Revista Română de Studii Eurasiatice, an IX, nr. 1-2/2013, p

Revista Română de Studii Eurasiatice, an IX, nr. 1-2/2013, p. 185-206 THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESSES IN THE WESTERN BALKANS WITHIN AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH WITH ROMANIA AND BULGARIA Viorela Polena Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Political Sciences and Law, Aleksander Moisiu University of Durres, Albania; email: polenaviorela@gmail.com Eva Allushi Department of Political Sciences, Faculty of Political Sciences and Law, Aleksander Moisiu University of Durres, Albania; email: eva.allushi@gmail.com Abstract. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Southeast Europe, and more specifically the Western Balkans underwent substantial changes both economically and politically. Even though the term of the Western Balkans refers to a common geographical area, it also includes the diverse political specificities that in countries like Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia accompanied the transitional processes. By focusing on one of the main elements of these transitional processes such as the institutional framework, we aim at analyzing and providing the position of the institutions within these processes, their changes and reforms, as well as their role towards the consolidation of democracy and political elites in these countries. A more consolidated view is given by also providing, through a comparative approach, the successes and results of these processes in Romania and Bulgaria as compared to the Western Balkans. By making use of qualitative and quantitative data, the institutional rationale that this paper develops offers important insights on the improvements, problems and other elements to be taken in consideration in these countries for the future.

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi Rezumat. După căderea Zidului Berlinului, Europa de Sud-Est și în special Balcanii de Vest au suferit modificări substanțiale din punct de vedere economic și politic. Chiar dacă termenul de Balcanii de Vest se referă la o arie geografică comună, acesta include, de asemenea, diverse particularități politice care, în țări precum Albania, Croația, Macedonia, Muntenegru, Bosnia și Herțegovina, Serbia, însoțesc procesele de tranziție. Prin concentrarea pe unul dintre elementele principale ale acestor procese de tranziție, cum ar fi cadrul instituțional, ne propunem să analizăm și să prezentăm poziția instituțiilor în cadrul acestor procese, schimbările și reformele lor, precum și rolul lor în direcția consolidării democrației și elitele politice din aceste țări. Un punct de vedere mai consolidat este dedicat de asemenea, prezentării, printr-o abordare comparativă, a succeselor și rezultatelor acestor procese în România și Bulgaria, în comparație cu Balcanii de Vest. Prin utilizarea de date calitative și cantitative, raționamentul instituțional pe care această lucrare il dezvoltă oferă perspective importante cu privire la îmbunătățirile, problemele și la alte elemente care trebuie luate în considerare în aceste țări pentru viitor. Keywords. Western Balkans, institutions, democracy, political elites, European integration. Introduction After the 1990 s, as in many countries of CEE (Central East Europe), transitions towards democracy and market economy, were marked by important challenges and reforms. The Western Balkans doesn t make any exception on this, even though substantial changes and impediments continued to follow the processes of transition towards democracy after the 1990 s. The term was invented by the international community on the turn of the century (late 1990s early 2000s) in order to define the scope of policies needed in the fields of post-conflict development, economic and institutional reforms of most ex- Yugoslav countries and Albania vis-à-vis the opportunities of inclusion of this region into the perspectives of EU and NATO enlargement (Institute for Regional and International Studies, 2012: 2). It thus includes countries such as: Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Serbia, by 186

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective leaving aside Slovenia which has marked important achievements in the consolidation of democracy, and which is already a NATO and EU member. As it can be seen from the definition provided, one important rationale that applies on the term of Western Balkans is the institutional framework. The latter provides important insights in the understanding of the democratization processes in the Western Balkans, as well as its integration perspectives in the international structures. North defines institutions as the formal and informal rules of the game in society by structuring the social and economic interactions (North, 1990: 3). As such, they are essential especially when it comes to transitional processes of regime type. It is in this line, where Riha emphasizes that the main transition objectives of the former socialist countries were the establishment of democratic institutions and the transformation of the economy towards a market economy (Riha, 1994:10). By elaborating on the transitional processes from the institutional perspective, the paper tries to answer the following question: which is the role of the institutions on the transitional processes in the Western Balkans? Two dynamics are provided in this context. On the one hand, we focus on the micro-context of the countries themselves. On the other hand, we point to the macro-dynamics of integration perspectives of the region by also applying a comparative approach of two successful examples on this perspective: Rumania and Bulgaria. In this logic, the paper is organized as follows: first, we focus on democracy in the Western Balkans; then we continue with the representative elements of parliamentary democracy in these countries and the status of this democracy; thirdly, we provide an analysis of the institutional reforms and their outputs; furthermore, we continue with the European integration and its role on the institutional development of the Western Balkan countries, by also further elaborating on the analysis with a two-cases comparison and arriving at some conclusions about this topic of the paper. Democracy in the Western Balkans after the 90 s (the role of the elites) Most of the countries, except for Albania, included in the term of Western Balkans were a product of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. Even though, for most of the Eastern European Countries democratization started with the transitional processes at the beginning of the 90 s, in the case of Western Balkans the situation is different. This is not only because of different results on the transitional processes that these countries have gone through, but 187

