EUROSCEPTICISM: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS CRONEM Annual Multidisciplinary Conference 2013, University of Surrey, 2-3 July 2013 Simona Guerra University of Leicester gs219@leicester.ac.uk
WHY From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2008) Persistent; Embeddedness (Usherwood and Startin 2011, 2013) Different quality (EPP British MEP 2008; Wall 2010) - ECR
PRESENTATION STRUCTURE Euroscepticism and European integration Euroscepticism at the party level Euroscepticism at the public opinion level A theoretical framework
EUROSCEPTICISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (S)uspended judgement (Tiersky 2001: 3) (D)oubt and distrust (negative quality); the concept does not embrace any comprehensive ideology (Flood 2002a in Gower: 73-77) Brito-centric dimension (Spiering in Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 127) But growing Euroscepticism in countries that have always shown high levels of EU support (ie: Italy), in new member states (ie: Czech Republic, Latvia), increasing use of referendums (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2005) Healthy phenomenon (Milner 2003)
EUROSCEPTICISM Hard Euroscepticism describes a principled opposition to the EU and European integration - political parties aiming to withdraw their country from the EU or opposing EU integration or further developments, Soft Euroscepticism is where there is not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership, but there is opposition to one or more policies or the party opposes the EU because it may be against the national interest (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002, 2004)
PUBLIC OPINION ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION Research on the media and attitudes toward European integration is the most recent field of analysis across all the theoretical frameworks, and political communication is the most explanatory model on attitudes toward European integration, when compared to other theories. Political psychology factors such as cognitive mobilization (attentiveness to politics) Government proxy Mass-parties linkage (Elite discussion of the European Union) Rational utilitarianism (cost/benefit ratio) Concerns about the loss of national identity (McLaren & Guerra 2013)
FLOOD AND USHERWOOD S (i) maximalist, most supportive; (ii) reformist, improving current plans; (iii) gradualist, for an integration at a slow pace; (iv) minimalist, accepting the EU, but no further integration; (v) revisionist, going back to a pre-treaty situation, and at the other extreme; (vi) rejectionist, opposing both the EU and its policies. (Flood and Usherwood 2005)
NORRIS (2011) ON THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT Demand side Intermediary Supply side Democratic deficit Consequences Rising public aspirations for democracy growing cognitive and civic skills and evolving selfexpression values Negative coverage of government (scandalisation, infotainment ) Failure for democratic policy performance of the state to match public expectations (Blame the EU) Disparities between the perceived democratic performance and public aspirations For political activism, compliance with government, and democratisation (low turnout at EP elections SOM, referendums, Euroscepticism)
EUROSCEPTICISM some characteristics It generally signal discontent. Mainstreaming dimension. Difficult to pin down, ideology, strategy or diffuse. Geographical/Temporal/Historical it takes the colour of its environment. Elite level: negative connotation not used by parties (Eurorealists, Euro-pragmatists, Euro-critical). Hostility towards the EU integration process. Role of the media between demand and supply.
EXPLAINING PUBLIC EUROSCEPTICISM Developing process of European integration, higher expectations Negative media coverage Failure to provide effective policy performance to costly perceived issues (EB: unemployment; economic situation) Consequence: More options for political parties to use Euroscepticism strategically normalcy (mainstreaming)
PUBLIC LEVEL EUROSCEPTICISM In CEE, three main types of attitudes towards EU integration could be detected: The first is in favour and seeks out more information (Euroenthusiast); The second is in favour but has little knowledge of the EU and is not interested in seeking it out (Euroneutral); The third opposes EU membership (Eurosceptic). (Guerra 2013)
PUBLIC LEVEL EUROSCEPTICISM Following the study on American voters and elections by Patterson (The Vanishing Voter, 2003), this analysis tests the same framework of analysis: Alienation (angry and bitterness towards the EU) at the political or economic level (Hard eurosceptic); Disenchantement ( spawned by negative news) (Soft eurosceptic); Apathetic (little interest in the EU) (Euroneutral); (pro-eu) Euroenthusiast views. This study expects to find these attitudes across European citizens, moving towards a taxonomic framework of analysis on public euroscepticism.