Maras, Security and Development. in Central America Task Force

Maras: Diagnosing and Combating an Emergent Geopolitical Virus R. Evan Ellis Maras, Lecturer, Security International and Studies Development Department, University of Miami in Central America Task Force This paper expands upon remarks delivered at the first session of the Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force September November 2007 November 10, 2008 Maras, Security and Development in Central America Task Force activities were assisted financially by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State. Introduction In recent years, the mara phenomenon 1 has received an increasing amount of attention in both Central America and the United States. The growth of the maras has been linked to the expansion of criminality and violence at all levels, from delinquency and drug dealing to robbery, kidnapping, extortion and murder. In Central America, the mara phenomenon has overwhelmed local governments. In El Salvador, for example, through a combination of corruption and intimidation, 15 of 265 municipalities are believed to be effectively dominated by the maras. 2 Because the public attention now being given to the maras is relatively new, policy discussions of the phenomenon are complicated by a lack of information and precision regarding who is a mara member. Little credible information exists regarding important questions such as the number of gang members, leadership and dynamics within their organizations, or what they do with the money they raise through the criminal activities in which they are involved. Estimates of the number of gang members vary widely. In its 2006 gang assessment report, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reported that estimates of the total membership range from 50,000 to 305,000, which includes approximately 10,500 in El Salvador, 36,000 in Honduras, 14,000 in Guatemala, 20,000 in Mexico and 2,200 in Nicaragua. 3 Complicating 1 In general, the maras phenomenon refers to a violent group of gangs with roots in the flow of migrants between Central America and the barrios of Los Angeles. 2 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Central America s Increasing Gang Problem: A Comforting Handshake Needed as Much as a Tough Fist to Fight Crime Epidemic. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. July 31, 2007. http://www.coha.org. 3 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment. USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs. April 2006. p. 6.

matters, public discussions often begin from fundamentally different assumptions. Some discussions use the term mara to refer to the phenomenon of gangs in general, including a broad spectrum of groups that vary greatly in their level of organization and criminal behavior. Even those analyses that concentrate on the two principal groups, MS-13 (Mara Salvatrucha) and Barrio 18 (the 18 th Street Gang), frequently overlook important differences in sophistication among organizations in different countries and localities. While it is true, for example, that some parts of MS-13 and Barrio 18 think strategically and coordinate operations internationally, not all of the organizational units of the gang operate with such sophistication and discipline. This paper treats the maras as an emergent geopolitical virus whose unique characteristics give it the capacity to invade and feed off weak communities within the international body politic, ultimately replicating from within and destroying those societies that nurtured its growth. The metaphor is borrowed from biology and analyzes the maras as a system that operates within the larger international system. The term maras refers to a particular model of gang membership and activity. Although the groups MS-13 and Barrio 18 are the principal current manifestation of the mara phenomenon, the dynamic described in this paper is not limited to these groups or their Central American origins. I. Understanding the Systemic Effect of the Maras The threat presented by the maras must be understood from the perspective of what the group has the potential to become, rather than the number of gang members that can be counted or the current scope of their criminal activity. Maras do not present a threat to the international system because they are gangs. They are a threat because they are a form of organization that is well adapted to invade and feed off of the weaknesses of the region s poorly functioning social systems, and benefit from transnational flows of goods, people, information and money. Maras have an effective model for replicating themselves and leveraging these global flows to project themselves into new communities, infecting and weakening them and creating a powerful feedback loop of infection and expansion. Young people in particular are drawn to the maras because they meet physical and social needs not fulfilled by other parts of the society. 