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi also on the time frame when they took place. For example, after the secession from Yugoslavia, Slovenia established a democratic government and it is currently a member of the EU. On the other hand, it was only in the end of the 1990 s the beginning of the 2000 s that countries like Croatia and Serbia entered a new phase of democratization, especially after the death of Tudjman in 1999 in Croatia and the fall of Milosevic in Serbia. Likewise, it was only after the 2000 s that Montenegro and Kosovo got independence respectively in 2006 and in 2008. Differently, in the case of Albania, as a Western Balkan s state, the early 90 s marked substantial changes from a communist regime to a democratic one. If we try to categorize these developments we can speak of a triple transition in the Balkans: from war to peace, from a communist command economy to a liberal market economy, and, from a single-party rule to a pluralist democracy (Balfour, Stratulat, 2011: 1). The latter, is considered as the main measure in solving the difficulties that these countries are facing in the wake of these changes. This is further confirmed by Pridham in evidencing the fact that these countries are engaged in an extended form of democratic transition with open prospects for eventual consolidation (Pridham, 2008). We can see, democracy in the Western Balkans can be considered as a two-folded process. On the one hand, the democratization process is conditional upon state characteristics and inner dynamics of the regime, and on the other hand, it is a process also determined by the external factors. The former, include the state-building process which is accompanying the democratization processes for some of the Western Balkan s countries, postwar reconstruction, as well as the contribution of history. The external factors include the prospects of integration in international structures such as NATO and EU. More specifically, the process of EU enlargement together with the conditionality element that the EU has placed for future members has paved the way democracy promotion through integration (Dimitrova, Pridham, 2004), a specific model of democracy in the Western Balkans. However, many authors still claim a stagnation of democracy in the Western Balkans. Keil in explaining the stagnation of democracy in these countries sees in the two folded process the reasons for explaining the current situation in the region. According to him, there are a number of reasons for the stagnation of democratization in the Western Balkans namely the importance of historical legacies, the lack of consolidated statehood in a number of countries and the problematic role of international actors in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia (Keil, 2012:199). Furthermore, Keil argues that, the problematic role of the international factor can be seen in the culture of dependency already 188

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective established, which along with the transitional processes has been counterproductive for the development of democracy (Keil, 2012, 200). In general, the transitional processes leading towards the consolidation of democracy are lacking the aimed results. The Western Balkan countries haven t achieved consolidated democratic governments. This is also confirmed by Freedom House which includes Croatia, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, and Montenegro in the category of semi-consolidated democracies. Furthermore, it considers Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina as transitional governments or hybrid regimes, and Kosovo as a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House, 2012). On the other hand, the analysis and evaluation of the quality of democracy in transition and developing countries by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index ranks the Western Balkan countries with the following scores: Albania (7.02), Macedonia (7.35), Montenegro (7.28), Bosnia and Herzegovina (6.41), Croatia (8.25), and Serbia (7.51) (Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 2012). As it can be seen, almost all of the countries, except for Croatia belong to a group of countries with further needs for democracy development and consolidation. What is more, even if we take in consideration the effectiveness of democracy based on the Effective Democracy Index (EDI) of Welzel and Alexander (2008), all of the Western Balkan countries, except for Croatia show considerable low levels of the rule of law and democratic rights 1. The following table provides the position of the countries under analysis concerning this index and its two composing elements: Table 1.1: Effective Democracy Index (EDI) for the Western Balkans Source: Based on Welzel and Alexander (2008), in Balfour, R. Stratulat, C., (2011), The democratic transformation of the Balkans, pg. 6. 1 The rule of law and democratic rights are the two components that Welzel and Alexander use for the measuring of the effectiveness of democracy through the Effective Democracy Index. 189

