorporation in which the Crown took a closer supervisory role. Revolution in the North American colonies revealed both the limits of empire and the extent to which principles of British politics had been diffused across an ocean. What is the connection between Britain's leading role in the development of capitalism and its imperial power, even taking into account its loss of thirteen North American colonies in the 1780s? Kenneth Pomeranz offers an illuminating comparison of the economies of the Chinese and British empires, the first a great land empire with connections across Eurasia, the second deriving its strength from the sea. Pomeranz argues that in the early eighteenth century the potential for economic growth and industrial development in the two empires-especially in heartland regions-was not notably different. Their agriculture, craft industries, commercial institutions, and financial mechanisms were roughly comparable. The " great divergence" occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. Capital accumulated through the slave trade and sugar productionconsiderable as it was-does not explain the different trajectories of these empires. It was the complementarity between metropolitan and imperial resources that pushed Britain's economy ahead. Sugar was grown in the Caribbean; labor came from Africa. Feeding workers in England was not therefore constrained by the limits of land and labor at home. Combined with tea, another imperial product, sugar did much to keep workers in the cotton mills for long hours-without devoting British resources to the potatoes, grain, or sugar beets that would have been alternative sources of calories. Similarly with the cotton that clothed workers: other fibers might have been grown in England, but slave cotton from the southern United States in the early nineteenth century did not demand land in the British isles or labor within metropolitan Britain. China's imperial system was oriented toward extracting revenue from land; both land and labor were internal to the system. Britain's superior access to coal played an important part in its industrial growth, but the capacity to push opportunity costs in land and labor overseas gave Britain a distinct advantage. Other differences came into play only because of Britain's maritime empire: British use of joint-stock companies, for example, provided no great advantage in domestic manufacturing, but it brought together the large resources needed for transport and fighting capacity to sustain long-distance, coercive operations. Britain had made itself into a center of redistribution for goods arriving not only from its dependencies in the West Indies, North America, and India but from many parts of the world. By the r77os, over half of British Chapter 8

imports and exports were coming from or going to areas outside Europe. With the growth of industry as well as of financial and commercial institutions, Britain's economic power became increasingly self-perpetuating. It could lose the North American colonies without losing their trade, cling to the valuable sugar islands, and extend the breadth and depth of its reach into Asia. By the end of the eighteenth century, its industries produced commodities that people in the Americas, Africa, and even Asia wanted to buy. The trajectory of the British economy cannot be attributed only to imperial ventures, including plantation slavery.were slavery the decisive factor, then Portugal or Spain, the imperial pioneers in this regard, should have taken the lead in industrializing. It was the symbiosis between metropolitan and imperial factors that explains why Britain used its empire so productively. With less dynamic domestic economies, such as those of Spain and Portugal, much of the benefit of exporting to colonies went to financial institutions outside imperial territory. Portugal and Spain took a long time to move away from regimes oflandowning nobles with dependent peasants, and France's peasants were relatively secure on their land. In Britain's case, landowners in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries curtailed tenant farmers' and other cultivators' access to land and used more wage labor in agriculture. In the interpretation of Karl Marx-who had considerable if grudging respect for the material successes brought by capitalism-what distinguished the capitalist system was not just free markets but the separation of the majority of producers from the means of production. The violent extinction of England's small farmers' access to land left the majority with no choice but to sell the one thing they had-their labor-and left land and factory owners with no choice but to buy it. Capitalism was more successful in the long run than household production, serfdom, or slavery-and one could now add communism-because it compelled the owners of the means of production to compete to hire labor and to employ that labor as efficiently as everyone else. The ability and need of property owners to hire labor was not an automatic effect of markets or coercive power; it depended on juridical and political institutions capable of conveying legitimacy to ownership. Britain, having survived its civil wars and mobilized resources to fight Spanish and French empires, ended up with a solidly institutionalized state system. It struck a balance between the conservative aristocratic privilege of Spain and the monarchical centralism of France. Its merchant class was as avidly entrepreneurial as that of the Netherlands, but it had a stronger state. Britain was in a position to develop a flexible repertoire of power that, for a time, no rival could achieve. Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 237