4 In communities that are violent and lack opportunities to make a living, the maras provide a social bond that replaces the nonexistent or dysfunctional family unit. The maras act as a surrogate family, providing basic needs such as food and clothing, as well as protection from the threatening environment of the streets. The gangs commit crimes and sustain themselves in ways that propagate the atmosphere of insecurity and hopelessness in the community, driving other youth to join gangs as well. One of the most important ways in which the maras propagate the conditions for their own existence is by systemically destroying the society s ability to generate wealth by harming its businesses. In doing so, the maras undermine the ability of the society to support a government 4 The maras emerged in the barrios of Los Angeles in the 1980s, when young immigrants fleeing wars and hardship in Central America sought to find a place in the complex and often hostile new environment in which they found themselves. Beginning at the end of the 1990s, the maras were transplanted back to Central America when youths with criminal backgrounds were deported en masse back to their countries of birth in which they had few contacts, little knowledge of the language and scant prospects of finding employment to sustain themselves. 2

that can defend itself and perform social functions. In the process, the maras also eliminate the economic capacity of the society to sustain families and impart healthy values. Mara crime and violence drive out small businesses and dissuade small shopkeepers and producers from opening businesses in troubled neighborhoods. 5 The lack of commerce is further reinforced as troubled areas become physically isolated from safer communities that seek to protect themselves. On the outskirts of San Salvador, for example, bus drivers have refused to enter the city of Soyapango since a bloody incident in April 2004 in which three bus drivers were killed. 6 Overall, the economic impact of the maras and related groups is devastating. Some studies estimate that their behavior has caused the GDP of Central America to be 5% to 25% lower than would otherwise be the case. 7 The effect of mara violence is compounded because mara attacks are frequently concentrated on the middle class. In contrast to the poorest members of society, the middle class has something worth stealing. In contrast to the Central American elites, however, the middle class lacks the resources to purchase security systems and services sufficient to put their families and property beyond the maras reach. Mara violence drives the middle class out of the community. It leads to the construction of walls and fences around anything of value, thereby forcing the abandonment of public spaces to criminal elements and atomizing the society. The adverse economic impact of the maras is magnified by the particularly violent nature of these groups. Violence is an integral part of mara life, from the beatings of members that are part of mara initiation rites, 8 to the use of violence to enforce discipline in the ranks, to the importance of a reputation for brutality in determining leadership, to the use of violence in taking and defending territory. 9 As a result, the spread of maras in Central America has been accompanied by the spread of violence. Some 60% of the murders in El Salvador in 2004 were gang-related. 10 Violence is also propagated as the society reacts to the mara presence, and as the maras react to government attempts at law enforcement. In El Salvador, for example, the vigilante group Sombra Negra (Black Shadow) waged an assassination campaign against suspected gang members. 11 And in Honduras, a December 2004 mara attack on a public bus in 5 Even major companies that can physically protect their operations and executives experience costs stemming from the vulnerability of their employees to mara violence beyond the factory walls, such as increased absenteeism. 6 Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005. 7 The Inter-American Development Bank estimates that the total cost of the violence is between 5% and 25% of GDP in the affected countries. Diego Cevallos, Understanding the Maras. Inter Press Service News Agency. November 23, 2007. www.ipsnews.net. See also Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Gangs roil Central America. The Boston Globe.com. April 17, 2006. 8 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, Are the Maras Overwhelming Governments in Central America? Military Review. November-December 2006. p. 37. 9 In talking about the mara culture, Don Romulo Emiliani, Bishop of San Pedro Sula, Honduras, estimated that 8%- 12% of the maras can be characterized as psychotic and addicted to a culture of blood and violence. Tiempos Del Mundo Centroamérica y Caribe. April 7, 2005. p. 3. See Thomas C. Bruneau, The Maras and National Security in Central America. Strategic Insights. Volume IV, Issue 5. May 2005. 10 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, Are the Maras Overwhelming Governments in Central America? Military Review. November-December 2006. p. 38. 11 El Salvador: the specter of death squads. Amnesty International. AMR 29/15/96. December 1, 1996. http://web.amnesty.org. 3