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi Parliamentary democracy and its representative elements Besides the general evaluation of the democracy status in the Western Balkans, in analyzing the institutions role in the transitional processes, the democratic mechanisms and the functioning of the rule of law itself are also to be taken in consideration. This is closely related to the form of government that these countries have established, where most of them are unicameral parliamentary democracies, in which the executive branch is democratically legitimized by and accountable to the legislature with the exception of Bosnia- Herzegovina, which has a rather more complex system of government along ethnic lines (Balfour, Stratulat, 2011:10). Taking in consideration the time frame that these transitional countries are undergoing democratization processes, the parliament as one of the main representative institutions of the political system is still rigid. This is further emphasized by Penev, who explains the lack of a consolidated legislative in the Western Balkan countries by the lack of a democratic tradition and the launching in the early 1990 s of the transformation from socialist to market economy systems (Penev, 2012: 101). What is more, the 1990 s events that took place in most of these countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, etc), leading to high levels of political instability have influenced the process of democratization by slowing it down and extending it in time. Table 1.2: Parliamentary oversight of government activity Source: Penev, S., (2012), Economic and European Perspectives of Western Balkan Countries, Westminster Foundation of Democracy pg. 103. 190

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective The role of parliaments in these democracies is focused on the legislative (transformation of the legal systems, and the harmonization of the legal systems with the EU acquis and oversight (oversight of the parliamentary activity and law implementation monitoring) functions (Penev, 2012, fq.15). Table (1.2) provides a general overview of the parliaments oversight activity of the Western Balkan countries. Similarities in the position of parliaments in these countries can be seen in their inner structure as well. In all the countries, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, parliaments are unicameral. Post-Communist Transition was mainly confronted with institutional transformation. Different concepts of institutions created different paths of transformations. Transformation of the institutional structure affects economic development both from the cost of transactions aspect and the operating costs. It will be argued further on, that key challenge for governance in Western Balkan post-conflict period was institutional transformation required for successful and sustainable economic growth (Şenturan, & Husić, 2012). Many of structural transformations already started in Western Balkan countries but had not been successfully implemented to the end (Ibid). Thus, the changing and reforming of the institutional framework for Western Balkan countries can be considered as a prerequisite for the successful transition towards democracy. The understanding of the institutional initiatives undertaken by the countries themselves, offers important insights on their status of democracy and the integration in international structures. This is because institutions are intermediates of the political, social, and economic systems by reducing uncertainty involved in human interaction by giving us pattern for our behavior (Dumludag, Sukruogly, 2007: 142). However, it is these patterns of behavior that especially during the first decade were missing in the Western Balkans. This was explained by Filipovic through the selective implementation of the laws and regulations or inefficient judicial and prosecuting system. However, according to the same author, countries that most successfully implemented those reforms and established more or less effective institutional framework, are Bulgaria and Romania, already became candidate countries and other countries are yet to be integrated in the European area (Filipovic, 2006: 2). Another important element influencing the effectiveness of institutions is the framework where they act and interact. The framework provides the context for the functioning of institutions and, thus is correlated to the regime type. The role of institutions within the democratization processes in the Western Balkans is also determined by other political processes. One of them is 191

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi the state-building process. However, the political science literature argues that the latter is basic for the continuation of other processes, and the existence of the state is a precondition for the ongoing of democracy (Dahl, Rustow). According to Woodward, in countries like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia, there is a deep, pervasive skepticism about the possibilities for democracy -- despite multiple rounds of democratic elections and, with the partial exception of Kosovo, peacefully held. (Woodward, 2007:3-4). The ongoing state-building processes in these countries, by most of the literature are considered to hamper the functioning of the institutions themselves and the transitional processes as well. Moreover, Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl argue that the most distinctive characteristic of democracy is citizens, and thus until one knows what state one is a citizen of and until leaders competing for elective office know the reach of their potential constituents, democracy has no meaning (Woodward, 2007:15). In transition countries insufficient political demand for institutions or institutional development may be the single most important obstacle to public administration reform (Potocek, 2004). In the countries of the Western Balkans, the institutional structure has had adverse effects on the reform process mainly because there are insufficient capacities for coordination, cooperation, communication and policy development (Ibid). Other characteristics of the institutional reforms can also be evidenced in each of these countries. The Institute for Regional and International Studies in the case of Albania emphasizes the chronic deficit of resources, the widespread corruption and the frequent political interventions and manipulations make reform progress seem doomed (The Institute for Regional and International Studies (IRIS), 2012: 9). On the other hand, the Institute sees a lack of effectiveness and incoherence of the institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only because of corruption but also because of the dissent among the different nationalities. What is more, Croatia has been positively evaluated by the EU Commission concerning the development of the institutional framework. Kosovo s institutions are also lacking the necessary experience because of the state-building process and the late timeframe when it took place. On the other hand, Macedonia IRIS evaluates the institutional framework as weak, inefficient, biased and compromised domestic institutions operated by the massive bureaucracy (IRIS, 2012:59). Furthermore, Serbia is standing in a better position concerning the institutional development, which the European Commission states that it corresponds to European and international standards. However, yet they all of these countries have a 192