Imperial Power and North American Revolution Commercial linkages centered on Great Britain tied together what Edmund Burke called a "mighty and strangely diversified mass": slave-owning sugar producers, New England farmers, Indian nawabs, sailors, fishermen, merchants,peasants, and slaves.the European population of the North American colonies grew between 1700 and 1770 from 250,000 to 2.15 million-over a fourth of the population of Britain itself. Exports from England and Wales to the thirteen colonies tripled between 1735 and 1785-in the midst of political conflict. It was in 1773 that reference was first made to "this vast empire on which the sun never sets." Some English writers saw themselves as the inheritors of the Roman republic. As David Armitage has pointed out, the British state was "neither a solely metropolitan nor an exclusively provincial achievement; it was a shared conception of the British Empire." Where slaves were numerically predominant, as in the Caribbean, fe ar of slave revolt-and vulnerability of rich islands to other empires-meant that whites needed the assurance of the empire connection. Settlers in North America, facing substantial indigenous populations, had different and conflicting options with regard to empire. Native peoples could be dangerous, hence a need for the presence of an imperial army; they could be useful trading partners, playing a complementary role within an imperial economy. But indigenous peoples' land was desirable to settlers, pulling imperial authorities into conflicts they did not necessarily want. The British government regarded indigenous peoples within the colonies as subjects of the king and tribes beyond colonial boundaries as under the king's "protection." After the Seven Years' War-in which French and British had vied for alliances with Indian groups and fought those on the opposite side-the British government drew a line west of which colonists were prohibited from settling, hoping to diffuse clashes over land while reserving to the Crownnot local governments-all rights to negotiate with Indians. This provision became a source of settler-government conflict, exacerbated by repeated violations by settlers eager to buy or seize land in fertile interior valleys. The ideas that made the British empire both British and an empire eventually fostered rebellion against it. British creoles expected that institutions of parliamentary government for men of property would be reproduced wherever in the empire they lived-and that meant assemblies in the individual colonies. To a certain extent their expectations were fulfilled, although colonial assemblies were more ad hoc inventions than miniparliaments. John Adams even suggested that the capital ofbritain could be located in North America. Had American colonists obtained the authority they wanted, they might have turned the British empire into a confedera- tion-each component with its own governing institutions, its own sense of Chapter 8

political unity, and, as the efforts of George Washington and others to gain control of inland river valleys made clear, its own imperial ambitions. Such a solution, however, risked creating what British jurists who knew their Roman law called "imperium in imperio"-an empire within an empire. Colonists, until the eve of the revolution, cherished the British connection but disagreed over its terms, wanting at the very least a measure of provincial government and acknowledgment of their rights. Some colonists claimed, perhaps disingenuously, that the founding charters of their settlements made them subject to the king, but not Parliament. Parliament thought otherwise, and was adamant that it alone had the power to tax, while the regulation of commerce, via the Navigation and other acts, was essential to tying the diverse parts of the empire to Britain itself. The vast debts acquired in the war of 1756-63, in backing up the East India Company's aggressive stance in India, and in conflicts with Native Americans led London both to tighten its own officials' control over administration and to impose higher taxesincluding those on its North American subjects. The Sugar and Stamp acts (1764, 1765) that entered the legend of American rebellion were part ofthis empire-wide fiscal problem. Elites in the Americas-the merchants, law- Figure 8.3 " Forcing Te a Down America's Throat," by Paul Revere for the Royal American Magazine, 1774. British men hold down "Lady Liberty," while the British prime minister pours tea down her throat. Britannia-the symbol of what was truly British-averts her eyes. The cartoon protests British retaliation for the Boston Te a Party of 1773, itself a protest against British policies forcing consumers in New England to buy tea shipped by the British East India Company, a restriction that hurt American merchants. Hulton Archive, Getty Images. Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 239