Chamalecon, in which 28 people were killed, was reportedly done to warn the government to back off in its campaign against the gangs. 12 Mara activities also drive another malevolent feedback cycle by leveraging and exacerbating the weakness of institutions. To some degree, the ability of the maras to operate in a community depends on the failure of government: from schools that do not educate or discipline; to underresourced and corruptible police; to overwhelmed judicial institutions and social service agencies. 13 On one hand, the flight of business from a community leads the local revenue base to dry up, leaving fewer and fewer resources for schools, police, judicial institutions and social services. The corresponding increase in mara membership and the resources at their disposal leave law enforcement institutions more vulnerable to financial corruption, as well as increasingly outnumbered and outgunned. Although the dynamics just described apply to many types of social malaise, what distinguishes the mara phenomenon and makes it so malignant are the ways in which the gang retains members, reproduces itself and grows. Like a powerful addiction, maras are relatively easy for marginalized youth to join and very difficult to leave. The latter problem typically comes from two sources. First, as part of their initiation, new members are frequently required to commit a serious crime, often involving publicly killing an innocent bystander or rival gang member. 14 Among its other effects, this criminal act reinforces the sense that a new member cannot return to society. In addition, leaving the gang is generally punishable by death, except for a narrow set of exceptions such as a sincere religious conversion. Because maras are engaged in a process of continual recruitment of new gang members, but do not offer a path out of the gang, the organization has an inherent tendency to grow, creating an ever greater demand for criminal activity to sustain its members. 15 The level of forced retention, however, is not equal across all mara organizations. Although maras grow through a fundamentally parasitic relationship with their host society, they are also nurtured by a number of transnational flows, such as narcotics and human trafficking. Under normal circumstances, when criminal violence is contained within the boundaries of a country or area, it tends to be self-limiting. To the degree that such a bounded organization succeeds and grows in size, it destroys the generators of wealth within the society that sustain its existence. Like livestock that over-graze a field, gangs that destroy the economic base of the society in which they operate cannot grow further, since there is nothing more to steal or extort. Narcotrafficking in contrast, is not self-limiting. Instead, it allows the maras to tap into and benefit from this transnational commerce in multiple ways. At the local level, the maras use their physical presence in marginalized neighborhoods to distribute and sell drugs on the street. Their 12 Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005. 13 In Guatemala, for example, the federal anti-narcotics department was dismantled in November 2002, when it was discovered that some 320 of its employees were in the pay of criminals. See Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005. 14 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, Are the Maras Overwhelming Governments in Central America? Military Review. November-December 2006. p. 37. 15 At the same time, the growth tendency of the maras is complemented by their relative discipline, coordination, and culture of violence, which helps them to oust other groups which are less well organized and violent, effectively allowing the maras to corner the market on criminality in those areas which they come to operate. 4

combination of organization and violence has helped them displace the competition and monopolize local drug markets. The maras also sell criminal services to narcotrafficking organizations, from smuggling the drugs to acting as hired gunmen. 16 The emergence of this role was fueled by a shift in drug transshipment patterns in the 1990s. As the United States and other authorities increased their surveillance of traditional smuggling routes from South America, narcotics rings expanded their use of land routes through Central America. The Carlos Fuentes cartel in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, is one example of a group to which the maras sell their services as assassins or enforcers. 17 The expulsion of criminal aliens from the United States to Central America has helped keep gang members out of jail by transplanting them from poor neighborhoods in Los Angeles to those of Central America. Between 1998 and 2004, more than 34,000 criminals were deported by the United States to El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. 18 Because the governments receiving the deported criminals did not have information concerning their criminal status, the deportations had the effect of setting them free in Central America, where many committed crimes and acts of violence and were available for recruitment by the gangs. The maras have also benefited from immigration flows to the United States. Maras and copycat gangs, such as those in Tapachula in the state of Chiapas, Mexico, 19 have come to prey on migrants heading toward the United States since these immigrants are generally vulnerable and tend to carry significant amounts of cash. In addition to robbing, raping and murdering them, the maras tax the trade, charging for safe passage through territories under their control, and in some cases acting as coyotes (human smugglers) themselves. 