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective common characteristic: they are Balkans countries which, challenging a process of deep transformation of their institutions, converge (at an institutional level) to the European Union (Ancona, Patimo, 2010: 50). EU enlargement approach towards the institutional framework of the Western Balkans The agenda for the countries of the Western Balkans and the EU is clear, there are still numerous challenges and dilemmas facing the region (Rupnik, 2011:145). The inbuilt ambitions of democratization, conflict transformation, stabilization, and Member State building embodied within the EU s enlargement approach are not necessarily compatible, and as a result, institutional learning within the EU enlargement approach has affected its operation and implementation (Braniff, 2009: 124-125). The various strategies of stabilizing, democratizing, Member State building, and transforming conflict have at times been contradictory and have challenged the realization of any of these objectives. There is a tension between and within each of these ambitions and a tension between the capacity of the EU to export EU norms and practices in Western Balkans and the potential side effect of reaction, reproduction, or causing of conflict (Ibid). According to the European Commission, the EU aims to carry out a carefully managed enlargement process that will address the EU public s legitimate concerns ; this suggests a weakening of opinion to the EU. This new situation within the enlargement process was characterized by the intensification of the use of conditionality and monitoring along with the introduction of benchmarks. The Copenhagen Criteria formed the basis of a conditionality that has since evolved, particularly in political and institutional terms. According European Council for the countries of the Western Balkans, political conditionality has been extended significantly including additional conditions specified in the Regional Approach, the Stabilization and Association process (SAP) conditionality. All Western Balkan countries more or less do not fulfill those conditions. So, it is something else that prevents Western Balkan's to become a full member of EU territory. It is institutional framework development that is missing in a great measure in this region and, what we want specially to stress, selective implementation of the laws and regulations or inefficient judicial and prosecuting system (Filipovic, 2006: 1-11). Countries that most successfully implemented those reforms and establish more or less effective institutional framework, like Bulgaria and 193

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi Romania, are now full members. This example is a clear sign for other countries of the Region how to speed up their process of EU Accession (Ibid). In the European countries it becomes obvious that the most successful ones are the countries that radically enter into structural transformation of their economies and societies. Filipovic analyses that today it is modern to classify all transition economies into three main categories: (a) The most successful economies in transition that provides stable economic growth rates, establish institutional framework comparable with developed economies and that already deeply enter into European integration; (b) Relatively successful economies in transition that has temporary episodes of successes measured by economic and social performances (c) Third group of countries in transition are the most obsolete countries, with slow and not in depth institutional changes, countries that are still at the beginning of the transition process and that miss enough courage to cope with the changes transition must comprised. Effective institutional framework is not a question of adaptation of foreign rules and norms, but more the question of gradual and long time consuming process. It is expected that the countries of Western Balkan will build suitable capacities, which will enable better coordination and usage of funds. That is a challenge which won t be easy to fulfill. There is a question if the states are ready to supply the suitable institutional frame and arrange the help efficiently (Baranenko & Milivojevic, 2011:102). The countries of the Western Balkan made significant progress in developing relations with the EU during the last two decades. For the analysts is obvious that as main result of long-term cooperation of every single WB country should be membership in European Union. According to the European Commission the states of the Western Balkan are on different levels of pre-joining process and it is still not known when and which state will become a full member of the EU. During accession negotiations the European Commission supervised the completion of all the obligations that Croatia had with focus on judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; as well as competition policy Macedonia also has the candidate status. Macedonia should also focus on encouraging and attracting foreign investments, which are currently on an unsatisfactory level. Their lack could have a negative impact on the economical development and could be a problem in the future, which could stop the state in fulfilling the conditions necessary for the membership in the EU ( Uvalic, 1997:12). 194