yers, and large landowners who were the vital intermediaries of an imperial regime--were the most directly affected by such measures, and they took the lead in the escalating protests that eventually led to war. From an imperial perspective, the American revolution was a British civil war. Many residents of the Thirteen Colonies identified strongly enough with their brethren in the British isles or saw enough of a common interest with the empire that they gave the Crown their contingent accommodation. The "loyalists" were an important dimension of the war. Like any effective empire, Britain tried to exploit differentiation to save its dependencies, enticing slaves to desert masters and fight for Britain with freedom as the reward. Slaves also called themselves "loyalists," and after their side lost the war many of them followed the lines of imperial connection to Nova Scotia or Sierra Leone. Britain tried with some success to get Indian allies, as it had against the French in the war of 1756-63, and many rebels came to regard Indians as their enemies. In a wider perspective, the revolution turned into yet another interempire war, for France and Spain entered on the side of the rebels, took some territory in the Caribbean and Florida, diverted British forces into the West Indies, and challenged the British navy sufficiently to make reinforcing and resupplying the army difficult, a significant contribution to the outcome of the war. On the rebels' side, leaders' desire for unity inspired them to make clear that, despite class differences, white settlers of modest means were part of the American political community. In so doing, they sharpened racial divisions. The patriotic struggle brought together poor and rich whites; the fate of slaves was work (chapter 9). Corning soon after the victory over their French imperial rival in 1763, defeat at the hands of colonial rebels forced British leaders to come to grips with the limits of empire. The seemingly sure way to enracinate British power across an ocean-to settle British subjects-had fallen afoul of an old problem of empire: that intermediaries could use their ideological and political affinity to the metropole not to sustain that connection but to twist it in new directions. Empire after Revolution In the end, British rulers were not willing to sacrifice parliamentary sovereignty to accommodate the demands of creole rebels or to pay the price of continued warfare to bring them back into the imperial fold. But if the loss of North American colonies deprived the British government of tax revenue, Britain continued to trade with Americans, to the profit of commercial interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Having lost an empire of kith and kin, Britain now was left with a less populous, less wealthy version of the Chapter 8

settler colony-canada-plus islands in the Caribbean where most of the inhabitants were slaves, and-via an arrangement with a private companyparts of India. To many in England, it appeared as if holding the remaining empire together would depend less on appeal to a common "Britishness" and more on the direct exercise of power over people regarded as backward or elites seen as tyrannical. But British ability to carry off this harsher control was still constrained by the need to give local elites a stake in the imperial enterprise, by the danger even in the most oppressed slave society of rebellion, and by the conviction of at least some members of the imperial establishment that the political and moral viability of empire depended on recognizing the place of all subjects within the polity. India was the focus of both more intensive colonization and increasingly difficult questions about what deepening involvement meant to British conceptions of their political institutions. Creeping colonization-a company interested in trade, profiting from preexisting commercial networks in India and southeast Asia and gradually taking on more of the functions of sovereignty-started to move much faster after mid-century. In 1756 the nawab <?f Bengal nearly threw the East India Company out; this became the occasion for the company to make use of its military capabilities and local allies to win a major victory over local rulers in 1757 at the battle of Plassey. The Seven Years' War, meanwhile, led the British state to contribute large new military resources so that the company and its Indian allies could defeat the French and their Indian allies in the contest for dominance over south Asia. The ante was raised. Map 8.3 India, 1767 and 1805. 1767 CHINA Te rritories of British East India Company Ill Indian states allied with Great Britain Empire, Nation, and Citizenship 241

With his own power much diminished and the company strengthened, the Mughal emperor in 1765 ceded to the ' East Indian Company the diwani, the right to administer and collect taxes in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. The EIC would now enjoy the revenue produced by some twenty million people in an area of India notable for its productive agriculture-in rice and export crops-its cloth and other industries, and its sophisticated commercial and financial elites. The large majority of people defined as "inhabitants of India" came under the jurisdiction of courts supervised by the company but administering what officials considered to be Islamic or Hindu law. In much of the Indian subcontinent the business of government-the de facto exercise of sovereignty-was from then on a profit-making activity. The key to success was to pass the costs onto the people being governed. The EIC used locally recruited troops known as sepoys. The political map of India became a patchwork: areas of company rule spreading out from Bengal, regions of continued Mughal rule, and independent principalities. In south- Figure 8.4 Robert Clive, leader of the British East India Company, receiving the land revenues of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, 1765, painted by Benjamin West. British Library, London. HIP, ArtResource. Chapter 8