20 Immigrants contribute to mara resources in numerous, and often ironic, ways. Mara violence and crime increase the insecurity and hopelessness that prompt many in the region to migrate to the United States and elsewhere. Maras operating in areas through which migrants pass, rob and tax them. Immigrants who make it to the United States, in turn, provide new recruits for U.S.- based mara groups. Those who work and send money back home provide a steady stream of resources for other maras to steal. The catastrophic effect of the maras on the body politic and their ability to expand do not imply that they are well coordinated or organized transnational organizations. Experts generally place mara organizations somewhat below narcotics and human smuggling rings and other criminal organizations with respect to their ability to conduct and coordinate operations across transnational boundaries. Maras do not threaten the viability of Central America or the national security of the United States because their leaders choose to pose such a threat. 21 Instead, the 16 MS-13, for example, provided a range of services for Mexican drug cartels. See Sam Logan, Illegal migration and Mexico s maras. ISN Security Watch. November 7, 2006. http://www.isn.ethz.ch. 17 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment. USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs. April 2006. p. 111. 18 Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Gangs roil Central America. The Boston Globe.com. April 17, 2006. 19 Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005. 20 Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005. 21 One distinction that may be made in this regard, for example, is that maras may think strategically, but do not necessarily purposely shape their own battlespace. 5

threat they pose is a consequence of their being loosely coordinated, criminal franchises trying to survive and expand. II. Where is this going? It is not clear whether the maras will ever become sophisticated international cartels or criminal organizations. Although police and military officials refer off the record to coordination among mara organizations at the national and international levels, the behavior of the maras generally is more characteristic of independent franchises loosely united by a common identity, rather than of a hierarchical group. For example, the ability of the maras to conduct operations requiring effective international organization, such as financial crime, has been limited. The maras have demonstrated the ability to effectively use technology, such as computers and cell phones, in their international operations. 22 Fear and profit as key behavioral mechanisms, however, become liabilities in maintaining coordination and organizational cohesion over time and distance, when what is required is confidence and trust. Although it is dangerous to underestimate the potential of the maras to adapt and learn, in the near term at least, the maras are more likely to live off of the revenues generated by subcontracting to more sophisticated criminal organizations, rather than by trying to supplant them. Are Maras Growing More Sophisticated? Plausible scenarios for the evolution of the maras can nonetheless be made. Just as the elimination of the Cali and Medellín cartels in Colombia in the mid 1990s created the conditions for the emergence of their Mexican counterparts as major players, the current war being waged by the Calderón administration in Mexico against that nation s drug cartels could create a power vacuum that the maras could fill. Following a bloody turf battle with the Mexicans, for example, one or more of the maras could emerge with an operation that controls the transshipment of narcotics through Central America and Mexico, to the group s own distribution networks in the United States. 23 In the future, the maras will probably prefer to operate in the shadows, rather than organize or back a coherent political force. Although they prefer weak states, which help sustain their criminal operations, they have thus far not attempted to replace the state with their own political model. The maras could, however, choose to develop a political agenda or ally with legitimate political organizations at some point in order to increase their market share of criminality and violence, or to protect their membership from punishment. This is what occurred in Colombia, for example, where disparate militias and armed groups organized themselves into a political force, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), and negotiated with the state in order to obtain pardons for certain criminal acts that they had committed. Are Maras Developing a Political Role? 22 Thomas C. Bruneau, The Maras and National Security in Central America. Strategic Insights. Volume IV, Issue 5. May 2005. 23 Such a partnership could also involve a major new mara footprint in human trafficking, the routes which coincide to some extent with the routes used to smuggle drugs. 6