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective Montenegro made the next important step and continued to successful development of relations with the EU. It also achieved good results in the struggle to fulfill political reforms. The European Commission stands ready to support Montenegro in the further implementation of reforms and it will pay attention to the progress in these areas: judiciary, anti-discriminatory policy, fight against organized crime and corruption. Albania has lately faced political problems, which could have a negative impact to its cooperation with the EU (because of instable political situation, Albania didn t receive candidate status in 2010). For European Commission, political forces should concentrate on the stabilization of the situation so that democratic institutions could continue working normally. Only after taking the necessary steps and together with successful following of the key priorities and membership criteria the accession negotiations will be opened. It is lately expected European Commission s progress report in which it will state its opinion on Albania s status of candidate country. The relations between Serbia and the EU could be considered as the most complicated in the region. Even if the situation has greatly improved there are still many problems and factors that complicate the approaching process of Serbia to the EU (Baranenko & Milivojevic, 2011). The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) summed up, using transitional indicators, the advancement of structural and institutional reforms in the year 2010 for 29 countries in transition. Eleven transitional indicators encompass six main transitional areas: liberalization, privatization, companies, infrastructure, financial institutions, and the legal environment. Each indicator shows a synthesized assessment of improvement achieved in a certain area, based on various data, narrative information and analyses (EBRD, 2010). Table 1.3: Transition indicator scores 2010. - Enterprises Markets and trade financial institutions infrastructure. Source: EBRD, 2010. Population mid- 2010 (million) Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia FYR Macedonia Montenegro Serbia 3,2 3,8 4,4 2,0 0,7 9,9 195

Private sector share of GDP mid-2010 (EBRD estimate in per cent) Large-scale privatization Small-scale privatization Governance and enterprise restructuring Price liberalization Trade and foreign exchange system Competition policy Banking reform and interest rate liberalization Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions Overall infrastructure reform Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi 75 60 70 70 65 60 4-3 3+ 3+ 3+ 3-4 3 4+ 4 4-4- 2+ 2 3 3-2 2+ 4+ 4 4 4+ 4 4 4+ 4 4+ 4+ 4 4 2 2 3 2+ 2 2+ 3 3 4 3 3 3 2-2- 3 3-2- 2 2+ 3-3 3-2+ 2+ 196

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective The integration process of the Western Balkan countries in the EU depends a lot on the suitable distribution and the efficient use of the financial aid. Lately, a frame for the period from 2014 to 2020 is being prepared. The proposition for a budget in the amount of 12.5 billion EUR was granted by the European Commission on June 29th 2011. It was announced that the financial aid would give pre-joining help and that it would be focused above all to inducing the reforms in the countries that were a part of the expenditure process through the existing Instrument. The European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Štefan Füle stated: The Commission s Proposal to maintain the current levels of pre-accession assistance will allow the EU to continue strong support for our partners efforts to prepare for accession and advance their reforms. This will ultimately benefit all of us through greater security and prosperity. The realization of the aid will mostly be based on the reform strategies, appliance of the law and the EU standards. Thus, the appropriateness and efficiency of public institutions are likely to be main areas of negotiations with the six countries of the Western Balkans (SIGMA Paper, 2007). Meanwhile the EU change of attitude is likely to be felt on the ground as a much stricter monitoring of the conditionality attached to accession rather than any tightening of the conditions themselves. This has already been evident in the conditions attached to the accession of Bulgaria and Romania (Ibid). The case of Romania and Bulgaria vs. the Western Balkans It is obvious that the struggle toward EU seems to be very different for WB in front of the experience of the enlargement of Romania and Bulgaria. When the 12 countries of the largest enlargement and Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU, the closest European neighbors became Western Balkan countries. Bulgaria and Romania had been included in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) group for which the EU eventually elaborated an enlargement policy and a distinctive pre-accession strategy. According to the analyst "The decision for Romania's and Bulgaria's accession was more geopolitical. It was better to have these countries on board and influence them in this new capacity, rather than letting them become festering wounds, in the context of the problems of the Western Balkans, which would have contaminated a whole region." 197