Although the maras may not choose to organize politically, it is likely that they will be used by others for political ends. Political groups may use public desperation to control the mara phenomenon to seize power and institute changes that undermine the democratic system. In the 2007 Guatemalan elections, for example, retired general Otto Pérez Molina almost won the presidency on an anti-crime and anti-mara platform that included a call to change the constitution so as to remove legal impediments to cracking down on criminal groups. 24 Maras may also be used in the future to intimidate voters from voting. In addition, there have been reported instances in which maras have been contracted by bus companies in Honduras to scare customers away from rival companies. 25 Are Maras Creating Failed Spaces? Perhaps the most compelling question with respect to the future of the maras is the impact that they could have on other groups, such as narcotraffickers, human trafficking networks, terrorists and guerillas. The single greatest consequence of the maras is the creation and expansion of ungovernable spaces in which criminals, guerrillas and other undesirable entities can operate. By weakening local institutions and by corrupting and displacing local law enforcement, mara activity makes it easier for narcotics traffickers and other criminal groups to move and act freely. The expansion of badly governed spaces in the region also has important implications for terrorists. Where law enforcement is neutralized, terrorists can operate and find opportunities to collaborate with other criminal groups. Much attention has been given to the possibility of links between the maras and Al Qaeda, such as the reported meeting in September 2004 in Honduras between mara leaders and Al Qaeda operative Adnan el Shukrijumah. 26 Following this logic, mara involvement in migrant flows and human trafficking, and the presence of an estimated 38,000 members of MS-13 and the 18 th Street Gang, 27 logically positions maras to help smuggle terrorist operatives into the United States and hide them within the growing community of undocumented immigrants. The interest of the maras in self-preservation, however, is likely to limit such activities, given the amount of military, intelligence and law enforcement attention directed against groups involved in terrorism. Significant collaboration between maras and terrorist groups is thus unlikely. III. Policy Solutions Because the principal threat of the maras arises from their operation as a virus that propagates itself within the international body politic, the best solutions involve helping the body to resist 24 Samuel Logan, Governance in Guatemala Increasingly Threatened by Organized Crime. Power and Interest News Report. October 19, 2007. http://www.pinr.com. 25 The maras have, for example, been contracted by bus companies to intimidate the competition. Thomas C. Bruneau, The Maras and National Security in Central America. Strategic Insights. Volume IV, Issue 5. May 2005. 26 Ana Arana, How the Street Gangs Took Central America. Foreign Affairs. May/June 2005. See also Carlos Mauricio Pineda Cruz, Al-Qaeda s unlikely allies in Central America and Mexico. MexiData.Info. January 24, 2005. 27 Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment. USAID Bureau for Latin American and Caribbean Affairs. April 2006. 7

and expel the infection. The most effective and least damaging solutions to the international body politic may therefore be those that involve an integrated, long-term approach to attacking and undermining the mara phenomenon. A. Improved Enforcement. Although enhanced enforcement against maras is not the complete answer, it is nonetheless important. 28 There are a number of areas that need to be bolstered: 1. Improved Intelligence Capabilities. Currently, important but basic questions about maras remain unanswered, such as the nature of their senior leadership and how the groups use the funds gained from their illicit activities. There is, however, poor collection and management of intelligence about the groups. Much of the intelligence apparatus in Central American countries was discredited and dismantled during the peace process that ended the civil wars there. Efforts such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Gang Intelligence Center, and its attempts to work with the countries of Central America, are steps in the right direction. The establishment of FBI offices in the embassies of El Salvador and Honduras is also a useful step to advance institutional coordination and data sharing. Beyond such institutional reforms, more coordination is needed across countries to maintain accurate and updated databases on gang members as they cross borders or enter police custody. It is important to make the greatest possible use of technology to keep track of those gang members who come into contact with the government through the penal system or other such points, instead of trying to scare them through police roundups and by driving them further underground. Inter-governmental efforts, such as the Central American Integration System, potentially provide the political basis at the ministerial level for offering policy guidance and instituting the necessary legal and procedural reforms. The U.S. government also needs to improve its interagency process in dealing with Central American governments, including better coordination between the FBI, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Bureau of Prisons and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), among others. 