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi Referring to the rest of the Balkans, military confrontations have proved necessary for the formulation of more coordinated (though less comprehensive) EU approaches. Thus, the Bosnian wars and the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreements led to the adoption of a Regional Approach in 1996-97 and the Kosovo crisis opened the way for the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in 1999 (Demetropoulou, 2002:87-106) This framework clearly defines the aims, necessary steps and support instruments for the democratization, marketisation, stabilization and final inclusion of the concerned countries into the EU institutional edifice (European Commission, 1999). After the accession, the reality in this countries showed that the benefits didn t guarantied the success. In fact, the European Commission criticized Romania for failing to meet demands on protecting democracy and the rule of law and urged the government to accelerate its reforms. The Commissioned expressed concerns regarding the lack of respect for the independence of the judiciary and the instability faced by judicial institutions. During the 1991-1997 period, the EU provision of technical assistance and funding to Romania and Bulgaria addressed (though not always successfully) confining conditions such as the lack of political, economic and social institutions, the obsolete and insufficient infrastructures and means of production, the economic stagnation, the lack of civil society and privatization caused problems (Ibid). The other Europeanization framework concerns the Western Balkans and is still under development. In the past few years, the regional disparities and conflicts have increased and the fierce competition concerning the speed of integration did not create synergy, regional stability and an improvement of neighborly relations at expected levels (Djurovic, 2010). Only Croatia has a clear and credible perspective, declaring itself a country of South-East Europe, as Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia have done, distancing itself from the still problematic western Balkans, which is sometimes referred to as region of unsolved projects (Knaus & Bender, 2012: 1-4). Since the initiation of relations between the EU and post-communist Romania, the EU demonstrated its interest in the country s regional development and provided support for the elaboration of a compatible regional development policy. 198

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective This broad model has been promoted in Romania too through a series of PHARE program designed and implemented to encourage the development of the appropriate institutional and legal framework (Green Paper, 1997). Creating a good investment environment which could attract fresh new investments requires a much deeper and more decisive reforms in the fields of public administration, public finances, the rule of law and, perhaps most important of all, a strong and determined fight against crime and corruption (Tešić, 2011: 1-14). Nearly 20 billion was set aside for Romania over the 2007-2013 period from the so-called cohesion funds, and some 6.7 billion for Bulgaria. However, as a result of purported mismanagement and corruption, Romania has been able to absorb only 3.5% of the funds available, with Bulgaria doing marginally better at 18%. It is interesting to rank countries of the region according to the spread of corruption. Graph: 1.1 Comparison of each SEE country with the regional average according to the World Bank Rule of Law aggregate indicator 199

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi Graph:1.2 The World Governance Control of Corruption Indicator, Comparison of each SEE country with the regional average according to the World Bank Control of Corruption aggregate indicator With Croatia set to become the 28 th member state in July 2013, we are reminded how crucial the role of the EU membership prospects was in the transformation of individual Balkan states and societies (Nič, Gyarmati, Vlkovský, Żornaczuk, 2013). 200

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective Against the backdrop of the EU internal crisis, several Balkan countries have slowed down their own transformation process as their leaders have become more reluctant to implement the EU integration agenda (with its emphasis on transparency, fights against corruption and organized crime) at the expense of the powerful domestic interest involved (Ibid). Priorities should include enhancing the capacity of state administration, transferring of knowledge on economic and social transformation, reinforcing the rule of law and supporting efforts to create a functional and stable civil society. This analyst thinks that under the formula of Visegrad Plus a space is opened up for broader co-operation with other regional countries with more recent integration experience Romania, Bulgaria, and especially Croatia. The membership perspective of the Western Balkan states does not only depend on progress in the region itself, but also on developments within the EU. The fact that the enlargement fatigue has increased in the past years in the member states constitutes another danger for the Western Balkan s membership. An important but not the sole reason for the enlargement fatigue is the premature accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, which has not elevated enlargement euphoria in the member states. In addition, the technical hurdles to EU membership seem to gradually rise. In this respect, Bulgaria and Romania s EU accession had a direct impact on the Western Balkans pre accession process (Tolksdorf, 2013: 1-6). Bearing in mind the current status of integration, one can conclude that the enlargement process has transformed itself in a kind of enlargement plus approach. Criteria are higher, requests are stronger and the sensitive phase from potential candidate, to candidate status and opening of negotiations has become a serious challenge (Ibid). Second Tolksdorf, this is partly because of current integration capacities of the western Balkans, which is made up of tiny democracies and vulnerable and non-competitive economic structures which is partly because of low level of the Union absorption capacity, where support for strengthening the EU as it currently exists much stronger than enlargement towards new members. There are also other reasons for the weak dynamic of western Balkans integration. It comes from the lessons learned from the enlargement to include Romania and Bulgaria. The problems of the last enlargement do not encourage EU Members State s support for potential candidates from western Balkans deserving faster integration track. 201

Viorela Polena, Eva Allushi According to Tolksdorf EU enlargement to Romania and Bulgaria was a largely a political decision, not fully followed by fulfillment of all requested accession criteria. This decision shows that Union has had success with economic integration, but underestimates the importance of fulfillment of political criteria. However, while these countries have formal democratic standards and criteria, they still lack strong provisions on the rule of law and still face corruption, criminality and administrative ineffectiveness in terms of fighting corruption. They also suffer from a weak judicial system which fails to create a feeling of social justice among citizens. Balkan economies are now struggling with a double-dip recession, characterized by a decline in outputs and sharp increases in unemployment (Ibid). Serbia has an unemployment rate above 25%, Macedonia over 30% and Kosovo over 40%. Exports, foreign direct investment and remittances have all been hit in recent years. The World Bank, in its December 2012 report warned that no other region in Europe is experiencing greater shocks from the ongoing crisis. It projected a drop of 0.6% in the combined real GDP of Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia for 2012. New sustainable growth needs to be based on accelerated structural reforms, and on major infrastructure. It is obvious that in the case of the western Balkans, the process of accession is not just about meeting the standards of the common market but also involves complying with the criteria for state building and security, which include offering of concrete, viewable results in fulfillment of political criteria in early phases of accession. Due to lessons learned from the last round of enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania, and under the pressure of enlargement-skeptic EU members, the whole accession process has become more difficult and rigorous. Finally we can evaluate that EU conditionality as applied to the new Member States and Eastern Balkan applicants does not seem to work very well (Rupnik, 2011: 145-163). Conclusions The role of institutions in the Western Balkan countries is central to the effectiveness of transitional processes. The institutional framework constitutes the foundations for the further consolidation of democracy and the rule of law in these countries. However, empirically, different indexes measuring democracy, its quality and effectiveness refer to the Western Balkan countries as 202

The transitional processes in the Western Balkans within an institutional perspective transitional democracies, semi-consolidated democracies or hybrid regimes. Besides the multidimensional reforms in the institutional framework, also reflected in the organization of the economic systems of these countries, the lack of a democratic tradition, the considerable levels of political instability and the slow steps undertaken, will lead to a longer transition and towards the consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, in the light of international dynamics, the integration prospects have been of a major influence in supporting the establishment of democratic regimes in the Western Balkan countries, not only by providing assistance in the creation of a democratic tradition, but also in in the imposition of democratic criteria through the conditionality principle. For each country in the Western Balkans, and also for the region as a whole, it is of crucial importance to speed up the process of institutional development. The development of a democratic political culture is a long process. Indeed, Croatia s integration process demonstrates how EU accession can serve as a tool to further democratization. Nevertheless, developments in Romania and Bulgaria demonstrate that even the more stable democracies in Eastern Europe have been challenged of late. The year 2013 will herald a new era in the relations between the European Union (EU) and the states of the so-called Western Balkans. With Croatia joining the Union in July, the membership perspective that was given to the states of the region ten years earlier finally materializes for one of the countries. The membership perspective of the Western Balkan states does not only depend on progress in the region itself, but also on developments within the EU. The fact that the enlargement fatigue has increased in the past years in the member states constitutes another danger for the Western Balkan s membership. An important but not the sole reason for the enlargement fatigue is the premature accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU in 2007, which has not elevated enlargement euphoria in the member states. * Bibliography Ancona, G. Patimo, R., (2010), Notes on macroeconomic and institutional convergence of the economies of Western Balkans Countries, The Western Balkans Policy Review, Vol. 1(1): 49-64. Balfour, R. Stratulat, C., (2011), The democratic transformation of the Balkans, EPC Issue Paper No. 66, European Politics and Institutions Program. 203

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