2. Enhanced Law Enforcement Capabilities. Central American nations require enhanced law enforcement capabilities, while simultaneously reinforcing civilian control and professionalism, to ensure that such institutions help strengthen, rather than undermine, democracy in these societies. As with intelligence apparatuses, important parts of Central America s security forces were demobilized in recent times. The anti-mara activities of local and national police forces across the region could benefit greatly from expanded training programs and an infusion of resources including technology and law 28 Despite significant criticism by human rights and other groups, enforcement campaigns such as Mano Dura (instituted by the Maduro regime in Honduras in 2001) and Super Mano Dura (instituted by the Saca regime in El Salvador in 2004) have achieved tangible results. From a systemic perspective, however, their emphasis on only one dimension of the problem prevented them from consolidating success in a manner commensurate with the resources spent on them. 8

enforcement equipment for gathering and handling evidence to process cases more effectively. 3. Improved Law Enforcement-Military Coordination. The United States also has an important role to play in helping Central American states improve coordination between law enforcement and military organizations. Currently, using the 1995 Framework Treaty for the Democratic Security of Central America, nations of the region are examining new possibilities for regional security cooperation, as well as new ways to use the military to augment the capabilities of civilian police. The inadequacy of police resources in the region virtually guarantees that the military will be used in some fashion. The U.S. military can play an important role in helping its Central American counterparts work effectively with law enforcement agencies in a context of respect for civil liberties and the retention of civilian control. 4. Augmentation of Judicial System Capability. Since improved law enforcement capabilities push more people into already overwhelmed judicial systems, it is important to bolster the capabilities of judicial institutions to avoid a revolving door effect, in which people who are arrested are quickly released because of the inability of the system to build a case against them and secure convictions. Capability enhancements in this area include more judicial personnel and technology to process cases, as a complement to enhanced police resources to collect evidence, build solid cases and protect witnesses who frequently fail to appear, or who disappear, in the face of mara threats. 5. Prison System Reform. Significant reforms are also required in Central American prison systems. Currently, overcrowding and poor supervision allow them to serve as a base of operations as well as a recruiting ground. According to one estimate, a quarter of Salvadoran maras were recruited in prison. 29 Strengthened and perhaps expanded facilities, in combination with more personnel and technology, are necessary to help block such activities and to monitor them for police and intelligence use. B. New Approaches. Besides enforcing laws more effectively, innovative approaches are needed to combat the mara phenomenon as a system. Some approaches with promise include the following: 1. Attack the Maras Sources of Revenues. Individual mara organizations have a variety of revenue streams that can be attacked in different ways to deny these organizations the resources to attract and sustain recruits. At the local level, this means not only enforcement actions against groups and their existing funds, but helping to harden targets making it more difficult for the maras to obtain these resources in the first place. Greater use of community policing, for example, can make it more difficult for the maras to rob, kidnap and extort in the neighborhoods in 29 An estimated 3,000 of the 11,000 maras currently in El Salvador were recruited in prison. Thomas C. Bruneau, The Maras and National Security in Central America. Strategic Insights. Volume IV, Issue 5. May 2005. 9

which they operate. 30 Relatively modest levels of U.S. government resources can help Central American communities to set up neighborhood-watch programs and to coordinate more closely with local police departments. Such programs can be complemented by better-trained, more reliable security forces. Although private security does not absolve police of the responsibility to protect communities, communities will continue to use private security services, from the neighborhood vigilante to more sophisticated security companies. Private security in the region is a highly unregulated industry, implying that the United States and Central American governments can help consumers of that security to assess its quality through activities such as training and certification. Although not all consumers of private security services will be able to afford to pay for personnel who have undergone rigorous training programs and testing, the establishment of such programs will provide more information to the market and induce a certain subset of security companies to raise the competence of their personnel. Governments can also hamper the ability of maras to secure resources internationally. By targeting maras who distribute drugs or who work for cartels, governments can create disincentives for criminal organizations to use these groups in their operations. Similarly, by working with immigrants to identify and trap the maras who systematically prey on them, law enforcement organizations can create disincentives for maras to attack these groups. This could ensure that victim reports are cross-referenced with databases of known gang members, and potentially allow for using coyotes and others who have been compromised in law enforcement operations to provide information to set up sting operations against groups preying on immigrants. 2. Attack the Maras Ability to Recruit and Retain Members. Numerous programs and policy initiatives exist to help keep youth out of maras, including the Mano Amiga program initiated by President Martín Torrijos of Panama, which provides theater and sports programs for at-risk Panamanian youth. 31 Other options include anti-gang campaigns and expanded efforts to block mara recruiting in public schools, as well as closer collaboration with the press to avoid the sensational coverage that inadvertently glorifies the violence perpetuated by maras. 3. Make Possible and Promote Defections from Mara Ranks. The Central American governments need to break the chains binding individual gang members to the maras, for example, by creating life alternatives for youth seeking to separate from the maras. Many proposed programs fit into this category, from technology schools that teach exgang members marketable skills, to drug treatment and mentoring, to military-style boot camp that give gang members pride in something positive and teach them discipline. 30 Community policing programs have proven successful not only in the United States, but to some extent, in countries such as Nicaragua, where the Policía de Proximidad is cited for contributing to the relatively limited growth of maras in that country. 31 Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, Are the Maras Overwhelming Governments in Central America? Military Review. November-December 2006. p. 38. 10

Another important component for enabling defections from the mara ranks is some form of pardon for crimes committed by gang members willing to leave the gangs. Although community service and/or victim restitution may be necessary elements to ensure that justice is served, the possibility of amnesty is key to convincing gang members that they can have a viable future outside the gangs. In addition to such forgiveness, credible options for the protection of individuals leaving the gangs are also necessary, given that the often demonstrated penalty for leaving the gang is death. 4. Promote the Disintegration and Disfunctionality of Mara Organizations. To the extent that police, military and intelligence organizations focus on mara organizations, they should consider actions that undermine the cohesion of mara organizations and their ability to function. Options include targeted information campaigns to discredit specific mara leaders and enforcement and deception campaigns targeting the limited number of mara organizations that show evidence of acting in a coordinated and sophisticated fashion internationally. Conclusions The considerable public attention dedicated to the mara phenomenon in recent years has highlighted the actual and potential threat presented by these groups to both the United States and the political and social fabric of Central America. Much work remains to be done with respect to developing and testing approaches to combating the maras. Strategies, operations and tactics need to be discussed within institutions responsible for implementing them, as well as within high-level coordinating bodies, such as the Association of Police Chiefs of Central America and the Caribbean. On the other hand, the modest $50 million dollars proposed by the United States in the Mérida Initiative for combating crime in Central America 32 make it doubtful that the needed resources will be forthcoming. Yet only the implementation of innovative, systemic solutions can ensure that the damage of the mara virus to the regional body politic will be contained. R. Evan Ellis is an associate with Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc., specializing in Latin American business and security issues. Dr. Ellis is a consultant on Chinese trade and investment initiatives, Latin American business and security issues, political mobilization in Venezuela and democratic security in Colombia. He has authored several publications on the topic of China-Latin America relations, including The New Chinese Engagement with Latin America: Understanding its Dynamics and the Implications for the Region, A New Chinese-Led Economic Order for Latin America? and U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America. Dr. Ellis is currently a lecturer in the international studies department at the University of Miami. 32 Presidentes discutirán tema de seguridad. La Prensa Gráfica.com. San Salvador, El Salvador. November 29, 2007. 11

All statements of fact or expression of opinion contained in this publication are the responsibility of the author. 12